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Abstract 
The twenty-first century has seen a resurgence of academic interest in 
biopolitics: the often oppressive political power over human biology, human 
bodies and their actions that emerges when political technologies concern 
themselves with and act upon a population as a species rather than as a 
group of individuals.  The publication of new works by theorists including 
Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben, Roberto Esposito, Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri has furthered academic understanding of biopolitical attempts 
to ensure an orderly, productive society.  Biopolitics bases these attempts 
upon optimising the majority population’s health and well-being while 
constructing simultaneously a subrace of unruly, unproductive bodies 
against which the majority requires securitising.  However, despite the still-
proliferating and increasingly diverse recent theoretical work on the subject, 
little material has appeared examining how literature represents biopolitics 
or how theories of biopolitics may inform literary criticism.  This thesis 
argues for Salman Rushdie’s novels as an exemplary site of fictional 
engagement with biopower in their portrayal of the increasingly intense and 
pervasive biopolitical technologies used in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries.  Rushdie has been considered frequently as a novelist who 
explores political discourses of race and culture.  However, analysis of the 
ways in which he depicts these discourses animating recent biopolitical 
practices has proven scarcer in Rushdie Studies.  This thesis asserts that 
Rushdie’s novels affirm consistently the desirability of non-racialising 
polities, but almost always suggest little possibility of constructing such 
communities.  In the process, it will reveal that he represents more 
numerous and varied forms of racialisation than has been supposed 
previously.  This study considers how Rushdie describes biopolitical 
racialisation by state and superrace alike, the massacres of subraces that 
often ensue, how biopower operates and is resisted in space, and the 
discursive and practical forms this resistance takes.  Contrasting Rushdie’s 
early fiction with his less-studied more recent works, this analysis deploys, 
critiques and augments canonical theories of biopower in order to chart his 
generally growing disinclination to depict this resistance’s potential success.  
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This study thus works towards a new biopolitical literary criticism which 
argues that although the theories of Foucault and others illuminate the ways 
in which literature represents power and resistance in contemporary politics, 
narrative fiction indicates simultaneously the limitations of these theories 
and the practices of resistance they advocate. 
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Introduction 
Salman Rushdie and Biopolitics 
In its portrayals of political discourses and practices, Salman Rushdie’s 
fiction was political even before the controversy surrounding The Satanic 
Verses.  While there have been probably more words written about Rushdie 
than any other South Asian author of contemporary fiction, the breadth and 
complexity of the ways in which his novels represent politics means that his 
work opens itself up constantly to new readings.1  Much of the existing 
criticism analyses Rushdie’s political engagement with the culturalist, 
ethnicist and phenotypical discourses of race that shaped the relationships 
between former imperial centres and their erstwhile colonies after 
decolonisation.  However, less research has been undertaken to uncover 
how he describes the ways in which these discourses animate specific 
political practices, and how in depicting these practices he suggests that the 
variety of racialisations that govern their operations exceed the culturalist, 
ethnicist and phenotypical.  This mirrors Michel Foucault’s political 
philosophy in indicating that the state may construct race using any criteria 
it desires. 
 In the twentieth-century polities in which Rushdie sets most of his 
fiction, practices of government have tended to take the form of biopolitics.  
Biopolitics describes the application of biopower; the power that the state 
wields over the human body when it considers humanity as a species rather 
than as a collection of individuals.  The state deploys technologies including 
statistical analysis, public health and education to optimise the well-behaved 
and pliant majority population – which Foucault calls the ‘superrace’ on 
account of the state’s privileging of their well-being (2004, 61) – in order to 
engender efficient economic production and the orderly running of society.  
This optimisation requires the superrace to be protected from the actions, 
cultures and even genes of the subraces that the state constructs 
simultaneously on account of their perceived resistance to, or the difficulty 
of assimilating them within, its categorising, homogenising biopower.  As 
Foucault argues in his theory of governmentality, members of the superrace 
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must choose either to assist the state perpetually in optimising their lives 
and bodies, or to themselves be placed into the category of subrace on 
account of their resistance.  He thus formulates a concept of race as based 
on an infinitely variable conjunction of biological and behavioural signifiers. 
 Rushdie’s fiction does not occupy the terminological matrix of 
communities, subjectivities, states of exception, discourses and multitudes 
that characterise the influential, canonical theories of biopolitics that 
Foucault, Giorgio Agamben, Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri and Roberto 
Esposito offer.  However, by fictionalising different historical examples of 
biopolitical practice, Rushdie still explores many of the same questions as 
these thinkers.  He constructs a body of work that not only complements 
their critiques of biopower, which prove consequently useful in aiding 
analysis of his novels, but suggests the ways in which the nature of 
contemporary biopolitics exceeds and problematises their theories.  He thus 
indicates the necessity of a literary criticism which does likewise. 
Biopolitical Literary Criticism 
Rushdie’s fiction engages deeply with how biopolitical technologies and the 
multiple racialisations that animate them became increasingly intense and 
pervasive during twentieth-century history.  It thus constitutes an exemplary 
site for a new biopolitical literary criticism.  This biopolitical literary criticism 
does not aim to uphold or justify biopolitical governance in the same way 
that a Marxist or psychoanalytic literary criticism accepts the value and 
veracity of the Marxisms and psychoanalytical theories that inform them.  
Rather, this study is biopolitical in that it shows how Rushdie’s novels 
deconstruct and expose biopower’s racist and authoritarian excesses, and 
how they problematise theories of biopower.  It contributes towards an 
affirmative biopolitics in Hardt and Negri’s sense; an affirmation of ‘the 
power of life to resist and determine an alternative production of subjectivity’ 
(2011, 57). 
 The twenty-first century has seen an increased interest in biopolitics 
within academic disciplines.  The publication of new works by Foucault, 
Hardt and Negri, Agamben and Esposito has inspired productive ways of 
conceptualising both historical biopolitics and the biopolitical governmental 
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campaigns of the twenty-first century itself, including the War on Terror and 
the Australian state’s incarceration of asylum seekers in offshore camps.  
However, criticism examining how biopolitics has been depicted in literature 
remains scarce.  Stephen Morton’s brief analysis of the ways in which 
Rushdie presents Indira Gandhi’s historical sterilisation programme in 
biopolitical terms (2008, 48) constitutes a rare example of literary criticism 
that displays an awareness of recent politics’ specifically biopolitical nature, 
as does his discussion of Max Ophuls in Shalimar the Clown in terms of 
sovereignty and homo sacer (139).  Christopher Breu’s recent monograph, 
Insistence of the Material (2014) considers more substantively how William 
Burroughs, Thomas Pynchon, J. G. Ballard, Leslie Marmon Silko and Dodie 
Bellamy represent bio/thanatopolitics.2  It attempts ‘to think about the way 
in which materiality can form one site of resistance to and divergence from 
the dominance of biopolitical forms of governance and economic 
organisation in twentieth- and twenty-first century life’ (Breu 2014, x).  
However, while Breu’s book proves innovative in its engagement with 
biopolitics in fiction, the incipient field of study towards which it contributes 
has not yet approached the multiplicity and profusion of the work that the 
academic vogue for philosophical responses to historical and contemporary 
biopolitics has occasioned outside of literary studies. 
 This study intends not only to augment the critical field surrounding 
Rushdie but to work towards an emerging discipline of theoretically aware 
biopolitical literary criticism.  In order to produce a conception of biopolitics 
appropriate to further study of how other literary works depict its discourses 
and technologies, this thesis analyses the ways in which Rushdie’s novels 
invite a biopolitical reading, but also suggest that the reality of historical 
biopolitical practices exceeds that which canonical theories of biopower 
posit.  Considering the increasing imbalance in the twenty-first century 
between the depth and copiousness of philosophical approaches to 
historical biopolitics and the scarcer analysis of biopolitics in literature, this 
approach to scholarship appears more important than ever within the 
discipline of English Studies. 
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Rushdie’s Trajectory: From Pessoptimism to Pessimism 
Studying Rushdie’s fiction by using and critiquing the theories of biopolitics 
and governmentality that Foucault developed and inspired indicates the 
utility of biopolitical literary criticism.  It reveals, more clearly than ever, that 
Rushdie’s novels display a growing disinclination to depict effective 
resistance to biopower within twentieth-century politics, or the potentiality of 
a future non-racialising polity.  Some critics have used their analyses of 
Rushdie’s later novels to gesture towards the existence of this trajectory 
(Teverson 2007, 222; Khanna 2009, 410-11).  Yet an enduring tendency in 
Rushdie Studies to focus primarily on his fiction up to The Moor’s Last Sigh 
(1995), even in some recent monographs (Kimmich 2008; Thiara 2009), has 
meant that this arc’s precise nature remains uncharted.  By reading 
Rushdie’s earlier work through the prism of his post-1995 writing this study 
argues that, with the exception of The Ground Beneath Her Feet (1999), his 
fiction becomes increasingly doubtful that pluralist discourses or 
movements may resist racialising biopolitical oppression effectively within 
contemporary (bio)politics, and that constructed subraces may escape 
race-thinking.  Andrew Teverson calls Rushdie’s novels ‘pessoptimistic 
fictions’ (2007, 161); optimistic in that they explore the possibility of new 
forms of inclusive community and resistance, but pessimistic in their 
portrayals of (bio)political oppression, racialisation and slaughter.  A 
biopolitical reading which considers how Rushdie represents biopolitical 
technologies and the discourses that animate them – hence revealing a 
greater variety of racialisations than previous studies of his work have 
identified – delineates in detail the growing tendency of his novels towards 
this latter aspect of pessoptimism. 
 This study seeks to chart the evolution of the ways in which Rushdie 
represents how biopower operates and is resisted within twentieth-century 
governmentality specifically.  Parts of his fiction thus fall outside of its remit.  
Rushdie’s debut Grimus (1975) takes place in a fantasy world ruled by a 
petty sovereign, and as such cannot illuminate significantly a study of how 
he portrays historical biopolitical practices.  His latest two adult novels prove 
similarly inutile.  The Enchantress of Florence (2008) occupies a sixteenth-
century setting in which petty sovereignty characterises political governance 
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far more than do nascent proto-biopolitical technologies.  Rushdie sets 
much of Two Years Eight Months and Twenty-Eight Nights (2015) in the 
twenty-first century, which has been pervaded by a securitising biopolitics, 
particularly since the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon.  However, the main conflict in the novel takes place not between 
biopolitical governments and resistance forces but between two 
supernatural armies which use humans merely as proxies; one benevolent 
force, and one violent faction which proves too capricious, indolent, vicious 
and thinly spread to optimise life biopolitically.  Otherwise, if a Rushdie text 
provides useful material for the purposes of charting how his depiction of 
twentieth-century biopolitics has evolved, this study has examined it.3 
Towards a Biopolitical Reading of Rushdie 
Approaches to Rushdie 
The richness of thematic content in Rushdie’s fiction has inspired a growing 
diversity of studies concerning his work.  However, despite the ever-
increasing variety of literary criticism on Rushdie, particularly in the new 
millennium, analyses of how he depicts specific historical political 
techniques remain relatively scarce in Rushdie Studies, especially with 
respect to biopolitics. 
 Timothy Brennan’s Salman Rushdie and the Third World (1989) 
constitutes the founding text of Rushdie criticism.  The book claims that 
novels written by literary cosmopolitans such as Rushdie are 
‘unrepresentative[…]of the writing now being published from the Third 
World’, but have proven popular amongst audiences in First World countries 
‘because they tell strange stories in familiar ways’ (Brennan 1989, 36).  
Brennan wrote his pioneering study at a time when, as he argued, ‘[o]nly a 
handful of critics (often themselves tied to the colonised by background or 
birth) have seen English fiction about the colonies as growing out of a 
comprehensive imperial system’ (5).  His analysis, which contributed 
significantly to the still emerging discipline of postcolonial literary studies, 
proved fruitful because all of Rushdie’s novels at the time (except Grimus) 
focused on Britain and its former colonies.  However, Rushdie’s more recent 
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fictional explorations of twentieth-century governmentality have covered a 
greater variety of spaces, from America to France to the South Pacific.  By 
using a broad, variegated Foucauldian conception of race to explore 
Rushdie’s evolving portrayals of biopolitics on a global scale, this study 
argues that oppressive race-thinking proves less resistible for Rushdie’s 
characters than Brennan (147) and others have supposed. 
 Aijaz Ahmad’s chapter on Shame in In Theory: Classes, Nations, 
Literatures (1992) became the most influential critique of Rushdie in the 
years immediately following Brennan’s monograph.  Ahmad focuses on the 
character of Sufiya Zinobia, whose abuse at her family’s hands and 
overwhelming sense of shame transform her into a feral, mindless beast 
that topples her father’s government violently.  He questions Rushdie’s 
feminist credentials by arguing that ‘[t]he novel[...]becomes incapable of 
communicating to us, in whatever grotesque forms, the process whereby a 
woman’s intellectual and emotional abilities may be sapped, or regained’ 
(1992, 145).  Ahmad gestures towards the Foucauldian elements of 
Rushdie’s ‘(post)modernist literary imagination’ (128).  However, this study 
builds upon this gesture by contrasting Sufiya’s bestial, unthinking rampage, 
and its failure to alter biopolitical power structures in the long term, with the 
discourses and praxes of resistance advocated by Foucault and those he 
influenced, the efficacy of which Rushdie questions indirectly.  This new 
analysis of Sufiya thus augments this thesis’ argument that Rushdie’s fiction 
suggests that the reality of contemporary biopolitics exceeds canonical 
theorisations of biopower. 
 The broad conception of race that complements Brennan’s 
foundational work on Rushdie and the Third World, and the critique of 
theories of resistance to biopolitical oppression that augments Ahmad’s 
reading of Shame, represent just two of the tools through which this study 
argues that Rushdie increasingly represents twentieth-century biopower’s 
efficacy in quelling resistance and oppressing populations.  Analysing 
coherently the multiple racialisations, biopolitical techniques, spaces, 
discourses and movements of resistance that Rushdie describes requires 
taking these elements in turn, thus diverging from the chronologically based 
structural conventions of the early monographs that followed Brennan.  The 
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growing critical interest in Rushdie in the 1990s led to the publication of 
numerous introductory guides to his work; many, including those by James 
Harrison (1992), Catherine Cundy (1996), D. C. R. A. Goonetilleke (1998) 
and Damian Grant (1999), simply called Salman Rushdie.  Because of the 
structural coordinates of the introductory study as a critical genre, these 
books follow a similar format with a chapter on each of Rushdie’s novels in 
turn.  This study traces a general chronological trajectory, culminating in 
Shalimar, characterised by the growing tendency of Rushdie’s fiction to 
depict twentieth-century biopolitics as effective.  However, it does so within 
chapters which each focus on specific aspects of biopower, from racism to 
massacres to resistance.  This approach enables the thesis to argue that 
Rushdie represents biopower increasingly as oppressive and difficult to 
resist while asserting simultaneously that his novels suggest consistently 
the complexity and multiplicity of race-thinking and the biopolitics it 
animates. 
 Studies of Rushdie stand currently at a peak of profusion, diversity 
and theoretical rigour, towards which this study contributes.  In the new 
millennium approaches to Rushdie’s work have diversified in form and 
content, even in the case of newer introductory guides such as Andrew 
Teverson’s Salman Rushdie (2007).  Teverson begins with an apposite 
epigraph from Rushdie’s Imaginary Homelands (1992) – ‘For every text, a 
context’ (1992, 92) – and provides extensive background on political, 
intellectual and biographical contexts, Indian writing in English, 
intertextuality and postmodernism.  His monograph reflects the growing 
interest in the intellectual origins of Rushdie’s fiction that has inspired books 
including Martine Dutheil Hennard de la Rochère’s Origin and Originality in 
Rushdie’s Fiction (1999), Roger Y. Clark’s Stranger Gods: Salman 
Rushdie’s Other Worlds (2001) and Nicole Weickgennant Thiara’s Salman 
Rushdie and Indian Historiography: Writing the Nation into Being (2009). 
 A concomitant tendency has emerged, within studies of politics in 
Rushdie’s novels, to go beyond a general postcolonial analysis in favour of 
engaging with the specific historical polities he fictionalises.  In Salman 
Rushdie: Fictions of Postcolonial Modernity (2008) Stephen Morton argues 
that before his book was written ‘there ha[d] been no sustained book-length 
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studies of how Rushdie’s writing contributes to an understanding of 
decolonisation and political violence in South Asia’ (2008, 15).  Morton 
emphasises how 
 Rushdie’s novels are bound up with wider debates about the legacies 
 of colonial modernity in India, Pakistan and Britain, the meaning of 
 secularism in India’s political discourses, the emergency period in 
 India, the experience of migration and displacement from India to 
 Pakistan and South Asia to Britain, the rise of communal violence in 
 both India and Pakistan, the conflict over Kashmir, the politicisation 
 of Islam and the contemporary discourses of terrorism and anti-
 Americanism. (12) 
This study extends Morton’s concern with specifics of historical political 
practice in Rushdie’s novels into a distinct focus on how they represent 
biopolitics, a theme that Morton briefly and usefully touches upon (48; 139).  
Its analysis of Rushdie not only provides a new interpretation of his work but 
intervenes in the emerging field considering how literature depicts 
biopolitics.  This field has been animated by the growing interest in, and 
profusion and sophistication of, theories of biopolitics in the twenty-first 
century. 
Studying Biopolitics in the Twenty-First Century 
G. W. Harris coined the term ‘biopolitics’ in 1911.  Harris perceived the task 
of biopolitics as ensuring a manageable population of equal numbers of men 
and women through techniques including legalising abortion, gassing the 
mentally ill and exiling ‘superfluous women’ through a lottery (1911, 197).  
However, the term has since been used to denote many different concepts 
marrying biology and politics, especially from the 1960s onwards. 
 The contemporary study of biopolitics has two main currents.  The 
first denotes a subfield of political science.  Lynton Caldwell’s influential 
1964 essay ‘Biopolitics: Science, Ethics, and Public Policy’ defined 
biopolitics as ‘political efforts to reconcile biological facts and popular values 
– notably ethical values – in the formulation of public policies’ (1964, 3).  
Thinkers including Thomas Thorson (1970), Thomas Wiegele (1979) and 
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Roger Masters (1989) followed Caldwell in exploring how policy could be 
formulated based on a perceived innate propensity of humans to think, act 
and vote in certain ways.  Biopolitics in this sense thus mostly concerns 
hypothetical politics rather than historical public policy, and has proven of 
limited interest to philosophers and literary critics. 
 Conversely, the second main current of academic inquiry into 
biopolitics defines it not as a putative politics informed by the body but as a 
set of historical political technologies that aim at controlling the body.  
Philosophers of this form of biopolitics – most notably Foucault, Hardt and 
Negri, Agamben and Esposito – analyse how absolute sovereign power has 
historically been supplemented increasingly by a capillary politics of the 
body.  They examine the complex array of racialisations by which 
governments attempt to optimise one part of the population’s health and 
productivity, and the state’s attendant surveillance, punishment and even 
massacring of the remainder; the multiple forms these optimisations and 
punishments take; and the methods by which this politics potentially can be 
resisted.  Because Rushdie’s novels explore frequently how historical 
biopolitical technologies and policies have operated, this conception proves 
much more useful than the strand of subjunctive political science detailed 
above in illuminating the ways in which he represents twentieth-century 
biopolitics. 
 The twenty-first century has seen a resurgence of interest in this form 
of biopolitical study.  As Thomas Lemke wrote in 2011, ‘[t]he notion of 
biopolitics has recently become a buzzword.  A few years ago it was known 
only to a limited number of experts, but it is used today in many different 
disciplines and discourses.  Beyond the limited domain of specialists, it is 
also attracting increasing interest among the general public’ (2011, 1).  
Much of this increased interest has arisen because of changes in global 
geopolitics in the new millennium that have been conceptualised 
increasingly in biopolitical terms. 
 In particular, numerous considerations of America’s military 
response to the 9/11 terror attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon as a biopolitical conflict have emerged.  Slavoj Žižek drew upon 
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Giorgio Agamben’s recently-translated Homo Sacer (1996, trans. 1998) in 
an early philosophical response to the War on Terror.  He argued that ‘the 
“unlawful combatant”, who is neither enemy soldier nor common criminal’ 
(Žižek 2002), constitutes homo sacer: the figure that Agamben conceives 
as suspended between humanity and non-humanity through its subjection 
to biopower and its consequent placing into a state of exception.  For Žižek 
the unlawful combatants that the American government constructed were 
rendered homo sacer by their incarceration in the space of exception at 
Guantanamo Bay without recourse to the Geneva Convention or the 
American legal system, an observation also made by Judith Butler in 
Precarious Life (2006, 67-68). 
 Not only did Agamben’s thought influence responses to the War on 
Terror, but Agamben himself opened his 2003 book State of Exception by 
arguing that 
[t]he immediately biopolitical significance of the state of exception as 
the original structure in which law encompasses living beings by 
means of its own suspension emerges clearly in the ‘military order’ 
issued by the president of the United States on November 13, 2001, 
which authorised the ‘indefinite detention’ and trial by ‘mi litary 
commissions’ (not to be confused with the military tribunals provided 
for by the law of war) of noncitizens suspected of involvement in 
terrorist activities. (2005, 3) 
Agamben accused President Bush of ‘producing a legally unnameable and 
unclassifiable being’ (3) and of ‘attempting to produce a situation in which 
the emergency becomes the rule’ (22); of producing homo sacer and a state 
of exception. 
 Later academic responses to the War on Terror began to consider 
other theoreticians of biopower.  Butler criticised Guantanamo not just for 
its production of homo sacer but in Foucauldian terms.  She argued that as 
a form of governmentality ‘the protocols governing indefinite detention and 
the new military tribunals reinstitute forms of sovereign power at both the 
executive and managerial levels’ (Butler 2006, 92).  The existence of a 2008 
volume called Foucault in an Age of Terror supports Rey Chow’s assertion 
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that ‘the post 9/11 global scene only seems a fantastical set of 
demonstrations of Foucault’s arguments about the omnipresent and 
omnipotent reach of technological-cum-ideological surveillance under the 
guises of our neo-liberal society’ (2010, 62).  The interrelated biopolitical 
technologies of racialisation, surveillance and security that Foucault 
describes have been seen widely to underpin the increasing panopticism of 
post-9/11 geopolitics. 
 However, the War on Terror did not constitute an exceptional 
deployment of biopolitics in the twenty-first century, nor were the 
technologies and discourses it utilised novel.  As François Debrix and 
Alexander Barder argue, ‘the virtual “real possibility” of the exception 
(Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib) may also seek to draw our attention towards the 
idea of a supposedly unique, unusual, extreme, or indeed “exceptional” 
zone as if such a site were not the norm, or as if it were not supposed to be 
real or actualised anywhere else’ (2011, 82).  The new theories of biopolitics 
that have appeared in the twenty-first century can enable analysis of other 
states of exception either in history, in contemporary politics or as depicted 
in literature.  The recent (and ongoing) publication of Foucault’s Collège de 
France lectures of the 1970s and 1980s has added significantly to the sum 
of knowledge of his thought on discipline, biopolitics, governmentality and 
discourse, and forced academics to rethink the extent to which his 
philosophy offers a strategy of resistance to oppressive biopower.  
Heightened interest in Agamben following the use of Homo Sacer and State 
of Exception in responses to the War on Terror has led to the translation of 
his works both old and new into other languages, as well as numerous 
monographs on his thought.  Hardt and Negri’s three books on Empire 
published since 2000 have proven influential and controversial in their 
theoretically incorporative critique of biopolitical globalisation.  Since 2008 
four volumes of Roberto Esposito’s work on community and biopower have 
been translated into English, enabling greater understanding of the 
exclusionary, immunising character of modern biopolitics.  Just as these 
new publications make possible a richer analysis of historical and 
contemporary biopolitics than ever, they can illuminate how literature such 
as Rushdie’s depicts biopower’s racialising discourses and technologies. 
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Michel Foucault’s Political Philosophy (1): Sovereignty and Discipline 
Foucault’s foundational analyses of racism, sovereignty and discursive 
resistance, which have influenced heavily and been critiqued by most late 
twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophies of historical biopolitical 
technologies, inform much of this study’s investigation of the ways in which 
Rushdie depicts twentieth-century biopolitics.  Foucault emphasises the 
multiplicity of power relations that the diffuse, capillary nature of power 
under biopolitical governments engenders, and the multiplicity of 
racialisations by which these governments identify bodies to be placed 
under biopolitical surveillance, punished or eliminated.  Consequently, a 
reading of Rushdie’s novels informed by Foucault’s thought can delineate 
comprehensively the profusion of prejudicial discourses, (bio)political 
policies and violent acts that they describe, and thus trace most accurately 
his fiction’s growing disinclination to suggest that these may be resisted 
effectively. 
 Foucault’s early political thought assesses the ways in which the 
state wields sovereignty through political technologies.  By sovereignty 
Foucault means early monarchies’ absolute power of seizure, deduction 
and oppression that formed a direct relationship between sovereign and 
subject: ‘the right to take life or let live’ (1990, 136).  Despite this power’s 
lack of constraints by parliaments or electorates, Foucault argues that 
because the sovereign possessed limited resources through which to exert 
it, it could only be applied to a population incompletely.  Sovereignty in itself 
‘can found absolute power on the absolute expenditure of power, 
but[…]cannot calculate power with minimum expenditure and maximum 
efficiency’ (Foucault 2004, 36).  For Foucault, ‘[s]o long as the institutions 
of sovereignty were the basic political institutions and the exercise of power 
was conceived of as an exercise of sovereignty, the art of government could 
not be developed in a specific and autonomous way’ (2002a, 213). 
 Foucault’s political philosophy concerns the ways in which this art of 
government developed in history as sovereign power was diffused and 
refracted increasingly through new political technologies.  For Foucault 
power is everywhere.  Humans, even sovereigns, do not possess power but 
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wield it to varying degrees: through discourses, which Foucault defines as 
‘characterised by the delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a 
legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms 
for the elaboration of concepts and theories’ (1980a, 199); and through the 
political technologies that these discourses animate.  Consequently the 
sovereign may allow other humans or government institutions to use power 
by acting in his/her name and hence control the bodies of his/her subjects 
indirectly.  Foucault’s early political thought analyses the historical 
development of what he calls discipline, in which a refracted sovereign 
power acts upon individual human bodies by locating them in disciplinary 
spaces including the clinic, the barracks and the prison.  Sovereign power 
does not affect humans directly within these spaces, but the technologies 
which diffract it nevertheless shape them into docile citizens.  For Foucault 
‘[t]his discourse of disciplines is about a rule: not a juridical rule derived from 
sovereignty, but a discourse about a natural rule, or in other words a norm’ 
(2004, 38).  Disciplinary apparatuses make humans obedient and 
productive not by threatening that the sovereign will take their lives, but 
through capillary scientific technologies of normalisation such as 
routinisation, exercise and confined movement. 
 Rushdie’s novels depict political oppression frequently by describing 
the incarceration of his characters in disciplinary spaces, as with Saleem 
Sinai’s sterilisation in prison in Midnight’s Children, and the death of 
resistance fighter Anees Noman in the Indian army’s ‘secret torture 
chambers’ (2006a, 307) in Shalimar.  However, because Rushdie 
represents these disciplinary spaces as part of a wider system of political 
control over the nation, Foucault’s later political philosophy, in which he 
began to examine the historical spread of these techniques of normalisation 
and optimisation beyond disciplinary spaces into the general population, 
further illuminates the ways in which Rushdie’s novels portray the mass 
racialisations and political oppressions of twentieth-century (bio)politics. 
Michel Foucault’s Political Philosophy (2): Biopolitics 
Foucault’s theory of biopolitics enables this study to consider how Rushdie 
represents political technologies’ effect on populations because, contrary to 
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discipline, in biopolitics ‘[t]here is absolutely no question relating to an 
individual body[...][biopolitics] is therefore not a matter of taking the 
individual at the level of individuality but, on the contrary, of using overall 
mechanisms and acting in such a way as to achieve overall states of 
equilibration or regularity’ (2004, 246).  Consequently, a biopolitical reading 
of the nation-state’s power over and relationship with its population as a 
whole – a dynamic central to Rushdie’s portrayal of twentieth-century 
politics – proves more productive when it augments Foucault’s work on 
discipline with his later philosophy, which examines biopolitical discourses 
and technologies in detail. 
 Foucault first used ‘biopolitics’ in his published writing in 1976 in the 
first volume of The History of Sexuality, in which he remarks that ‘[d]uring 
the classical period[...]there was an explosion of numerous and diverse 
techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of 
populations, marking the beginning of an era of “biopower”’ (1990, 140).  
Here Foucault argues that in politics ‘[i]t is no longer a matter of bringing 
death into play in the field of sovereignty, but of distributing the living in the 
domain of value and utility’ (144) at the level of the species rather than the 
individual.  He later extended his observations on sexuality by exploring 
other biopolitical efforts to optimise bodies’ health and security. 
 For Foucault, just as sovereignty was incorporated into discipline, 
both were incorporated into biopolitics.  Foucault conceives of biopolitics as 
a set of political technologies enacted inside and outside disciplinary 
spaces, which emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and 
became particularly effective from the nineteenth century onwards.  These 
technologies seek to optimise human life at the level of the population as a 
whole by improving amenities and institutions including housing, medicine, 
sanitation and education, in order to make society and its economy run more 
efficiently and productively.  However, although biopolitics intends that the 
majority of the population benefit from the improvements made to their 
bodies and society, in its efforts to maintain stability and productivity it also 
sanctions reprisals against humans who prove unwilling to submit to their 
bodily optimisation, their plugging into economic production or the 
population’s biopolitical ordering: those bodies David Nally calls ‘human 
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encumbrances’ (2011, 16).  As Michael Dillon argues, ‘where life is 
improvable, biopolitics specifies continuous revision and reform.  Where life 
is however obdurately resistant to biopolitical revision, biopolitics specifies 
correction and punishment’ (2008, 168).  The state constructs subraces of 
troublesome human encumbrances, and uses the recapitulated sovereignty 
inherent in biopower to securitise the superrace of orderly, productive 
citizens against the actions of these bodies. 
 The biopolitical state identifies subraces not just in order to prevent 
resistance to biopolitics but as a precondition for biopower’s efficient 
operation.  By persuading the superrace that subraces threaten its survival, 
the state securitises itself twofold: by discouraging the superrace from 
perceiving the state as a threat; and thus through further inducing the 
superrace to participate in its often oppressive optimisation.  Members of 
the superrace come to see any punishment of the subrace – even 
massacres – as justifiable in order to securitise their own bodies.  As 
Foucault claims, ‘[i]n the biopower system[...]killing or the imperative to kill 
is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries, but 
in the elimination of the biological threat to and the improvement of the 
species of race’ (2004, 256).  Biopolitics benefits a section of the population, 
but also incorporates a thanatopolitical potentiality that reinstitutes the old 
sovereign power to take life and which theoretically can be turned on any 
bodies that the state perceives as a threat, whether actively rebellious or 
merely difficult to assimilate within biopower’s optimising embrace. 
 Rushdie’s novels describe efficacious state operations of biopolitical 
oppression, from the sterilisation campaign in Midnight to the British 
government’s racist immigration policies in Verses, but also depict the 
limitations of these technologies and thus suggest that humans possess the 
ability to resist racialisation and violence.  Foucault’s conception of race and 
biopolitics can inform usefully an analysis of how Rushdie portrays 
bio/thanatopolitical practices.  Yet its overwhelming focus on the state 
restricts its utility to a comprehensive investigation into how Rushdie’s fiction 
indicates not just the strength of biopolitical technologies, but the possibility 
of effective resistance to biopower by discourses and movements 
extraneous to the state.  However, Foucault’s later theory of 
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governmentality, which explores both how humans abet their own 
biopolitical oppression and that of subraces, and the possibility that they 
may refuse to do so, illuminates the ways in which Rushdie represents this 
latter dynamic. 
Michel Foucault’s Political Philosophy (3): Governmentality 
The term ‘biopower’ was preeminent in Foucault’s philosophy for a short 
period of time, after which he began to conceive of politics since the 
seventeenth century in terms of ‘governmentality’.  This shift from biopolitics 
to governmentality constitutes a terminological reinscription on Foucault’s 
part rather than a historical shift in political practice akin to sovereignty’s 
diffusion through discipline or biopower’s recapitulation of both.  His concept 
of governmentality augments his earlier work on biopolitics by focusing 
more radically on the idea that ‘with government it is a question not of 
imposing law on men but of disposing things: that is, of employing tactics 
rather than laws’ (Foucault 2002a, 211).  Just as Foucault’s genealogy of 
biopower was premised on the idea that, historically, the limitations of 
sovereign power necessitated its diffraction into biopolitical technologies, 
governmentality recognises that the power that these technologies wield, 
while applicable to more spaces than petty sovereignty, remains limited.  
Hence, the government must create tactics to persuade the population to 
participate in optimising their own bodies: to become what Julian Reid calls 
‘self-securing subjects’ (2013, 116).4 
 Effective governmentality requires the population to assist the 
securitising work of biopolitical technologies.  Yet political oppression does 
not necessarily prove more stultifying than it would be without the 
population’s participation.  Foucault asserts that while human beings may 
be persuaded to aid state biopower’s optimisations, racialisations and 
oppressions, they may also choose not to.  His work on governmentality, 
particularly his recently published Collège de France lectures, argues for a 
robust potentiality of resistance to modern biopower through parrhēsia: an 
Ancient Greek discourse characterised by public-spiritedness, 
fearlessness, sincerity and directness.  However, in suggesting the near-
impossibility of producing and disseminating widely this ideal discourse, and 
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by portraying effective discursive resistance based even partially on 
parrhesiastic qualities as unlikely, Rushdie’s novels indicate increasingly 
the impracticality of Foucault’s proposed method of opposition to biopolitical 
regimes.  Foucault’s theory of governmentality thus enables this study to 
analyse Rushdie’s growing emphasis on biopolitics’ capacity to produce 
self-securing subjects, and to trace his fiction’s lessening tendency to evoke 
the possibility of inclusive communities, nations and state institutions. 
 Despite its still-increasing profusion, Foucault’s published work on 
biopower and governmentality offers scarce detail regarding, or outright fails 
to cover, numerous aspects of biopolitics that Rushdie’s fiction critiques: 
colonial biopolitics; biopolitical oppression of women; biopower’s multiple 
spatialities; and the ways in which discursive resistance to biopower may 
engender resistance movements.  Yet, as Michael Dillon and Andrew Neal 
argue, ‘Foucault’s legacy lies not with the text he expended on the 
problematisation of biopower, but with its astonishing prescience and 
enormous heuristic potential’ (2008, 12).  Considering philosophers of 
biopolitics including Hardt and Negri, Agamben and Esposito, who have 
critiqued Foucault and considered facets of biopower untouched by his 
thought, will enable this study to analyse as fully as possible the complex 
and multiple biopolitical spaces and technologies that Rushdie depicts. 
 However, just as Rushdie’s novels problematise Foucault’s state-
centric theory of racism by describing the superrace’s prejudice towards 
subraces, and question whether a parrhesiastic or pseudo-parrhesiastic 
discourse can resist biopower effectively, the ways in which they depict 
biopolitical discourses and technologies indicate the limitations of these 
other thinkers’ theories and suggested praxes.  His fiction suggests that the 
nature of contemporary biopolitics exceeds Agamben’s argument that 
spaces of biopolitical oppression prove invariably impermeable and 
inescapable; his theory of the homology of biopolitics and thanatopolitics; 
Esposito’s assertion of their antinomy; and Hardt and Negri’s claims for the 
potentiality of effective resistance through a non-hierarchical, 
communicative multitude.  In his engagement with historical twentieth-
century biopolitics, Rushdie thus points the way towards a new biopolitical 
literary criticism which uses selected, recapitulated and augmented 
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versions of these theories of biopower to illuminate literary depictions of 
biopolitics. 
Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Bare Life 
Rushdie not only depicts frequently the oppressive strength of modern 
biopolitical technologies including mass sterilisation, high-tech immigration 
camps and massacres enacted by devastating military hardware, but often 
emphasises how these technologies create categories and spaces of 
indeterminacy and uncertainty for their victims.  Giorgio Agamben 
complicates Foucault’s distinction between superrace and subrace by 
emphasising the spatial and racial indistinctions that biopolitics produces.  
He thus complements Foucault’s philosophy in informing a comprehensive 
reading of the various ways in which Rushdie represents biopower’s 
multiple aspects.  However, just as they problematise Foucault’s conception 
of race and resistance, the ways in which Rushdie describes twentieth-
century biopolitics suggest that the nature of modern biopolitical discourses 
and practices exceeds Agamben’s thought. 
 Agamben’s most influential book, Homo Sacer (1996), argues a 
distinction between bios (life which possesses the right to participate in 
politics and the community) and zoē (so-called natural life lacking this right).  
Taking a term from Roman law, Agamben defines those who resist 
biopower’s ordering of the community as homo sacer or bare life, 
suspended between bios and zoē: between superrace and subrace.  For 
Agamben, under regimes of biopower ‘the realm of bare life – which is 
originally situated at the margins of the political order – gradually begins to 
coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and 
inside, bios and zoē, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible 
indistinction’ (1998, 9).  The construction of homo sacer creates a ‘state of 
exception’ (Agamben 2005, 3) in which bare life’s indeterminate status as 
life enables the state to eliminate it thanatopolitically. 
 Agamben not only asserts homo sacer’s racial indistinction but 
argues that the sovereign also stands ‘outside and inside the juridical order’ 
(1998, 15).  By claiming that the sovereign represents a ‘zone of 
indistinction’ (47), he diverges from Foucault’s model of sovereignty as 
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absolute, deductive power diffracted through biopolitical technologies.  As 
Johanna Oksala contends, in this formulation ‘it is exactly sovereignty that 
must account for those modern biopolitical mechanisms that fall through the 
grid of the juridical realm’ (2010, 41).  Yet Agamben’s formulation of what 
Andreas Kalyvas calls ‘[t]he bio-sovereign’ (2005, 109) does not apply solely 
to these modern biopolitical mechanisms.  For Agamben sovereignty has 
not become incorporated into biopower as Foucault asserts, but was always 
biopower: ‘the inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the 
original – if concealed – nucleus of sovereign power[…]biopolitics is at least 
as old as the sovereign exception’ (1998, 6). 
 Agamben’s category of homo sacer illuminates the ways in which 
Rushdie describes the indistinctions that biopower has produced within 
twentieth-century politics – for example, in Verses’ depiction of a British 
immigration centre – and his numerous portrayals of how subraces 
constructed as less than human subsequently have been massacred.  
However, Rushdie’s novels suggest that biopolitical oppression and the 
sovereign potentiality of thanatopolitics have become increasingly effective 
and pervasive throughout history.  They therefore indicate the inadequacy 
of Agamben’s argument for a homology between sovereignty and 
biopower’s intense imbrication in contemporary politics, and homo sacer’s 
production in antiquity, to a comprehensive biopolitical reading of Rushdie’s 
work and that of other writers. 
 In novels including Midnight, Shame and Shalimar, Rushdie 
represents the efficacy of twentieth-century bio/thanatopolitical 
technologies.  However, his fiction also depicts a more limited, more 
provisional and therefore more resistible petty sovereignty, as in Grimus and 
Haroun and the Sea of Stories’ fantastical settings and the sixteenth century 
of Enchantress.  It suggests that governments lacking technologies of 
biopower may racialise and even produce homo sacer, but not as efficiently 
as contemporary biopolitical regimes.  Rather than portraying biopower as 
an originary component of an ancient sovereign exception, his fiction thus 
indicates that biopower constitutes a technological augmentation of 
sovereign power, the effect of which has increased throughout history.  As 
Paul Patton argues, ‘[a]t the level of representation, classical sovereignty 
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was already biopower.  At the level of political technology, it only became 
biopower in the course of the nineteenth century’ (2007, 214).  This study 
utilises Patton’s periodisation; for example, in Chapter Two’s argument that 
Rushdie’s novels chart sovereignty’s increasing re-emergence through 
thanatopolitics.  Hence, it conceives sovereignty using Foucault’s 
historicised genealogy of a deductive power that has been diffused and 
recapitulated through a growing number of biopolitical technologies both 
deductive and productive, rather than Agamben’s theory of an ancient bio-
sovereignty.  This conception of an ever more pervasive biopolitics, of which 
the violent and often lethal sovereign power of the past constitutes a 
growing component, will enable this study to analyse the ways in which 
Rushdie depicts the specifically modern nature of a biopower that, his 
novels emphasise increasingly, became more and more prevalent as the 
twentieth century progressed. 
Hardt and Negri, Roberto Esposito and the Spaces of Biopolitics 
Despite Agamben’s problematic periodisation of biopolitics, the utility of his 
concept of homo sacer in analysing the ways in which Rushdie portrays 
spatial and racial indistinction shows that a comprehensive, granular 
biopolitical literary criticism requires problematising and exceeding 
Foucault’s foundational theory of biopower.  Hardt and Negri’s Empire 
trilogy, which departs from Foucault in conceiving biopower and resistance 
as modalities of production, and Roberto Esposito’s deconstruction of 
recent bio/thanatopolitics’ specifically immunitary dimension enable further 
investigation of the complex, multifarious ways in which Rushdie depicts 
biopolitics. 
 Hardt and Negri theorise a contemporary political paradigm of 
globalised, capitalist, American-led power, which they call Empire.  Their 
thought focuses especially on ‘the productive dimension of biopower’ (Hardt 
and Negri 2000, 27) within Empire.  They argue that Foucault’s exploration 
of the relationship between economic production and biopolitical 
normalisation was inadequate.  For Hardt and Negri exploitative economic 
production may be resisted by a different kind of production: ‘biopolitical 
production’ (2011, 286).  This non-hierarchical production is ‘immanent to 
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society and creates social relationships and forms through collaborative 
forms of labour’ (Hardt and Negri 2006, 94-95).  Hardt and Negri’s overly 
optimistic ideal of pluralistic resistance functions in this study’s final chapter 
as a benchmark against which to measure the ineffective, hierarchical and 
racialising oppositional movements that Rushdie describes.  The increasing 
degree to which these movements fail or refuse to constitute this formation 
contributes towards revealing and delineating clearly a trajectory in which 
Rushdie’s fiction places progressively greater emphasis upon the 
pervasiveness and efficacy of biopolitical technologies in the twentieth 
century. 
 Esposito’s work on the specific reasons for the increasingly 
thanatopolitical nature of modern biopolitics provides a corrective to 
Agamben’s assertion of an ancient bio-sovereignty, and hence helps draw 
this trajectory yet more sharply.  Similarly to Hardt and Negri, Esposito 
asserts that biopolitics can be understood only through its modern 
dimension, an observation lacking from Foucault and Agamben.  Esposito 
defines immunisation (immunitas) as the process by which states and 
superraces have become more and more likely to construct subraces as a 
threat against which the community must be securitised.  His concept of the 
community that eschews immunisation completely – what he calls 
communitas, ‘a locus of plurality, difference, and alterity’ (Esposito 2013, 
55) – also proves useful in order to denote, in a less schematic manner than 
Hardt and Negri’s concept of biopolitical production, the hypothetical non-
racialising polity that Rushdie’s fiction lionises constantly while indicating 
increasingly the impossibility of its construction. 
 Although these theories illuminate the ways in which Rushdie 
represents twentieth-century biopolitics and resistance, they are often more 
compelling in considering discourses and technologies themselves than 
how these discourses and technologies operate and are resisted in space.  
Agamben’s concept of the state of exception can enable analysis of how 
Rushdie depicts the indistinctions that biopolitical oppression produces, but 
he perceives ‘the space that is opened when the state of exception begins 
to become the rule’ (1998, 168-69) – the camp – as infinitely reproducible 
and therefore inescapable.  He thus fails to augment his theory of racial 
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indistinction with one of spatial indistinction.  In his work on disciplinary 
space and the heterotopia Foucault proves similarly reluctant to explore the 
potential malleability, porousness and relationality of space through which, 
as Rushdie’s novels suggest, resistance to biopolitical oppression may be 
enacted.  The closed and non-relational spaces that Agamben and Foucault 
describe remained prevalent in twentieth-century history and in Rushdie’s 
representations of this history.  However, through stressing the potentially 
relational nature of space by drawing on thinkers such as Henri Lefebvre, 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, this study aims at the ‘properly 
poststructuralist understanding of biopower’ that Hardt and Negri advocate 
(2000, 28).  By further delineating the lessening potentiality for effective 
resistance to contemporary biopower that Rushdie’s fiction evokes, this 
theoretically incorporative analysis of various spaces of biopower and 
resistance indicates that examining biopower in fiction thoroughly 
necessitates a biopolitical literary criticism that exceeds and critiques 
Agamben and Foucault’s insufficiently relational conceptions of space. 
Resistance to Biopower in Rushdie’s Fiction: A 
Waning Potentiality 
Revealing comprehensively Rushdie’s trajectory of growing disinclination to 
describe a potentiality of effective resistance to twentieth-century biopower 
requires analysing the multiple aspects of biopower and racism that he 
depicts.  To this end, this study’s individual chapters utilise, critique and 
augment canonical theories of biopolitics in order to consider how Rushdie 
represents: biopolitical racialisation by state and superrace alike; the 
massacres of subraces that often ensue; how biopower operates and is 
resisted in space; the discursive forms this resistance takes in his novels; 
and the oppositional practices these discourses inspire. 
 Chapter One examines the ways in which Rushdie’s novels indicate 
the permanence and ubiquity within twentieth-century politics of the multiple 
racialisations and technologies through which biopower operates, in 
portraying post-independence societies and exploring discrimination 
towards immigrants within former colonial powers that have become neo-
colonial.5  Using Foucault’s conception of race as denoted by limitless 
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criteria, this chapter argues that Rushdie’s fiction suggests consistently the 
efficacy of the process whereby the state securitises itself against 
resistance from subraces and superraces alike through constructing the 
former as a scapegoat for society’s ills, thus making the latter less likely to 
attribute them to the state.  However, Rushdie’s habitual focus on the role 
that the superrace’s race-thinking plays in complementing the state’s racism 
invites a biopolitical literary criticism that augments Foucault’s state-centric 
theory of race with genealogies of para-state racisms.  In Chapter One this 
biopolitical reading reveals that, although Ground evokes a nascent hope 
that humans may eradicate and transcend race and racism, novels including 
Midnight, Verses, Ground and Fury affirm the permanence of race-thinking 
within twentieth-century states and populations both colonial and post-
colonial, and hence the pervasiveness of effective biopolitical oppression. 
 Chapter Two extends the previous chapter’s analysis of the state’s 
racism by exploring how Rushdie represents thanatopolitics: the massacres 
of the subrace in which the sovereign power to make life die re-emerges.  
Rushdie emphasises that these massacres arise when pre-existing 
racialisations within state biopolitics engender the subrace’s securitising 
extermination in times of political crisis.  He thus suggests the inadequacy 
both of Agamben’s argument that biopolitics and thanatopolitics became 
homologous in the twentieth century, and Esposito’s conception of 
thanatopolitics as the deadly opposite of a biopower which optimises life.  
His fiction helps to formulate a biopolitical literary criticism which, 
conversely, conceives thanatopolitics as a potentiality inherent within 
biopolitics.  By using this theory of thanatopolitics to contrast Shalimar with 
Midnight and Shame, this chapter begins to delineate a trajectory within the 
events of Rushdie’s fiction in which race-thinking proves progressively 
endemic, the lethal potentiality of thanatopolitics thus manifests more and 
more frequently, and the massacre’s efficacy in quelling resistance within 
twentieth-century polities increases. 
 Chapter Three clarifies this trajectory further by arguing that 
Rushdie’s novels indicate increasingly that the ease with which 
bio/thanatopower shapes space suggests why the discourses and 
technologies that the previous two chapters scrutinise proved so effective 
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in twentieth-century (bio)politics.  This chapter works towards a new, 
incorporative biopolitical literary-geographical criticism.  It deploys 
Agamben’s notion of the camp and Foucault’s concept of the heterotopia in 
order to conceive static or inescapable spaces of biopolitical oppression in 
Rushdie’s fiction.  However, Chapter Three also augments Agamben and 
Foucault’s insufficiently relational theories of space via the thought of 
contemporary philosophers of relational and variform space (Lefebvre, 
Deleuze and Guattari), in order to analyse the remarkable complexity and 
variety of lived spaces in Rushdie’s novels.  It not only considers how states 
and superraces produce oppressive spaces in Rushdie, but uses theories 
of relational space to analyse his gradual disinclination to represent a 
potentiality of effective opposition to biopolitical oppression by complicating 
notions of space, place, fixity and borders.  The chapter delineates this 
tendency’s precise nature by tracing an arc from the relative autonomy 
Rushdie depicts in Midnight’s spatial margins to the near-total control of 
Kashmir’s space by bio/thanatopolitical forces in Shalimar. 
 Chapter Four develops this study’s analysis of the waning potentiality 
of resistance that Rushdie’s novels evoke, by considering how he presents 
resistance through discourse in twentieth-century (bio)politics.  This chapter 
uses Foucault’s work on parrhēsia – a public-spirited, fearless, simple, 
sincere Ancient Greek discourse directed at a more powerful figure, which 
he appropriates as a possible mode of resistance to modern biopolitics – as 
an ideal of effective, selfless resistance against which to measure the 
oppositional discourses that Rushdie describes.  With the exception of 
Ground, which depicts parrhēsia’s forcefulness, Rushdie suggests less and 
less that such resistance may threaten contemporary biopower.  By charting 
the generally growing degree to which he indicates that the biopolitical 
oppressions of governments and superraces, and his characters’ personal 
failings, render parrhēsia – and effective, widely disseminated discursive 
resistance of any kind – impossible, Chapter Four brings his fiction’s overall 
trajectory of growing scepticism regarding the potentiality of resistance into 
clearer focus.  In so doing it argues that even impractical theories of 
resistance to biopower can inform biopolitical literary criticism usefully. 
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 By examining how Rushdie represents movements of resistance, 
Chapter Five both draws still more sharply the trajectory of waning 
oppositional potentiality that his fiction evokes, and further indicates the 
utility of such theories to biopolitical literary criticism.  Whereas Chapter 
Four utilises Foucault’s work on parrhēsia in order to compare Rushdie’s 
characters’ ineffective discourses of resistance with this ideal, this chapter 
considers Hardt and Negri and Esposito, who go beyond Foucault in 
imagining how humans may transform discursive resistance into a 
movement of non-hierarchical, pluralist resistance to oppressive biopower.  
A critique of the idealism and impracticality of these theories with regard to 
their possible actualisation within the twentieth-century polities that Rushdie 
explores will inform an analysis of why movements of resistance in his 
novels fail invariably to replace biopower with a political system based on 
pluralism.  Rushdie’s fiction at many points asserts the potentiality and even 
the efficacy of discursive resistance, but suggests more and more that 
constructing an effective movement of resistance to biopower proves much 
more difficult, especially if the putative movement is to be non-hierarchical 
and pluralist.  This chapter builds upon Chapter Two’s argument that in their 
engagement with historical twentieth-century massacres Midnight, Shame 
and Shalimar depict increasingly the actualisation of biopolitics’ 
thanatopolitical potentiality.  Its biopolitical reading charts a concomitant 
cessation of the potentiality and efficacy of pluralist resistance movements 
in these novels. 
 Using Rushdie as a case study, this thesis works towards a new 
method of reading literature in terms of the ways in which it engages, 
critiques and exposes the authoritarian and racialising excesses of 
biopolitical technologies.  Rushdie’s novels represent an exemplary site of 
such engagement in their descriptions of twentieth-century biopolitics.  
Showing how his work indirectly problematises canonical theories of 
biopower and race produces a conception of biopower appropriate to 
considering its depiction in literature.  In turn, utilising and critiquing these 
theories and the practicality of the praxes they advocate illuminates how 
Rushdie’s fiction represents specific discourses and practices of biopolitical 
oppression and opposition, and their relative success and failure to 
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accomplish their objectives.  It thus brings into clearer focus than ever the 
trajectory of waning potentiality regarding resistance that previous critics in 
Rushdie Studies have identified.
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Chapter One – Biopolitics and Race 
Introduction: Biopolitics and Race 
Rushdie’s fiction has often been investigated with regard to its depiction of 
the psychological and violent effects of racism based on skin colour 
(phenotype) (see Brennan 1989; Afzal-Khan 1993; Teverson 2007).  
However, augmenting this analysis by considering additionally how Rushdie 
represents biopolitical technologies reveals that he engages with race more 
widely and variously than has been supposed.  This chapter argues that 
because his novels portray these technologies as animated by racialisations 
which the state constructs based on any criteria it desires, they suggest 
consistently the inevitability of suffering and discrimination as an effect of 
multiple racisms.  Attempts by his characters to transcend race and escape 
race-thinking prove invariably incomplete and provisional because of a 
conjunction of biopolitical state operations and the racism of those members 
of the population who perceive the racialising biopolitical state as 
guaranteeing their freedom, security and species. 
 Governments use discriminately the biopolitical technologies that 
Rushdie’s novels describe, not just because the state possesses limited 
resources but because biopower must racialise in order to regulate and 
optimise a population effectively.  Biopolitics operates extensively by 
identifying sections of the population that require extra biopolitical 
surveillance and proceeding to racialise them.  Phenotype may function as 
a means by which a group can be racialised easily, or as a complementary 
signifier of otherness making it possible to identify an already racialised 
group, but the state racialises primarily through discourses of security, 
economic efficiency and civic order.  As Michel Foucault argues, the 
biopolitical state practices ‘the splitting of a single race into a superrace and 
a subrace’ (2004, 61).  The government asserts a hierarchy between the 
superrace of those it deems worthy of protection and the racially-othered 
subrace(s) from which the superrace of the better-behaved, more valued 
population must be shielded biologically and politically. 
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 The state produces subraces either because these communities 
prove difficult to assimilate within its categorising, homogenising biopower 
or because they resist the state’s attempts to optimise life actively, 
becoming what David Nally calls ‘human encumbrances’ (2011, 16).  As 
Michael Dillon observes, ‘where life is improvable, biopolitics specifies 
continuous revision and reform.  Where life is however obdurately resistant 
to biopolitical revision, biopolitics specifies correction and punishment’ 
(2008, 168).  Rushdie’s novels suggest frequently that states construct 
subraces in this way.  Midnight’s Children refigures the Indira Gandhi 
government’s biopolitical sterilisation programme as an attempt to destroy 
alternatives to the Prime Minister and her dynasty as symbols of the Indian 
nation.  In Shalimar the Clown Rushdie portrays the Indian government’s 
military crackdown against Kashmiri rebels as a racialising operation in 
which ‘every Kashmiri was [considered] a militant’ (2006a, 292).  Rushdie 
indicates consistently that the racism of modern biopolitical states exceeds 
phenotypical form in its securitising efforts. 
 This chapter further argues that, by engaging with a second 
securitising function of biopower, Rushdie’s fiction depicts the frequently 
phenotypical racism displayed by civilian members of superraces as an 
adjunct to a biopolitical state control more likely to be based on other 
constructions of racial difference.  The state identifies rebellious bodies in 
order to secure itself against their resistance via surveillance, but also so 
that it may impress upon the rest of the population the alterity of these 
bodies and thus justify – and make more efficient – their correction, 
punishment or even their elimination.  The state not only persuades the 
superrace to complement biopolitical technologies by obeying commands 
to optimise its health, productivity and orderliness, but to legitimise and abet 
the government’s state-securing racialisations.  It thus renders resistance 
by both subrace and superrace even more unlikely.  Rushdie explores this 
dynamic in The Satanic Verses when describing a British government which 
racialises immigrants from its former colonies.  His fiction indicates that the 
conjunction of multiple racisms by the biopolitical state and the superrace it 
constructs prevents the formation of a pluralist, inclusive polis – what 
Esposito calls communitas, the ‘locus of plurality, difference, and alterity’ 
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(2013, 55) – and virtually precludes the possibility of resistance to and 
escape from racialisation. 
 Foucault’s foundational analysis of how biopower and race are 
reticulated outlines usefully the methods by which regimes of biopower seek 
to securitise themselves by constructing subraces.  His thought informs this 
chapter’s exploration of the ways in which Rushdie depicts the various 
racisms of twentieth-century biopolitical states and their deleterious effects 
on the subraces these states constructed.  However, Foucault’s theory of 
race lacks detail regarding the complementary role that non-state actors 
play in oppressing subraces.  Arguing most effectively that Rushdie’s novels 
suggest consistently the persistence of – and difficulty of resisting – race-
thinking of multiple types within modern states and populations alike 
requires a theory of race and biopower that goes beyond Foucault.  By 
outlining how twentieth-century civilian groups of all phenotypes internalised 
the hierarchies that earlier colonial governments and discourses instituted, 
and through engaging with the specific character of non-state actors’ 
phenotypical, biocultural and ethnicist racisms, this theory reveals a greater 
pervasiveness of racism in Rushdie’s fictional worlds than has been 
supposed.  It works towards a new conception of race and biopower 
appropriate to a biopolitical literary criticism of state and non-state racisms 
in the fiction of Rushdie and others, augmenting the valuable insights that 
Foucault offers, particularly in Society Must Be Defended. 
Michel Foucault: Society Must Be Defended 
Foucault described perceptively and influentially the means by which 
biopolitical governments use racism to justify their ordering of society.  His 
thought proves critical to a thorough investigation of how Rushdie depicts 
modern biopolitical states and the effect of their technologies on the 
racialised.  Foucault’s most detailed exploration of the biopolitics of race 
comes in his Society Must Be Defended lectures, published in 2004, in 
which he traces a genealogy of race-thinking within the biopolitical state.  
Foucault argues that ‘from the seventeenth or eighteenth century onward, 
the human body essentially became a productive force’ (2004, 31) within 
technologies and economies of biopower.  However, the widespread use of 
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this productive force to institute a biopolitical regime of securitising racism 
began in the nineteenth century.  For Foucault this was the century where 
racism and the state became symbiotic (254).  Foucault claims that before 
the nineteenth century theories of race primarily animated an emancipatory 
race war discourse (discours de la guerre des races) which, in David 
Mutimer’s words, ‘argued that society was split, the state represented but 
one side of that split and it was an instrument of oppression, therefore it had 
to be overthrown by the oppressed race’ (2007, 167).  Whereas race war 
discourse constructs the nation’s population as two warring races, the 
securitising form of state racism (racisme) which developed in the 
nineteenth century affirms the existence of a national population constituted 
by an essential racial oneness and beset by multiple alien races, causing 
‘the splitting of a single race into a superrace and a subrace’ (Foucault 2004, 
61). 
 Foucault calls this racism ‘the postrevolutionist theme of the struggle 
for existence’ (80) because the superrace, frightened by racially-othered 
outsiders and racially-othered sections of its own polis (human 
encumbrances who resist biopower or prove difficult to order), no longer 
prioritises overthrowing the state.  Instead, the superrace’s fear of the racial 
Other that the biopolitical state constructs leads it not just to accept the 
state’s racist oppression of the Other but to participate in its own 
concomitant oppression and optimisation.  Perceiving ‘the imperative to 
protect the race’ (81), the superrace now views the state as a vital security 
apparatus rather than an oppressive fetter.  Through racism the biopolitical 
state immunises the superrace from the subrace, and immunises itself 
simultaneously against mass resistance. 
 Foucault argues that the state’s criteria for acceptance into the 
superrace are not based necessarily on phenotype or biology.  The 
biopolitical state secures the superrace against bodies constructed 
discursively as non-normative and hence as a threat to national security, 
whether in terms of sexuality, nationality, physical health or phenotype.  
Anybody can be ejected from superrace into subrace, in what Foucault calls 
‘the internal racism of permanent purification’ (62).  Foucault’s concept of 
porous and malleable superracial and subracial categories enables a 
43 
 
reading of Rushdie’s novels which suggests that the pervasiveness of the 
biopolitical state’s racism – and hence the difficulty of resisting its effects – 
results from this racism being based on a theoretically limitless array of 
signifiers. 
 However, considering how Rushdie represents the complex 
dynamics of racism by states and constructed non-state superraces alike 
demands a theory of race that goes beyond Society Must Be Defended.  
Foucault focuses overwhelmingly on the relationship between state power 
and its construction of race.  As Mary Beth Mader argues, these lectures do 
not constitute ‘a genealogy, history or typology of race and racisms[…]race 
is treated only as a part of a genealogy of state power and not as a focus of 
investigation in itself’ (2011, 98).  Rushdie’s novels indicate that the self-
securing subjects living within biopolitical governmentality augment the 
state’s racist ordering with biopolitical race-thinking and discourses of their 
own.  In Midnight he fictionalises and excoriates the state racism of the 
Indira Gandhi government’s sterilisation campaign, but also criticises the 
phenotypical racism of ordinary Indians which he portrays as a legacy of 
British colonialism.  In Verses his characters are assailed by racists in the 
employ of the British state, but also by racist citizens including street traders, 
hooligans and advertising executives.  However, Foucault only gestures 
towards the superrace’s part in racialisation in his writings on 
‘[g]overnment’s limit of competence’ (2010a, 40), which concentrate on the 
ways in which superraces optimise their health and productivity under 
governmentality rather than the ways in which their race-thinking 
complements that of the state.  Understanding fully the severity and 
pervasiveness of biopolitical oppression in Rushdie’s fictional worlds – and 
in those of other writers – requires complementing Foucault’s perceptive 
genealogy of European state racism with genealogies of para-state racisms, 
which Rushdie’s novels suggest continue to be shaped by the legacy of 
colonialism. 
The Biopolitics of Race Beyond Foucault 
Rushdie’s novels describe a number of different racisms – phenotypical, 
ethnicist, culturalist and bioculturalist – within and outside biopolitical state 
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apparatuses.  Although Foucault’s theory of race illuminates the ways in 
which Rushdie represents state biopolitics, a concept of racism that goes 
beyond Foucault’s Eurocentric, state-centric thought proves necessary to 
analyse how Rushdie’s novels depict other racisms, including some forms 
of government racism that Foucault declines to examine. 
 Foucault’s treatment of race concerns the European state almost 
exclusively.  He notes that ‘[r]acism first develops with colonisation, or in 
other words, with colonising genocide’ (Foucault 2004, 257), but fails to 
explore how conquered spaces, foreign subject populations and racial 
hierarchies and othering(s) are interrelated.  As Paul Gilroy argues, ‘[a] fuller 
appreciation of specifically colonial input into modern statecraft promises an 
altogether different sense of where bio-political procedures and 
anthropological hierarchies might fit into an amended history of modernity’ 
(2004, 48).  Considering how colonialism stimulated biopolitical 
government’s development allows an extension of the analysis of state 
biopower in Rushdie’s novels to his fiction’s non-European locales, and an 
examination of how he represents racism among the superraces 
constructed by colonial and neo-colonial states alike.  Rushdie depicts 
consistently how the contemporary state’s race-thinking often augments 
phenotypical racism with discourses of culture or ethnicity, or eschews 
phenotypical racism altogether.  He thus mirrors Foucault’s notion that the 
state racialises based on any criteria it wishes.  However, he also explores 
the race-thinking of the superrace the state constructs, which Midnight, 
Verses, The Ground Beneath Her Feet and Fury portray as more likely to 
be based on a more straightforward assertion of phenotypical difference 
influenced by a legacy of colonial racism that he suggests has continued to 
characterise neo-colonial government.  Hence, a genealogy of the different 
racisms present in the twentieth-century colonial and neo-colonial polities 
that Rushdie fictionalises complements Foucault’s state-centric thought in 
illuminating how Rushdie represents race. 
The Legacy of Colonial State Biopolitics 
Rushdie’s novels explore colonial racism and its psychological and political 
effect on humans, from figures such as Ahmed Sinai in Midnight, Saladin 
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Chamcha in Verses and Darius Cama in Ground – Indians who perceive 
Britishness (and sometimes even whiteness) as preferable to their own race 
– to the internally colonised non-white people of Britain in the latter two 
novels.  Analysing in detail how Rushdie represents racism requires an 
awareness (absent from Foucault) of the continuities between the British 
Empire’s racialising colonial biopower, governmental racism in post-
independence societies and race-thinking’s persistence amongst 
constructed superraces in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century history 
upon which Rushdie draws. 
 As Kenan Malik notes, for early Victorians ‘race was a description of 
social distinctions, not of colour differences’ (1996, 91).  However, by the 
end of the nineteenth century the development of a sustained discourse of 
scientific racism, which held that non-whites were biologically inferior as well 
as biologically different from whites, had engendered a widespread belief in 
the homology of phenotype and race.  This race-thinking provided a 
convenient rationale for the conquests of European empires, whose rule 
over non-white populations began to be perceived more concretely at their 
imperial centres as the natural order of things.  Lawrence Blum argues that 
the need to justify colonial (bio)power was what necessitated biological 
racism in the first place: ‘It was only when the European powers turned 
definitively to conquest, subjugations, displacement of native peoples, and 
slavery that they began to develop rationalisations in which the latter were 
viewed as inferior and subhuman’ (2002, 112). 
 During the nineteenth century the British Empire became able to 
order and administer its colonies increasingly efficiently on the basis of 
these racial distinctions, through biopolitical technologies such as mapping, 
sanitation and statistical surveys which made easier the construction and 
surveillance of subraces.  For Arjun Appadurai the British imperial state, 
particularly in India, treated the non-white bodies it governed as ‘inherently 
both collective and exotic, set[ting] the stage for group difference to be the 
central principle of politics’ (1996, 130).  Indigenous populations were 
racialised simultaneously at the level of representation and, through the 
empire’s more expansive use of technologies of biopower, biopoliticised at 
the level of administration: ‘The modern colonial state brings together the 
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exoticising vision of orientalism with the familiarising discourse of statistics.  
In the process, the body of the colonial subject is made simultaneously 
strange and docile’ (133).  These theories and technologies of race fed back 
from the colonial periphery, animating the biopolitical governance of other 
races within the central nation-state in the nineteenth century and beyond 
(see Gilroy 2004, 8). 
 Rushdie’s novels emphasise the lasting effects of these racialising 
technologies, and the new racisms that have come to inform them 
discursively, in the post-imperial societies of the formerly colonised and their 
former colonisers.  In Midnight previously colonised populations retain the 
psychological trauma of racialising colonial discourses that stressed their 
inferiority to whites.  India’s post-independence economic and political elite 
in the novel thus prioritises attaining whiteness and Britishness over 
constructing a new Indian national identity.  Similarly, Rushdie suggests in 
Verses and Ground that immigrants from former colonies into erstwhile 
imperial centres are likely to find themselves racialised by both state and 
civilian actors who even after decolonisation seek to securitise themselves 
against non-white bodies.  However, by exploring racisms based on criteria 
other than skin colour his fiction indicates that colonialism’s spread of 
efficient technologies of biopower in the nineteenth century – as described 
by Foucault (2004, 254) – and the rise of phenotypical racism are roughly 
contemporaneous, but not homologous.  The racisms that govern 
technologies of biopower evolve independently of the technologies 
themselves, as do racisms amongst the superraces that these techniques 
construct.  Beyond the phenotypical, a form of racism that he indicates has 
persisted even after its scientific discrediting in the twentieth century, 
Rushdie examines the devastating impact of culturalist, bioculturalist and 
ethnicist racisms on subraces inside and outside former imperial centres, 
and inside and outside biopolitical state apparatuses, be they colonial, post-
independence or neo-colonial.  Considering how his fiction engages with 
biopower’s securitising technologies and discourses reveals that it depicts 
more varieties of race-thinking than has been supposed, and therefore 
evokes a more attenuated potentiality of escape from race-thinking. 
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The Twentieth Century’s Multiple Racisms 
Rushdie’s novels depict the persistence of multiple types of race-thinking in 
twentieth-century society despite the discovery that race has no basis in 
biology, as Victorian colonising biopoliticians supposed.  Whereas the 
nineteenth century saw a growing scientific belief that the white race was 
superior biologically, a new consensus emerged in the mid- to late twentieth 
century.  In Robert Blank and Samuel Hines’ words, ‘emphasis began 
shifting to the micro level within biology’ (2001, 52).  Biologists began to 
analyse humans not by phenotype but by genotype.  One of the first, 
Richard Lewontin, argued in his 1972 article ‘The Apportionment of Human 
Diversity’ that ‘human races are remarkably similar to each other, with the 
largest part by far of human variation being accounted for by the differences 
between individuals’ (1972, 397).  Scientific investigations into epigenetics 
led to the widespread acceptance within the field of human biology that 
phenotypical difference arose from environmental factors and that human 
beings were virtually identical genotypically (see Gill 2015, 481).  It has 
become an almost unanimously held view within the scientific community 
that, as John McLeod asserts, ‘all constructions of racial difference are 
based upon human invention and not biological fact’ (2000, 110). 
 However, in the mid- and late twentieth-century societies that 
Rushdie fictionalises, the lack of credible scientific evidence that biological 
difference causes variations in skin colour did little to end phenotypical 
racism.  As Sara Upstone argues, ‘[r]acism exists within a system where, as 
for colonial control of space, sight is essential’ (2009, 95).  For the state, 
phenotypical racism remained an effective measure of security because it 
was surveyed easily, and because most humans even towards the century’s 
end continued to perceive it as a signifier of racial difference (see Masters 
1989, 128), thus making constructed superraces more likely to abet the 
state’s securitising operations. 
 Rushdie’s fiction, on the few occasions that it engages directly with 
contemporary epigenetics, represents the persistence of phenotypical 
racism in twentieth-century societies in spite of scientific discoveries, rather 
than indicating the possibility that these theories will find widespread 
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acceptance outside the scientific community in the future.  In Ground Ormus 
Cama, who dreams of transcending race and escaping from race-thinking, 
uses contemporary epigenetics to justify his claim that this escape is 
possible: ‘He had taken to quoting biologists, geneticists.  Human beings 
are just about identical, he’d say.  The race difference, even the gender 
difference, in the eyes of science it’s just the teeniest-tiniest fraction of what 
we are.  Percentagewise, it really doesn’t signify’ (Rushdie 2000, 413).  
However, he remains racialised phenotypically by both biopoliticians and 
civilian subjects.  Rushdie, even in the novel in which he suggests most 
vividly the possibility of opposing racist biopolitical technologies and 
discourses, offers only an attenuated potentiality of effective resistance. 
 In Rushdie’s novels phenotypical racism persists because 
constructed superraces continue to consider skin colour a signifier of racial 
difference.  It also endures because biopolitical governments, while ceasing 
to racialise explicitly on the grounds of phenotype, absorb phenotypical 
racism into similarly exclusionary discourses of ethnicity or culture that 
securitise the state by appealing to the superrace’s enduring phenotypical 
racism.  Rushdie further suggests, particularly in Verses, that this 
securitisation proves effective because the resistance of these subraces to 
biopolitical oppression entrenches the superrace’s belief in their ungrateful 
intransigence and thus in their racial inferiority.  By depicting how multiple 
forms of racism animate biopolitical technologies and protect the state from 
race war discourse by persuading the superrace of a threat from the 
subrace’s otherness, Rushdie’s fiction consistently indicates the near-
impossibility of escaping race-thinking and racism. 
 In novels such as Ground, in which the British state asserts the 
otherness of non-white races without invoking phenotype explicitly, Rushdie 
depicts the ways in which complex and multiform discourses of ethnicity and 
culture have offered new ways for mid- to late twentieth-century biopolitical 
states to construct subraces and segment the populations they govern.  
After the atrocities committed by the Nazis – whose bio/thanatopolitical 
nature Foucault, Giorgio Agamben and Roberto Esposito examine – it 
became less acceptable for politicians to assert racial or phenotypical 
hierarchies overtly, particularly in Europe.  Increasingly, racialising post-war 
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biopoliticians referred not to race but to ethnicity.  They disavowed the 
explicit race-thinking now associated with the Third Reich’s genocide while 
continuing to practice racial othering.  In order to justify their continued 
discursive scission between superrace and subrace, these politicians 
eschewed the socially constructed conception of ethnicity posited by 
academics (see Maiello 1995, 99), instead asserting its primordialism.  In 
Gilroy’s words, ‘[t]hese formations [were] treated as if they spring, fully 
formed, from their own special viscera’ (1993, 4). 
 The post-war racialising state’s culturalist discourses have proven 
similarly likely to emphasise primordial ties, or at the very least the fixity of 
cultural groups within society.  For Gilroy ‘[t]he logics of nature and culture 
have converged, and it is above all the power of race that ensures they 
speak in the same deterministic tongue’ (2004, 6).  Even those who accept 
that humans are near-identical biologically may still construct superraces 
and subraces on the grounds that the different customs, behaviour and 
history of other nationalities, colours or socio-economic groups make them 
inassimilable within the nation-state’s safe, securitised biopolitical order.  
These discourses, which cloak racism in apparently more benign shrouds 
of authenticity and belonging, strengthen the biopolitical government by 
indirectly condoning the superrace’s state-securitising phenotypical racism.  
Rushdie frequently depicts, as in Verses and Ground, how the racialising 
aspect of biopower persisted in twentieth-century politics even as 
discourses of government abjured overt racial hierarchising in favour of 
asserting ethnic and cultural alterity. 
 Rushdie’s fiction suggests the difficulty of resisting these multiple 
racialisations through resistance organised along racial lines, and thus the 
endurance of the categories of superrace and subrace.  Gilroy argues that 
‘[f]or many racialised populations [subraces], “race” and the hard-won, 
oppositional identities it supports are not to be lightly or prematurely given 
up’ (2000, 12).  However, he warns that these often essentialist ‘postures of 
resistance’ (13) risk reifying the very racial categories which the biopolitical 
state uses to justify its punitive actions.  In Verses efforts to reclaim 
blackness and the demonic as badges of pride cannot prevent the British 
state and the white superrace it constructs from viewing these signifiers as 
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marks of unruliness and racial inferiority.  Rushdie’s novels indicate 
frequently that this kind of oppositional (sub)race-thinking only fortifies 
(super)race-thinking. 
 Yet attempts by Rushdie’s characters to resist racist biopolitical 
oppression not by asserting racial identity but by eschewing it also fail.  
Michael Dillon argues that ‘[i]f you biopoliticise you will racialise’ (2008, 188).  
As in Midnight, which portrays the Indian government’s sterilisation 
programme as a targeted attempt to destroy alternatives to Indira Gandhi 
as the symbol of the nation, Rushdie’s novels suggest not only the 
prevalence of interrelated phenotypical, culturalist and ethnicist racisms in 
twentieth-century polities but mirror Foucault by showing that a state may 
use any criteria it desires to construct a subrace from which the superrace 
must be securitised.  However, Rushdie also indirectly problematises 
Foucault’s Eurocentric, state-centric conception of biopolitical racism and 
government.  His fiction explores the enduring influence of colonialism on 
many of the state’s racisms, and the ways in which the often phenotypical 
racism of superraces enables the state better to securitise itself.  A 
biopolitical reading reveals that Rushdie imagines a greater plethora of 
racialisations, prejudices and (often violent) identitarian conflicts than critics 
have supposed, and thus affirms more firmly than ever that his fiction 
indicates the near-impossibility of constructing a non-racialising 
communitas.  It therefore asserts the necessity of an incorporative theory of 
biopolitics and race, if biopolitical literary criticism is to analyse fictional 
depictions of biopower as comprehensively as possible. 
 Through their depictions of multiple racialisations and failed attempts 
to resist them, Rushdie’s novels demonstrate the difficulty of moving beyond 
the phenotypical ‘frontier of the skin’ (2000, 413) or beyond the concept of 
race and its effects in general.  Race-thinking pervades biopolitical nation-
states in his fiction: from the phenotypical racism and biopolitical state 
sterilisation programme he represents in Midnight; to the rampant racial 
prejudice of the British state and public in Verses and Ground; to Fury’s 
descriptions of ethnic conflicts and racial discrimination that countermand 
Ground’s nascent suggestion that the frontier of the skin can be 
transcended.  Rushdie criticises the racism of twentieth-century states and 
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superraces scathingly, while portraying consistently their vast capacity and 
ability to discriminate on the basis of gender, wealth, sexuality, race, 
ethnicity, culture or whatever constructed category they wished. 
Biopolitics and Racism in Midnight’s Children 
In Midnight’s Children (1981) Rushdie offers an encomium to the pluralist, 
egalitarian ideal of the Indian nation.  However, he also criticises the 
racialisations, enacted on the bases of phenotype, gender, nation and 
region by India’s people and its biopolitical nation-state alike, that he 
suggests have increasingly prevented this ideal from animating India’s daily 
life and politics since independence in 1947.  As the narrative unfolds India 
progressively becomes a space whose hugely numerous and diverse social 
groups racialise and are racialised in turn.  Consequently, the possibility 
wanes that India may become an inclusive communitas that accepts these 
groups’ differences. 
 Early in Midnight Rushdie explores how colonial biopower influenced 
the racism of Indian civilians.  He depicts a fictional post-independence 
Indian socio-economic elite that continues to prize whiteness and 
behaviours associated with their former British rulers.  The novel’s later 
chapters focus more on how the central government’s increasingly 
racialising practices after independence diminished the potentiality of 
communitas in India.  Rushdie fictionalises the gradual erosion within the 
nation’s politics of the pluralist ideals of Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first post-
independence Prime Minister.1  Nehru wrote of ‘the mass of the Indian 
people, in their infinite diversity and yet their amazing unity’ (1969, 35).  He 
advocated ‘equal opportunities for all and no political, economic, or social 
barriers in the way of any individual or group’ (521).  Nehru associated 
national stability and worth with a pluralist acceptance of diversity, a politics 
that Midnight’s protagonist Saleem Sinai shares. 
 Rushdie contrasts Nehru’s tenure as Prime Minister with that of his 
daughter Indira Gandhi, particularly during the period of ‘Emergency’ (2008, 
597) between 1975 and 1977 in which democratic norms including elections 
and habeas corpus were suspended.  By depicting the biopolitical 
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sterilisation campaign that her government carried out during this period as 
a targeted attempt to remove perceived threats to India’s security, Rushdie 
suggests that India’s central government in the post-independence era has 
become marked increasingly by the autocracy, racism and technologies of 
biopower that characterised British colonial rule.  He presents the possibility 
of an inclusive nation by establishing Saleem and his diverse collective of 
magical children as symbols of a desirable pluralist India.  However, 
Midnight emphasises most of all the prevalence of racially-othering 
discourses and practices in India.  Rushdie stresses the perseverance of 
colonial-influenced phenotypical racism, and by describing the ways in 
which Indira Gandhi’s government uses discourses and technologies of 
biopower to racialise, persecute and eventually sterilise the children in the 
novel, he indicates that the post-independence Indian nation-state has 
disavowed pluralism and tolerance. 
White Equals Might: Phenotypical Racism in Midnight’s Children 
The sterilisation of Saleem Sinai and his fellow magical children towards the 
end of Midnight constitutes the novel’s most vivid description of the 
racialising biopolitics that Rushdie suggests has come increasingly to 
characterise Indian central government since Nehru’s death.  However, in 
its early chapters Midnight also depicts the pervasiveness of race-thinking 
outside state apparatuses in twentieth-century India.  Rushdie represents 
racism among ordinary Indians as the legacy of British colonialism.  
Similarly to the late nineteenth-century biologists whose work provided a 
rationale for colonial expansion and biopolitical administration, many of 
Rushdie’s Indian characters in Midnight think of themselves not only in 
terms of race but in terms of phenotypical hierarchies.  Members of 
Saleem’s family talk openly of white skin’s desirability.  After independence 
his father Ahmed Sinai forms part of a socio-economic elite which seeks to 
imitate behaviours associated with the British and which not only prizes 
whiteness but achieves it.  Rushdie uses the literary device of imagining a 
supernatural post-independence India in which gaining wealth turns people 
white, in order to evoke the difficulty of eradicating colonial race-thinking 
and racial hierarchies that associate whiteness with success, beauty and 
power from post-independence Indian society. 
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 The British colonised India through a conjunction of biopolitical 
technologies and a discursive racism that fed into them.  One such 
technology was the British-run education system which, characteristically of 
the optimisations of life that biopolitical states enact, was established to aid 
India’s colonial government’s smooth running rather than for altruistic 
reasons.  Thomas Babington Macaulay’s notorious ‘Minute on Education’ of 
1835 betrays these administrative concerns.  Macaulay argued that the 
British Empire in India needed to establish ‘a class of interpreters between 
us and the millions whom we govern – a class of persons Indian in blood 
and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect’ 
(1958, 601).  In Midnight Rushdie explores this racialising biopolitical 
discourse’s lasting effects on twentieth-century India.  He indicates that 
because the white-dominated colonial government sought to create a class 
of interpreters through behavioural conditioning and racialising discourse, 
India’s post-independence socio-economic elite, despite being no longer 
answerable to the British Empire, continued to prize the morals, opinions 
and even the phenotype of their former rulers.  By suggesting that the 
transfer of power from British to Indian hands left colonial racism intact, 
Midnight’s early chapters evoke the difficulty of overcoming these 
associations psychologically and politically. 
 In Midnight the behavioural continuity between old and new elites 
means that colonial discourses of Eurocentrism and racialisation persist in 
India after independence.  Rushdie uses allegory to suggest that the 
conditions for Indian self-rule, set by a British imperial machine 
characterised by discursive racism, biopolitical technologies and economic 
neoliberalism, led to a post-independence nation run along similar lines.  
The sale of William Methwold’s estate at the precise moment of India’s 
independence to a group of wealthy Indian families, including Saleem’s, on 
the proviso ‘that the entire contents be retained by the new owners’ 
(Rushdie 2008, 126), represents the handover of India in miniature.  As 
Macaulay advised, Methwold selects a class of interpreters to take over, 
ensuring that they will conduct themselves in much the same way as their 
predecessors: 
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 ‘My notion,’ Mr Methwold explains, staring at the setting sun, ‘is to 
 stage my own transfer of assets.  Leave behind everything you see?  
 Select suitable persons – such as yourself, Mr Sinai! – hand 
 everything over absolutely intact: in tiptop working order.  Look 
 around you: everything’s in fine fettle, don’t you agree?  Tickety-boo, 
 we used to say.  Or, as you say in Hindustani: Sabkuch ticktock hai.  
 Everything’s just fine.’ 
 ‘Nice people  are buying the houses,’ Ahmed offers Amina his 
 handkerchief, ‘nice  new neighbours…that Mr Homi Catrack in 
 Versailles Villa, Parsee chap, but a racehorse-owner.  Produces films 
 and all.  And  the Ibrahims in Sans Souci, Nussie Ibrahim is having a 
 baby, too, you can be friends…and the old man Ibrahim, with so-big 
 sisal farms in Africa.  Good family.’ (128) 
In this section of Midnight Rushdie evokes the historical transfer of power 
from British hands and its attendant creation of a post-independence Indian 
elite that felt bound to respect and imitate the political practices and social 
mores of the British colonists.  As Methwold watches the sun set on the 
British Empire – here Rushdie plays on the well-worn phrase that argued for 
the impossibility of this occurrence – he outlines his intention to ‘[s]elect 
suitable persons’ (128) to take over the house and its contents, meaning the 
rich and well-connected.  By juxtaposing Methwold’s plan with Ahmed 
Sinai’s assessment of his putative new neighbours, in which his 
characterisation of the Ibrahims and Catracks as ‘nice’ and ‘[g]ood’ (128) 
appears occasioned entirely by their wealth and business interests, Rushdie 
criticises the way in which post-independence India became ruled by a 
wealthy, British-influenced elite. 
 Rushdie further indicates the influence of Methwold and British 
colonial discourse when he details the gradual assimilation of the house’s 
occupants into behaviours associated with the British.  Rather than shaping 
their space they become shaped by it, taking on ‘imitation Oxford drawls’ 
(131) and growing to enjoy evening cocktails and budgerigars.  Through ‘the 
subtle magic of Methwold’s Estate’ (132) Rushdie suggests allegorically 
how in order to take their place among the post-independence socio-
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economic elite, Indians have often imitated the colonisers’ behaviour.  
However, the traits of Rushdie’s middle-class Indian characters which arise 
from the positive qualities they ascribe to the British colonisers exceed a 
desire to emulate their behaviour.  The post-independence socio-economic 
elite in Midnight also crave whiteness.  In the case of businessmen such as 
Ahmed they achieve it supernaturally through the effort of taking their place 
at the forefront of India’s economy.  They thus contribute further towards 
preserving colonial hierarchies and discourses of race. 
 Rushdie depicts colonial-influenced phenotypical racism amongst 
Indians both before and after independence.  This racism proves rife within 
Saleem’s wealthy family prior to their becoming part of India’s British-
imitating post-independence elite.  Saleem’s cousin Zohra demonstrates a 
mixture of pity and contempt towards darker pigmentations: ‘How awful to 
be black, cousinji, to wake every morning and see it staring at you, in the 
mirror to be shown proof of your inferiority!  Of course they know; even 
blackies know white is nicer, don’tyouthinkso?’ (89-90)  That Saleem’s 
mother Amina later sees a white beggar, and feels ‘embarrassment, 
because he was white, and begging was not for white people’ (106), 
indicates the veracity of Zohra’s statement.  Saleem’s family associate 
whiteness with wealth, beauty and superiority.  Similarly to their racialising 
colonial administrators, they perceive a natural order of white elites and 
black subraces.  Moreover, Midnight uses the supernatural disturbingly to 
suggest this racial hierarchy’s immutability even after independence. 
 Rushdie represents the fixity of discursive associations of whiteness 
with political and economic power by describing magical phenotypical 
transmogrifications.  Multiple characters in Midnight find their phenotypes 
altering from dark to white.  These transformations countermand Macaulay’s 
argument that a body can be defined as ‘Indian in blood and colour’ (1958, 
601), and the similar claims of nineteenth-century racialising biologists.  
Rushdie suggests that environment rather than innate biological 
characteristics produces phenotype, as epigeneticists discovered in the late 
twentieth century.  However, because the phenotypical transformations of 
India’s post-independence socio-economic elite in the novel occur as a 
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result of their increasing influence and wealth they leave received 
discourses of white superiority intact. 
 Saleem’s businessman father Ahmed Sinai not only imitates the 
behaviour of British colonials on Methwold’s Estate, but his growing power 
in post-independence India transforms him supernaturally into a white man.  
Characteristically of his family members, Ahmed associates whiteness with 
power, wealth and superiority, arguing that ‘[a]ll the best people are white 
under the skin’ (Rushdie 2008, 247).  He reifies colonial notions of subrace 
and superrace, a self-loathing that Frantz Fanon argues was common under 
colonialism: ‘For the black man there is only one destiny.  And it is white’ 
(1986, 12).  In Midnight this destiny proves not only desirable but achievable 
in post-independence India, thus constituting a further reification.  After 
1947 a second wealthy white elite replaces its departed predecessor.  
Saleem attributes the phenotypical change to the effort of seizing control of 
the country.  He thus augments the novel’s description of Methwold’s Estate 
in indicating a continuity between India’s post-independence socio-
economic elite and their former colonial masters: ‘the gargantuan (even 
heroic) efforts involved in taking over from the British and becoming masters 
of their own destinies had drained the colour from their cheeks’ (Rushdie 
2008, 248).  Having been convinced by British colonial discourse of the 
white race’s superiority and that of the British tastes and morals that 
Macaulay lionised, the businessmen of post-independence India leave the 
nation’s racial hierarchy virtually untouched.  They do so partly because 
they emulate the behaviour of the white British colonials and prize 
whiteness, but also partly because they are forced supernaturally into a 
white phenotype.  Rushdie criticises British colonial racialising but, through 
his novel’s supernatural elements, affirms the extreme difficulty of altering 
perceptions of whiteness as aesthetically desirable and socio-economically 
beneficial. 
 Rushdie suggests in Midnight that the continuing discursive and 
economic strength of whiteness is neither the only impediment to 
communitas in post-independence India nor the most severe.  Race-
thinking proves prevalent psychologically and discursively amongst the new 
socio-economic elite in the novel’s fictional version of India.  However, post-
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Nehru, it also comes pervasively to inspire the (bio)politics of the nation’s 
government, which possesses far more ability than ordinary citizens to 
affect the lives of constructed subraces.  Rushdie maps a trajectory in which 
Nehru’s pluralist, inclusive politics gives way to intensely biopolitical 
government under his daughter Indira Gandhi.  Saleem’s plural, diverse 
collective, which attempts to resist state biopower, falls victim to a 
biopolitical campaign of sterilisation through which the state asserts its 
power over their bodies and numbers.  Rushdie thus indicates the veracity 
of Foucault’s argument that state biopower’s strength arises from its ability 
to construct race using any criteria it desires and to use these racialising 
discourses to animate powerful biopolitical technologies. 
Jawaharlal Nehru’s Pluralist Politics 
Rushdie’s novels and essays alike demonstrate his affinity with the pluralist, 
inclusive politics of India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru.  In 
Imaginary Homelands (1992) Rushdie argues that ‘Nehru represents the 
[Indian] dream’s noblest part, its most idealistic phase.  Indira Gandhi, 
always the pragmatist, often unscrupulously so, becomes a figure of decline’ 
(1992, 48).  Midnight depicts this perceived decline within India’s post-
independence politics by contrasting Nehru’s attempts at constructing a 
democratic, egalitarian nation with his daughter’s autocracy and biopolitics. 
 The chapters of Midnight that Rushdie sets before India’s 
independence chart the nascent coalescing of multiple identities into Indian 
nationhood.  Rather than representing the often violent thanatopolitical 
methods by which India retained possession of Kashmir, as he does in 
Shalimar, Rushdie uses the character of Saleem’s grandfather Aadam Aziz 
to emphasise how Kashmiris embraced the Indian nation voluntarily within 
the inclusive Nehruvian framework.  By tracing Aadam’s progression from 
Kashmiri to Kashmiri Indian, Rushdie suggests the Indian nation’s 
theoretical ability to include even those at its geographical margins within its 
polity.  From the beginning of the novel Aadam perceives ‘the narrowness, 
the proximity of the horizon’ (Rushdie 2008, 5) in Kashmir and prizes a 
diverse, hybrid community that incorporates many regions, peoples and 
races.  He rejects the philosophy of Tai the boatman, ‘the living antithesis 
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of[...]belief in the inevitability of change’ (11).  He prefers to put his faith in 
the Nehruvian ideal of a modern, inclusive Indian nation.  His experiences 
at the Amritsar Massacre in 1919 produce an allegiance to the multiplicitous 
Indian nation attempting to resist British rule.  Years later he remembers, ‘I 
started off as a Kashmiri and not much of a Muslim.  Then I got a bruise on 
the chest that turned me into an Indian’ (47).  Through Aadam’s affiliation 
with Nehru’s political project – albeit an affiliation characterised by support 
for the anti-Partition Free Islam Convocation rather than Nehru’s Congress 
– Rushdie depicts how in the years before independence even people from 
India’s most contentiously held region affiliated themselves with Nehru’s 
conception of the nation and thus became Indian. 
 Rushdie further accentuates the desirability of Nehru’s pluralist ideal 
by having Saleem argue for a connection between himself and the Prime 
Minister in his idiosyncratic historiographical narrative of post-independence 
India.  Rushdie juxtaposes Saleem’s birth with Nehru’s ‘Tryst with Destiny’ 
speech made at the moment of India’s independence: 
 So I was brought to my mother; and she never doubted my 
 authenticity for an instant.  Ahmed Sinai, toe in splint, sat on her bed 
 as she said: ‘Look, janum, the poor fellow, he’s got his grandfather’s 
 nose.’  He watched mystified as she made sure there was only one 
 head; and then she relaxed completely, understanding that even 
 fortune-tellers have only limited gifts. 
 ‘Janum,’ my mother said excitedly, ‘you must call the papers.  Call 
 them at the Times of India.  What did I tell you?  I won.’ 
 ‘…This is no time for petty or destructive criticism,’ Jawaharlal Nehru 
 told the Assembly.  ‘No time for ill-will.  We have to build the noble 
 mansion of free India, where all her children may dwell.’  A flag 
 unfurls: it is saffron, white and green. (157-58) 
Having underscored Nehru’s pluralist exhortations to build a nation ‘where 
all her children may dwell’ (158), Rushdie then establishes further parallels 
between Nehru and his protagonist through a fictional letter that the Prime 
Minister sends to the newborn Saleem: ‘My belated congratulations on the 
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happy accident of your moment of birth![...]We shall be watching over your 
life with the closest attention; it will be, in a sense, the mirror of our own’ 
(167).  While Nehru is not aware of Saleem’s magical powers, Saleem takes 
the Prime Minister’s apparent interest in him as proof of a great destiny.  
When Saleem discovers the ‘exotic multiplicity of [the Midnight’s Children’s] 
gifts’ (275), which Rushdie associates closely with the flowering of India’s 
independence and which represents a diverse profusion of India and 
Indians that tallies with the author’s preferred hybrid national ideal, he views 
the children as a mirror of the nation.  He attempts to realise his perceived 
destiny by shaping this multiplicitous collective along inclusive, Nehruvian 
lines into a political movement to change India for the better. 
 Hence, when Indira Gandhi has the children sterilised during her 
biopolitical Emergency, Rushdie suggests that she largely excises 
symbolically from the public sphere the incorporative, pluralist and nebulous 
Nehruvian conception of Indianness that Midnight’s early chapters lionise.  
Rushdie represents Nehru’s India as a nation – and a nation-state – that 
strives to include as many different bodies as possible within its bios.  
However, this inclusivity wanes under Nehru’s daughter, who seeks instead 
to eject Indians from this bios into subracial categories that her government 
constructs.  She does so through a campaign of sterilisation whose stated 
aim – to eliminate poverty – masks a securitising, racialising biopolitical 
operation aimed at destroying the symbols of Nehruvian pluralism that 
countermand her construction of herself and her family as the embodiment 
of India. 
The State Biopolitics of Sterilisation 
Although Midnight lauds Nehru’s pluralist politics, Rushdie’s fictional 
portrayal of post-independence India also criticises his failings.  The nation-
state that Nehru established after independence included mechanisms 
liable to turn biopolitical and racialising in the wrong hands.  As Paul Brass 
observes, ‘the power to declare a national emergency that, in effect, may 
convert the country into a unitary state’ (1994, 63) – Indira Gandhi’s 
biopolitical use of which Rushdie depicts in Midnight – was written into 
India’s constitution under Nehru’s watch.  Nehru’s distribution of power 
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within the political system was much less egalitarian than his identity 
politics.  In The Discovery of India (1946) he argued that ‘[t]he idea of 
planning and a planned society is accepted now in varying degrees by 
almost everyone’ (Nehru 1969, 501).  He advocated ‘equal opportunities for 
all’ (521), but saw the state as the vehicle for implementing these 
opportunities.  He thus invested large amounts of power within central state 
mechanisms.  In Midnight Rushdie criticises Nehru’s planned economy by 
having Saleem Sinai describe the mixed success rate of the government’s 
Soviet-style Five Year Plans (2008, 285).  Saleem also hints occasionally at 
incipient autocratic tendencies within Nehru’s government.  For example, 
he details how Congress hires a gang of toughs to ‘encourag[e] the 
electorate to use its vote with wisdom and care’ (308) in the 1957 election.  
Rushdie depicts the Indian nation-state under Nehru as a potent tool for 
inclusivity, pluralism and socialism, but also as an apparatus whose bias 
towards centralisation enabled Indira Gandhi’s future biopolitical 
oppression. 
 However, Rushdie emphasises Nehru’s willingness to compromise 
and his inclusive rhetoric far more than his government’s abuse of power.  
Midnight’s later chapters contrast Nehru’s pluralist politics favourably with 
the government of his daughter Indira Gandhi, who Rushdie presents as 
much more willing to utilise the totalitarian potentiality within India’s central 
state apparatuses.  He does so most vividly through the episode in which 
her government has the Midnight’s Children sterilised.  Indira Gandhi 
militates against the diversity and pluralism of the Nehruvian ideal that the 
children represent symbolically by constructing them as a subrace and 
using biopolitical technologies to prevent them from reproducing.  She 
complements this process through a supernatural programme that seeks to 
entrench her own dynasty’s power through cloning her family members.  By 
showing how his fictionalised Indira Gandhi uses state apparatuses to 
destroy magical symbols of pluralism and replace them with magical 
symbols of autocracy, Rushdie mirrors Foucault in indicating the 
devastating power of securitising biopolitical technologies based on 
infinitely variable and malleable racial criteria. 
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 The historical sterilisation campaign upon which Rushdie’s novel 
draws employed the categorising and organising technologies of central 
planning and statistical methods through which biopolitics aims, as Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri argue, at ‘an absolute and total ordering of[...]social 
subjectivity and social life as a whole under a unified sovereign power’ 
(2006, 161).  The deleterious effects of these technologies were felt 
overwhelmingly by India’s poor.  Brass writes that during the sterilisation 
programme’s height – the Emergency of 1975-1977 – government 
employees in some states were ‘given quotas to fulfil to have ordinary 
members of the public sterilised’ (1994, 42).  In order to achieve these 
quotas, officials began to use increasingly coercive methods.  Because 
India’s poor were less mobile than the middle classes and less able to bribe 
officials to avoid being vasectomised, they suffered disproportionately from 
these biopolitical statistical measures (see Tarlo 2003, 149).  The state’s 
sterilisation programme constituted, in Stephen Legg’s words, ‘an 
exceptional biopolitical stripping of the urban poor’ (2007, 281). 
 However, Rushdie’s novel deviates from this conception of the 
biopolitical sterilisation programme during the Emergency as a campaign 
that harmed the poor in a misguided quota-driven attempt to improve their 
lot.  Instead he evokes the historical Indira Gandhi’s autocracy by depicting 
the programme that her fictional equivalent institutes as a deliberate, 
targeted effort to create new symbols of Indianness by replacing the 
Midnight’s Children’s multiplicity and magic with clones of her family through 
a campaign of state racism that uses similar quotas.  Hardt and Negri define 
state racism as 
discussions of demographic explosions and population 
crises[...][which] are not really oriented toward either bettering the 
lives of the poor or maintaining a sustainable total global population 
in line with the capacities of the planet but are rather concerned 
primarily with which social groups reproduce and which do not. 
(2006, 166) 
In Midnight Indira Gandhi identifies the magical Midnight’s Children as a 
social group which should not reproduce.  As Saleem argues, ‘the truest, 
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deepest motive behind the declaration of a State of Emergency was the 
smashing, the pulverising, the irreversible discombobulation of the children 
of midnight’ (Rushdie 2008, 597).  The privileged group whose reproduction 
must, conversely, be encouraged numbers only the Prime Minister and her 
family.  Through this state racism she attempts to entrench herself as the 
symbol of the Indian nation, a megalomania which Rushdie indicates 
through the election slogan, ‘India is Indira and Indira is India’ (587).  She 
does so by using biopolitical practices to prevent alternative symbols of 
Nehruvian multiplicity and pluralism from producing further potentially 
magical offspring, and by using a mysterious supernatural cloning 
technology to bolster the numbers of her dynasty. 
 Rushdie describes the government’s move against the Midnight’s 
Children not as an act of political oppression aimed at securitising the nation 
against human encumbrances which threaten its safety and stability, but as 
an effort to securitise Indira’s personal power by erasing Nehruvian political 
pluralism and replacing it with a personality cult based around her and her 
dynasty.  Often Rushdie’s fiction re-imagines historical oppressions by 
regimes of biopower ‘where life’, in Michael Dillon’s words, proves 
‘obdurately resistant to biopolitical revision, [and] biopolitics specifies 
correction and punishment’ (2008, 168).  Rushdie suggests, as when he 
depicts the British government’s response to the race riots of the early 
1980s in Verses, that twentieth-century biopolitical governments tended to 
represent political dissidents as a subracial threat to the population on 
account of their unruliness and resistance.  However, by the time the 
Midnight’s Children are sterilised their political movement has long since 
disintegrated.  Rushdie establishes the children as a symbol of a politics 
that welcomes free and frank discussion of a wide range of viewpoints 
through their debates in ‘the lok sabha or parliament of [Saleem’s] brain’ 
(2008, 314), and through their destruction evokes the possibility of a new, 
as yet unthought form of pluralist politics.  Yet the Midnight Children’s 
Conference fractures without accomplishing anything tangible in resisting 
state biopower.  If Rushdie’s Indira Gandhi feared political dissent from the 
children she would simply have imprisoned them along with her major 
political opponents.  Her targeted sterilisation campaign against them 
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demonstrates that she aims to remove them from the gene pool.  Rushdie 
portrays the children’s sterilisation as an act of state racism, an attempt to 
prevent ‘the very essence of multiplicity’ (317) from producing yet more 
multiplicity.  He depicts further state racism through the government’s 
concomitant programme of cloning its Prime Minister’s family 
supernaturally. 
 In describing the government’s raid on the Magicians’ Ghetto, 
Rushdie juxtaposes these two aspects of Indira Gandhi’s state racism: 
 there were figures descending from vans: a brightly-coloured tent 
 was being hastily erected, and there were camp beds and surgical 
 equipment…and now from the vans there poured a stream of finely-
 dressed young ladies of high birth and foreign education, and then a 
 second river of equally-well-dressed young men: volunteers, Sanjay 
 Youth  volunteers, doing their bit for society…but then I realised no, 
 not volunteers, because all the men had the same curly hair and lips- 
 like-women’s-labia, and the elegant ladies were all identical, too, their 
 features corresponding precisely to those of Sanjay’s Menaka[…]I 
 was shown once again that the ruling dynasty of India had learned 
 how to replicate itself; but then there was no time to think, the 
 numberless labia-lips and lanky-beauties were seizing magicians 
 and old beggars, people were being dragged towards the vans, and 
 now a rumour spread through the colony of magicians: ‘They are 
 doing nasbandi – sterilisation is being performed!’[…]the air is thick 
 with yells and missiles and the elegant labia-lips and lanky-beauties 
 are retreating before the harsh fury of the illusionists; and there goes 
 Picture Singh, leading the assault against the tent of 
 vasectomy…Parvati or Laylah, disobeying orders, is at my side 
 now, saying, ‘My God, what are they –’, and at this moment a new 
 and more formidable assault is unleashed upon the slum: troops 
 are sent in against magicians, women and children. (599-600, 
 original emphasis) 
Rushdie uses the ‘stream’ or ‘river’ of volunteers, which sweeps the slum 
dwellers swiftly along and uses the biopolitical tools of ‘camp beds and 
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surgical equipment’ (599) to sterilise them, to evoke the government 
sterilisation programme’s efficiency.  A ‘new and more formidable assault’ 
(600) of soldiers crushes any resistance.  Rushdie compares the slum 
dwellers’ helplessness against this biopolitical operation with the 
disenfranchising symbolic power of the Gandhi dynasty that enacts it.  He 
communicates this superrace’s might by hinting at a mysterious government 
cloning programme.  ‘The Sanjay Youth Movement [which] was particularly 
effective in the sterilisation campaign’ (588) lives up to its name literally by 
comprising entirely clones of Indira Gandhi’s son Sanjay and his wife 
Menaka.  Saleem writes, ‘all the men had the same curly hair and lips-like-
women’s-labia, and the elegant ladies were all identical, too, their features 
corresponding precisely to those of Sanjay’s Menaka[...]I was shown once 
again that the ruling dynasty of India had learned how to replicate itself’ 
(599).  Through the italicised ‘the’ Rushdie emphasises the sameness of the 
men involved in the ‘civic-beautification and vasectomy programmes’ (603).  
Menaka’s presence affirms the fertility of Indira Gandhi’s family as opposed 
to the sterility of the subraces it constructs.  In this section Rushdie contrasts 
the replication of the same few bodies of an elite with its efforts to prevent a 
larger, more multiplicitous social group from producing more multiplicity. 
 Rushdie indicates the devastating strength of the Indian state’s 
biopolitical operations by detailing the destruction and numerous 
sterilisations that the raid on the Magicians’ Ghetto causes.  However, the 
clones’ assault against the slum proves a ‘diversionary manoeuvre’ (603) to 
mask a targeted operation of state racism not against the poor but against 
the Midnight’s Children.  As Saleem argues, ‘those who would be gods fear 
no one so much as other potential deities’ (612).  In Midnight Indira Gandhi’s 
biopolitical Emergency represents an attempt to use biopolitical 
technologies to extinguish a potent symbol of Nehruvian multiplicity while 
associating her family with the idea of the Indian nation.  This act of state 
racism constitutes the final point on the trajectory of decline from pluralism 
to racialising biopower that Rushdie’s novel identifies in India’s post-
independence politics.  In suggesting the veracity of Foucault’s argument 
that biopolitical governments wield effective oppressive technologies 
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animated by an infinitely malleable racism, Midnight’s portrayal of India 
evokes little hope for escape from race-thinking by the end of the novel. 
 Midnight does not excise completely the potentiality of effective 
resistance to biopolitical racialisation.  By showing that Indira Gandhi loses 
power, Rushdie disproves the idea that ‘Indira is India’ (587).  Through 
describing the disintegration of Saleem and the Midnight Children’s 
Conference, and the possible dissemination of Saleem’s narrative 
indictment of the Emergency, the novel gestures towards the possibility of 
an as yet unthought future form of pluralist politics.  However, Rushdie 
depicts racism as prevalent amongst post-independence India’s population, 
and biopolitics as enduring within its state apparatuses.  Characters 
discriminate on the grounds of phenotype throughout the novel, and 
Rushdie portrays Nehru’s pluralist government as a lull between racialising 
British colonial biopower and racialising Indian state biopower.  Just as 
Rushdie uses Ahmed Sinai’s phenotypical racism to suggest a continuity 
between colonial and post-independence views of whiteness, Midnight 
reveals a technological continuity between the British Empire’s racialising 
biopower and that of Indira’s Congress.  It thus indicates the severe difficulty 
of eradicating biopower and racism in twentieth-century polities. 
 In Verses Rushdie charts a similar continuity between technologies 
and discourses of colonial and neo-colonial biopower.  Biopolitical 
technologies have been feeding back from the colonies to the metropolitan 
centre since the nineteenth century (see Gilroy 2004, 8).  Rushdie suggests 
in his fictional exploration of race relations in post-imperial Britain that 
because of increased immigration the British state has been able to racialise 
as it did in the days of the British Empire by using these technologies to 
subjugate a new, internally colonised, non-white population.  Moreover, he 
describes the buttressing of the state’s racism by the phenotypical and 
bioculturalist racism of the white superrace it constructs.  Whereas Midnight 
invites a biopolitical reading informed primarily by Foucault’s conception of 
state biopolitics as animated by a theoretically infinite variety of racisms, 
Verses depicts civilian racism more vividly as an adjunct to the smooth 
operation of the state’s biopolitical technologies.  Delineating accurately the 
lesser potentiality of resistance to racism that the novel evokes thus requires 
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– and hence indicates the utility of – a biopolitical literary criticism that 
augments Foucault’s state-centric political philosophy with genealogies of 
para-state racisms. 
Biopolitics and Racism in The Satanic Verses 
Midnight depicts an attenuated potentiality of effective resistance to race-
thinking on the parts of biopolitical governments and superraces, but The 
Satanic Verses (1988) evokes no such possibility in its portrayal of a post-
war Britain ruled by a racialising government which after decolonisation has 
become, in Timothy Brennan’s words, ‘a colonising spirit with little to 
colonise but itself’ (1989, xi).  Rushdie explores how Britain’s post-imperial 
government and the nation’s majority population, shorn of external spaces 
to colonise, sought to bolster their crumbling sense of national and racial 
identity by constructing the country’s non-white population as subrace.  In 
Verses white British citizens, and biopolitical state institutions including 
immigration centres and the police, punish both non-whites’ efforts at 
assimilation and their assertions of cultural difference.  Attempts by the 
racialised to mimic the white British superrace’s behaviours fail because of 
this superrace’s enduring phenotypical racism.  Conversely, efforts at 
reclaiming words such as ‘devil’ and ‘nigger’ discursively prove futile 
because the majority of white British people continue to construct these 
terms as pejoratives and view their wielders accordingly.  Resistance which 
transmutes oppositional discourse into violence only confirms racist 
stereotypes of non-whites as savages.  Rushdie suggests in Verses that the 
power of neo-colonial biopolitical technologies and discourses, inside and 
outside state apparatuses, dooms to failure all attempts to escape race-
thinking in post-imperial Britain, whether they take assimilationist or 
oppositional form. 
Chamcha as Chamcha: Failed Assimilation among the New Racists 
Through the failed efforts of his protagonist Saladin Chamcha to become 
accepted as British, in Verses Rushdie affirms that bioculturalist racism 
among Britain’s white population and its biopolitical government alike 
renders futile the efforts of non-whites to assimilate themselves within 
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British culture.  Saladin, an Indian who adores and admires the British, and 
hence imitates British customs, a British accent and even British racism, 
finds himself nevertheless constructed as subrace because of his 
phenotype.  The ideologies of cultural and ethnic hermeticism carry such 
discursive power in post-imperial Britain that his love for his adopted country 
cannot save him from detention and torture by its racialising biopolitical 
government, nor from racial abuse by the white superrace this government 
constructs. 
 Verses indicates the inadequacy of Foucault’s state-centric, 
Eurocentric political philosophy to a comprehensive biopolitical reading of 
literature without its being complemented by genealogies of para-state and 
colonialism-influenced racisms.  In the post-imperial British moment upon 
which Rushdie’s novel draws, white Britons and their government continued 
to racialise on the basis of phenotype in spite of the findings of contemporary 
epigeneticists who showed skin colour to be produced by environment 
rather than genetics.  As this chapter has argued, in the latter half of the 
twentieth century politicians and the superraces they constructed became 
less likely to practice overt phenotypical or biological racism.  Instead they 
incorporated it within racialising discourses of ethnicity and/or culture.  
Historians of racism(s) have charted the rise, within post-war Britain, of a 
bioculturalist so-called New Racism which, as Tariq Modood argues, was 
‘simultaneously culturalist and biological’, with the latter being ‘the less 
explanatory aspect of a complex phenomenon’ (1997, 156). 
 The New Racism’s newness comes not from its racialising partially 
on grounds extraneous to biology (155) but from its incorporative, nationally 
situated nature, which hearkens back to Britain’s supposedly glorious 
imperial past and blurs the distinction between race and nation.  For Gilroy 
‘its novelty lies in the capacity to link discourses of patriotism, nationalism, 
xenophobia, Englishness, Britishness, militarism and gender difference into 
a complex system which gives “race” its contemporary meaning’ (2002, 43).  
In the absence of an external colonial population to racialise and hence 
against which to define themselves, white British racists assert aggressively 
the unity and homogeneity of their culture and of the white phenotype, so 
as to avoid having to examine the emptiness of the categories by which they 
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construct themselves as superrace (see Hall 1995, 71).  Hence, they deny 
that non-white subraces can be assimilated into this atavistic white British 
culture. 
   Conversely, in Verses Rushdie suggests the multiplicity, 
processuality and malleability of Britishness.  The novel affirms that British 
identity arises not from a so-called British race’s innate biological 
characteristics but as a product of discourse, politics and environment.  The 
latter of these proves central to an episode in which Gibreel Farishta, 
Rushdie’s second protagonist, uses magical powers to change the 
behaviour of London’s inhabitants tangibly and thus reveals the mutability 
of British culture.  Believing himself to possess the ability to change the 
capital’s climate, Gibreel hypothesises ‘that the moral fuzziness of the 
English [is] meteorologically induced’ (Rushdie 2006c, 354).  His litany of 
‘the benefits of the proposed metamorphosis of London into a tropical city’ 
(354) encompasses ‘vivid and expansive patterns of behaviour among the 
populace’ (355).  He predicts that British culture will be altered drastically by 
a change in its physical environment: 
Religious fervour, political ferment, renewal of interest in the 
intelligentsia.  No more British reserve; hot-water bottles to be 
banished forever, replaced in the foetid nights by the making of slow 
and odorous love.  Emergence of new social values: friends to 
commence dropping in on one another without making 
appointments, closure of old folks’ homes, emphasis on the extended 
family. (355) 
Emboldened, he looses ‘the unimaginably colossal, elemental forces of the 
transformative process’ (355) on the city.   
 It appears initially that this apparent alteration constitutes one of 
Gibreel’s characteristic hallucinations.  Yet Rushdie later reveals that, as 
with the changes in phenotype amongst India’s post-independence 
business elite in Midnight, his protagonist has effected a real transformation 
(356).  Not all of Gibreel’s predicted alterations in British behaviour come to 
pass, but ‘political ferment’ (355) results from his actions.  Rushdie 
associates the heatwave closely with a growing racial tension and societal 
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instability in the London of his novel: ‘The temperature continued to 
rise[…]the heatwave reached its highest point, and stayed up there so long 
that the whole city, its edifices, its waterways, its inhabitants, came 
perilously close to the boil’ (420).  Although he depicts the racism of the 
British state, its institutions and its people as the prevailing cause of the 
Brickhall riots, he suggests that London’s Gibreel-induced heatwave 
contributes towards the violence’s intensity.  By showing how London’s 
environment shapes its denizens’ behaviour and culture, Rushdie criticises 
characterisations of Britishness as biological and immutable. 
 However, while Rushdie in Verses indicates British culture’s 
malleability, he also acknowledges the great discursive power of the 
exclusionary discourse of British New Racism.  He exposes this 
bioculturalist post-war racism, which he portrays as endemic within Britain’s 
white population, by depicting its continuing racialisation of even those non-
whites who prove keenest to assimilate and who subscribe to the fixed 
notion of Britishness that the New Racists construct.  In detailing the failure 
of Saladin Chamcha’s attempts to be accepted as British by affecting an 
ideal of Britishness that imitates the New Racism’s conservatism and even 
its race-thinking, Rushdie suggests that, because of the phenotypical racism 
of much of the white British population, ‘from Indianness to Englishness [is] 
an immeasurable distance’ (41). 
 An Indian-born British citizen obsessed with becoming British, 
Saladin perceives Britishness as a cultural given but thinks that he can 
attain it despite being a non-white foreigner.  His stage name, Chamcha, 
translates aptly as ‘Mister Toady’ (54).  Similarly to the residents of 
Methwold’s Estate in Midnight, Saladin affects the opinions, morals, tastes 
and prejudices of his idea of the archetypal Englishman.  He attempts to 
reject completely his past as an Indian, eschewing the possibility of a 
synthesised, culturally hybrid self.  Rather than identifying behaviours and 
lifestyles which constitute new ways of being British he rejects the idea that 
Britishness can be altered, even by certain of the nation’s own citizens. 
 Rushdie presents Saladin’s ideal of Britishness as fixed, 
exclusionary, conservative and imperialist: similar to that of the New 
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Racists.  Donning a bowler hat (87) and a ‘narrow, haughty demeanour’ 
(135), he affects the bearing of a stiff, respectable middle-class Englishman.  
He strives towards a ‘moral code’ of ‘[a]ssiduity, fastidiousness, moderation, 
restraint, self-reliance, probity, [and] family life’ (257) that for him constitutes 
the essence of Britishness.  In a further attempt to assimilate, Saladin 
augments this cultural conservatism by joining the majority of white Britons 
in Verses in constructing non-white bodies as subraces.  At one point he 
remarks, ‘Damn all Indians’ (137).  He later reacts with horror when he finds 
that he is ‘entertaining romantic notions about a black woman’ (170).  
Despite his former (and, as Rushdie later stresses, current) status as a 
colonised body, Saladin even feels a nostalgia for Empire typical of New 
Racism: ‘Empire was no more, but still he knew “all that was good and living 
within him” to have been “made, shaped and quickened” by his encounter 
with this islet of sensibility, surrounded by the cool sense of the sea’ (398).2 
 Yet Saladin’s adoption of an exclusionary neo-imperial discourse of 
Britishness fails to inure him from the very same discourse’s oppressive 
effects when white Britons subject him to it.  Rushdie indicates how white 
British citizens’ racism on the grounds of phenotype, ethnicity and culture 
endures even in the face of attempts at assimilation from non-white bodies.  
Saladin fails in his quest to become his ideal of ‘a goodandproper 
Englishman’ (43).  His attempts to be accepted as British founder not just 
because his mask slips, his performance falters or his voice reverts to its 
natural accent (49), but because white British people continue to construct 
him as subrace.  For example, the television producer Hal Valance informs 
Saladin when firing him from his job as a voice actor, ‘[y]our profile’s wrong, 
if you follow: with you in the show it’s just too damn racial’ (265).  Among 
Verses’ white Britons, Valance is by no means alone in his race-thinking.  
From businesspeople lamenting competition from ‘Pakis’ (299) to 
independent political activists – one woman hands Gibreel ‘a racist text 
demanding the “repatriation” of the country’s black citizenry’ (326) – 
Rushdie’s novel depicts a Britain teeming with racist citizens. 
 However, as with the sterilisation campaign that Rushdie describes 
in Midnight, the most deleterious effects of race-thinking in Verses occur 
when it informs the biopolitical state’s racialising workings.  The abuse 
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Saladin suffers when incarcerated in an immigration centre under suspicion 
of being an illegal alien confirms that while he may have an ‘Englished soul’ 
(439), the New Racism’s discursive power renders attaining an Englished 
skin or race impossible.  The immigration officers’ actions possess the ability 
to construct racial difference – a power Rushdie figures characteristically 
through the literary device of supernatural physical transformation – and to 
place non-white immigrants like Saladin into a biopolitical state of exception.  
In Verses’ later chapters Rushdie suggests that this power to produce racial 
difference renders the state’s racist operations severely difficult to resist by 
depicting a resistance movement which, in attempting to oppose the 
biopolitical state by reclaiming non-normative appearances and behaviours, 
only entrenches the racism of the superrace that the state constructs. 
Racism, Immigration and the Construction of Difference 
Rushdie sets Verses during a period in which immigration into Britain was 
controlled very tightly and prejudice against immigrants was widespread.  
As Susan Smith writes, ‘[b]y 1976, Britain had tightened its immigration laws 
to reduce immigration to a trickle’ (1993, 61).  Moreover, she argues that in 
the 1980s ‘the Thatcher government passed unnecessary and symbolically 
restrictive legislation which served largely to bolster national pride and 
undermine the status of “visible minorities”’ (62).  In Verses Rushdie 
explores this historical mixture of strict immigration control and state-
sanctioned racialisation by depicting how racism manifests within the 
biopolitical apparatus of the immigration service.  Saladin Chamcha’s 
experiences in the state’s immigration detention centre prove false his naïve 
appraisal of his comfortable standing in British society.  The immigration 
officers within this state of exception not only treat Saladin as a non-British 
subrace in spite of his British citizenship and his imitating (his ideal of) British 
custom and behaviour, but transform him supernaturally into a devil through 
their violence and racialising discourse.  Rushdie suggests through this 
device that the state’s ability to persuade the superrace of subraces’ 
monstrosity augments the securitising capacity of its biopolitical institutions 
to discipline and punish the racialised.  By emboldening its constructed 
superrace to immunise itself against ostensibly savage subraces the state 
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in Verses uses racism to protect itself from the instability that race war 
discourse amongst a majority population can cause. 
 When Saladin plunges onto British soil following a plane explosion at 
‘twenty-nine thousand and two feet’ (Rushdie 2006c, 3) he enters an 
unfamiliar zone of topographical and legal indistinction.  Rushdie indicates 
that non-white immigrants in post-imperial Britain stand at permanent risk of 
becoming homo sacer, the inhabitants of the state of exception which, as 
Agamben argues, ‘is neither external nor internal to the juridical order[…]a 
threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude 
each other but rather blur with each other’ (2005, 23).  As soon as Saladin 
lands back in Britain following a trip home he perceives that he is not in the 
country he knows and treasures but an indeterminate ‘transit lounge’ 
between India and Britain in which the very landscape appears uncanny: 
He was looking up at the sky, and noticed that it was the wrong colour  
entirely, blood-orange flecked with green, and the snow was blue as 
ink.  He blinked hard but the colours refused to change, giving rise to 
the notion that he had fallen out of the sky into some wrongness, 
some other place, not England or perhaps not-England, some 
counterfeit zone, rotten borough, altered state. (Rushdie 2006c, 132) 
Saladin’s sense of indeterminacy intensifies when the biopolitical state’s 
immigration officers arrest him on suspicion of being an illegal immigrant 
and subject him subsequently to physical and sexual abuse: ‘“This isn’t 
England,” he thought, not for the first or last time.  How could it be, after all; 
where in all that moderate and common-sensical land was there room for 
such a police van in whose interior such events as these might plausibly 
transpire?’ (158)  The police van and the immigration centre it serves house 
people whom the state deems to be in Britain but not of it, and hence 
undeserving of the same rights and laws as white citizens.  They constitute 
spaces of exception and indistinction between the immigrants’ home nations 
and the England of belonging and security that, prior to his arrest and abuse, 
Saladin thought he inhabited.  Rushdie suggests that because the 
biopolitical state practices what Foucault calls ‘the internal racism of 
permanent purification’ (2004, 62) Saladin was always at risk, despite his 
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Anglophilia and British citizenship, of being placed into a subrace of homo 
sacer alongside other non-white bodies that the state refuses to accept 
within the protected superrace.  By describing the ease with which a racist 
and abusive immigration service wrenches Saladin from his safe existence 
and imprisons him within a state of exception, Rushdie evokes the 
precariousness of non-white people’s rights in post-imperial Britain. 
 Rushdie indicates that the biopolitical state’s powers of discursive 
racialisation exacerbate this precariousness.  The immigration officers 
arrest Saladin because they do not believe an Indian can be British, and 
racialise him further during his incarceration.  From the moment they first 
speak to Saladin they deny his imagined Britishness: 
I’m a British, he was saying, with right of abode, too, but when he 
couldn’t produce a passport or any other identifying document they 
began to weep with mirth, the tears streaming down even the blank 
faces of the plain-clothes men from the immigration service. (Rushdie 
2006c, 140) 
Later on they abuse him racially for his name: ‘You’re a fucking Packy-billy.  
Sally-who? – What kind of name is that for an Englishman?’ (163)  His retort 
that the surnames of the white immigration officers (Stein, Bruno and 
Novak) suggest that they themselves are not of unbroken Anglo-Saxon 
ancestry only earns him more physical punishment (163).  The officers’ 
attitudes infer their belief that while the descendants of white continental 
Europeans can be British, non-whites cannot, no matter how entrenched 
they are within British society.  Rushdie’s fictional exploration of Britain’s 
post-war immigration policy exposes the ways in which government agents 
engage in phenotypical racism.  He evokes the prevalence of bioculturalist 
New Racism within Britain’s state and superrace alike. 
 Rushdie further explores the power of state institutions to construct 
subraces as monstrous when he depicts a racist discourse that 
supernaturally produces actual biological difference in a way which for Josie 
Gill ‘has clear parallels with the conclusions of epigenetic studies which 
recognise seemingly racial characteristics as the biological embodiment of 
cultural and environmental circumstances’ (2015, 492).  The biopolitical 
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state in Verses seeks to immunise the race of white British people against 
immigrants by asserting a qualitative difference between white and non-
white phenotypes, but also reinforces and intensifies its claim that non-
whites present a threat to the constructed white superrace through forcing 
non-whites literally to become another species.  Like Ahmed in Midnight, 
Saladin finds himself altered physically by supernatural forces.  However, 
whereas Ahmed acquires a longed-for white phenotype, Saladin’s bodily 
change causes him profound distress and leads to him being perceived as 
monstrous by much of British society. 
 Through his device of literalising the claims of bestiality made against 
non-whites in post-war Britain, Rushdie depicts effectively the harm that 
racialising discourses cause in two main ways.  He renders their effects 
more vivid through imagining a world in which biopolitical state apparatuses 
can alter the biology of subraces, and by detailing the limitations that these 
transmogrifications place on discursive resistance.  The racist immigration 
officers who govern the state of exception within which they place Saladin 
make him into a demonic, goat-like creature not through any scientific 
experimentation but simply through their racialising discourse: the same 
discourse in which the biopolitical state they serve engages.  The officers 
tell their charges, ‘You’re all the same.  Can’t expect animals to observe 
civilised standards’ (Rushdie 2006c, 159), and thus transform them 
physically into animals.  As a detainee who has been changed into a tiger-
headed being laments, ‘[t]hey have the power of description, and we 
succumb to the pictures they construct’ (168).  In a typically fantastical 
manner, Rushdie shows how discourse constructs its own reality, just as 
race-thinking constructs races.  In his supernatural idiom, the power to 
construct the racialised subject becomes not only figurative but literal, which 
makes it all the more oppressive and all the more difficult to resist. 
 The detainees’ discursive-literal transformation militates against 
opposition to state biopower and racism by making it difficult for them to 
oppose their incarceration and bestialisation discursively.  Because of their 
new forms the only linguistic ability many of them possess in response to 
their captors is ‘the snorting of bulls [or] the chattering of monkeys’ (166).  
Saladin finds that ‘a tone of authority[…][is] pretty difficult to bring off from 
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that undignified position on his back with his hoofy legs wide apart and a 
soft tumble of his own excrement all about him’ (159).  The detainees’ 
mutations into animals preclude resistance further by making them seem 
less than human to the outside world biologically as well as discursively.  
Their appearance justifies their ill treatment.  When discussing the 
possibility of killing Saladin in order to conceal their physical and racial 
abuse of a fairly prominent naturalised British citizen, the immigration 
officers consider using his newfound monstrosity, which they themselves 
caused, to excuse their incarcerating him in the first place: ‘as for this 
bugger, you only have to clock the bleeder, looks like the very devil, what 
were we supposed to think?’ (164)  Through the supernatural, Rushdie 
evokes the continuities between racist discourses and racist actions.  By 
depicting the effects of physical and discursive violence on non-white 
immigrant bodies, he portrays forcefully the ability of Britain’s post-imperial 
state apparatuses to construct them as subracial homo sacer whenever it 
desires. 
 In Verses Rushdie suggests that these techniques of biopolitical 
othering, and others like them, produce subraces and preclude effectively 
their resistance to racism outside as well as inside state institutions.  Some 
of London’s non-white citizens in the novel attempt to reclaim the devil as 
an assertive image of resistance to the racist British state and its institutions.  
However, Rushdie indicates that the New Racism’s discursive power proves 
so strong that the superrace’s abiding perception of this non-normative 
behaviour, and of the non-white bodies that the biopolitical state constructs 
as a subrace, remains overwhelmingly unfavourable.  As with Rushdie’s 
portrayal of Saladin’s failed attempts to assimilate, the ways in which he 
describes oppositional discourses and movements of resistance to racism 
acknowledge the difficulty of militating against the complex, multiplicitous 
race-thinking he depicts as endemic in post-imperial Britain. 
The Reclamation(?) of the Pejorative 
Verses displays Rushdie’s characteristic scepticism that resistance to 
oppressive state (bio)power can work effectively.  Just as Saladin 
Chamcha’s attempts to assimilate himself within Britain founder because of 
76 
 
racism amongst the country’s state and population alike, attempts to oppose 
the racism of British society fail in the novel.  The residents of the fictional 
London borough of Brickhall appropriate Saladin (and by extension the 
devil) as an avatar for their alterity and grievances.  Many later participate 
in a violent uprising against the racist Metropolitan Police.  However, the 
strength of the New Racism’s discursive power in Verses means that every 
action taken by London’s non-white people in an effort to resist the 
biopolitical state’s racism serves only to entrench the racial othering to 
which the state and its superrace subject them. 
 Early on in Verses Rushdie’s narrator argues that ‘[t]o turn insults into 
strengths, whigs, tories, Blacks all chose to wear with pride the names they 
were given in scorn’ (2006c, 93).  At times Rushdie’s characters transmute 
both their bodily alterity and their discursively constructed status as subrace 
into powerful discourses and practices of resistance.  Eventually the 
detainees at the immigration centre flee captivity through the very animal 
qualities that the officers of the biopolitical state impose upon them.  They 
run ‘quickly, silently, to the edge of the Detention Centre compound, where 
the manticore and other sharp-toothed mutants were waiting by the large 
holes they had bitten into the fabric of the containing fence’ (171).  Saladin’s 
escape enables his physiological otherness subsequently to inspire an 
entire anti-racist movement that seeks to reclaim subracial signifiers and 
images of monstrosity as badges of honour. 
 Rushdie evokes the discursive power of images and discourses of 
subracial alterity to galvanise resistance to racism when the demonic 
Saladin becomes a totem for Brickhall’s subraces: 
the image of the dream-devil started catching on, becoming popular, 
it should be said, only amongst what Hal Valance had described as 
the tinted persuasion[…]browns-and-blacks found themselves 
cheering, in their sleep, this what-else-after-all-but-black-man, 
maybe a little twisted up by fate class race history, all that, but getting 
off his behind, bad and mad, to kick a little ass. (286) 
Mishal Sufyan explains the image’s popularity by claiming, ‘[i]t’s an image 
white society has rejected for so long that we can really take it, you know, 
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occupy it, inhabit it, reclaim it and make it our own’ (287).  Many non-white 
residents of Brickhall share her sympathy (and enthusiasm) for the devil.  
They begin to wear plastic horns as a gesture of opposition to the racialising 
British state.  This collective defiance animates the campaign that later 
forms to protest prominent black intellectual Dr Uhuru Simba’s arrest on 
trumped-up charges.  Rushdie depicts the group as a broad, plural coalition 
‘packed[…]with every conceivable sort of person’ (413).  The anti-racist 
writings of Simba, who aims politically ‘to occupy the old and honourable 
role of the uppity nigger’ (414) towards Britain, are quoted liberally at the 
protest meeting.  They provide a powerful argument for non-white 
immigrants’ value to the British nation: 
we are here to change things.  I concede at once that we shall 
ourselves be changed; African, Caribbean, Indian, Pakistani, 
Bangladeshi, Cypriot, Chinese, we are other than what we would 
have been if we had not crossed the skies in search of work and 
dignity and a better life for their children.  We have been made again: 
but I say that we shall also be the ones to remake this society, to 
shape it from the bottom to the top. (414) 
Simba argues that although the migratory journey transforms the immigrant 
– a theme to which Rushdie returns in Ground – immigrants of numerous 
nations possess, in turn, the ability to shape the nation to which they 
migrate.  Verses frequently suggests the possibility of resisting racism 
through asserting racial difference and its value to the nation. 
 However, Rushdie also indicates that racism’s discursive power in 
post-war British society causes superraces either to ignore attempts by non-
whites to assert the desirability and legitimacy of non-normative behaviours 
and racial signifiers, or to view these efforts as confirming the subrace’s 
savagery and unwillingness to assimilate.  In Verses those who resist the 
racism of the British state and its white British people remain racialised, 
however much they try to deconstruct and rebel against biopower’s 
racialising logic.  The detainees escape one space of exception 
successfully, but their transformation into animals continues.  Even after 
they flee the immigration centre together, in a nightmare recalling their 
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escape Saladin Chamcha perceives the nurse Hyacinth Phillips becoming 
monstrous: ‘He saw in the yellow light that her skin was growing darker by 
the minute, and her teeth more prominent, and her body as long as a child’s 
stick-figure drawing’ (254).  In this ambiguous passage Rushdie suggests 
the persistence of racism whether Hyacinth becomes othered literally as an 
atavistic supernatural punishment for deserting her role within the 
biopolitical state apparatus, or whether Saladin’s nightmare in fact recalls 
events inaccurately.  Saladin racialises Hyacinth whether or not she actually 
transforms physically.  Saladin, too, continues ‘slowly transmogrifying’ 
(282), to the horror of many Brickhall residents.  Because of his monstrosity 
the borough’s non-white people do not view him universally as an inspiring 
figure of alterity and resistance.  His demonic appearance ‘succeed[s] in 
terrifying the entire temporary population of the bed and breakfast 
establishment [in which he lives] to the point of incoherence’ (291).  The 
effects of the biological transformation that the state’s immigration service 
imposes upon Saladin linger even after his escape.  He thus remains liable 
to be seen as evil.  Despite attempts at reclamation, traditional discourses 
regarding the devil hold sway for many ordinary citizens in the Britain of 
Verses. 
 Hence, the anti-racist movements aiming to reclaim pejoratives such 
as ‘devil’ and ‘nigger’ fail to resist successfully the racism of the British state 
and its people in the novel.  Rushdie describes discourses and movements 
of opposition to racism in post-imperial Britain, but by portraying their 
inefficacy suggests that embracing racial difference and behavioural non-
normativity risks leaving racism intact.  Their failure becomes especially 
apparent once the resistance movement turns violent.  In Verses Britain’s 
police and media use non-whites’ violent resistance as proof of their 
savagery and subracial status as human encumbrances.  They thus 
reinforce the white British population’s existing racism.  In the novel’s final 
chapters Rushdie continues to portray the existence of complex, multiform 
racisms within both the biopolitical state and the superrace it constructs.  He 
again invites a biopolitical reading which asserts that the nature of 
contemporary biopolitics exceeds Foucault’s state-centric theorisations. 
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Polizeiwissenschaft, Media and Racism 
In Verses Rushdie suggests that racialising national institutions including 
the Metropolitan Police and the British media possess the ability discursively 
to influence the opinions of white British people in favour of upholding the 
racist status quo.  He uses a fictionalised version of the 1981 Brixton riots 
to indicate how violent non-white resistance against racialisation thus only 
reinforces associations between non-whites, crime and racial otherness 
amidst a white population terrified of the subraces it has been told threaten 
its survival.3  Rushdie depicts a further obstacle to opposing or escaping 
race-thinking, the pervasiveness and multifariousness of which – amongst 
state and non-state actors alike – his novels underscore consistently. 
 As with the immigration service which racialises Saladin so severely 
that his physiognomy alters, Rushdie shows in Verses how, as Foucault 
claims, police forces function as an arm of the racialising biopolitical state.  
For Foucault police forces and their techniques of discipline and ordering 
(polizeiwissenschaft) constitute a key instrument of the biopolitical state’s 
operation.  They share its concerns with optimising human life’s orderliness 
and productivity: 
What the police are concerned with is men’s coexistence in a 
territory, their relationships to property, what they produce, what is 
exchanged in the market, and so on.  It also considers how they live, 
the diseases and accidents which can befall them.  In a word, what 
the police see to is a live, active, and productive man. (Foucault 
1988, 155-56) 
The police are responsible for aiding this productivity through the corrective 
punishment of those the state perceives as threatening the nation’s stability 
and that of the superrace the state seeks to protect.  Many writers have 
condemned the police as a neo-colonial racialising force in the late 
twentieth-century British context upon which Verses draws.  For Gilroy, 
‘crime came to occupy the place which sexuality, miscegenation and 
disease had held as the central themes and images in the earlier discourses 
of “race”’ (2002, 109).  He argues that the police colonised the non-white 
inhabitants of Britain through racial profiling, harassment and racially-
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aggravated violence: ‘The “thin red line” of troops in the colonial front line, 
standing between us and them, between black and white, [was] translated 
into the “thin blue line” of police, personifying the law’ (110). 
 In Verses Rushdie stresses the presence of racialising neo-colonial 
polizeiwissenschaft within the Metropolitan Police’s discourses and 
practices.  However, he also emphasises how polizeiwissenschaft 
buttresses racism amongst Britain’s civilian superrace by making its 
members liable to view resistance of non-whites against racial oppression, 
violent or otherwise, as confirming their unruly and criminal nature.  He 
again indirectly problematises Foucault’s state-centric theory of racism.  As 
with the move from race war discourse to racism that Foucault describes, 
Verses indicates that because Britain’s police offer security against threats 
from subraces, the majority of the white population prove unlikely to criticise 
their racialising operations.  Yet Rushdie goes further by showing how the 
superrace’s desire for order and support for the police leads it actively to 
complement the state’s racist oppression. 
 In Verses Rushdie charts the racist police actions that lead to 
protests and anti-racism campaigns.  He shows subsequently how the 
police use these acts of resistance to justify more racial oppression to the 
superrace.  The police exploit Brickhall’s growing veneration of Saladin 
Chamcha as proof that non-white subraces are violent and uncivilised: 
‘Police community relations officers pointed to the “growing devil-cult” 
among young blacks and Asians” as a “deplorable tendency”’ (Rushdie 
2006c, 286).  Crucially, Rushdie places this pejorative statement directly 
before Mishal Sufyan’s assertion that non-whites can take the image of the 
devil, ‘reclaim it and make it [their] own’ (287).  He undercuts her optimism 
immediately.  The police’s construction of the cult around Saladin as a threat 
to the nation’s order provides them with a scapegoat for an unexplained 
series of ritual killings: ‘The detention of “tints” intensified accordingly, as did 
the incidence of snap raids on establishments “suspected of harbouring 
underground occultist cells”’ (288).  Rushdie indicates the erroneousness of 
Mishal’s idea that images seen traditionally as evil can be reclaimed 
discursively within a state-led cycle of biopolitical repression, resistance and 
more racialising repression. 
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 Rushdie stresses that racialisation and resistance take place within 
a matrix of opposing discourses.  In his essay ‘The New Empire Within 
Britain’, written one year after the Brixton riots upon which Verses draws, 
he argues that ‘[w]hite and black perceptions of everyday life have moved 
so far apart as to be incompatible’ (1992, 134).  In Verses Rushdie evokes 
this perceptual incompatibility by depicting the conflicting discourses of anti-
racist activists and the racist police.  Following Dr Uhuru Simba’s death in 
police custody after his dubious arrest on suspicion of committing the ritual 
murders, police spokesman Inspector Stephen Kinch dismisses compelling 
suggestions from Simba’s lawyer, Hanif Johnson, that the police murdered 
his client as ‘inflammatory’ and ‘unprofessional’ (Rushdie 2006c, 450).  
Hanif uses comparable terms – ‘provocative and incendiary’ (451) – to 
describe the increased police presence in Brickhall to control the protests 
over Simba’s death.  Similar discursive oppositions arise during the 
subsequent racialised violence when the ‘[s]elf-defence patrols of young 
Sikh, Bengali and Afro-Caribbean males’, formed to protect non-whites 
unable to rely on the police, are ‘described by their political opponents as 
vigilante groups’ (451).  The state apparatus of polizeiwissenschaft views 
these actions, which Brickhall’s non-whites perceive as essential for their 
own security, as threatening the security of the city and nation.  Here 
Rushdie further suggests the incompatibility of white and black perceptions 
of everyday life. 
 However, Rushdie affirms that the discourses disseminated by 
biopolitical state apparatuses such as the police wield more influence than 
oppositional anti-racist discourses over the superrace’s opinion of non-white 
subraces in post-imperial Britain.  He indicates that the institutionally racist 
British media bolsters this discursive power.  The Metropolitan Police in 
Verses convince the majority white British public successfully that the 
violent resistance of Brickhall’s non-whites in response to Simba’s death 
represents proof of the subrace’s savagery, ingratitude and cultural 
otherness, and thus warrants further racialising actions.  In an attempt to 
quell the anti-racist resistance movement the police charge non-white 
rioters exclusively.  They leave white racists free to continue assaulting non-
whites (451).  When the violence escalates after the police’s attempt to 
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cover up the identity of the real ritual murderer – ‘a bland, pale man’ – is 
discovered, the police declare ‘riot conditions’ (453) and institute a violent 
racialising crackdown.  The police can justify these practices more 
effectively because the media’s reporting of the riots exculpates the 
biopolitical state and places the blame for the violence solely on non-whites.  
Verses describes a symbiotic relationship between the media’s discursive 
power and that of the police.  In detailing the fictional Inspector Kinch’s 
statement to TV cameras following the riots, Rushdie suggests that the 
British media’s analysis of race riots in the early 1980s racialised by giving 
an uncritical platform to the state’s racist discourse, and led the superrace 
to accept this discourse similarly uncritically by presenting favourably those 
who disseminated it. 
 Frank Reeves argued in 1983 that ‘[i]n Britain, the interests of racial 
minorities are seldom expressed through the mass media, and black people 
are rarely in a position to speak with effect on behalf of the common interest 
of a social whole which includes themselves’ (1983, 42).  The media 
coverage surrounding Rushdie’s fictionalised version of the roughly 
contemporaneous Brixton riots excludes non-white, anti-racist perspectives 
in this manner.  It instead privileges Inspector Stephen Kinch’s racialising 
discourse: 
 A camera requires law, order, the thin blue line.  Seeking to preserve 
 itself, it remains behind the shielding wall, observing the shadow-
 lands from afar, and of course from above: that is, it chooses sides.  
 […]Inspector Stephen Kinch.  The camera sees him for what he is: a 
 good man in an impossible job.  A father, a man who likes his pint.  
 He speaks: cannot-tolerate-no-go-areas better-protection-required-
 for-policemen see-the-plastic-riot-shields-catching-fire.  He refers to 
 organised crime, political agitators, bomb-factories, drugs.  ‘We 
 understand some of these kids may feel they have grievances but 
 we will not and cannot be the whipping boys of society.’  Emboldened 
 by the lights and the patient, silent lenses, he goes further.  These 
 kids don’t know how lucky they are, he suggests.  They should 
 consult their kith and kin.  Africa, Asia, the Caribbean: now those are 
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 places with real problems.  Those are places where people might 
 have grievances worth respecting.  Things aren’t so bad here, not by 
 a long chalk; no slaughters here, no torture, no military coups.  
 People should value what they’ve got before they lose it.  Ours 
 always was a peaceful land, he says.  Our industrious island race. – 
 Behind him, the camera sees stretchers, ambulances, pain. – It sees 
 strange humanoid shapes being hauled up from the  bowels of the 
 Club Hot Wax, and recognises the effigies of the mighty.  Inspector 
 Kinch explains.  They cook them in an oven down there, they call it 
 fun, I wouldn’t call it that myself. – The camera observes the wax 
 models with distaste. – Is there not something witchy about them, 
 something cannibalistic, an unwholesome smell?  Have black arts 
 been practised here? – The camera sees broken windows.  It sees 
 something burning in the middle distance: a car, a shop.  It cannot 
 understand, or demonstrate, what any of this achieves.  These 
 people are burning their own streets. (Rushdie 2006c, 454-55) 
 Here Rushdie evokes the symbiotic relationship between racist 
discourses of polizeiwissenschaft and their media representation by using 
the device of a biased camera which stands in for both the British media 
establishment’s prejudice and the racialising tendencies of the audience for 
which it records and warps events.  The camera ‘requires law, order [and] 
the thin blue line’ and hence ‘chooses sides’ (455) in favour of biopolitical 
securitisation.  It adds to the appeal and power of Kinch’s discourse by 
presenting him to the public as ‘a good man in an impossible job[…][a] 
father, a man who likes his pint’ (455).  Bolstered by this sympathetic 
portrayal and ‘[e]mboldened by the lights and the patient, silent lenses’, 
Kinch disseminates a nostalgic, nationalistic discourse of Britain as an 
‘industrious island race’ (455) beset by ungrateful aliens.  In turn, the 
camera gives its assent.  When Kinch criticises the anti-racist bacchanals 
at the Club Hot Wax the camera, rather than effecting a neutral reportage, 
agrees: ‘[t]he camera observes the wax models with distaste. – Is there not 
something witchy about them, something cannibalistic, an unwholesome 
smell?  Have black arts been practised here?’ (455)  The camera excludes 
anti-racist perspectives in favour of absorbing the biopolitical state’s 
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racialising discourse and hence cannot appreciate the causes of the riots.  
It only perceives – and thus presents – senseless violence that entrenches 
the public’s perception of non-whites as a savage subrace: ‘It cannot 
understand, or demonstrate, what any of this achieves’ (455).  Through 
showing how the representational biases of news agencies mediate and 
justify the racialising actions of the biopolitical state and its police force, 
Rushdie depicts further obstacles to resisting race-thinking and state racism 
through either discourse or violence.  By the time the racialised Saladin 
returns to India in Verses’ final chapter, the potential for change in the 
novel’s fictionalised version of Britain appears scarce. 
 As with Rushdie’s exploration of phenotypical racism and sterilisation 
in Midnight, a biopolitical reading reveals that Verses suggests the 
inevitability of race-thinking within twentieth-century politics and society.  
Verses depicts a British state and majority population pervaded by a 
complex, multifaceted biocultural New Racism which at every turn neuters 
discursive and practical efforts by non-whites to resist their racist biopolitical 
ordering; whether these be assimilationist, oppositional, peaceful or violent.  
Saladin’s phenotype means that his affected persona of a nationalistic, 
racialising pillar of the establishment cannot save him from imprisonment 
on suspicion of being an illegal immigrant.  He finds that the British state’s 
racialising discourse wields such power that it literally can transform the 
subraces it creates and places in a state of exception into non-human 
bodies.  The state, its police force, the superrace it protects and the media 
that relays its racist discourse perceive attempts to construct these bodies 
counter-hegemonically as symbols of resistance and assertive alterity, and 
the later frustrated, violent protests against the Metropolitan Police’s blatant 
racism, as proof that non-whites constitute a savage, ungrateful subrace of 
human encumbrances.  Through describing the efficacy of multiple, 
complex and interrelated racisms in animating a physical and discursive 
biopolitical violence that successfully quells multifarious attempts at 
resisting the British state’s race-thinking, Rushdie mirrors Foucault in 
asserting the flexibility of the numerous criteria by which biopolitics 
constructs subraces.  However, Verses exceeds Foucault’s thought by 
suggesting that the racisms that the state’s discourses and technologies 
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engender and reinforce amongst the superrace complement the state’s 
actions in rendering race-thinking and biopolitical oppression near-
impossible to resist or escape.  Rushdie indicates little prospect of 
overcoming racism in post-imperial Britain. 
 Ground, Rushdie’s next novel to cover post-imperial Britain in detail, 
depicts similarly insurmountable obstacles to anti-racist resistance in the 
former colonial power, though also posits a certain potentiality for moving 
beyond ‘the frontier of the skin’ (2000, 55) in the more welcoming national 
space of America.  However, his subsequent novel, Fury, evokes no such 
possibility.  In Fury Rushdie explores the global pervasiveness of race-
thinking; in New York, the South Pacific and even in a fictional alien world.  
As with Saladin’s years as a successful chamcha in London, any escape 
from race-thinking for characters in these two novels proves provisional and 
temporary.  Rushdie further indicates the veracity of Foucault’s argument 
that multiple racisms, based on any criteria the state wishes, characterise 
contemporary biopolitics.  He also continues to stress the role of the 
superrace in bolstering racist biopolitical oppression.  Ground and Fury, like 
Midnight and Verses, hence invite – and help to construct – a biopolitical 
literary criticism that goes beyond Foucault’s state-centric conception of 
biopower and race. 
Biopolitics and Racism in The Ground Beneath Her 
Feet and Fury 
In The Ground Beneath Her Feet (1999) Rushdie again represents Britain 
as a nation whose government and people have engaged in racialisation 
both before and after decolonisation.  However, reading Ground in 
conjunction with Verses reveals that Rushdie depicts a greater possibility of 
effective resistance to racism in the later novel by decentring Britain in 
favour of the more welcoming United States of America as the desired 
destination for his immigrant characters.  America’s state and people in 
Ground racialise similarly to their British equivalents, but Rushdie suggests 
an attenuated potentiality for resistance through remaking the self and 
hence transcending ‘the frontier of the skin’ (2000, 55) in the US. 
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The Ground Beneath Her Feet (1): Racism in the British Membrane 
In Ground Rushdie continues to depict Britain’s government and white 
majority population as pervaded by a biocultural racism that proves near-
impossible for constructed subraces to resist or escape.  As in Verses, in 
describing attempts by his Anglophile Indian characters to assimilate within 
British culture he indicates that non-white immigrants find themselves 
invariably racialised phenotypically by figures inside and outside biopolitical 
state apparatuses.  An Indian who venerates all things English, Sir Darius 
Cama resembles Saladin Chamcha in many ways.  His Anglophilia leads 
him to yoke his fortunes to the British Empire.  After the colonial 
administration departs he lionises Britain’s grace in ceding its South Asian 
territories, while chastising India for its ‘backwardness’ (Rushdie 2000, 151).  
Darius idealises what he refers to as ‘the mother country’ (88).  He dreams 
of 
England as a pure, white Palladian mansion set upon a hill above a 
silver winding river, with a spreading parterre of brilliant green lawns 
edged by ancient oaks and elms, and the classic geometry of flower 
beds orchestrated by unseen master gardeners into a four-seasons 
symphony of colour. (86) 
However, just as Saladin’s rose-tinted Anglophilia renders him shocked by 
his incarceration and racialisation in the immigration centre, when Darius 
and his son Ormus, who maintains a similar fantasy, travel to Britain they 
realise the falsity of this ideal of a verdant, welcoming space. 
 A comparable conjunction of racialising white citizens and biopolitical 
institutions to that which marks Britain in Verses construct Darius and 
Ormus as subracial once they arrive in Ground’s fictionalised version of the 
country.  The immigration officers in Verses refuse to accept that Saladin, a 
prominent actor and member of the Garrick Club, possibly could be a British 
citizen on account of his phenotype (Rushdie 2006c, 140).  Similarly, in 
Rushdie’s later novel Darius’ status as a knight of the realm and a pillar of 
India’s old Anglophile elite carries less weight than his skin and nationality 
in the eyes of the biopolitical state’s equivalent agents.  He suffers a 
‘gruelling interrogation by immigration officials who were bewilderingly 
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unimpressed by his explanations, his credentials or even his knighthood, 
news of which they treated with extreme scepticism’ (Rushdie 2000, 152). 
 When Ormus emigrates to Britain he too finds himself racialised by 
the British state and the white superrace it constructs.  The ‘rapid 
disenchantment of Ormus Cama with his fantasy of the West’ (270) begins 
almost as soon as he leaves India.  His co-workers on the pirate radio ship 
– a DJ who calls an ‘obstinate fucking Paki’ (275) and another who believes 
in apartheid (279) – render him racialised bioculturally from the beginning 
of his working life in Britain.  Not only do Ormus’ racist co-workers other him, 
but the British state’s institutions criminalise him as they did his father.  
Although the state does not single Ormus out because of his race, Rushdie 
nevertheless depicts the authorities’ treatment of him as the act of a violent 
state which cannot permit spaces or bodies to stand outside its categorising 
biopolitical knowledges.  When a government drug squad boards the ship, 
looking for any excuse to shut down the outlaw radio station, Ormus suffers 
sexual humiliation just as surely as Saladin does: ‘Naked and innocent 
before the officers of the law, suffering their jolly rogerings, he shakes with 
rage and shame’ (278).  In both Verses and Ground Rushdie portrays race-
thinking’s prevalence within Britain’s post-imperial government, evokes the 
harassment that the state proves consequently liable to inflict upon human 
encumbrances, and problematises Foucault’s thought indirectly by 
emphasising the superrace’s role in this oppression. 
 However, the racist British nation proves much less central to 
Ground’s narrative and to its characters’ lives and psyches than in 
Rushdie’s earlier novel.  In Verses Saladin bases his constructed self on his 
idealised version of Britain and Britishness.  When the racialising biopolitical 
state incarcerates and abuses him violently within its state of exception it 
comes as such a shock to him that he reacts by thinking, ‘This isn’t England’ 
(Rushdie 2006c, 158).  Even after his escape he insists upon Britain’s 
‘hospitality[…]in spite of immigration laws, and his own recent experience’ 
(398).  By contrast, although Ormus idealises Britain to an extent before 
emigrating there, he sees the country as a ‘membrane’ (Rushdie 2000, 255) 
to pass through on his way to America.  When he finds himself subject to 
racism and police harassment he does not respond with Saladin’s disbelief 
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but by accepting the reality of the racialising, oppressive underside of the 
country that his father venerated.  Saladin views the racialising state of 
exception as alien to England’s true nature, whereas Ormus perceives it as 
‘an England his father never knew, at whose existence he could not have 
guessed’ (278).  Rushdie not only decentres Britain as a longed-for 
destination space but depicts Ormus’ later attempts to escape race-thinking 
by reinventing himself in America as partially successful.  He thus suggests 
an attenuated potentiality of effective resistance to biopolitical racialisation 
that exceeds that found in his other novels. 
The Ground Beneath Her Feet (2): Transcending the Frontier of the Skin in 
America 
In Ground Rushdie portrays the United States as a nation in which non-
white immigrants may escape the racialisation that pervades Britain.  Ormus 
Cama’s half-American, half-Indian lover Vina Apsara believes that one can 
become American regardless of phenotype, nationality or culture.  She 
lionises America as an agglomerative, inclusive space which, unlike Britain, 
incorporates all cultures, all races and all lifestyles into an increasingly rich 
national tapestry: ‘by becoming an American you add to the kinds of 
American it’s possible to be’ (Rushdie 2000, 331).  Vina does not idealise 
America as Saladin does Britain.  By the time she persuades Ormus to join 
her there she is already a veteran of many American anti-racist movements.  
However, she views it as a space where one may take on a new identity 
and cast off old roots. 
 Ormus attempts to go even further than Vina in his attempt to escape 
racialisation in America through remaking the self.  Ground marks a rare 
occasion on which Rushdie explores racism by engaging specifically with 
the findings of twentieth-century epigeneticists and the persistence of race-
thinking amongst the general public in spite of these discoveries.  He writes 
that Ormus ‘had taken to quoting biologists, geneticists.  Human beings are 
just about identical, he’d say.  The race difference, even the gender 
difference, in the eyes of science it’s just the teeniest-tiniest fraction of what 
we are.  Percentagewise, it really doesn’t signify’ (413).  Vina proves 
‘sceptical, questioning his universalist premises’, but Ormus proves 
89 
 
determined ‘to transcend the frontier of the skin, not to cross the colour line 
but to rub it out’ (480).  He succeeds to an extent by affecting a deracinated 
public persona and, with Vina, disseminating a syncretic rock music which 
gains the pair widespread acceptance and celebrity as a canonical part of 
American popular culture.  Rushdie depicts a greater potentiality for 
effectively resisting and transcending race-thinking in Ground than in 
Midnight or Verses.  Yet he also suggests that Vina and Ormus’ eventual 
acceptance by America and its media culture has more to do with their fame 
than the nation’s disavowal of race-thinking.  He thus shows the 
incompleteness of their escape from racialisation and issues of race. 
 In Ground Rushdie characteristically deconstructs the identitarian 
essentialisms that animate racism.  Moreover, by using Ormus and Vina’s 
reinventions of the self to suggest the possibility of escaping being 
constructed as a subrace – or as a race at all – he indicates more vividly 
than in his other novels a potentiality of effective resistance to race-thinking 
in twentieth-century politics.  Rushdie’s narrator Rai repeatedly emphasises 
Ormus and Vina’s ability to fashion new anti-essentialist selves and thus put 
down new roots: ‘The rest of us get our personae off the peg, our religion, 
language, prejudices, demeanour, the works; but Vina and Ormus insisted 
on what one might call auto-couture’ (95).  Rai asks the question, ‘What if 
all of it – home, kinship, the whole enchilada – is just the biggest, most truly 
global, and centuries-oldest piece of brainwashing?  Suppose that it’s only 
when you dare to let go that your real life begins?’ (176-77)  Through letting 
go by emigrating to America, Ormus and Vina manage to leave behind their 
old lives and, to an extent, their old racial identities.  Indian-American Vina 
protests on behalf of African-American victims of racism: ‘[o]wing to her 
golden voice and, above all, her renown, nobody questions her right to sing 
out for American blacks’ (394).  The success and fame of the couple’s band 
VTO leads white and non-white Americans alike to embrace Vina and 
Ormus as icons of American popular culture in spite of their phenotypes.  As 
Rai observes, ‘[t]hose were the days when the first crossover stars were 
making their way through the firmament: O. J., Magic, people whose talent 
made people colour-blind, race-blind, history-blind’ (412-13).  Vina and 
Ormus traverse boundaries of geography and colour successfully.  They 
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find themselves assimilated and welcomed within America’s white-majority, 
white-dominated culture.  However, in Ground’s depiction of late twentieth-
century America Rushdie emphasises the rarity and provisionality of this 
escape from racialisation.  He indicates that, because the American state 
and the white superrace it constructs continue to produce subraces, most 
of the country’s non-white citizens remain racialised.  Even the fortunate 
Vina and Ormus fail to escape racialisation completely. 
 In Ground Rushdie characterises America by a near-endemic 
racism.  The ways in which he describes how Vina and Ormus negate their 
racialisation suggest that only their wealth and fame allows them to escape 
much of the racism that affects other non-white residents of America.  
Nobody protests when Vina speaks on behalf of African-Americans because 
of ‘her renown’ (394).  Ormus and Vina make people ‘colour-blind’ by way 
of their ‘talent’ (413).  Rushdie indicates that most of America’s non-whites 
lack these protections against being constructed as subracial.  Rai relates 
the circumstances of Vina and Ormus’ self-fashioning, but also asserts its 
rarity.  For Rai most humans prove unwilling to defy the discourses of racial 
or cultural essentialism that powerful political figures and institutions 
disseminate.  They prefer instead to think of themselves and others in 
racialising terms: ‘those who value stability, who fear transience, 
uncertainty, change, have erected a powerful system of stigmas and taboos 
against rootlessness[…]we hide our secret identities beneath the false skins 
of those identities which bear the belongers’ seal of approval’ (72-73). 
 The ways in which Rushdie depicts America’s endemic racism 
confirm Rai’s analysis.  They not only suggest the veracity of Foucault’s 
argument that race-thinking under regimes of biopower proves pervasive, 
multiform and hence nearly impossible to resist effectively, but augment 
Foucault’s observations by exposing the role of non-state actors in 
upholding racial hierarchies.  In Ground figures who even escape race-
thinking partially, such as Ormus and Vina, constitute a minority because 
people who eschew race-thinking are similarly scarce.  Rushdie 
characterises America’s politico-economic structures and cultural 
discourses by multiple state and para-state racisms that accept only a 
handful of rich, famous non-whites as truly American.  He evokes the unjust 
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economic legacy of America’s past colonialism by describing ‘Shinnecock 
Indians trimming the hedges and cleaning the pools and maintaining the 
tennis courts and moving the grass and in general tending to the high-
priced, stolen land’ (492) of their ancestors.  He criticises the enduring 
presence of racialising Orientalism within American public discourse by 
having numerous characters define India as a peaceful, ‘spiritual’ space 
(496).  Rushdie thus indicates that America’s acceptance of certain 
exceptional non-whites within its cultural fabric does little to prevent a 
prevalent racialisation which damages the lives of the vast majority of non-
whites who lack the fame and wealth to resist their construction as a 
subrace.  This racialisation proves so forceful that even Ormus and Vina’s 
attempts to transcend race-thinking only succeed partially. 
 As with Saladin’s failed attempts at assimilation within a racist Britain 
in Verses, Rushdie suggests in Ground that one cannot escape racism 
entirely or indefinitely by fashioning a new self.  Despite her success in the 
music business and the Civil Rights movement, Vina remains conscious of 
her race and her attendant precarious position in American society.  Unlike 
Ormus, whose fervour for modern epigenetics leads him to attempt 
deracination, ‘life at the frontier of the skin always made Vina 
uneasy[…]Vina also dreamed of lynch mobs, of burning crosses.  If such 
horror was happening to anyone, anywhere, it might yet someday happen 
to her’ (413).  Vina’s past experience of American race-thinking makes her 
deeply conscious of racism’s enduring presence within the nation’s society.  
She maintains that anyone potentially can become American but 
acknowledges simultaneously, as does Foucault in his writings on ‘the 
internal racism of permanent purification’ (2004, 62), that anyone may be 
placed into a constructed subrace: even a rich, successful rock star at the 
heart of America’s celebrity culture. 
 Even Ormus, who goes beyond Vina in seeking to escape not just 
race but the signifier of his own phenotype, finds that ‘the frontier of the skin’ 
(Rushdie 2000, 55), in spite of the epigenetic discoveries he lauds, cannot 
be transcended in a twentieth-century world pervaded globally by multiple 
racisms.  His decision, mindful of ‘the link between deracination and 
success’, that ‘the taking of a stage name is not a dishonourable act’ (291) 
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comes back to haunt him when he attempts a musical tour of India.  His own 
brother persuades the Indian government that Ormus’ ‘self-hating, 
deracinated music has long been at the service[…]of the arrogance of the 
West, where the world’s tragedy is repackaged as youth entertainment and 
given an infectious, foot-tapping beat’ (556).  Ormus finds himself and his 
music drawn into a debate on race and neo-colonialism which leads to his 
being banned from India on the grounds of betraying his homeland through 
his supposed Westernisation and deracination.  His being barred from India 
does not significantly affect him psychologically.  Nevertheless, Rushdie 
uses the episode to indicate how attempts to void categories of phenotype, 
race and nation often meet with resentment from those whose interests lie 
in maintaining these racialising distinctions, whether they be biopolitical 
governments or individual citizens frightened to attempt such a 
transgression themselves. 
 In Ground Rushdie depicts an uncharacteristically high number of 
fissures in racist discourses, and obstacles to their biopolitical shaping of 
twentieth-century society.  Whereas the British state defeats all attempts to 
resist racialisation in Verses, Ground, though it describes racism in Britain 
in similar terms to its predecessor, portrays America as a space that affords 
its non-white inhabitants a better chance to escape racism and race-
thinking.  However, Rushdie indicates the rarity and provisionality of this 
escape.  Even Vina and Ormus’ success in liberating themselves from 
racialisation fails significantly to impair race-thinking in America or to shield 
them entirely from its effects.  By asserting race-thinking’s pervasiveness 
and biopolitical governance’s efficacy not just in America but globally, Fury 
extinguishes even this limited possibility of transcending race. 
Fury: The Persistence of Race-Thinking 
The attenuated potentiality of resistance to racism that Rushdie depicts in 
Ground disappears in Fury (2001).  Just as the majority of his fiction evokes 
the multiformity and near-impossibility of escaping racism within twentieth-
century (bio)politics, Fury affirms race-thinking’s global pervasiveness at the 
outset of the twenty-first century.  From the novel’s engagement with 
phenotypical racism in American high society, to a science-fiction debate on 
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the very nature of the human race itself, to the culturalist racism that the 
racialisations during this debate inspire in the South Pacific, Rushdie 
indicates that the frontier of the skin remains resolutely intact, as do many 
other frontiers of race.  He suggests once more that states and superraces 
within contemporary biopolitical polities construct and oppress subraces 
invariably effectively using a theoretically infinite array of criteria. 
 In Fury Rushdie depicts far fewer prospects for escaping racialisation 
through remaking the self than in Ground.  He exposes America’s 
inequalities of income and race in the earlier novel, but through VTO’s 
success and Vina’s enthusiasm for the idea of becoming American also 
portrays the United States as a land of possibility and potential escape from 
racism.  By contrast, in Fury Rushdie’s protagonist Malik Solanka finds 
himself adrift in an irredeemable American sea of simulacra, commercial 
excess and barely-suppressed rage (2002, 3).  Rushdie criticises the 
persistence within this modern-day Babylon of the phenotypical racism that 
the discoveries of twentieth-century epigeneticists would have ended if not 
for the determination of racists, inside and outside state institutions, to 
ignore their findings. 
 As in Verses, Rushdie suggests in Fury that phenotypical racism’s 
persistence among the constructed superrace within a racialising culture 
dooms non-white attempts at assimilation to failure.  Jack Rhinehart, a 
successful black journalist, becomes ‘seduced’ (58) by a socio-economic 
elite which will never truly accept someone of his colour as an equal.  The 
white American super-rich coterie of whom Jack writes acerbic profiles view 
him as ‘their house nigger’ (57): a pet of sorts, or a court jester.  Like Saladin 
Chamcha in Verses, who tries to assimilate by performing his ideal of 
conservative British respectability, Jack does everything he can to ingratiate 
himself with the whites he seeks to emulate.  He parrots their right-wing 
political opinions and dances for them like a puppet, performing ‘all the 
obsolete thirty-year-old moves old white people like’ (150).  He ceases to 
think of himself as African-American: ‘He stopped hyphenating himself and 
became, simply, an American’ (57).  Just as Saladin perceives that he does 
not belong to a race (Rushdie 2006c, 267), Jack ‘move[s] in bien-pensant 
circles in which race was “not an issue”: that is, almost everyone [is] white’ 
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(Rushdie 2002, 57).  He persuades himself that he has escaped the black 
subrace that American society constructs.  By showing that Jack persuades 
himself incorrectly, Rushdie once again questions the extent to which non-
whites can resist racialisation within polities in which the state’s racialising 
biopolitics and the white superrace’s phenotypical racism inform and 
embolden each other. 
 In describing Jack’s failed attempts to insinuate himself further within 
America’s white elite, Rushdie characteristically criticises the conjunction of 
the state’s racism and the racism of the superrace it constructs within 
biopolitical polities: 
Neighbours had reported an intruder on the property, and [Jack] was 
it.  It took him close to an hour to persuade the cops that he wasn’t a 
burglar but a bona fide purchaser.  A week later the golf club 
blackballed his application for membership[…]Rhinehart, for whom, 
as he said, ‘being black’s just not the issue any more’, had 
rediscovered, the hard way, that it still was. (151) 
The white, privileged Americans of Jack’s new neighbourhood prove so 
conditioned by discourses associating African-Americans with criminality 
that their phenotypical racism leads them to perceive any black man in their 
residential space as a threat to their security.  Similarly to the racialising 
immigration officers in Verses, who assume Saladin Chamcha to be an 
illegal immigrant because of his phenotype, and Ground’s immigration 
officers, who assume the fraudulence of Darius Cama’s knighthood on 
account of the same, the American police in Fury refuse to countenance the 
legitimacy of a black man’s presence within the nation and its polite society.  
Through detailing the vast effort Jack must expend in order to persuade the 
police of his innocence, Rushdie emphasises how state apparatuses 
condone the prejudices of civilian racists by taking their claims seriously.  
His fiction continues to argue that non-white attempts to assimilate within a 
white-dominated biopolitical polis invariably fail because members of the 
superrace and the government’s racialising agents of polizeiwissenschaft 
persist in constructing them as part of a subrace. 
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 The racism to which America’s white elite subject Jack harms him 
even more grievously than does Saladin’s racialisation in Verses.  Saladin 
regains human form eventually, gives up his attempts at assimilation and 
returns home to a more contented life in India.  Conversely, the privileged 
young white men into whose culture Jack tries to integrate not only racialise 
but kill him.  They sacrifice him ‘on the altar of their invincible, egomaniacal 
pride’ (200) in an unsuccessful bid to scapegoat him for murders they 
committed.  As in Rushdie’s earlier novels, attempts at voiding phenotype 
as a signifier of race fail, as do non-white efforts at assimilation into the 
culture of the constructed white superrace.  However, Fury also continues 
to stress that phenotype names just one of the multiform criteria by which 
states construct subraces.  As Foucault argues, this multiformity means that 
the discursive power of essentialising, fundamentalist race-thinking far 
exceeds that of ideas which would disavow identitarianism or problematise 
the concept of race.  Through his usual augmenting of state-centric notions 
of racialisation with an examination of civilian contributions towards multiple 
racisms, Rushdie asserts that discourses and practices of biopolitical 
racialisation, so prevalent in the twentieth century, show no signs of abating 
in the twenty-first. 
 Rushdie further depicts the power of racialising discourses by 
describing the reception of Solanka’s literary output in Lilliput-Blefuscu, a 
fictional country based on Fiji, which was riven by racial tensions at the time 
Rushdie was writing Fury.4  Solanka’s story problematises essentialist ideas 
of race, yet the resistance movement in Lilliput-Blefuscu appropriates the 
discourses of the characters who seek to reinforce racial hierarchies.  In this 
episode Rushdie indicates racism’s globally diffuse nature in the twenty-first 
century – a racialising political movement in the South Pacific perverts a tale 
of an alien world by a British writer living in America – and reinforces his 
novel’s assertion of humanity’s continuing tendency towards race-thinking. 
 By having Solanka’s fiction engage with the concept of the 
posthuman, Rushdie exposes biological racism’s aporias by suggesting that 
man-made bodies may problematise and exceed fixed notions of superrace 
and subrace.  However, he simultaneously represents humankind’s 
enduring racism based on other criteria.  Solanka’s story takes place on 
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Galileo-1, a fictional alien planet populated by ‘human[s]’ (163) and cyborgs.  
It questions received discourses regarding race, life, identity and humanity.  
In the story the ‘amoral cyberneticist’ (139) Akasz Kronos constructs a race 
of sentient cyborg slaves, the Puppet Kings (PKs).  The PKs prove so 
advanced technologically that they learn eventually ‘how to modify their own 
systems without Kronos’ help’ (165).  They become not only more powerful 
intellectually and physically but more conscious that their maker has created 
them as a subrace.  They develop a sense of ‘rights’ (166) and establish 
their own autonomous community in defiance of both their creator and the 
human ruler of Baburia, the nation-state which hosts them.  The PKs come 
increasingly to think of themselves as humans, and to resemble them.  
Solanka’s fiction constructs a complex web of doppelgangers and doubling 
which problematises the very notions of authentic identity and biological 
humanity.  He pens a fractal, ever-shifting conflict which describes 
‘encounters between “real” and “real”, “real” and “double”, “double” and 
“double”, which blissfully demonstrated the dissolution of the frontiers 
between the categories’ (187).  Similarly to Ormus’ theories in Ground, by 
asserting the mutability of race and humanity in general these encounters 
affirm the possibility of transcending the constructed biological frontiers that 
divide races.  However, Rushdie characteristically implies that the presence 
of oppositional potentiality does not mean its inevitable actualisation.  
Galileo-1 also houses those who would reinforce the frontiers of race.  
Solanka’s collaborator’s summation of the story as a ‘fight to the death 
between the counterfeit and the real’ (177) does not go far enough.  The 
tale of the PKs proves a fight between those who subscribe to this racialising 
dichotomy and those who do not. 
 In describing a debate between Kronos and the Mogol, Baburia’s 
ruler, Solanka stages a conflict, similar to those in late twentieth-century 
biology, between the belief that a subrace can attain the same qualities as 
the supposed superrace, and the perception of an unbridgeable gap.  
Kronos’ 
 explanation of his creations’ arrival at autonomy was rejected by the 
 Mogol with a snort of disbelief.  There followed, in the pages Solanka 
 wrote, a long dispute between the two men on the nature of life itself 
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 – life as created by a biological act, and life as brought into being by 
 the imagination and skill of the living.  Was life ‘natural’, or could the 
 ‘unnatural’ be said to be alive?  Was the imagined world necessarily 
 inferior to the organic one?  Kronos was still a genius in spite of his 
 downfall and long penurious concealment, and he proudly defended 
 his cyborgs: by every definition of sentient existence, they had grown 
 into fully-fledged life-forms.  Like Homo faber, they were users of 
 tools; like Homo sapiens, they reasoned and engaged in moral 
 debate.  They could attend to their ills and reproduce their species, 
 and by shedding him, their maker, they had set themselves free.  The 
 Mogol rejected these arguments out of hand.  A malfunctioning 
 dishwasher did not become a busboy, he argued.  By the same 
 token, a rogue puppet was still a doll, a renegade robot was still a 
 robot.  This was not a fit direction for their discussions to take. (188-
 89) 
Despite his former slave race having rebelled against his tyranny, Kronos 
defends proudly their right to be called human.  He argues that, through 
their physical and intellectual prowess and their disavowal of their maker, 
‘by every definition of sentient existence, they had grown into fully-fledged 
life-forms’ (189).  By contrast, the Mogol continues to assert that race is 
biological rather than a matter of consciousness, self-fashioning or 
perception: ‘a rogue puppet was still a doll, a renegade robot was still a 
robot’ (189).  Similarly to the biopoliticians that Agamben describes, the 
Mogol refuses to regard the PKs as truly alive and hence constructs them 
as homo sacer by not regarding their killing as murder: ‘The term “killed” 
was forbidden; what was not alive could not be dead’ (189).  The PKs 
problematise biological racism through their elevated consciousness, but 
many humans on Galileo-1 prove unwilling to accept race’s constructed 
nature and the provisionality of racial hierarchies. 
 By describing the reception of Solanka’s work by racists in Lilliput-
Blefuscu, Rushdie indicates that the discourses of racialising humans wield 
more power than those of people who problematise frontiers of phenotype 
and race.  The PKs’ fate proves inconclusive.  Because from a business 
standpoint ‘it [is] vital to the project’s long-term prospects that the tale be 
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capable of almost infinite prolongation’ (190), Solanka’s story has no 
ending.  Seemingly decisive victories by one force soon resolve into a 
proliferation of new conflicts and new doublings.  Even ‘[t]he “recantation of 
Kronos”, his declaration that machines had no souls whereas man was 
immortal, [which] was greeted by the deeply religious Baburian people as a 
mighty victory’ (189), does not presage a final Baburian triumph or convince 
the PKs of their subraciality.  Hence, no final victor emerges in the war or in 
any of its sub-conflicts.  Solanka’s fiction offers no answer as to which 
conception of race – problematising or fundamentalist – carries the most 
discursive power on Galileo-1. 
 However, the way in which Rushdie depicts how Lilliput-Blefuscu 
receives Solanka’s fiction suggests that the dominant discourses of identity 
amongst state and non-state agents alike on twenty-first century Planet 
Earth continue to be racialising, essentialist and culturalist.  The Fremen, 
an Indo-Lilliputian resistance group, appropriate Solanka’s work selectively 
in order to justify their racism.  The faction don the masks of the PKs, but 
eschew their racial anti-essentialism.  Both inside and outside of 
government, the members of this bioculturally racialising political movement 
disavow the arguments that Kronos and his cyborgs make regarding the 
provisionality and constructed nature of race.  Instead they follow the Mogol 
in regarding themselves as irrevocably different from their perceived 
enemies and, moreover, as an inherently superior race. 
 Rushdie establishes numerous parallels between the PKs and the 
Fremen in order to suggest the persistence of the politics of hierarchical 
race-thinking in the twenty-first century.  The Fremen’s appropriation and 
perversion of the PKs’ slogan, ‘Let the fittest survive’ (167) proves the most 
important of these parallels.  Although the PKs’ use of this phrase implies 
that they regard themselves as superior to the Baburians, their conception 
of superrace and subrace arises not from biological essentialism but from 
their belief that they have transcended their earlier subracial enslavement 
and become a stronger and more intelligent race.  Additionally, the PKs do 
not demand that their perceived superiority be recognised, but simply that 
‘the “Peekays” and Baburians must live on their twin islands as equals’ 
(167).  The PKs engage in a form of race-thinking, but one that conceives 
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race as mutable and non-hierarchical.  Conversely, the Fremen appropriate 
‘Let the fittest survive!’ (227) to justify racial essentialism and their 
construction of the Indo-Lilliputians as superrace.  By describing how 
Solanka’s story, which presents problematising and fundamentalist 
accounts of race as equally powerful, becomes a totem for racists Rushdie 
affirms humanity’s tendency towards racialisation when presented with both 
arguments. 
 Rushdie characterises Lilliput-Blefuscu’s bifurcated politics by a 
bioculturalist race-thinking he depicts as endemic amongst political and 
civilian figures on both sides.  Even Malik Solanka’s lover Neela Mahendra, 
who states that when you ‘[s]tir all the races together[…]you get the most 
beautiful people in the world’ (63), believes in an unbridgeable cultural 
difference between the Indo-Lilliputians and the indigenous Elbees.  In an 
effort to gain more rights for her people, constructed as a foreign subrace 
by the Elbee-dominated government and as such forbidden to own land 
despite their being the backbone of the nation’s economy (157-58), Neela 
joins the Fremen and their leader Babur.  However, under Babur’s direction 
the Fremen movement takes a sinister racialising turn.  Babur does not 
simply want ‘justice’ for his people as Neela does (158), but a reversal of 
subrace and superrace.  Growing ranks of Indo-Lilliputian citizens come to 
share this sentiment.  One proclaims to Solanka, 
Indian people of Lilliput-Blefuscu have finally standed up for our right.  
Our culture is ancient and superior and will henceforth prevail.  Let 
the fittest survive, isn’t it.  For one hundred years good-for-nothing 
Elbee cannibals drank grog[…]and made us eat their shit.  Now they 
can eat ours instead. (238) 
In contrast to the PKs’ discourse, the bioculturalist, essentialising and 
racially hierarchical Fremen ideology focuses on revenge rather than 
justice.  In human hands the slogan of Solanka’s fictional cyborgs becomes 
an excuse not to abolish racial hierarchies but to recapitulate them by 
subjugating the supposedly unfit. 
 Neela’s growing disgust at Babur’s fascist racialising leads her to 
sacrifice herself to defeat him.  However, the Fremen’s fall offers only a 
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minimal boon to the prospect of a future free of race-thinking.  Rushdie 
suggests in Fury that the twenty-first century will not see an end to the 
multifariousness, pervasiveness and near-impossibility of escaping racism 
that his novels have explored frequently within twentieth-century 
(bio)politics.  As in Midnight two decades earlier, he remains sceptical that 
attempts to move beyond the frontier of the skin, or frontiers of constructed 
identity in general, can prove effective.  In complementing his fictional 
exploration of American phenotypical racism by describing the Fremen’s 
twisting of Solanka’s narrative attempt to problematise race into a biocultural 
racist discourse, Rushdie indicates an enduring tendency towards race-
thinking, animated by infinitely variable criteria, amongst humans inside and 
outside political structures in all corners of the globe; from India to Britain, 
from America to the South Pacific.  Fury constitutes another Rushdie novel 
which exceeds Foucault’s state-centric conception of racism by exploring 
and criticising not only the multiple ways in which contemporary 
biopoliticians racialise, but how civilians bolster the state’s power through 
their own race-thinking.  Rushdie again invites a reading which augments 
Foucault’s thought and hence suggests ways by which future biopolitical 
readings of race in literature might proceed. 
Conclusion: Frontiers of Biopolitics and 
Thanatopolitics 
Rushdie’s novels present the possibility of resistance to race-thinking, but 
remain consistently doubtful that it can operate effectively.  Multiple 
interrelated racialisations by states and populations characterise each of his 
fictionalised locales.  In Midnight Rushdie depicts a prevalent phenotypical 
racism in post-independence India to which the nation’s biopolitical 
government adds further subraces through its sterilisation programme.  
Verses and Ground indicate that the colonialist race-thinking that influences 
much of the phenotypical racism in Midnight did not end with the advent of 
modern biology or the end of the British Empire, but lives on in a post-
imperial British nation which discriminates against non-whites when these 
constructed subraces emigrate to the land of their former colonial rulers.  
America in Ground and Fury proves only a provisional and temporary refuge 
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from race-thinking.  In the latter, racialisation reappears in metropole and 
far-flung periphery alike, from Jack Rhinehart’s racialisation to the Indo-
Lilliputian political movement which reads Solanka’s stories and adopts not 
their problematising of race and human identity but their primary villain’s 
fascist, essentialist racism.  In engaging with twentieth- and twenty-first-
century history Rushdie’s fiction criticises the multiple phenotypical, 
culturalist, ethnicist, worldwide and persistent racisms that have 
characterised the biopolitical discourses and actions of states and 
populations in these periods.  By emphasising the symbiotic relationship 
between state and para-state racisms, it offers an exemplary site through 
which to develop a biopolitical literary criticism that suggests the limits of 
Foucault’s state-centric analysis of race, both as a theory of real-life politics 
and as a means of reading the ways in which literature represents biopower. 
 In Shalimar the Clown, Rushdie’s most recent novel to deal 
extensively with biopolitics, he continues to depict race-thinking’s 
persistence in twentieth-century politics and society.  Through his fictional 
elegy for Kashmir he exposes the thanatopolitical component of a 
biopolitical state racialisation in which, as Foucault argues, ‘massacres have 
become vital’ (1990, 137).  He shows how mass killings have become 
viewed increasingly as a necessary component in maintaining biopolitical 
order, a dynamic he explores more briefly in Midnight and Shame.  The next 
chapter of this thesis argues that by emphasising the ways in which pre-
existing racism causes massacres under certain circumstances Rushdie’s 
novels invite a biopolitical reading, and therefore suggest indirectly a theory 
of biopolitics, that conceives of thanatopolitics as a conditional potentiality 
inherent within biopolitics.  Just as Chapter One augmented Foucault’s 
theory of state race-thinking in order to explore fully the ways in which 
Rushdie depicts racism, Chapter Two will critique both Agamben’s 
argument for the homology of biopolitics and thanatopolitics, and Esposito’s 
assertion of their antinomy.  Using this conception of thanatopolitics to 
analyse the degrees to which Midnight, Shame and Shalimar evoke the 
possibility of resisting or escaping thanatopolitical massacres, this chapter 
builds upon Chapter One’s gestures towards delineating a trajectory of 
waning oppositional potentiality across Rushdie’s successive fictionalised 
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twentieth-century polities.  This trajectory culminates in Shalimar, in which 
massacres prove especially pervasive, racialised, and difficult to resist. 
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Chapter Two – Thanatopolitics 
Introduction: Lingering Sovereignty 
Chapter One argued that Rushdie’s novels persistently depict racism’s 
deleterious effects on the bodies, psyches and rights of the racialised.  In 
Midnight’s Children, Shame and Shalimar the Clown Rushdie further 
suggests the severity of these effects by describing how the state’s race-
thinking often engenders mass killing under circumstances of political 
instability or perceived insecurity.  Chapter Two contrasts the relatively 
resistible thanatopolitical violence he depicts in Midnight and Shame with 
the more pervasive and effective racialised production of death in Shalimar, 
in which the state’s lethal potentiality emerges most frequently and 
devastatingly.  It begins to trace the trajectory of lessening potentiality for 
effective resistance that characterises Rushdie’s successive fictional 
representations of twentieth-century polities. 
 Under classical sovereignty political power functions as absolute and 
deductive of human rights and human life.  Conversely, modern biopower 
operates productively by diffusing sovereignty through various apparatuses 
and technologies which act on behalf of the sovereign and aim at creating 
healthy, vigorous, useful human bodies.  However, biopolitics retains the 
sovereign power to punish to the fullest extent of the law the human 
encumbrances who threaten, or are perceived to threaten, society’s order 
and security.  Biopolitics thus deploys the technologies of mass killing 
wielded by older regimes of classical sovereignty, but to a new end: 
preserving the superrace of productive bodies that it creates. 
 Rushdie’s fiction details the lethal actions of para-state forces 
including racist members of superraces, multinational terrorist groups in The 
Satanic Verses and regional biopolitical governments in The Moor’s Last 
Sigh and The Ground Beneath Her Feet.  However, his novels indicate that 
the central biopolitical state possesses the greatest capacity to produce 
racialised death on a mass scale, through its numerous armies and 
administrators.  In Rushdie, racialising states perpetrate the most 
devastating and vividly described episodes of mass killing: the atrocities 
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committed during Bangladesh’s war of independence in Midnight; Raza 
Hyder’s violence against tribals around the city of Q. in Shame; and the 
especially overwhelming crackdown of India’s army in Kashmir in Shalimar.  
He frequently depicts how the state legitimates human encumbrances’ 
harassment by police, their placing into a state of exception or even their 
sterilisation by constructing them as subrace.  Yet by fictionalising historical 
massacres he also exposes how the enduring sovereign power inherent in 
biopolitics impacts upon subraces not merely by denying rights or 
preventing new subracial life from being created but by destroying the mass 
of racialised bodies.  For Rushdie, death proves always potentially present 
in contemporary politics.  His novels describe how the biopolitical state 
produces death when it believes that massacring subraces safeguards most 
effectively its security and that of the superrace it constructs; the 
circumstances under which biopolitics, through wielding the sovereign right 
to kill, becomes thanatopolitics.  That Rushdie suggests more and more the 
difficulty of resisting these thanatopolitical acts, and portrays the conditions 
which produce them as increasingly common, demonstrates his fiction’s 
growing assertion of race-thinking’s persistence, the biopolitical state’s 
power and lethal sovereignty’s lingering potentiality in the twentieth century. 
Thanatopolitics: A Potentiality within Biopolitics 
Massacres do not pervade Rushdie’s fictional worlds.  Rather, his novels 
show how mass killings by state apparatuses occur under certain 
circumstances in which pre-existing racist logics of biopower lead to deadly 
attempts at securitising state and population against subraces.  
Consequently, constructing a theory of thanatopower appropriate to 
studying Rushdie requires engaging with Giorgio Agamben and Roberto 
Esposito’s useful work on twentieth-century massacres, while critiquing 
their assessments of the relationship between biopolitics and 
thanatopolitics.  Whereas Agamben asserts the homology of the two, and 
Esposito their antinomy, in his emphasis on the conditionality of massacres 
Rushdie problematises both of these theories indirectly.  Chapter Two 
argues that his fiction invites a biopolitical reading which conceives 
thanatopolitics as a potentiality inherent within biopolitics.  This theory of 
105 
 
thanatopolitics allows this chapter to draw clearly a trajectory across 
Rushdie’s novels in which he suggests increasingly that political instability 
and the state’s perceived insecurity prove liable to transmute discursive 
racism and biopolitical oppression into massacres which prove difficult to 
resist or escape. 
 The extent to which biopolitics is already, or can become, 
thanatopolitics has been debated widely.  Michel Foucault is ambivalent on 
the issue.  His earliest published work on biopolitics argues that ‘massacres 
have become vital’ (Foucault 1990, 137) for the state to optimise and order 
its population as a whole.  In his most detailed examination of race and 
racism, Society Must Be Defended, he explores the state’s use of the 
categories of superrace and subrace to vindicate these apparently vital 
massacres: ‘racism justifies the death-function in the economy of biopower 
by appealing to the principle that the death of others makes one biologically 
stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or a population’ (Foucault 
2004, 258).  Foucault’s thought on biopower and race asserts that in times 
of political instability the biopolitical state’s racialisation of its people may 
lead it to massacre the subrace of human encumbrances it has constructed 
in the name of national security. 
  However, elsewhere in Foucault’s writing he indicates that he 
considers some genocidal governmental actions to exceed biopower’s 
limits.  He argues that a state’s use of the atom bomb ‘cannot be power, 
biopower, or the power to guarantee life, as it has been ever since the 
nineteenth century’ (253).  Foucault posits massacres as a vital component 
of biopolitics, but stresses their qualitative difference from the power to 
guarantee life that techniques of biopolitical optimisation wield. 
 Foucault’s ambiguity regarding the relationship between biopolitics 
and thanatopolitics has led later thinkers, such as Agamben and Esposito, 
to evaluate diversely the extent to which biopolitical practices of life 
incorporate, or transform into, thanatopolitical practices of death.  For 
Agamben, contemporary biopolitics is always already thanatopolitics.  In 
Homo Sacer he claims that ‘[i]f there is a line in every modern state marking 
the point at which the decision on life becomes a decision on death, and 
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biopolitics can turn into thanatopolitics, this line no longer appears today as 
a stable border dividing two clearly distinct zones’ (Agamben 1998, 122).  
Agamben allows that biopolitics has not always been thanatopolitics, but 
argues that the twentieth century saw the pervasive homology of the two. 
 Esposito also asserts that thanatopolitical actions became more 
widespread in the twentieth century.  However, whereas Agamben argues 
that the two formerly distinct zones of biopolitics and thanatopolitics have 
merged in recent history, Esposito does not conceive twentieth-century 
biopolitics and thanatopolitics as always already coterminous, or even as 
circumstantially coterminous, but as firmly contiguous opposites.  He claims 
that ‘under certain conditions, [the] biopolitical vector is turned into its 
thanatopolitical opposite, thereby linking the battle for life to a practice of 
death’ (Esposito 2013, 71).  These conditions arise when the racialising 
biopolitical government perceives that eliminating the human 
encumbrances which refuse to conform to its technologies of ordering will 
securitise most effectively the state and the superrace it constructs. 
 Understanding the ways in which Rushdie’s fiction increasingly 
criticises state race-thinking by drawing upon the racist discourses, laws 
and violences that engendered massacres in the twentieth century requires 
a biopolitical reading that conceives thanatopolitics as a conditional 
potentiality inherent within biopolitics.  Hence, this chapter departs from both 
Agamben’s theory of twentieth-century biopolitics as intrinsically 
thanatopolitical, and Esposito’s characterisation of thanatopolitics as the 
power to destroy life against which biopolitics constitutes the power to 
promote life.  Contrary to Agamben, Rushdie’s novels suggest that 
thanatopolitics, as Esposito argues, arises only under certain conditions, in 
certain spaces and at certain times.  However, because Rushdie presents 
biopolitics as mass killing caused by racialising elements intrinsic to 
biopower, he also problematises Esposito’s claim that biopolitics and 
thanatopolitics are diametrically opposed.  In Rushdie, biopolitics appears 
as the power to promote life tempered by the will to promote only some.  His 
fiction indicates the existence of a border between biopolitics and its 
inherent thanatopolitical elements which governments cross when they 
massacre the subraces they have created.  Arguing for a continuum 
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between biopolitics and thanatopolitics rather than an opposition or a 
homology, a more nuanced theory of the relationship between the two 
categories which may illuminate future studies of biopolitics in literature and 
beyond, reveals most productively the ways in which Rushdie depicts 
racialised massacres. 
 Rushdie portrays these border crossings occurring in times of 
national insecurity.  He explores the circumstances under which the central 
government perceives such a threat from the unruliness of human 
encumbrances that it massacres them, and uses their status of subrace to 
justify the act to the superrace.  Departing from Agamben’s and Esposito’s 
assessments of the categorical relationship between biopolitics and 
thanatopolitics, this chapter argues that Rushdie’s novels indicate that 
biopolitics does not become thanatopolitics inevitably, nor does it become 
completely qualitatively different when it does so.  However, because 
Agamben and Esposito theorise how the state uses its construction of 
subraces to validate their attempted annihilation, their work on techniques 
and discourses of thanatopower proves useful in reading the ways in which 
Rushdie represents massacres and the circumstances leading to them. 
 Agamben theorises perceptively the means by which the state 
produces a subrace and subsequently cleanses it thanatopolitically in order 
to protect the superrace.  Homo sacer – the subrace which he conceives as 
lacking the protection of the rights and laws afforded to the superrace – 
emerges frequently within the states of exception that governments in 
Rushdie’s novels produce.  Augmenting a focus on state apparatuses with 
an examination of para-state racisms, Esposito explores how communities 
attempt to secure themselves from what the state constructs as a threat.  
He perceives this process, which he calls immunisation, as progressively 
prevalent and deadly in recent history.  His thought exposes the twentieth-
century state’s unprecedented heights of paranoia, racialisation and 
exclusionary logic culminating in thanatopolitics, which Rushdie’s novels 
indict.  Using Agamben and Esposito’s philosophy, while arguing that 
governments release the thanatopolitical potentiality within biopolitics only 
conditionally, provides a conceptual framework through which to chart how 
Rushdie’s fiction stresses increasingly that the race-thinking and paranoid 
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securitising of twentieth-century biopolitical states against their outlying, 
resistant people and regions proved liable to engender massacres. 
Giorgio Agamben: Homo Sacer 
Rushdie frequently suggests that states and superraces construct subraces 
as not quite human and therefore not deserving of the same juridical 
protection.  Agamben’s identification of homo sacer – a subrace whose 
uncertain legal status and rights enable the state to enact and justify their 
elimination – thus illuminates how Rushdie describes the state’s massacres 
of these racialised bodies in times of political crisis. 
 Agamben bases his conception of biopolitics on a theory of how 
states produce indistinction.  He introjects an examination of the law and its 
racialising operations into the study of biopolitics in order to critique the 
supposed antinomy of superrace and subrace: concerns he perceives as 
lacking in Foucault.  Agamben draws a distinction between the superrace 
of bios (life that has the right to participate in politics and the community) 
and the subrace of zoē (life lacking this right).  He posits the existence of a 
further subrace called bare life, or homo sacer, within antiquity and 
modernity alike.  In his book of the same name he argues that the biopolitical 
state produces this subrace by creating a state of exception which 
problematises laws and norms, and the borders between them.  Within the 
state of exception, in which certain humans are constructed as homo sacer, 
‘exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoē, right and fact, 
enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction’ (Agamben 1998, 9).  For 
Agamben, ‘the state of exception is neither external nor internal to the 
juridical order’ (2005, 23) of the biopolitical state.  As it proves consequently 
‘impossible to distinguish transgression of the law from execution of the law, 
such that what violates a rule and what conforms to it coincide without any 
remainder’ (57), the government renders law not quite law, rights not quite 
rights and life not quite life. 
 Because life is not quite life within the state of exception, death is not 
quite death.  Agamben argues that ‘the killing of homo sacer does not 
constitute homicide’ (102) in the eyes of the state, nor in the eyes of the 
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superrace whom the state persuades that the dead were never fully alive.  
The state’s capacity to construct the discursive, disciplinary and spatial state 
of exception means that the killing of bare life is permitted and justifiable if 
it becomes necessary.  States may therefore use the state of exception as 
a means to wage full-blown thanatopolitical campaigns of massacres 
against the human encumbrances they identify as a danger to the superrace 
and to the nation’s smooth biopolitical running.  Agamben perceives these 
campaigns as increasingly common in twentieth-century history. 
 Rushdie’s fiction also suggests that racialising massacres grew in 
intensity and frequency in the twentieth century.  Examples of massacred 
homo sacer abound in the twentieth-century polities that his novels imagine.  
Bangladeshis in Midnight, tribals in Shame and Kashmiris in Shalimar all 
find themselves placed into a state of exception by governments who use 
their status as bare life to enable and later vindicate their killing on a huge 
scale.  However, Agamben’s illuminating exploration of the juridical 
indistinction that allows homo sacer and the state of exception to be 
produced proves unclear regarding precisely why and how the associated 
production of death purportedly intensified in recent history.  This lack of 
clarity arises from Agamben’s insistence on the homology of biopolitics and 
thanatopolitics in the twentieth century, which prevents him from 
considering in detail the conditions under which biopolitics begets 
thanatopolitics.  Understanding how Rushdie describes the actions through 
which states convert homo sacer into dead bodies requires a biopolitical 
reading which augments Agamben’s insights with a theory of the conditions 
under which thanatopolitics manifests. 
 Esposito comprehensively explores the paranoid, racialising 
immunitary practices of the contemporary biopolitical state that, according 
to him, cause not the merging of biopolitics with thanatopolitics but the 
former to transform into the latter under certain conditions.  Esposito goes 
too far in arguing that the two categories are diametrically opposed.  He 
imputes a less deadly meaning to the term ‘biopolitics’ than other critics and 
thus attributes massacres to the separate and opposite category of 
thanatopolitics.  However, when subracial categories such as homo sacer 
are considered as a means by which the thanatopolitical potentiality of 
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biopolitics can emerge in a politics of the massacre, Esposito’s genealogy 
of circumstantial immunisation contributes towards a thorough biopolitical 
reading of the insecurity, paranoia and conditional massacres that 
characterise the actions of twentieth-century governments in Rushdie’s 
novels. 
Roberto Esposito: Immunitas 
Rushdie’s novels Midnight, Shame and Shalimar expose twentieth-century 
states’ attempts to securitise themselves and their populations during 
political crises by massacring the subraces they produce and using their 
victims’ status as subrace to justify the massacre to the increasingly 
paranoid and racialising superrace.  Esposito’s deconstruction of this 
combined state and para-state racialisation argues for the growing 
pervasiveness of a circumstantial thanatopolitics in the century Rushdie’s 
fiction represents most frequently.  His theory of immunisation defines the 
conditions for thanatopolitics: the increasing mobility of populations and 
commodities; the subsequent insecurity that communities perceive; and the 
state’s tendency to respond to this insecurity – and its own – by 
scapegoating and massacring the subraces it constructs.  Identifying the 
growing prevalence of these conditions, and the immunising massacres 
they beget, in Rushdie’s fictional locales helps reveal a trajectory of 
lessening potentiality for effective resistance in his own deconstruction of 
twentieth-century thanatopolitics. 
 For Esposito, understanding biopolitics requires an examination of 
twentieth-century history that is all but absent from Foucault’s work: ‘only 
when biopolitics is linked conceptually to the immunitary dynamic of the 
negative protection of life does biopolitics reveal its specifically modern 
genesis’ (2008, 9).  He conceives immunisation (immunitas) as the process 
by which the totally inclusive and non-racialising ideal of communitas gives 
way to a ‘community of death’ (Esposito 2013, 15).  This community cannot 
bear to include all humans or to imagine commonalities with, and 
responsibilities to, the marginal and different.  Instead, it constructs people 
on society’s margins as a risk to the nation in the same way that, as Foucault 
argues, the biopolitical state racialises human encumbrances who resist 
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biopower’s optimising embrace.  The community perceives a common 
enemy’s identification, and often its thanatopolitical destruction, as essential 
to securitise itself against the disorder and terror of communitas: ‘[t]he 
community can survive the violence that traverses it only by shifting violence 
onto an enemy that is able to attract it’ (Esposito 2010, 33).  The state thus 
identifies a subrace against which to securitise the community.  It racialises 
this social group as less than human so that it may be massacred if 
necessary (a similar dynamic to that which Agamben calls the production of 
homo sacer). 
 Esposito argues that these securitising tendencies became more 
widespread than ever in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  In this 
period populations, races, currencies and weapons have become 
increasingly mobile.  Communities feel consequently less secure in their 
being, property and socio-economic status.  They are therefore more likely 
to demand protection from subraces: 
In the moment in which liberty is no longer understood as a mode of 
being, but rather as a right to have something of one’s own – more 
precisely the full predominance of oneself in relation to others – the 
subtractive or simply the negative sense is already destined to 
characterise it ever more dominantly. (Esposito 2008, 72) 
For Esposito, ‘[i]t would seem that, instead of adjusting the level of 
protection to the actual presence of risk, we [are] adjusting instead the 
perception of risk to the growing demand for protection.  That is, risk is 
artificially created in order to control it’ (2013, 62).  This process benefits 
superrace and state alike.  Esposito notes that ‘[t]he more individuals seek 
to defend from others what is proper to them, the more they must allow 
themselves to be appropriated by the collectivity intended to defend their 
defence’ (2011, 26).  Hence, similarly to Foucault’s theory of an earlier 
historical transition from race war discourse to racism, he argues that when 
states enacted thanatopolitics in the twentieth century populations proved 
much more prone to view massacres as necessary to securitise them. 
 Yet Esposito asserts that neither biopolitics nor thanatopolitics can 
truly securitise the superrace, for the state does not offer protection against 
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the state itself.  As Foucault does in conceiving ‘the internal racism of 
permanent purification’ (2004, 62), Esposito argues that members of the 
superrace are always at risk of being placed into a subracial category.  The 
more paranoid the state, the fewer citizens remain bios: ‘immunisation in 
high doses means sacrificing every form of qualified life, for reasons of 
simple survival’ (Esposito 2013, 61). 
 Esposito’s deconstruction of immunisation advocates replacing 
immunitary community with communitas, but acknowledges the increasing 
prevalence of the politics of the massacre – the most extreme form of 
immunisation – in contemporary (bio)politics.  He perceives the twentieth 
century as characterised by heightened mobility of populations, superraces 
and governments’ attendant growing use of immunitary logic and the state’s 
subsequent and theoretically limitless thanatopolitical production of death 
under the conditions of a perceived insecurity.  Because he departs from 
Agamben in examining why thanatopolitics manifests in certain times and 
spaces, Esposito’s theory of immunitas enables this chapter to augment 
Agamben’s work on the state of exception and thus produce a theory of 
circumstantial thanatopolitics adequate to exploring its depiction in 
literature.  Rushdie’s exploration of the conditions under which the 
production of homo sacer engendered massacres in twentieth-century 
history suggests the necessity of this theory.  In turn, its ability to chart the 
growing degree to which Rushdie depicts massacres as an effective political 
technology indicates its utility. 
 Rushdie’s fiction frequently criticises the extreme immunisation that 
often results from the race-thinking he portrays as permanent in the nations 
and communities he fictionalises.  A biopolitical reading which utilises and 
critiques Agamben and Esposito reveals that Rushdie suggests that the 
actualisation of biopolitics’ thanatopolitical potentiality under conditions of 
perceived insecurity came increasingly to characterise twentieth-century 
government, and that he progressively indicates the difficulty of resisting 
these immunitary practices.  Rushdie describes the racialising 
thanatopolitics of Pakistan’s military during Bangladesh’s war of 
independence in Midnight and the violent suppression of regionalist rebels 
in an allegorical version of the country in Shame.  However, both of these 
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novels also expose state thanatopower’s limits.  Conversely, in representing 
India’s military crackdown against Kashmiri militants in the 1980s and 
1990s, Shalimar infers the near-impossibility of resisting massacres.  
Contrasting Shalimar with Rushdie’s earlier depictions of thanatopolitics 
traces the trajectory of waning potentiality that his fiction evokes regarding 
effective resistance to racialising immunisation and the state massacres it 
engenders. 
Thanatopolitics in Midnight’s Children and Shame 
Rushdie presents Pakistan’s recent history as characterised by 
thanatopolitics.  In Midnight he depicts East Pakistan’s secession and the 
lethal, surreally intense but resistible violence of the subsequent civil war in 
1971.  In Shame he uses a fictionalised version of the Pakistani 
government’s military campaign against rebellious tribals in mid-1970s 
Balochistan to suggest that governments of nations comprised of 
irreconcilable elements may securitise themselves effectively against 
threats from outlying regions by producing death, though not indefinitely.  
Reading both novels through the biopolitical critical methodology detailed 
above shows that Rushdie emphasises and describes how pervasive pre-
existing discourses of racialisation within state institutions (intended to 
engender security and national unity) lead to thanatopolitical massacres 
which attempt to prevent further instability under conditions of political crisis 
or perceived threats to the state from human encumbrances.  The 
governments of the fictionalised Pakistan in Midnight and Peccavistan, 
Shame’s version of Pakistan ‘at a slight angle to reality’ (Rushdie 1996b, 
29), seek to immunise themselves and their superrace by constructing 
homo sacer and then massacring it.  In these early novels Rushdie indicates 
that a state’s use of thanatopolitics does not guarantee that a nation or a 
government will remain intact, a notion he largely excises from Shalimar.  
However, the devastating strength of immunitary operations in his fictional 
versions of Pakistan in Midnight and Shame suggests the ease with which 
racialisation becomes lethal in the state’s hands, and the human cost of this 
thanatopolitics. 
114 
 
Thanatopolitics in Midnight’s Children: Military Interventions and Resistance 
in East Pakistan 
Rushdie focuses most of Midnight’s depiction of twentieth-century politics 
around a fictionalised version of India’s nation-state which he presents as 
racialising and biopolitical.  However, whereas India’s government in the 
novel practices a sinister biopolitics, Pakistan’s immunising militarised state 
actualises biopolitics’ thanatopolitical potentiality in a bid to maintain 
territorial integrity and stability.  Though unsuccessful, this attempt has 
deadly consequences.  In his treatment of the historical military atrocities 
through which Pakistan’s central state attempted to prevent its East Wing’s 
secession in 1971, Rushdie lays bare the vulnerability of racialising 
thanatopolitical governments despite their oppressive violence.  Yet at the 
same time he suggests the lethality of thanatopolitical practices and the 
permanence of the race-thinking that engenders them. 
 In Midnight Rushdie emphasises the state’s immunitary, 
thanatopolitical tendencies in post-independence Pakistan.  The military 
techniques of mass killing that he describes constitute thanatopolitics 
because a pre-existing profile of bare life animates their meticulously 
planned efforts to securitise a state and a superrace against secession.  
Rushdie depicts Pakistan as an artificially created nation of heterogeneous 
regions and cultures constantly on the verge of fragmenting.  Unlike the 
similarly heterogeneous India, a nation created by British colonists and 
which Rushdie’s protagonist Saleem describes as ‘a dream we all agreed 
to dream[...]a collective fiction in which anything was possible’ (2008, 150), 
Pakistan in Midnight lacks an ethos of unity-in-diversity strong enough to 
combine its constituent regions into a stable territorial formation.  The 
actions of West Pakistan’s army in the novel confirm Saleem Sinai’s 
appraisal of ‘the fear of schizophrenia, of splitting, that was buried like an 
umbilical cord in every Pakistani heart’ (490).  In showing how the army’s 
paranoid racialisation of every East Pakistani as secessionist subversives 
leads to thanatopolitical massacres when secession occurs, Rushdie’s 
novel indirectly indicates the need for a biopolitical literary criticism that 
treats thanatopolitics as a potentiality inherent within racialising biopolitics. 
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 Rushdie portrays West Pakistan’s military campaign in Bangladesh 
as a premeditated security operation of thanatopolitical state terror.  
Historians have stressed that the attack on Bangladesh used technologies 
of knowledge and centralised planning (techniques characteristic of 
biopolitics).  As Ian Talbot argues, ‘[w]hat is most chilling[...]is not the level 
of the violence unleashed on 25 March 1971, but the meticulous planning 
which accompanied it.  Parallels with the Nazi Holocaust immediately spring 
to mind’ (1998, 33).  Rushdie emphasises this type of planning by 
presenting the massacres carried out by West Pakistan’s army not as a 
reaction to Bangladesh’s independence but as a calculated tactic to be 
deployed in case of secession.  Its officers base this strategy on a discourse 
which racialises East Pakistanis as subversive human encumbrances and 
constructs them as homo sacer thanatopolitically permitted to be killed. 
 Through Saleem’s sergeant-major’s racialising discourse, Rushdie 
suggests that West Pakistan-dominated state apparatuses constructed 
East Pakistanis as homo sacer even before their nation’s declaration of 
independence.  Sergeant-Major Najmuddin addresses his unit: 
 Purpose of units? – To root out undesirable elements.  Nature of such 
 elements? – Sneaky, well-disguised, could-be-anyone.  Known 
 intentions of same? – To be abhorred: destruction of family life, 
 murder of God, expropriation of landowners, abolition of film-
 censorship.  To what ends? – Annihilation of the State, anarchy, 
 foreign domination.  Accentuating causes of concern? – Forthcoming 
 elections; and subsequently, civilian rule.  (Political prisoners have 
 been are being freed.  All types of hooligans are abroad.)  Precise 
 duties of units? – To obey unquestioningly; to seek unflaggingly; to 
 arrest remorselessly.  Mode of procedure? – Covert; efficient; quick.  
 Legal basis of such detentions? – Defence of Pakistan Rules, 
 permitting the pick-up of undesirables, who may be held 
 incommunicado for a period of six months.  Footnote: a renewable 
 period of six months.  Any questions? –  No.  Good. (Rushdie 2008, 
 485) 
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Here Rushdie stresses race-thinking’s discursive power within West 
Pakistan’s army.  Najmuddin orders his troops to immunise Pakistan against 
‘undesirable elements’ (485) including pro-independence intellectuals and 
Mukti Bahini guerrillas.  He presents these rebel factions as a threat to 
Pakistan’s morality and its very existence by alleging that the separatists 
desire ‘destruction of family life, murder of God, expropriation of landowners 
[and] abolition of film-censorship’ (485).  He perceives these ideals as 
leading inevitably to ‘[a]nnihilation of the State, anarchy, foreign domination’ 
(485).  However, his racialising logic precludes a precise surgical strike 
against these supposedly subversive groups.  The army categorises East 
Pakistanis as a subrace in their totality in an attempt to securitise Pakistan 
and the simultaneously constructed superrace of West Pakistanis.  The 
undesirable elements ‘could-be-anyone’ (485).  Najmuddin founds his 
strategy for combating this subrace on a discourse of homo sacer that, 
under the ‘Defence of Pakistan Rules’ (485), affords East Pakistanis fewer 
legal rights than the West Wing’s population.  It places every East Pakistani 
into a state of exception which permits the army to imprison them indefinitely 
for ‘a renewable period of six months’ (485) or even kill them.  In outlining 
this operation Najmuddin plays the roles of both questioner and answerer.  
He leaves no room for alternative discourses to enter the planning process, 
save for a cursory query of ‘Any questions?’ (485)  Because this securitising 
strategy racialises it leads to massacres when put into practice in Midnight’s 
later chapters, in which Rushdie fictionalises the circumstances of 
secession under which the thanatopolitical potentiality of West Pakistan’s 
state biopolitics became lethal action. 
 Rushdie depicts West Pakistan’s military campaign in East Pakistan 
as a racist attempt to kill not just confirmed pro-independence intellectuals 
and guerrillas but anybody suspected of being one.   Because the state’s 
extreme immunitary logic renders every Bangladeshi a suspect, intense 
thanatopolitical brutality results.  Rushdie presents the violence’s 
indiscriminate nature and surreal horror as exceeding rationality: 
 Midnight, March 25th, 1971: past the University, which was being 
 shelled, the buddha led troops to Sheikh Mujib’s lair.  Students and 
 lecturers came running out of hostels; they were greeted by bullets, 
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 and Mercurochrome stained the lawns[…]And while we drove 
 through city streets, Shaheed looked out of windows and saw things 
 that weren’t-couldn’t-have-been-true: soldiers entering women’s 
 hostels without knocking; women, dragged into the street, were also 
 entered, and again nobody troubled to knock[…]Ayooba Shaheed 
 Farooq watched in silence through moving windows as our boys, our 
 soldiers-for-Allah, our worth-ten-babus jawans held Pakistan 
 together by turning  flamethrowers machine-guns hand grenades on 
 the city slums. (497) 
Here Rushdie vivifies the shift that takes place as the thanatopolitical 
potentiality within biopolitics, which in the sergeant-major’s racialising 
orders operated only discursively, manifests in sweeping massacres which 
outstrip any violence that Saleem and the boy soldiers he accompanies 
have imagined.  Because the army constructs every Bangladeshi as a 
possible subversive and therefore as homo sacer, it executes students and 
lecturers and rapes women summarily without establishing their complicity 
in fomenting resistance.  Moreover, Saleem’s description of how the army 
‘held Pakistan together by turning flamethrowers machine-guns hand-
grenades on the city slums’ (497) demonstrates that the army’s discourse 
of immunitas leads its soldiers to internalise and believe in a thanatopolitical 
correlation between national security and massacres.  In Midnight Rushdie 
shows how in contemporary biopolitics the state may use immunitary 
discourses successfully to convince its constructed superrace of the 
necessity of sacrificing entire subraces in the name of stability. 
 And yet this concerted operation of deadly immunisation fails to 
securitise Pakistan against secession.  Considering the ways in which 
Rushdie engages with the circumstances under which biopower begets 
massacres in Midnight not only reveals that he portrays thanatopolitics as a 
potentiality inherent within biopolitics rather than asserting the two 
categories’ homology or antinomy, but that he presents this potentiality’s 
actualisation as finite.  Rushdie depicts the indiscriminate lethality of 
racialising thanatopolitics in Bangladesh’s capital and the countryside 
where ‘entire villages are[…]burned owing to their collective responsibility 
for harbouring Mukti Bahini’ (499).  However, he also indicates the limits of 
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its power to securitise territories, governments and superraces.  Even a 
campaign of immunitary violence so intense that every East Pakistani 
becomes homo sacer cannot prevent Bangladesh’s independence.  The 
meaningful presence of West Pakistan’s troops in the East proves 
inadequate as, consequently, does their power to fight the Mukti Bahini and 
to commit massacres.  They kill Bangladeshis by the thousands, and still 
the Mukti Bahini ‘mov[e] invisibly through the smoking land [and] bullets 
come buzzing in like bees-from-nowhere’ (515).  Eventually Indian military 
support helps end the war decisively in Bangladesh’s favour: ‘in a mere 
three weeks Pakistan had lost half her navy, a third of her army, a quarter 
of her air force, and finally, after the Tiger surrendered, more than half her 
population’ (523).  Most of the East Pakistani homo sacer constructed by 
West Pakistan’s racialising state survive potentially to become bios in the 
new state of Bangladesh.  Rushdie indicates immunitary thanatopolitics’ 
limited power to retain a rebellious region and to eradicate the subrace of 
human encumbrances it constructs. 
 Despite the eventual defeat of the instruments of thanatopolitical 
security that Rushdie depicts, Midnight communicates immunitary race-
thinking’s deleterious consequences and the potentiality of thanatopolitical 
violence under circumstances of insecurity in twentieth-century politics.  The 
fictional version of Pakistan’s state that Rushdie portrays in his next novel, 
Shame, wages a thanatopolitical campaign just as devastating as the 1971 
war in Midnight.  However, because this thanatopolitics meets with less 
effective resistance, Shame only augments the previous novel’s suggestion 
of the ease with which racism engenders death under regimes of biopower. 
Thanatopolitics in Shame: Raza Hyder’s War in the West 
Shame (1983) centres on Peccavistan, a fictional nation based on Pakistan.  
In this novel Rushdie again invites a biopolitical reading that conceives 
thanatopolitics as a circumstantially actualised potentiality inherent within 
racialising biopolitics.  Peccavistan’s state, perceiving the country to be 
constantly on the verge of spatial fragmentation, racialises the inhabitants 
of rebellious regions and then practices thanatopolitics on them.  In this 
sense his representation of the nation resembles his portrait of Pakistan in 
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Midnight.  However, Rushdie places greater emphasis on the efficacy of the 
state’s immunitary thanatopolitics and its production of homo sacer than in 
the earlier novel.  He does so by devoting less space to the unsuccessful 
war in the East Wing than the conflict in Balochistan between 1973 and 
1977, which he depicts as a successful act of immunitas.  Popular 
resistance fails to defeat the thanatopolitical campaign in the west.  The 
president’s daughter Sufiya Zinobia merely avenges the slaughter years 
later through bloody murder.  Sufiya’s act of resistance does not hold 
political leaders democratically accountable to the subraces they construct 
and massacre, and comes far too late to save the Outer Rim’s homo sacer.  
In Midnight Rushdie evokes the limitations and resistibility of thanatopolitical 
actions, but in representing the successful quelling of tribal rebellion Shame 
mostly depicts the emergence of biopolitics’ thanatopolitical potentiality as 
devastatingly effective in securitising governments. 
 Rushdie again fictionalises Pakistan as an artificially created nation 
of heterogeneous, incompatible parts.  Peccavistan fails to construct 
effectively a distinct national identity upon the palimpsest of the past, as, 
Rushdie’s narrator argues, does the country upon which he bases Shame’s 
fictional polity: ‘To build Pakistan it was necessary to cover up Indian history, 
to deny that Indian centuries lay just beneath the surface of Pakistani 
Standard Time’ (1996b, 87).  As in Midnight, Rushdie does not so much 
suggest the unity-in-diversity he attributes to India in the earlier book as a 
nation ‘insufficiently imagined, a picture full of irreconcilable elements’ (87).  
In both novels Rushdie’s fictionalised Pakistani state perceives a constant 
risk of secession, racialises those it views as working towards it and hence 
practices thanatopolitics in an attempt to prevent the nation from 
disintegrating.  However, whereas Midnight describes effective resistance 
to thanatopolitics and its discourses and techniques of racialisation, in 
Shame Rushdie indicates more vividly the power of massacres to quell 
rebellion successfully. 
 In Shame, as in Midnight, Rushdie presents thanatopolitics as a 
potentiality innate to biopolitics by fictionalising the pre-existing 
governmental and military racialisation that animated West Pakistan’s 
conduct in the 1971 civil war.  Future Peccavistani Prime Minister Arjumand 
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Harappa refers to the East Wing’s inhabitants as ‘savages, breeding 
endlessly, jungle-bunnies good for nothing but growing jute and rice, knifing 
each other, cultivating traitors in their paddies[...]perhaps not foreigners 
exactly, but aliens without a doubt’ (179).  Yet although Rushdie once again 
engages with the historical racism of Pakistan’s West Wing-dominated 
government towards the East in the years leading up to Bangladesh’s 
secession, and covers secession’s impact on the remaining Peccavistani 
state’s politics, he pays scant attention to the military conflict itself on this 
occasion.  Shame’s version of Pakistan’s civil war lacks the graphic brutality 
of its equivalent in Midnight.  Rushdie fails to depict the state’s 
thanatopolitical massacres in the East Wing, and hence omits any mention 
of the rebel movements that rendered them unable to securitise the nation 
against secession. 
 When Rushdie depicts the massacres that biopolitical racialising 
begets under circumstances of perceived insecurity during his fictional 
analogue for the Pakistani government’s campaign against rebellious tribals 
in mid-1970s Balochistan, he makes little effort to evoke the possibility of 
effective resistance.  The wild, violent spaces in Peccavistan’s west prove 
much more central to Shame’s narrative than East Peccavistan and its 
secession.  Consequently, the army’s thanatopolitical suppression of the 
regional uprising around the ‘remote border town’ (11) of Q. in a successful 
attempt to keep Peccavistan’s remaining provinces together carries more 
importance than the civil war in Rushdie’s exploration of Peccavistan’s 
biopolitics.  This conflict’s relative prominence in the novel, as opposed to 
the defeat of the thanatopolitical campaign in the East Wing, means that 
Shame emphasises the efficacy of immunitary thanatopolitics based on 
race-thinking much more than does Midnight. 
 Rushdie describes the region around Q. as ‘a zone of instability’ (23) 
which the central governmental cannot control completely.  By virtue of its 
remoteness and inhospitable nature this ‘hideously indeterminate’ (30) area 
constitutes a potential space of resistance to biopower.  However, the 
resident tribals’ autonomy and resistance to central government 
immunisation’s devastating violence within this space proves severely 
limited.  Many Rushdie critics have argued that the inability of Shame’s 
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characters to move and resist freely within Peccavistan’s frontier space 
arises from the topography of the space itself.  For example, Catherine 
Cundy laments ‘the rigidity of the framework imposed on the text by the 
internal structure of such motifs as the frontier[...]coalesc[ing] in a way that 
suffocates the internal movement that was so obvious and defining a feature 
of Midnight’s Children’ (1996, 49).1  These readings fail to address the 
specific reason for the borderland’s suffocating quality and the defeat of the 
tribals’ movement for regional autonomy: the thanatopolitical, immunitary 
aspect of the army officer Raza Hyder’s bloody crackdown.  The frontier 
suffocates its inhabitants because Peccavistan’s central government, in an 
attempt to securitise itself and its superrace, racialises the tribals as human 
encumbrances and subsequently sacrifices them thanatopolitically in the 
name of a perceived greater good. 
 As in Midnight, Rushdie suggests that the state’s prior racism begets 
and seeks to justify an ostensibly stabilising thanatopolitics which emerges 
in times of national crisis.  As soon as Peccavistan’s government discovers 
gas fields in the region around Q. ‘the unpatriotic behaviour of the 
intemperate tribals bec[o]me[s] a matter for national concern’ (Rushdie 
1996b, 91).  For the government the tribals’ deadly violence towards the 
engineering team sent to survey the area represents more than a mere act 
of resistance to central government domination.  It proves that they are less 
than human: homo sacer.  The government racialises the tribals as 
‘savages’ (102) because of their brutality, but also because they attempt to 
retain natural resources for the outlying region’s benefit rather than that of 
the privileged superrace.  They become considered human encumbrances 
that present a threat to national unity and security.  In his portrayal of the 
tribals’ subsequent massacring Rushdie characteristically indicates how 
biopolitics’ thanatopolitical potentiality becomes extant under conditions of 
perceived political instability.  Moreover, he evokes the difficulty of resisting 
thanatopolitics to a much greater degree than in Midnight. 
 By describing Raza Hyder’s immunitary activities when he becomes 
administrator of the Q. region, Rushdie again exposes the role of the legal 
indistinction which creates homo sacer in engendering the circumstances 
under which thanatopolitics manifests.  Raza, who argues that ‘[a]t certain 
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moments civil law must bend before military necessity’ (101), ousts the 
region’s chief minister, declares martial law and institutes a state of 
exception.  The space around Q. no longer comprises a spatial 
indeterminacy allowing for freedom of movement and autonomy for the 
tribals, but a juridical indeterminacy which militates against this autonomy 
and renders the tribals homo sacer which may be massacred to protect the 
state, the nation and the superrace.  The army visits horrific immunitary 
violence on the bodies of the rebels, which the shawls of Rani Harappa later 
depict in great detail: ‘the men without genitals, the sundered legs, the 
intestines in place of faces, the alien legion of the dead’ (195). 
 Rushdie refrains from portraying the crackdown as wholly 
suppressive of resistance.  He counterposes the state’s triumphant 
discourse to the vestigial tribal resistance movements that Raza’s 
indiscriminate brutality radicalises: 
 The official version of Hyder’s period of power in the west was that it 
 had been an unmitigated success, and his career was continuing 
 along its upward path.  Dacoity had been eliminated, the mosques 
 were full, the organs of state had been purged[…]of the corruption 
 disease, and separatism was a dead duck[…]but, as Iskander 
 Harappa was fond of telling Omar Khayyam Shakil when the pair of 
 them were in their cups, ‘Fuck me in the mouth, yaar, everybody 
 knows those tribals are running wild out there because Hyder kept 
 hanging innocent people by the balls’. (119) 
Yet despite their efforts the tribals fail to retain the natural resources they 
attempt to defend.  They cannot remove or even destabilise significantly the 
central government, whose production and massacring of homo sacer all 
but quells the uprising.  Unlike the attack on Bangladesh in Midnight, 
Shame’s most vivid depiction of immunitary thanatopolitics represents it as 
both violent and effective. 
 In contrast to Midnight, in Shame Rushdie emphasises 
thanatopolitics’ efficacy in pacifying rebellious outlying regions.  However, 
he also exposes its limits periodically.  Through Sufiya Zinobia’s successful 
campaign of terror against her father Raza Hyder’s biopolitical regime, 
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Rushdie suggests that no government can immunise itself and the nation 
against all threats indefinitely.  Yet Raza’s deposing comes too late to save 
the subrace of the borderlands from annihilation, and does not herald a new 
age of democracy or communitas.  By indicating that bloody violence from 
within the ruling elite wields more power to remove governments than do 
mass resistance movements, Shame evokes only an attenuated potentiality 
for a future free of racialising bio/thanatopolitical oppression. 
 This chapter has used a conception of thanatopolitics as a 
circumstantial but limited potentiality intrinsic to biopolitics, in order to 
contrast Rushdie’s depiction of effective resistance to thanatopolitics in 
Midnight with Shame, in which massacres prove mostly effective in securing 
the state against perceived threats.  It has thus begun to trace a trajectory 
of lessening potential for freedom from biopolitical oppression within 
Rushdie’s successive fictionalisations of twentieth-century history.  This 
biopolitical method of reading reveals that this trajectory culminates with 
Shalimar, Rushdie’s most recent novel to engage with twentieth-century 
biopolitics.  In Shalimar Rushdie mirrors Esposito’s thought most acutely by 
portraying the conditions that beget massacres as increasingly prevalent as 
the century progressed, and by indicating the impossibility of resisting the 
state’s devastatingly effective immunitary thanatopolitics. 
Thanatopolitics in Shalimar the Clown 
Shalimar the Clown (2005) constitutes Rushdie’s bleakest novel in large 
part because he emphasises more forcefully than ever the prevalence of 
massacres and their effectiveness in extinguishing resistance movements 
within recent political history.  Rushdie portrays thanatopolitics as endemic 
globally, from Nazi Germany’s concentration camps to the Indian army’s 
immunitary atrocities in Kashmir.  These campaigns prove more and more 
pervasive throughout a twentieth century marked increasingly by conditions 
of instability and insecurity.  The novel thus indirectly suggests the veracity 
of Esposito’s notion of ‘the accelerating, generalising character’ of 
biopolitics’ ‘contagious drift’ (2011, 2).  A biopolitical reading shows that 
Shalimar evokes only the scantest possibility of effective opposition to 
thanatopolitics and the racialisations that animate it. 
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Thanatopolitics of the Nazi Concentration Camp 
Although Rushdie depicts thanatopolitical massacres frequently, Shalimar 
represents his first extended fictional engagement with Nazism.  He 
describes the horror of the Nazi concentration camps, but also suggests the 
limits of their power to produce death.  After the Second World War the 
French Jew Max Ophuls discovers the full extent of the Jews’ reduction to 
homo sacer.  Victims include his parents, whom the Nazis exterminate in a 
thanatopolitical attempt to optimise the superrace: ‘they ended up as mere 
bodies, bodies that reacted this way to pain, this way to greater pain, this 
way to the greatest pain imaginable, bodies whose response to being 
injected with diseases was of interest, of high scientific interest’ (Rushdie 
2006a, 157).  Yet Max, by fleeing from France to Britain during the war and 
to America after its conclusion, leaves behind his precarious existence as 
homo sacer.  Here Rushdie evokes the possibility of escaping race-thinking 
and the state of exception.  As Stephen Morton argues, 
Ophuls’ escape from the threat of death in the Nazi concentration 
camps, and his rise to political power in the United States mirrors the 
distinction that the political theorist Giorgio Agamben makes between 
the figure of bare life (the person who can be tortured and killed 
outside the jurisdiction of the law), and the figure of sovereign power 
(the figure who decides on the exception to the law which allows bare 
life to be tortured and killed). (2008, 139) 
For Morton, Max’s journey indicates that Rushdie’s novel presents a 
potentiality of resistance to thanatopolitics in which homo sacer can become 
bios under certain circumstances.  However, as Morton acknowledges 
elsewhere (143), the vast majority of Rushdie’s characters in Shalimar who 
find themselves subject to immunitary thanatopolitics are helpless before its 
racialising logic, even after the Allies dismantle the Nazi camps.  Rushdie 
portrays Max as the exception to the state of exception. 
 By depicting Kashmir as another state of exception, Rushdie 
indicates that the defeat of Nazi thanatopolitics failed to end thanatopolitics 
worldwide.  A space ravaged increasingly by racialised massacres, in which 
the exception becomes the rule, every Kashmiri becomes homo sacer and 
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resistance proves near-impossible, Kashmir in Shalimar appears as one of 
the infinitely reproducible thanatopolitical camps that Agamben theorises.   
 Many of the most influential philosophical critiques of thanatopolitics 
argue for the Nazi concentration camps as an exemplary bio/thanatopolitical 
space.  In Society Must Be Defended Foucault, in a rare pronouncement on 
twentieth-century biopower, refers to Nazism as the most extreme example 
of lethal biopolitics.  He describes it as ‘the paroxysmal development of the 
new power mechanisms that had been established since the eighteenth 
century’ (Foucault 2004, 259).  However, Agamben goes further than 
Foucault in claiming the camp’s centrality to thanatopolitics.  Agamben 
describes the camp not only as ‘the most absolute biopolitical space ever to 
have been realised’ but as ‘the very paradigm of political space at the point 
at which politics becomes biopolitics and homo sacer is virtually confused 
with the citizen’ (1998, 171).  Although he discusses the specific camp in 
Remnants of Auschwitz (1998), he states elsewhere that he treats his key 
concepts ‘as paradigms whose role [is] to constitute and make intelligible a 
broader historical-problematic context’ (Agamben 2009, 9).  Consequently, 
he argues that 
if the essence of the camp consists in the materialisation of the state 
of exception and in the consequent creation of a space for naked life 
as such, we will then have to admit to be facing a camp virtually every 
time that such a structure is created, regardless of the nature of the 
crimes committed in it and regardless of the denomination and 
specific topography it might have. (Agamben 2000, 41-42) 
For Agamben, the paradigmatic, infinitely reproducible camp means that the 
defeat of the Nazis failed to stop the march of thanatopolitics.  The way in 
which Rushdie presents Kashmir in Shalimar mirrors Agamben’s point.  His 
brief description of the Nazi camps and their dismantling serves as a prelude 
to the horrors of Kashmir’s recent history that his novel describes.  In 
contrast to Midnight and Shame, in which Rushdie indicates a potentiality 
of effective resistance, Shalimar suggests the near-impossibility of opposing 
race-thinking, the lingering presence of the sovereign right to kill and the 
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increasingly common immunitary massacres that the twentieth century’s 
growing political instability engendered. 
Thanatopolitics and Hopelessness in Kashmir 
By charting how centralised Indian military control of Kashmir intensified in 
the twentieth century, Rushdie in Shalimar indirectly suggests the value of 
a biopolitical literary criticism informed not only by Esposito’s assertion of 
thanatopolitics’ circumstantiality, but by his argument that the conditions that 
beget immunising massacres have become progressively prevalent.  He 
depicts a brutal, coercive occupation in which growing instability means that 
biopower’s thanatopolitical component becomes more and more pervasive 
and thus gradually excises the prospect of effective resistance to 
massacres.  The immunitary military operations that Rushdie describes in 
the novel constitute a form of lethal state terror that goes beyond any 
government in his fiction in its paranoid, racialising, efficient production of 
death.  Midnight represents a thanatopolitical campaign’s limitations and 
defeat, and Shame implies that no thanatopolitical state can immunise itself 
from successful resistance completely.  However, Shalimar traces 
Kashmir’s decline from ‘paradise on earth’ (Rushdie 2006a, 76) to a ruined 
wasteland lacking any possibility for a future without fear of becoming bare 
life.  In its attempt to securitise the Indian union against both Islamist terror 
and forces fighting for ‘Kashmir for the Kashmiris’ (130), India’s central 
government racialises Kashmiris as homo sacer.  By the end of the novel 
the government proves so desperate to immunise the increasingly fragile 
nation that it permits any act of violence against this already constructed 
subrace, and refuses to save their lives through optimising biopolitical 
technologies when given the opportunity. 
 As in Midnight and Shame, Rushdie describes the pre-existing 
discursive racialisations that lead to thanatopolitical massacres under 
circumstances of perceived governmental insecurity.  The racialising agent 
of the Indian state’s eventual immunitary campaign in Shalimar, Colonel 
Hammirdev Kachhwaha, parrots the government’s official discourse 
regarding his military camp: ‘Elasticnagar was unpopular, the colonel knew 
that, but unpopularity was illegal.  The legal position was that the Indian 
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military presence in Kashmir had the full support of the population, and to 
say otherwise was to break the law’ (96).  Here Rushdie evokes the Indian 
state’s power to construct and disseminate discourses regardless of their 
empirical truth.  Kachhwaha remains conscious of Elasticnagar’s 
unpopularity among Kashmiris but, because the truth-claims that the state’s 
discourse carries are not just powerful but legally enforceable, believes – 
and attempts to create – the reality that the government propagates. 
 Consequently, Kachhwaha follows the state in considering Kashmir 
‘an integral part of India’ (96) and perceiving Kashmiris as human 
encumbrances which threaten the Indian union.  For him the prospect of 
Kashmir’s independence constitutes a slippery slope towards India’s 
dissolution: 
Kashmir for the Kashmiris, a moronic idea.  This tiny landlocked 
valley with barely five million people to its name wanted to control its 
own fate. Where did that kind of thinking get you?  If Kashmir, why 
not also Assam for the Assamese, Nagaland for the Nagas?  And 
why not stop there?  Why shouldn’t towns or villages declare 
independence, or city streets, or even individual houses? (101-102) 
Similarly to Pakistan’s army in Midnight, Kachhwaha’s paranoia about the 
secession of an outlying region leads him to construct its entire population 
as subrace.  He does not view Kashmiris as a race that ought to be 
preserved or optimised biopolitically, but as ‘a valley of subversives’ (98).  
He aims to obliterate this subrace entirely: ‘The population was unsuitable.  
A new population should be found.  The valley should be emptied of all 
these people and refilled with others, who would be grateful to be here, 
grateful to be defended’ (130).  Rushdie renders Kachhwaha’s thoughts 
ominous through his earlier portrayal of the Indian state’s ability to construct 
truth.  The colonel not only racialises, but believes that as a soldier his word 
is law. 
 In Shalimar’s later chapters Rushdie suggests characteristically that 
prior racialisation within state apparatuses leads to thanatopolitics under 
circumstances of political instability; circumstances that the novel presents 
as increasingly common in twentieth-century Kashmir.  The massacres in 
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the novel prove all the more severe and effective because Kachhwaha’s 
zealotry – encouraged by the army’s deceptive but legally enforced truth-
claims – and his refusal to perceive Kashmiris as potentially optimisable and 
productive bodies become manifest in the wider military and its strategy.  
The government’s new policy in response to the deteriorating security 
situation in Kashmir seems to Kachhwaha, now a general, to confirm his 
prior suspicions: ‘every Kashmiri was a militant as had been laid down by 
the political echelon’ (292).  Shalimar exposes the thanatopolitical 
potentiality within biopolitics by depicting the Indian military ‘crackdown’ 
(307) of the late 1980s and early 1990s as aimed less at immunising the 
Kashmiri people against Islamist terrorism than immunising India from the 
already racialised Kashmiris.  Rushdie describes a central state so 
determined to securitise itself against a constructed subrace that it ceases 
to enact the productive, optimising dimension of biopolitics in the outlying 
region that this subrace populates.  Instead, it produces only homo sacer 
and death.  To use Agamben’s terms, Rushdie portrays Kashmir as a camp 
in which the state of exception has become the rule. 
 In Shalimar, biopolitical control by India’s non-military state 
apparatuses and forces proves less than total in Kashmir.  However, 
Rushdie does not show this lack engendering a potentiality of effective 
resistance, as he does in Midnight when he describes Pakistan’s failure to 
subdue the Mukti Bahini in Bangladesh.  Under the crackdown, the 
government uses its resources primarily to securitise the Indian nation 
against separatists (every single Kashmiri being defined as such) rather 
than to protect the racialised Kashmiris from violence and disease.  
Because the Indian state thus ceases to optimise Kashmiri life biopolitically, 
its limited presence in Kashmir leads only to more death.  Rushdie depicts 
this lethal neglect when he evokes the deaths of thousands of Kashmiri 
Hindus in the first of Shalimar’s two litanies of unanswered questions: 
 There were six hundred thousand Indian troops in Kashmir but the 
 pogrom of the pandits was not prevented, why was that.  Three and 
 a half lakhs of human beings arrived in Jammu as displaced persons 
 and for many months the government did not provide shelters or 
 relief or even register their names, why was that[…]The tents 
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 provided for the refugees to live in were often uninspected and 
 leaking and the monsoon rains came through, why was that.  When 
 the one-room tenements called ORTs were built to replace the tent 
 they too leaked profusely, why was that.  There was one 
 bathroom per three hundred persons in many camps why was that 
 and the medical dispensaries lacked basic first-aid materials why 
 was that and  thousands of the displaced died because of inadequate 
 food and shelter why was that maybe five thousand deaths because 
 of intense heat and humidity because of snake bites and 
 gastroenteritis and dengue fever and stress diabetes and kidney 
 ailments and tuberculosis and psychoneurosis and there was not a 
 single health survey conducted by the government why was that and 
 the pandits of Kashmir were left to rot in their slum camps, to rot while 
 the army and the insurgency fought over the bloodied and broken 
 valley, to dream of return, to die while dreaming of return, to die after 
 the dream of return died so that they could not even die dreaming 
 of it, why was that why was that why was that why was that why was 
 that. (296-97) 
 The question ‘why was that’ (296) proves unanswerable in that 
Rushdie suggests such negligence to be inexplicable morally.  However, he 
implies a partial answer by juxtaposing the potential of the Indian state’s 
biopower to optimise life with its refusal to use it to such ends.  Rushdie 
states the vast number of Indian troops in Kashmir – ‘six hundred thousand’ 
(296) – in order to emphasise the enormous power that India’s state could 
have wielded to promote life, but which it chose to direct towards 
massacring insurgents.  India’s government in Shalimar leaves displaced 
Kashmiris ‘to rot while the army and the insurgency f[i]ght over the bloodied 
and broken valley’ (297).  Rushdie further lays bare this wasted optimising 
potentiality by detailing the numerous biopolitical technologies that India 
fails to use, including medicine and statistical accumulation: ‘the 
government did not provide shelters or relief or even register their names’; 
‘[t]he tents provided for the refugees to live in were often uninspected and 
leaking’ (296); ‘there was not a single health survey conducted by the 
government’ (297).  India’s state in Shalimar focuses its resources so 
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overwhelmingly on securitising the Kashmiri territory itself against the 
subrace that populates the valley, so as to retain the land as an integral part 
of India, that it refuses to make life live.  It wishes only to let, or make, 
Kashmiri life die.  Rushdie indicates paradoxically that the Indian state’s 
limited non-military presence in Kashmir actually makes it more dangerous.  
It produces death not just by massacres but by negligence. 
 Rushdie presents Indian state bio/thanatopolitics less in terms of 
productive and optimising biopower than in terms of thanatopolitical 
immunisation and security.  The ‘crackdown’ (307) that he fictionalises took 
place in the late 1980s, a time in which India’s central government was beset 
by separatist violence, particularly in Kashmir, the Punjab, Assam and 
Nagaland.  According to Seema Kazi, ‘the eroding legitimacy of the Indian 
state, together with a lack of democratic accountability, generated a crisis 
of extraordinary proportions that was sought to be masked by its self-
projection as a unitary and militarily “powerful” state in the realist tradition’ 
(2010, xxv).  The state confronted this crisis by placing greater emphasis on 
security through lethal force in unstable outlying regions.  In Shalimar 
Rushdie represents this historical ‘Indian effort[...]to preserve the integrity of 
the nation’ (2006a, 96), even unto massacres, by describing how 
Kachhwaha’s prior racism engenders a campaign of thanatopolitics once 
the valley’s stability deteriorates. 
 For Kachhwaha and India’s army in Shalimar, security means 
retaining Kashmir as a territory of the Indian union.  Kashmir’s people are 
far more expendable than its territory.  Hence, when resistance movements 
threaten the state’s power in the novel’s later chapters, ‘the ultimate crime 
of challenging the territorial integrity of India’ (290) becomes punishable by 
death.  India’s government institutes a legal state of exception: ‘[t]he 
amended code of criminal procedure immunised all public servants, soldiers 
included, against prosecution for deeds performed in the line of duty.  The 
definition of such deeds was broad and included destruction of private 
property, torture, rape and murder’ (290).  Because the law’s application to 
the army becomes ambiguous, the mass production of homo sacer ensues.  
The massacring of Kashmiris thus becomes permissible: ‘[e]very Muslim in 
Kashmir should be considered a militant.  The bullet was the only solution’ 
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(291).  Central government policy now sanctifies and emboldens 
Kachhwaha’s racism.  Rushdie again suggests the ease with which pre-
existing racism leads to thanatopolitics under circumstances of political 
instability and legal indistinction that he presents as increasingly prevalent 
in twentieth-century Kashmir. 
 Kachhwaha, eager to put his racist ideas into practice, 
enthusiastically conducts his new mission to convert homo sacer into dead 
bodies without restraint.  Rushdie describes this new thanatopolitics most 
vividly in the scene in which India’s army massacres the villagers of 
Pachigam.  In Shalimar’s early chapters Rushdie uses this harmonious, 
pluralist community to suggest the pervasive presence, before the Indian 
occupation, of Kashmiriyat, ‘the belief that at the heart of Kashmiri culture 
there was a common bond that transcended all other differences’ (110).  Its 
destruction serves as a death knell for the possibility of a peaceful 
community free from racism and thanatopolitics in Kashmir.  Rushdie 
represents the massacre through the novel’s second litany of unanswered 
questions: 
 Who lit that fire?  Who burned that orchard?  Who shot those brothers 
 who laughed their whole lives long?  Who killed the sarpanch?  Who 
 broke his hands?  Who broke his arms?  Who broke his ancient 
 neck?  Who shackled these men?  Who made those men disappear?  
 Who shot those boys?  Who shot those girls?  Who smashed that 
 house?  Who smashed that house?  Who smashed that house?  Who 
 killed that youth?  Who clubbed that grandmother?  Who knifed that 
 aunt?  Who broke that old man’s nose?  Who broke that young girl’s 
 heart?  Who killed that lover?  Who shot his fiancée?  Who burned 
 the costumes?  Who broke the swords?  Who burned the library?  
 Who burned the saffron field?  Who slaughtered the animals?  Who 
 burned the beehives?  Who poisoned the paddies?  Who killed the 
 children?  Who whipped the parents?  Who raped that lazy-eyed 
 woman?  Who raped that grey-haired lazy-eyed woman as she 
 screamed about snake vengeance?  Who raped that woman again?  
 Who raped that woman again?  Who raped that woman again?  Who 
 raped that dead woman?  Who raped that dead woman again? (308) 
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Through a sequence of short, dispassionate sentences, Rushdie describes 
dozens of violent acts including rape, poisoning, torture and, eventually, the 
thanatopolitical production of death.  The repeated and unanswered 
question of ‘Who?’ evokes the chaos that the Indian army creates, and its 
soldiers’ faceless lethality.  The narrator’s refusal to give details exacerbates 
the impersonality of the killings while emphasising the excess of the horror: 
‘There are things that must be looked at indirectly because they would blind 
you if you looked them in the face, like the fire of the sun’ (309).  Just as the 
Indian army’s neglect of the pandits defies reason, the massacre’s violence 
exceeds language.  Despite his narrator’s claim that ‘[t]he beautiful village 
of Pachigam still exists’ (309) – either in memory, history or literature – in 
depicting the severity of the violence in Pachigam and its efficacy in 
destroying the Kashmiri nationalist movement Rushdie suggests that under 
circumstances of governmental insecurity the conversion of racialised bare 
life into death is potentially limitless. 
 As in Midnight and Shame, Rushdie describes the ease with which 
racialisation led to massacres in twentieth-century (bio)politics.  However, 
although the earlier novels suggest the precariousness of thanatopolitical 
regimes and the limitations of their immunising techniques, Rushdie 
portrays no such potentiality of resistance in Shalimar.  When Max Ophuls’ 
adopted daughter Kashmira Noman visits the land of her biological parents 
in the novel’s final section, she finds it ruined by ‘the twin diseases of poverty 
and fear’ (364) and subject to the opposing thanatopolitical operations of 
jihadists and the Indian military.  By the end of Shalimar the dominant 
political logic in the valley has become immunitary, racialising and 
thanatopolitical to a much more radical degree than in Rushdie’s other 
novels.  Rushdie’s fiction, constantly conscious of race-thinking’s 
persistence in state and society, has become more sceptical than ever that 
the racialised politics of the massacre can be resisted in a world marked 
increasingly by the very conditions of insecurity that lead biopolitics’ 
thanatopolitical potentiality to emerge. 
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Conclusion: The Growing Efficacy of 
Thanatopolitics 
Rushdie’s fiction frequently depicts how racialisation may beget immunising 
massacres of homo sacer in times of political instability.  His novels suggest 
consequently that analysing biopolitics and thanatopolitics in literature and 
history requires an understanding of their interrelation that mediates 
between those that Agamben and Esposito offer; one that argues not that 
massacres arise from a coincidence or an opposition of biopower and 
thanatopower but that they are radically conditional and circumstantial.  This 
notion illuminates Rushdie’s growing disinclination to affirm that the 
thanatopolitics that racialisation engenders can be resisted successfully 
within an increasingly unstable contemporary politics.  Contrasting Midnight 
and Shame with Shalimar reveals a waning potentiality of effective 
resistance across his successive fictionalisations of twentieth-century 
history. 
 In order to explore this trajectory’s nature more fully, Chapter Three 
analyses the ways in which Rushdie represents space.  Each Rushdie novel 
generally depicts fewer spaces of successful resistance to biopower than 
the last.  His descriptions of spaces, and the social and political forces acting 
upon them, more or less emphasise increasingly the efficacy of techniques 
of racialisation, biopower and thanatopower.
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Chapter Three – Biopolitics and 
Space 
Introduction: Rushdie’s Relational Spaces 
Rushdie not only describes a plethora of bio/thanatopolitical discourses and 
technologies, but suggests that humans’ relative ability to shape and control 
the various spaces in which these practices operate greatly affects their 
efficacy.  From the potentiality of resistance to biopolitical racialisation that 
he evokes through depicting indistinct spatial margins in Midnight’s Children 
and migration in The Satanic Verses, to the increasing pervasiveness of 
political oppression and capitalist rapacity that his 1990s novels chart, to 
violent bio/thanatopolitical forces’ complete control of space in Shalimar the 
Clown, Rushdie’s fiction proves progressively doubtful that spaces of 
freedom from oppressive biopower may be constructed. 
 Chapter Three focuses less on the ways in which Rushdie represents 
specific biopolitical techniques of ordering, racialisation and killing than the 
first two chapters.  However, it argues that examining his growing emphasis 
on the ease with which biopolitical states and superraces mould space 
further explains his fiction’s progressive inclination to depict these 
technologies as effective.  Additionally, this analysis prepares the ground 
for Chapters Four and Five, which consider how Rushdie presents specific 
oppositional discourses and movements.  It asserts that his fiction’s 
increasing tendency to indicate the difficulty of fighting biopower’s shaping 
of space through oppositional spatialities and territorialisations contributes 
greatly towards its expanding scepticism regarding the possibility of 
effective resistance. 
 Conducting an analysis of the remarkable variety of twentieth-
century biopolitical spaces that Rushdie describes requires a conception of 
how biopower acts upon space that critiques the limitations of canonical 
theories.  Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben conceptualise race, 
biopolitics and thanatopolitics perceptively, but conceive the spaces in 
which they operate as contiguous and inescapable rather than penetrable 
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and potentially converging.  Drawing upon these thinkers to consider how 
Rushdie represents the complex, shifting spaces that engender potential 
resistance to biopolitical technologies proves much less productive than 
using their theories to explore the ways in which he portrays spaces that 
these technologies shape and govern.  Rushdie’s fictional spaces number 
near-impermeable disciplinary buildings including the immigration centre in 
Verses and Bombay Central jail in The Moor’s Last Sigh.  However, he also 
imagines nebulous spaces of uncertain dimensions and borders like the 
Sundarbans and the Rann of Kutch in Midnight.  Investigating the multiple 
spatialities that Rushdie describes requires a detailed understanding of 
space’s relationality that exceeds Foucault’s and Agamben’s thought.  This 
chapter augments their work on biopower and space with recent human 
geography which problematises spatial fixity and borders.  Considering the 
possibility of radically penetrable and formless spaces, whose bewildering 
complexity and/or their inhabitants’ ability to shape them to their will may 
render biopolitical technologies ineffective, produces a biopolitical reading 
which charts how Rushdie increasingly indicates the difficulty of creating 
these oppositional spatial formations. 
 Rushdie’s novels depict the multiple complex ways in which forces 
including people, governments, nature and buildings shape spaces and are 
shaped by them in turn.  He portrays lived space in the twentieth century as 
intricate, especially as flows of globalisation and migration intensified.  In 
the past few decades human geography has evolved a conceptual and 
analytical framework that has brought this complexity into greater relief.  
Henri Lefebvre writes that ‘[n]ot so many years ago, the word “space” had a 
strictly geometrical meaning: the idea it evoked was simply that of an empty 
area’ (1991, 1).  However, this is no longer the case.  Human geographers 
and philosophers have come increasingly to perceive space as constituted 
by numerous social processes of oppressive and oppositional power.  
Drawing on many of these recent theories of space, this inquiry into how 
Rushdie represents biopower’s spatiality formulates a broad, variegated 
concept of ‘relational space’, which David Harvey describes as ‘space 
regarded[…]as being contained in objects in the sense that an object can 
be said to exist only insofar as it contains and represents within itself 
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relationships to other objects’ (1973, 13).  This chapter’s consciousness of 
relational space enables it to chart Rushdie’s generally growing 
disinclination to represent freedom and resistance through its construction, 
and hence the waning potentiality of effective opposition to biopower that 
his fiction evokes.  This notion’s utility in delineating this trajectory indicates 
the necessity of a biopolitical literary criticism that marries its critique of 
Foucault and Agamben’s work on racism and thanatopolitics to a theory of 
how these practices operate within space that goes beyond their 
insufficiently relational formulations.  Through a biopolitical reading of 
Rushdie, this chapter works towards what Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 
term a ‘properly poststructuralist understanding of biopower’ (2000, 28) and 
how it shaped the twentieth century’s complex spaces. 
Theories of Biopower and Space 
Understanding comprehensively the ways in which Rushdie describes 
bio/thanatopolitical operations and resistance within space requires an 
incorporative theoretical approach which considers both closed and 
relational spaces.  Agamben’s notion of the camp and Foucault’s concept 
of the heterotopia prove useful in analysing how Rushdie represents spaces 
of biopolitical oppression and attenuated freedom respectively.  However, 
neither offer a radically plural theory of the nebulous, penetrable spaces 
through which greater freedom and resistance from oppressive biopower 
may be enacted.  Their thought cannot illuminate the full range of spatial 
formations that Rushdie’s fiction portrays without being complemented by 
recent human geography regarding relational, pervious space. 
Giorgio Agamben’s Spatiality: Escaping the Camp 
This study has argued that Agamben’s work on homo sacer and the state 
of exception can usefully inform an analysis of how Rushdie depicts 
twentieth-century states practising biopolitical oppression by constructing 
the camp (the state of exception’s spatial manifestation); for example, 
Saladin’s detention and forced mutation in an immigration centre in Verses 
and India’s government’s mass racialisation of Kashmiris in Shalimar.  
However, whereas Rushdie affirms the conditionality and limitations of the 
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camp’s materialisation, Agamben perceives the logic of the camp as so 
pervasive within contemporary (bio)politics that the spaces of exception it 
creates prove impermeable and inescapable.  The concept’s virtuality and 
paradigmatic nature in Agamben’s thought renders his work on space inutile 
in examining Rushdie’s depictions of effective resistance to the state of 
exception, and tracing their growing scarcity in his fiction. 
 Agamben’s subtle and complex theory of exception problematises 
received binaries regarding law and life at every turn.  He conceives the 
state of exception as a ‘zone of irreducible indistinction’ (Agamben 1998, 9).  
For Agamben, ‘the state of exception represents the inclusion and capture 
of a space that is neither outside nor inside’ (2005, 35) the juridical order.  
This legal indeterminacy means that ‘it is impossible to distinguish 
transgression of the law from execution of the law, such that what violates 
a rule and what conforms to it coincide without any remainder’ (Agamben 
1998, 57).  Hence, the state may use spaces of exception to construct and 
massacre homo sacer with impunity. 
 Not only does Agamben claim that indistinctions within the state of 
exception serve only to enable more effective biopolitical oppression, but he 
refuses to countenance the idea of indistinctions in its external dimensions 
that may enable escape from the camp or resistance to its racialising 
technologies.  The most distinct and concrete configuration in Agamben’s 
theory of the state of exception is the state of exception itself.  He conceives 
the camp as a space of indistinction, only to draw a virtual border around 
the entirety of lived space.  This border, as Thomas Lemke argues, appears 
‘not as a tiered or graded zone but as a line without extension or dimension’ 
(2011, 59).  It encompasses the whole world within a zone of dissolution in 
which the state of exception may gain physical form as a camp anywhere 
and at any time (see Agamben 2000, 41-42). 
 Rushdie’s descriptions of spaces of indistinction and resistance, 
including Delhi’s slums in Midnight and the nomad-populated desert in the 
early Jahilia sections of Verses, imply that the nature of biopolitics and 
space within twentieth-century governmentality exceeded Agamben’s 
flattening notion of the virtual, inescapable camp.  His fiction thus indirectly 
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indicates the necessity of a biopolitical literary criticism that acknowledges 
the limits to the state of exception’s reach, reproducibility and capacity to 
restrict its inhabitants’ freedom.  Moreover, understanding comprehensively 
Rushdie’s growing disinclination to emphasise the potentially infinite 
freedom that humans may gain through shaping space requires a theory of 
relational space that goes beyond not just Agamben’s stultifying camp, but 
the juxtaposed and ordered spaces of attenuated resistance that Foucault 
calls heterotopian. 
Michel Foucault: Heterotopias 
Foucault’s thought affirms a greater potentiality of resistance through the 
shaping of space than Agamben’s.  He stresses the difficulty of eroding 
significantly the discursive and symbolic power of the spatialities that the 
politically powerful produce, but by asserting the growing juxtaposition of 
multiple, heterogeneous concepts of socially constructed space within 
particular places – heterotopias – he proclaims the feasibility of creating 
spaces of freedom and resistance. 
 Yet Foucault’s notion of this juxtaposition does not go as far as 
conceiving the voiding of borders between spaces or the attendant intrusion 
of spaces of resistance into spaces of oppression.  As Nigel Thrift argues, 
‘Foucault tended to think of space in terms of orders, and[…]this tendency 
made him both alive to space as a medium through which change could be 
effected and, at the same time, blind to a good part of space’s aliveness’ 
(2007, 55).  As with Agamben’s camp, some of Rushdie’s descriptions of 
spaces demonstrate the heterotopia’s utility as a concept.  However, his 
portrayals of nebulous, permeable spaces, especially in his early novels, 
indicate that the twentieth-century world incorporated spaces whose 
relationality, complexity and resulting potential for freedom from biopower 
exceeded the heterotopian.  His fiction consequently invites a biopolitical 
literary criticism that augments Foucault with more radical theories of the 
open, flexible spaces which also prove subject – and resistant – to 
biopower. 
 Foucault often spoke of his ‘spatial obsessions’ (2007, 177).  Yet his 
insistence that ‘[g]eography acted as the support, the condition of possibility 
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for the passage between a series of factors [he] tried to relate’ (Foucault 
1980b, 77) did not translate into a detailed theory of spatiality once his 
thought moved away from the disciplinary techniques that operate in closed, 
impermeable spaces, and began to focus on technologies of biopower in 
wider society.  Explicit discussions of space outside disciplinary institutions 
such as the clinic, the prison and the school are scant in Foucault, with the 
exception of his much-discussed ‘Of Other Spaces’ (1967).  In this essay 
Foucault counterposes unreal utopias, and the Middle Ages’ discrete, 
contiguous, hierarchical system of places, with actually-existing modern 
places, which he calls heterotopias.  These locales ‘ha[ve] the power of 
juxtaposing in a single real place different spaces and locations that are 
incompatible with each other’ (Foucault 1997, 354).  For Foucault ‘there is 
probably not a single culture in the world that is not made up of heterotopias’ 
(353). 
 Foucault proves ambivalent as to whether these new spatial 
formations necessarily engender resistance to oppressive (bio)power.  He 
suggests that heterotopias’ opening up of hermetic, sacred and forbidden 
spaces, which become juxtaposed with other constructions of space, leads 
increasingly to these forbidden spaces’ gradual erosion and their replacing 
by ‘heterotopias of deviance, occupied by individuals whose behaviour 
deviates from the current average or standard’ (353).  Yet he also argues 
that ‘[h]eterotopias always presuppose a system of opening and closing that 
isolates them and makes them penetrable at one and the same time’ (355).  
No universal form of heterotopia exists (353).  Foucault warns that although 
heterotopias problematise received notions of spatial hierarchy they also 
possess ‘the function of forming another space, another real space, as 
perfect, meticulous and well-arranged as ours is disordered, ill-conceived 
and in a sketchy state’ (356).  Heterotopias juxtapose incompatible, 
heterogeneous spaces, but the politically powerful easily may co-opt these 
spaces and recapitulate them into a new placial formation that, though 
different from older hierarchical spatialities, is no less oppressive of 
resistance. 
 Rushdie’s novels often evoke this co-optation.  In Moor he describes 
how predatory capitalists shaped Bombay’s cityspace after India’s 
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independence by building and then dwelling in inaccessible skyscrapers.  
He contrasts their perception of the city with that of the homo sacer that 
these capitalists exploit, who live in ground-level slums.  Just as Rushdie 
portrays spaces that can be called camps in Agamben’s sense, he 
frequently depicts spaces that appear heterotopian in that they juxtapose 
heterogeneous spatialities within a specific place but do not go as far as 
voiding their boundaries.  However, Rushdie also imagines locales of 
indeterminate borders and dimensions which do not merely juxtapose lived 
social spaces but merge them to various extents.  He thus indirectly 
indicates the inadequacy of Foucault’s thought to a comprehensive 
investigation of fictional space.  Analysing Rushdie’s gradual disinclination 
to evoke a potentiality of effective resistance to biopower through shaping 
these locales spatially requires a biopolitical reading that augments 
Agamben and Foucault’s spatialities with a theory of post-space. 
 Post-space names a conception of space as characterised by 
endless complexity and mutability, and by ever-shifting spatial orders and 
borders.  Complementing the formulations of the camp and the heterotopia 
with Henri Lefebvre’s work on social space and Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari’s concepts of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation enables this 
chapter to comprehend the full range of spatialities that Rushdie’s novels 
describe.  These theories allow this chapter to identify the points at which 
Rushdie depicts resistance through producing and shaping relational post-
space, and hence to chart his rising disinclination to portray this resistance 
as effective. 
Theories of Relational Space 
In Marcus Doel’s words, the discipline of postmodern or poststructuralist 
geography asserts that ‘[g]eography is cracked, fissured, and fractal’ (1999, 
103).  It opposes the notion that space comprises perceptible orders, 
borders and hierarchies.  For Doel, ‘[s]pace has no points of constancy, only 
folds that lend consistency’ (2000, 127).  This type of thinking posits space 
as a pandemonium of infinite complexity: post-space.  Far from viewing this 
perceived irreducible openness as an undesirable obstacle to attaining the 
relative solidity and belonging of place, postmodern geographers assert the 
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possibility of resistance and freedom in post-space.1  As literary critic Sara 
Upstone argues, ‘[t]he central premise of post-space is its explicitly 
metamorphic function, where it is precisely through re-visioning chaos, 
fluidity and disorder, rather than in spite of it, that statements of resistance 
or survival are made’ (2009, 15).  However, the postmodern geographies of 
Lefebvre and Deleuze and Guattari conceive post-spatial freedom in the 
metamorphic spaces of modernity not as an inevitability but a potentiality.  
An awareness of their theories of post-space and the fetters on its 
emergence thus permits this chapter not only to identify the spaces which 
Rushdie presents as too complex and nebulous to be called camps or 
heterotopias, but his fiction’s increasing suggestion that even these 
relational spaces fall invariably under biopolitical control. 
Henri Lefebvre: Social Space 
Lefebvre’s seminal The Production of Space (1974) conceives space as 
socially produced by a complex matrix of human and capital interactions.  
Just as Foucault warns that the politically powerful may co-opt heterotopias 
of contiguous spaces and render them oppressive, Lefebvre argues that 
despite its relationality this multiplicitous and ever-changing social space 
does not necessarily prove a vehicle for alterity and plurality.  Consequently, 
his thought illuminates Rushdie’s growing suggestion that although space’s 
complexity within twentieth-century polities produced a potentiality of 
resistance, free movement and free perception, this relationality also 
rendered space recuperable by oppressive forces and governments.  
Lefebvre’s terminological distinction between abstract spaces of oppression 
and differential spaces of freedom further clarifies Rushdie’s engagement 
with twentieth-century practices of biopolitical coercion and resistance by 
providing a means by which a biopolitical reading may categorise the vast 
variety of spaces in which these take place: camps, heterotopias and 
spaces which exceed these forms. 
 Abstract space does not problematise received notions of materiality 
and perception as abstract art does.  Rather, it is abstract in the sense that 
it abstracts, negates and homogenises humans’ identities so as to absorb 
them into an overarching spatial logic of capitalism and political oppression 
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(see Lefebvre 1991, 49).  However, unlike Agamben’s camp, Lefebvre 
argues that abstract space can be escaped: ‘despite – or rather because of 
– its negativity, abstract space carries within itself the seeds of a new kind 
of space’ (52).  This differential space, the potentiality of which Lefebvre 
perceives as always inherent even within the most abstracted spaces, 
constitutes a space of heterogeneity and freedom which ‘put[s] an end to 
these localisations which shatter the integrity of the individual body, the 
social body, the corpus of human needs, and the corpus of knowledge’ (52).  
Lefebvre conceives differential space as a multivalent, multi-spatial state of 
free subjectivity and movement which includes and accepts all human 
identities equally. 
 Rushdie depicts biopolitical operations, and opposition to them, in 
both differential and abstract spaces.  His early novels in particular evoke a 
potentiality of resistance through differential space; for example, when he 
describes how the moving magicians’ slum in Midnight evades India’s 
biopolitical state apparatuses, and the possible non-communalist political 
sphere that Saladin Chamcha resolves to create in the country at the end 
of Verses.  However, Rushdie suggests more and more that space’s 
differentiality proves inevitably incomplete, provisional and subject to the 
abstractions that predatory capitalism, biopolitical regimes and the 
constructed superraces who support them impose.  His fiction describes 
spaces whose multiformity and nebulousness exceeds the formulations of 
the camp and the heterotopia, but increasingly indicates the veracity of 
Lefebvre’s argument that despite space’s theoretically infinite differential 
potentiality, abstract spaces in contemporary society far outnumber their 
differential counterparts. 
 Rushdie’s novels depict these differential and abstract spaces arising 
from a wide, interrelated array of social, political and sometimes even 
supernatural processes.  Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, which go beyond even Lefebvre 
in seeking to explain the complex processual formation of spaces, enable 
this chapter to analyse how Rushdie’s novels delineate the intricate ways in 
which acts of biopolitical oppression and resistance produce space.2  They 
provide a useful adjunct to the notions of the camp, the heterotopia, abstract 
143 
 
space and differential space within a biopolitical reading of Rushdie.  
Through their detailed play of voided and converging oppositions, Deleuze 
and Guattari argue that social and economic processes of deconstructive 
deterritorialisation in late capitalist modernity do not mean necessarily that 
disenfranchised subraces can use the resulting nebulous spaces in order to 
oppose (bio)political oppression.  This notion of deterritorialisation 
illuminates the passages in which Rushdie describes spatial indistinction 
and formlessness producing terror and/or confusion rather than effective 
resistance, as with the soldiers who perceive phantasms in the 
indeterminate space of the Sundarbans in Midnight, and Gibreel’s failed 
attempts to perceive London’s ever-shifting spatial form in Verses.  
Moreover, Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of reterritorialisation helps this 
chapter to chart Rushdie’s increasing emphasis on the numerous processes 
through which biopolitical states and superraces reformulate abstract space 
within contemporary governmentality.  The utility of their post-spatial schizo-
geography to an analysis of Rushdie’s fiction suggests the means by which 
a biopolitical literary criticism of biopower’s operations within, and 
subsequent effect in shaping, space may proceed. 
Deleuze and Guattari: Territorialisations 
Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of relational, processual space illuminates 
Rushdie’s fiction by providing a critical vocabulary through which to analyse 
the multiple, complex ways in which he depicts space’s production.  For 
Deleuze and Guattari, ‘[t]erritorialities[…]are shot through with lines of flight 
testifying to the presence within them of movements of deterritorialisation 
and reterritorialisation.  In a certain sense, they are secondary.  They would 
be nothing without these movements that deposit them’ (1988, 55).  The 
pair define deterritorialisations as the processes within contemporary 
(bio)politics and economics that disrupt and destroy existing spaces, and 
reterritorialisations as the processes that replace these formations with new 
spaces.  As Edward Soja elaborates, 
[d]eterritorialisation involves the breaking down of Fordist worlds of  
production and related spatial divisions of labour, the long-standing 
political and discursive hegemony of the modern nation-state and 
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traditional forms of nationalism and internationalism, and established 
patterns of real-and-imagined cultural and spatial identity at every 
scale from the local to the global.  Reterritorialisation is the critical 
response to globalisation and postfordist restructuring, generating 
new efforts by individuals and collectivities, cities and regions, 
business firms and industrial sectors, cultures and nations, to 
reconstitute their territorial behaviour, their fundamental spatiality 
and lived spaces, as a means of resisting and/or adapting to the 
contemporary condition (2010, 212). 
 As with Foucault’s notion of the heterotopia and Lefebvre’s 
conception of social space, Deleuze and Guattari claim that neither 
deterritorialisation nor reterritorialisation prove always oppressive or 
liberating for constructed subraces.  They assert that reterritorialisations 
often constitute recapitulated versions of previously existing oppressive 
spaces: ‘These neoterritorialities are often artificial, residual, archaic; but 
they are archaisms having a perfectly current function, our modern way of 
“imbricating”, of sectioning off, of reintroducing code fragments, 
resuscitating old codes’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1984, 257).  
Deterritorialisations, too, may not actualise post-space’s differential 
possibility.  Deleuze and Guattari argue that capitalism, ‘the 
deterritorialisation of the soil through privatisation’ (225), militates against 
differential space by rendering space and society increasingly subject to 
capital’s exploitative logic.  Both deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation 
incorporate a differential potentiality, but may just as easily (or, perhaps, 
more easily) produce new oppressive spaces segmented ‘by walls, 
enclosures and roads between enclosures’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, 
51).  Deleuze and Guattari call this process striation. 
 This conception of space’s production mirrors that which Rushdie’s 
novels evoke.  Rushdie does not portray either deterritorialisation or 
reterritorialisation as inherently oppressive or liberating.  In Midnight Delhi’s 
slums become subject to a biopolitical clearance programme’s violent 
deterritorialisations, which the constant reterritorialisations of the moving 
Magicians’ Ghetto escape and hence resist.  Conversely, in Moor the 
reterritorialisations of predatory capitalists who dot Bombay with 
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skyscrapers heighten socio-economic inequality and produce death.  
Reading Rushdie in the light of Deleuze and Guattari’s schizo-geography 
reveals his fiction’s growing tendency to present the twentieth century’s 
multiple complex territorialisations as a conjunction of deleterious striations 
both deterritorialising and reterritorialising in form.  He emphasises more 
and more that although the increasingly metamorphic nature of space and 
society in recent history meant broadly that fewer camps and heterotopias 
emerged, more spaces of resistance and differentiality did not necessarily 
ensue within this intricate matrix of social spaces. 
 Lefebvre’s notion of differential space and Deleuze and Guattari’s 
conception of liberatory territorialisations allow this chapter to identify and 
discuss the partial realisations of resistance through post-space in Rushdie.  
However, the biopolitical reading towards which these formulations 
contribute also reveals that Rushdie describes more abstract than 
differential spaces, and more camps and heterotopias than relational 
spaces of freedom.  His later novels in particular depict space’s differential 
possibilities as co-opted invariably by the striations of biopolitical and 
economic elites.  Using an incorporative theory which augments canonical 
theories of biopolitics and space with work on relational spaces and the 
social processes that create them makes clearer Rushdie’s almost 
constantly growing disinclination to depict a potentiality of effective 
resistance to biopolitical oppression.  Moreover, this chapter’s analysis of 
marginal spaces in Midnight affirms that any differential territorialisations in 
his novels prove partial and provisional even in his earliest fictional 
engagement with twentieth-century biopolitical space. 
Margins of Oppression and Resistance in 
Midnight’s Children 
In Midnight’s fictionalised version of India’s twentieth-century history 
Rushdie describes not only the urban centres that proved especially 
susceptible to governmental biopower’s striations, but marginal spaces 
more remote from biopolitical technologies’ effects.  These spaces range 
from the borders between India and Pakistan, to Delhi’s unmappable slums, 
to rural regions whose formlessness he suggests renders them resistant to 
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the embrace of central state apparatuses.  As Veena Das and Deborah 
Poole argue, spatial margins do not merely denote geometric limits, but may 
become spaces ‘in which the creativity of the margins is visible, as 
alternative forms of economic and political action are instituted’ (2004, 19).  
Rushdie evokes a potentiality of resistance to biopower within peripheral 
space in Midnight.  Yet he indicates that spatial margins prove much more 
likely to enclose abstract spaces than constitute problematising, differential 
ones. 
 Rushdie portrays India and Pakistan’s Partition as a deep, 
irreversible schism.  He counterposes the near-total solidity and 
permanence of India’s external dimensions to the fluidity of marginal spaces 
within the nation.  However, Midnight suggests that the broad efficacy of the 
biopolitical reterritorialisations that central governments enact upon their 
territory, and the confusion and horror that remote, nebulous spaces may 
induce in their inhabitants even in the absence of these reterritorialisations, 
mean that these comparatively formless margins do not necessarily become 
differential spaces of effective resistance and freedom.  As the novel 
progresses, its narrator Saleem Sinai’s nostalgic lionising of Bombay’s 
relatively differential cityspace becomes superseded increasingly by 
descriptions of abstract or terrifyingly indeterminate spaces.  The moving 
Magicians’ Ghetto in Rushdie’s fictionalised version of Delhi constitutes a 
space which partially escapes state biopower’s striating techniques.  Yet by 
detailing its residents’ constant, all-encompassing struggle to evade state 
agents he outlines the obstacles both to establishing a solid sense of place 
independent of abstract space within the twentieth-century city and using 
differential space to resist biopolitical oppression actively.  The ways in 
which he describes marginal non-urban locales including the Rann of Kutch 
and the Sundarbans also indicate this latter difficulty by suggesting that the 
inconstancy and inhospitability of rural spaces outside central biopolitical 
control may preclude their transformation into meaningful differential spaces 
of resistance.  Midnight’s engagement with India’s recent history evokes 
only an attenuated potentiality for recapitulating deterritorialisations into 
plural, hybrid spaces of democracy and freedom within the nation’s post-
independence (bio)politics. 
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The Impermeable National Border 
In Midnight Rushdie interrogates comprehensively the meaning of 
Indianness after India’s independence by offering the magical, diverse 
Midnight’s Children as an alternative to Indira Gandhi’s conception of the 
nation as an extension of the state and her family’s power.  However, 
because his critique of state biopower centres upon the idea of a better India 
he declines to problematise to the same degree the country’s external 
dimensions that the Partition of 1947 created.  On the few occasions when 
Rushdie explores Partition’s effect on space he represents it as an 
irreversible schism which created a barely movable, barely penetrable static 
border.  Despite being disputed by both national armies and relatively 
powerless citizens, India’s external borders in Midnight remain all but 
constant as irrevocable dividing lines between nations. 
 In Midnight Rushdie stresses the almost completely stationary 
position of the borders between India and Pakistan after independence.  In 
describing the 1965 war over Kashmir he emphasises the senselessness 
and waste of an attritional conflict fought in return for negligible portions of 
land: ‘India had occupied less than 500 square miles of Pakistani soil; 
Pakistan had conquered just 340 miles of its Kashmiri dream’ (Rushdie 
2008, 477).  Rushdie implies that the solidity and near-immovability of the 
two countries’ external margins means that they not only delineate India as 
an integral nation with fixed dimensions but produce tangible effects in 
shaping national social space. 
 The migration of Saleem Sinai’s family to Pakistan has deleterious 
consequences for his telepathic ability to communicate with his fellow 
magical Indian children.  Through this episode Rushdie suggests that the 
striated solidity of India’s post-Partition external borders, and their ability to 
divide and shape social space, renders the process of traversing them 
impossible without the migrant’s connection to India being severed.  As with 
its description of India’s post-independence elite’s forcing into the 
supposedly desirable white phenotype of their former masters, Midnight 
presents a harmful supernatural force in order to evoke the power of man-
made discourses and conceptions of order to shape reality.  Just as Rushdie 
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depicts the idea of the Indian nation as ‘a collective fiction in which anything 
was possible’ (150) – an artificial creation which nevertheless produces 
national forms of belonging and tangible spatialities – he portrays the 
capacity of its external borders to define the limits of these formations.  
Saleem observes, ‘my perceptions were, while they lasted, bounded by the 
Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal, the Himalaya mountains, but also by the 
artificial frontiers which pierced Punjab and Bengal’ (271).  When he finds 
himself ‘flung across the Partition-created frontier into Pakistan’ (393) he 
can no longer communicate with his fellow magical children.  Saleem’s 
power, which Rushdie associates with the birth of post-independence India, 
vanishes when he migrates outside the borders that Partition delineated.  
Despite the plurality and hybridity of Rushdie’s ideal of India, his attachment 
to the concept of the nation in Midnight leads him to depict its outer borders 
as striations.  He disallows the possibility that the post-independence Indian 
nation could attain different territorial form, or that it may in future 
incorporate or be subsumed by external spaces. 
 In Midnight Rushdie’s critique of India’s post-independence 
(bio)politics demurs from problematising the nation’s existence in its current 
topographical form.  He represents external borders and border regions 
more as sites for fruitless intra-national contestations than as spaces for the 
production of subjectivity or identity.  These margins carry vast, tangible 
power to include and exclude people, discourses and spatialities.  However, 
by exploring the ways in which India’s biopolitical state has shaped and 
produced the nation’s internal spaces, Rushdie exposes and outlines the 
limits of its attempts to militate against the spatial differentiality that he 
suggests offers a potentiality of effective resistance.  As Sara Upstone 
argues, ‘[t]here is a significant difference between[...]a rejection of the nation 
and the deconstruction of states themselves[…]The India that Rushdie 
nostalgically creates, imagines, and maintains is not one in which India is a 
“nation” if we take that to mean a unified, cohesive and homogeneous 
space’ (2009, 47).  A biopolitical reading, informed by the concepts of social 
space and schizo-geography, of the ways in which Rushdie describes the 
complex processes of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation within post-
independence India’s malleable internal politics and spaces reveals that 
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Midnight depicts a potentiality of resistance through producing differential 
space.  Rushdie uses the device of a constantly reterritorialising Delhi slum 
to affirm that biopolitical regimes can never render space fully abstract.  Yet 
by describing the slum-dwellers’ inability to shape a solid social space on 
account of their fugitive status, he evokes the severe difficulty of resisting 
biopolitical oppression through nebulous and shifting spaces.  This difficulty 
arises in both the novel’s urban and rural spaces.  When Rushdie portrays 
the psychotropic spaces of the Rann of Kutch and the Sundarbans he 
indicates that truly deterritorialised amorphous non-urban spaces offer not 
freedom and contentment but chaos and dread.  By revealing the attenuated 
possibility of effective resistance that Midnight evokes in its fictionalisation 
of twentieth-century India’s internal spaces, this chapter begins to trace the 
waning of this potentiality across Rushdie’s subsequent novels. 
The Striation of the Slums and the Terrors of Deterritorialised Space 
The indeterminate, unmappable spaces of Delhi’s slums prove central to 
Midnight’s efforts to expose how India’s biopolitical state striated the 
nation’s internal spaces after independence, especially under Indira 
Gandhi.  Yet in deconstructing these striations, Rushdie evokes only a 
limited potentiality of effective resistance.  He uses a fictionalised version of 
the state’s slum clearance programme during the Emergency, which 
complements his engagement with the sterilisation campaign that formed a 
parallel part of its biopolitical project, to indicate that although urban slum-
dwellers may escape such programmes through acts of deterritorialisation 
and reterritorialisation their ability actively to fight back is negligible.  
Rushdie suggests that the Prime Minister’s famous political slogan – 
‘GARIBI HATAO, Get Rid of Poverty’ (2008, 494) – masked her true 
purpose: to get rid of the poor themselves.  Midnight’s fictional Indira Gandhi 
attempts to bring every single space within Delhi under her (bio)power by 
eradicating the slums whose squalor and ugliness challenge her authority 
and her quest to optimise Indian space biopolitically.  She almost succeeds.  
Her government’s striations of cityspace prove so effective that a constant, 
exhausting reterritorialising migration proves the only recourse available to 
the slum-dwellers.  The series of precarious differential spaces that this 
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movement produces offer only escape from, rather than resistance to, 
biopolitical oppression. 
 Historically, as P. K. Das writes in an article on India’s slums, ‘[i]n the 
late eighties[...][b]oth the government and the middle and upper classes in 
the city began to accept the slums provided a housing opportunity for 
millions, which the government cannot otherwise provide’ (2003, 225-26).  
However, in India’s Emergency years it was more likely that the state would 
consider slums a nuisance or even an impediment to the city’s biopolitical 
optimisation and effective governance.  As Emma Tarlo notes, between 
1975 and 1977 seven hundred thousand slum-dwellers, representing fifteen 
per cent of Delhi’s population, were displaced to ‘marginal spaces beyond 
the borders of the city’ (2003, 4). 
 In Midnight Rushdie draws upon these events, which were occurring 
at the time he was writing the novel.  He augments his criticism of Indira 
Gandhi’s sterilisation programme and thus exposes more forcefully her 
government’s abuse of (bio)power during the Emergency.  Just as the 
novel’s fictionalised Indira Gandhi determines the necessity of sterilising the 
Midnight’s Children for the good of the species, she views destroying the 
slums as vital for the good of the city, even if this means sacrificing subracial 
bare life.  Rushdie refracts his description of the government’s raid on the 
Magicians’ Ghetto through the government’s worldview.  He emphasises its 
utilitarian, optimising biopolitical logic: 
the machines of destruction were in their element, and the little 
hovels of the shanty-town were slipping sliding crazily beneath the 
force of the irresistible creatures[…]the city was being beautified, and 
if there were a few deaths[...]well, what of it, an eyesore was being 
removed from the face of the ancient capital (Rushdie 2008, 602). 
Rushdie indicates that these violent, often thanatopolitical optimising 
techniques proved broadly effective in rendering Delhi’s cityspace abstract 
during the Emergency, though less than totally pervasive.  However, the 
only escape possible for the novel’s racialised slum-dwellers lies in an 
exhausting spatial practice of perpetual movement that falls short of an 
effective campaign of active resistance to biopolitical oppression. 
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 Rushdie evokes biopolitical control’s limitations, and cityspace’s 
differential potentiality, by describing a successful attempt at escaping the 
state’s ‘machines of destruction’ (602) through repeated reterritorialisation.  
After their slum’s demolition, some magicians escape being rehomed as 
homo sacer in a ‘barbed-wire camp’ (602) outside the city limits.  Rather 
than conform to Indira’s biopolitical vision of a well-ordered Delhi, they 
construct a new ‘moving slum’ (602).  Rushdie’s portrayal of this space 
affirms movement’s value as a practice of resistance within cityspace: 
 it is said that the day after the bulldozing of the magicians’ ghetto, a 
 new slum was reported in the heart of the city, hard by the New Delhi 
 railway station.  Bulldozers were rushed to the scene of the reported 
 hovels; they found nothing.  After that the existence of the moving 
 slum of the escaped illusionists became a fact known to all the 
 inhabitants of the city, but the wreckers never found it.  It was 
 reported at Mehrauli; but when vasectomists and troops went there, 
 they found the Qutb Minar unbesmirched by the hovels of poverty.  
 Informers said it had appeared in the gardens of the Jantar Mantar, 
 Jai Singh’s Mughal observatory; but the machines of destruction, 
 rushing to the scene, found only parrots and sun-dials (602-603). 
By describing the slum’s reterritorialisations upon multiple Delhi landmarks, 
Rushdie contrasts the subrace’s ability to render cityspace differential 
through disorder with the static disciplinary prison space outside the city.  
He shows how the striations and camps produced by biopolitical regimes 
may partially be effaced through the simple act of movement. 
 However, Rushdie also suggests that the overwhelming effort 
required to effect the deterritorialisations that accompany these oppositional 
reterritorialisations renders impossible a substantially effective programme 
of resistance to the biopolitical state’s attempts to create abstract cityspace.  
When Saleem locates the remaining magicians he finds that ‘[s]omewhere 
in the many moves of the peripatetic slum, they had mislaid their powers of 
retention, so now they had become incapable of judgement’ (621).  The 
‘confusion of hunger, disease, thirst and police harassment’ (621) in which 
they exist means that a perpetual, exhausting series of deterritorialisations, 
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rather than free movement, precipitates their constant reterritorialisations.  
Forced to concentrate solely on the present, the magicians cannot 
complement their escape from biopower’s embrace by creating or even 
conceiving a movement of active resistance, because the sheer act of 
survival and evading agents of government biopower consumes their 
labour.  Rushdie uses the moving slum’s reterritorialisations upon Delhi to 
demonstrate the limits of biopolitical ordering techniques, but by describing 
the continuing oppression that necessitates its perennial deterritorialisations 
he indicates the severe difficulty of constructing differential spaces of 
sustained, effective opposition to biopolitical technologies within twentieth-
century Indian cityspace. 
 Rushdie represents indeterminate, deterritorialised rural locales 
remote from central government biopower’s abstracting technologies as 
similarly unlikely to produce differential spaces of effective resistance.  
Midnight indicates that secluded locales outside biopolitical control offer a 
potentiality of freedom.  However, in describing the confusion and terror that 
the nebulous psychotropic spaces of the Rann of Kutch and the Sundarbans 
induce, the novel suggests that amorphous marginal spaces of indistinction 
may prove just as oppressive and lethal as the cityspaces that biopolitical 
regimes striate. 
 Rushdie depicts the Rann of Kutch as a rare fissure in the generally 
solid and static Indo-Pakistani border.  The nebulously proportioned Rann 
constitutes ‘disputed territory’ (465) that neither nation possesses the 
resources or will to reterritorialise.  However, despite its relative lack of 
striation by (bio)political forces, the ‘bog of nightmare’ (395) does not offer 
a sanctuary from fear nor a potential base for resistance.  The remoteness 
and fluidity of space in the Rann inhibits differential space’s production 
rather than enabling it.  Though Rushdie attributes some of the Rann’s 
ghostly noises to smugglers, he conjures up for the few humans stationed 
there ‘a crazy war[…]in which each side thought it saw apparitions of devils 
fighting alongside its foes’ (466).  The inhabitants’ inability to perceive the 
region’s nature leaves them powerless to act or think rationally.  Hence, they 
cannot reterritorialise upon it. 
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 Later in Midnight Rushdie presents a rural space which proves even 
deadlier than the Rann because it is even less striated.  As soon as Saleem 
Sinai and the Pakistani soldiers for whom he acts as guide enter the 
Sundarbans, Rushdie begins again to emphasise the terrors of 
deterritorialised space: 
 The jungle closed behind them like a tomb, and after hours of 
 increasingly  weary but also frenzied rowing through 
 incomprehensibly labyrinthine salt-water channels overtowered by 
 the cathedral-arching trees, Ayooba Shaheed Farooq were 
 hopelessly lost[…]Ayooba Baloch cried without stopping for three 
 entire hours or days or weeks, until the rain began and made his 
 tears unnecessary; and Shaheed Dar heard himself saying, ‘Now 
 look what you started, man, with your crying’, proving that they were 
 already beginning to succumb to the logic of the jungle, and that was 
 only the start of it, because as the mystery of evening compounded 
 the unreality of the trees, the Sundarbans began to grow in the rain 
 (503). 
Here Rushdie describes not a social space that humans shape, but an 
amorphous, ‘incomprehensibly labyrinthine’ terrain whose psychotropic 
properties and ever-shifting topographical dimensions induce a ‘logic of the 
jungle’ (503).  By rendering humans alternately terrified and soporific, this 
new jungle-induced subjectivity precludes the Sundarbans’ reterritorialising 
into a meaningful differential space of resistance.  As well as evoking only 
an attenuated potentiality of freedom within cityspaces close to the 
racialising state’s central apparatuses, Rushdie suggests that marginal 
spaces remote from biopolitical control may, in their indeterminacy and 
inhospitability, provide similarly infertile ground for effective opposition to 
biopolitical oppression. 
 Midnight proves broadly sceptical that successful resistance may be 
effected through constructing differential space within contemporary 
governmentality.  Yet a biopolitical reading informed by theories of social 
space and schizo-geography reveals moments at which Rushdie indicates 
the limits of biopower’s capacity to produce camps and abstract spaces.  
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Comparing Midnight’s portrayal of biopolitical space with Rushdie’s later 
novels further delineates his fiction’s trajectory of generally increasing 
bleakness.  Verses represents his next substantive engagement with the 
deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations through which constructed 
subraces attempt to resist biopolitical oppression by creating differential 
space.3  Through the themes of movement and migration from the former 
colonial periphery into the former imperial centre Rushdie continues to 
suggest an attenuated potentiality of effective resistance tempered with an 
acknowledgement of its difficulty.  Deploying an incorporative conception of 
space’s variability reveals that in describing Britain’s post-imperial spaces 
he evokes abstract cityspace’s unknowability for immigrants, their 
consequent inability to reterritorialise and thus resist their own racialisation, 
and even the dangers of the migratory journey itself.  Verses’ ending 
indicates the possibility of a future differential space in India.  However, this 
appears only a small counterweight to the pervasive abstraction of space in 
the novel’s fictionalised version of twentieth-century history. 
Movement and Migration in The Satanic Verses 
In Verses Rushdie produces a detailed fictional investigation into the effects 
that migration and movement have had on both spaces and subjects in the 
years following decolonisation.  He engages with migration through air 
travel, the immigrant’s attempted reterritorialisation of the infernal, 
amorphous destination city, and the journey home.  To a greater degree 
than in Midnight, Verses questions the solidity and stability of national 
borders, and social spaces within the nation.  London in the novel proves 
significantly more indeterminate than India’s relatively legible cities in the 
earlier novel.  In describing the deterritorialisations and attendant 
reterritorialisations that the city’s immigrants undertake, Verses evokes an 
attenuated potentiality of differential space and hence of resistance to 
oppressive discourses of racialisation. 
 However, Rushdie characteristically indicates the difficulty of 
combating the rival reterritorialisations produced by racialising regimes of 
biopower and the superraces they construct.  As Chapter One argued, 
resisting racialisation and oppression proves taxing for Verses’ migrant 
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characters.  Analysing the ways in which Rushdie depicts space in the novel 
complements the earlier reading by further illuminating why biopolitical 
discourses of superrace and subrace remain intact in his fictionalised 
version of Britain.  Rushdie portrays recapitulating Britain and London’s 
complex matrices of deterritorialising and reterritorialising flows into 
differential space as virtually impossible.  Despite their best efforts, 
Rushdie’s migrant characters, who have already suffered harm through the 
migratory journey itself, lack the codes that would enable them to 
understand London’s hostile cityspace enough to reterritorialise upon it.  
Consequently, at times London resembles the Rann of Kutch or the 
Sundarbans in its amorphousness and horror, ‘changing shape at will and 
without warning’ (Rushdie 2006c, 327).  As in Midnight, the journey through 
deterritorialised spaces of indistinction produces confusion and terror rather 
than effective resistance. 
 The novel’s final chapter, in which Saladin Chamcha returns to 
Bombay, commits to aiding the city’s transformation into differential space 
and finally attains a sense of belonging, suggests a greater potentiality of 
pluralism through the social production of space.  Yet even this apparent 
happy ending leaves biopolitical racialisation intact in the post-imperial 
Britain that Saladin abandons and gives up on reterritorialising.  A 
biopolitical reading which exceeds Foucault and Agamben’s theories by 
engaging with social space and complex processes of territorialisation 
reveals that, characteristically, Rushdie produces a novel in which the 
majority of spaces remain abstract and differential space’s construction 
proves provisional and incomplete. 
The Journey Out: Danger and Racialisation in the Act of Migration 
Verses opens with Rushdie’s protagonists Saladin Chamcha and Gibreel 
Farishta passing through the metamorphic zone of airspace in which ‘the 
processes of their transmutation’ (2006c, 5) commence.  From the very 
beginning of the novel Rushdie stresses the transformative nature of 
migration and movement.  In later sections he portrays not only migration’s 
effect on migrants but the reterritorialisations these migrants may enact 
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upon the places to which they journey.  He evokes this potentiality through 
Uhuru Simba’s defiant courtroom statement: 
we are here to change things.  I concede at once that we shall 
ourselves be changed; African, Caribbean, Indian, Pakistani, 
Bangladeshi, Cypriot, Chinese, we are other than what we would 
have been if we had not crossed the skies in search of work and 
dignity and a better life for their children.  We have been made again: 
but I say that we shall also be the ones to remake this society, to 
shape it from the bottom to the top (414). 
However, Verses indicates that the shaping of immigrants’ bodies and 
subjectivities by migration far outstrips their capacity to remake the societies 
to which they journey.  Even before he begins to explore the oppressive 
reterritorialisations and racialisations that preclude this remaking in the 
former imperial centre, Rushdie uses his description of Saladin’s 
supernatural transmogrification in order to depict the dangers of the 
migratory journey itself.  He suggests that these difficulties exacerbate the 
migrant’s inability to reterritorialise the destination city into differential space 
when they arrive. 
 Rushdie evokes the obstacles to attaining a spatial sense of 
belonging through migration in a passage relating Saladin and Gibreel’s 
journey from India to Britain through transformative airspace: 
How far did they fly?  Five and a half thousand as the crow.  Or: from 
Indianness to Englishness, an immeasurable distance.  Or, not very 
far at all, because they rose from one great city, fell to another.  The 
distance between cities is always small; a villager, travelling a 
hundred miles to town, traverses emptier, darker, more terrifying 
space (41). 
Here Rushdie depicts poverty and racism as fetters on successful migratory 
reterritorialisation.  He suggests that migration proves especially arduous 
for villagers of limited means.  They perceive the interstitial ground-level 
space through which they travel as ‘emptier, darker and more terrifying’ (41) 
than richer city-dwellers’ comfortable plane journeys.  This renders their 
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attempts to reterritorialise destination spaces more taxing, and perhaps 
even discourages movement altogether.  As Bishnupriya Ghosh argues, 
‘given their political and cultural visibility, for elite cosmopolitans migrancy 
assumes mythological status.  But migrancy remains a physically and 
socially painful experience for other (underprivileged) diaspora cultures and 
migrant peoples’ (2004, 19).  However, Rushdie also emphasises the vast 
distance ‘from Indianness to Englishness’ (2006c, 41).  Despite the time-
space compression possible through air travel, he implies that the act of 
migration itself transforms even wealthy cosmopolitans into othered 
subraces before they arrive at their destination.  Rushdie builds upon this 
suggestion by describing how Saladin’s journey to Britain transforms him 
supernaturally into a devil.  This fantastical literary device shows vividly how 
the automatic racialisation of non-white migrants by virtue of their having left 
their homeland makes later attempts to reterritorialise the destination space 
more likely to fail. 
 Through Saladin’s migration-induced transmogrification, Rushdie 
interrogates the precariousness of the non-white immigrant’s place within 
Britain’s post-imperial polis.  He characteristically indicates the veracity of 
Foucault’s theory that the state, by degrees, practices ‘the internal racism 
of permanent purification’ (2004, 62).  Saleem possesses British citizenship, 
and his flight with Gibreel on the Bostan is not his first journey to Britain.  
Yet his metamorphosis following his fall to earth suggests that his original 
act of migration rendered him at perpetual risk of eventually becoming 
subracial in the destination space.  Early in the novel Rushdie writes of 
Saladin’s fall, ‘changes took place in delirious actors that would have 
gladdened the heart of old Mr Lamarck: under extreme environmental 
pressure, characteristics were acquired’ (2006c, 5).  Josie Gill argues that 
in this passage 
 Rushdie comically invokes Lamarckian evolution as the magical 
 science which explains the immigrants’ equally magical 
 transmutation by migration; yet as the novel progresses it becomes 
 apparent that it is the socially and culturally hostile environment of 
 England which dictates the nature of the characteristics which the 
 immigrants go on to acquire (2015, 491-92). 
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However, the episode may be read more productively by considering 
Saladin’s initial transformation not as separate to the characteristics with 
which the biopolitical state’s racialising discourse imbues him, but as part of 
the same process of othering.  Verses frequently ventriloquises the 
viewpoint – though does not leave it uncriticised – that humans who migrate 
from their roots are ‘false’ (Rushdie 2006c, 427).  As Rushdie’s narrator 
asks of Saladin and Gibreel, ‘What did they expect?  Falling like that out of 
the sky: did they imagine there would be no side-effects?’ (133)  The 
nascent nubs of Saladin’s demonic horns are visible even before his arrest 
(133).  The majority of his metamorphosis arises at the hands of the 
biopolitical state’s agents, yet it begins not as a result of racism on the 
ground but as an apparent atavistic punishment for the very act of migration.  
Rushdie suggests not only the migratory journey’s physical dangers and its 
effects on bodies and subjectivities, but that migration itself renders human 
beings subracial even before they arrive at the destinations they hope to 
reterritorialise. 
 After exploring the often deleterious alterations that the migratory 
journey engenders, Rushdie indicates through Saladin’s imprisonment and 
further mutation within the British immigration camp’s state of exception that 
racialised migrants may experience incarceration and additional 
racialisation at the hands of biopolitical state apparatuses when they arrive 
at their destination.  Saladin’s ordeal takes the form of a discourse that, as 
Chapter One explored, makes him terrifying to the white British superrace 
by transforming him fully into a devil.  This augmentation of his atavistic 
transformatory punishment for leaving his roots implies a continuity between 
the automatic racialisation of all non-white migrants to Britain and the 
violence to which the state subjects them within biopolitical transit zones.  In 
Verses Rushdie depicts borders between nations as more porous and 
nebulous than in Midnight.  However, he continues to stress the difficulty 
and danger of crossing frontiers.  He suggests that before migrants can 
even hope to achieve a sense of place in their destination they must pass 
through dangerous border spaces of indistinction in the air and on the 
ground.  The capacity of these spaces to racialise and inflict punishment far 
outweighs their victims’ severely limited ability to reterritorialise the 
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destination space.  Moreover, Rushdie’s description of Gibreel’s experience 
in traversing London infers that further racialisation upon arrival contributes 
towards this impediment. 
 As Chapter One argued, because Saladin’s transformation into a 
devil leads the British state to view the movement he inspires as proof of 
non-whites’ unruly and ungrateful subracial nature, it prevents effective 
resistance to biopolitical oppression.  Gibreel’s attendant mutation into an 
angel gains him some ‘new disciple[s]’ (194), but has a similar outcome.4  
Although at one point ‘vendors of novelties in Brickhall, Wembley and 
Brixton were selling as many toy haloes[…]as headbands to which had been 
affixed a pair of rubber horns’ (352), most of the non-whites who come 
across Gibreel either refuse to recognise his divinity (329) or find his 
appearance perplexing or horrifying (448).  His angelic transformation fails 
to beget even a movement of ineffectual resistance akin to that which 
Saladin creates accidentally.  In contributing towards his schizophrenic view 
of himself as ‘the agent of God’s wrath’ (457), it also lessens the possibility 
of his attaining a spatial sense of belonging in London. 
 However, Rushdie attributes London’s infernal, deterritorialised 
appearance in Verses not solely to Gibreel’s transformation-exacerbated 
schizophrenia but also to the inhospitable and alienating ‘insanities of the 
city’ (333) which prevent new arrivals from perceiving its nature fully.  He 
complements his engagement with the deleterious racialising effects of 
migration itself by indicating the difficulty migrants face in traversing and 
creating their own social spaces once they arrive.  Gibreel undertakes the 
most sustained and vivid attempt to reterritorialise a destination space by 
any of the novel’s characters.  Whereas the assimilationist Saladin, who 
wishes only to become ‘a goodandproper Englishman’ (43), proves a 
reluctant totem for resistance, Gibreel embarks upon a campaign to reshape 
London in his own image.  Yet as with the failed efforts to traverse the Rann 
of Kutch and the Sundarbans in Midnight, Rushdie uses Gibreel’s failure to 
change London significantly in order to assert the near-impossibility of 
reterritorialising a hostile, nebulous space within twentieth-century 
governmentality. 
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The Journey Through: Heterotopian Illegibility and Failed Reterritorialisation 
By describing Gibreel Farishta’s failure to reterritorialise London 
significantly or even to perceive its shifting spatial form by walking through 
it, Rushdie suggests how little ability migrants possess to create their own 
spatialities within the places to which they journey.  Human geographers, 
prone to seeing space as constructed both physically and psychologically, 
have often considered the city not just as social space but as a space that 
is particularly socially produced: ‘a centre of meaning, par excellence’, in Yi-
Fu Tuan’s words (1977, 173).  David Harvey affirms the possibility of 
resistance via shaping social space.  He argues that cityspace is ‘predicated 
on[…]a certain hierarchical ordering of activity which is broadly consistent 
with the dominant mode of production’, but that it also constitutes ‘the likely 
birthplace of a new mode of production’ (Harvey 1973, 203).  However, 
Rushdie’s representation of London as a socially produced construct 
incorporates minimal scope for migrants to play their part in this 
construction.  Verses emphasises the alienating striations that Britain’s 
racialising post-imperial biopolitical elites enacted upon London.  Through 
Gibreel’s confusion and loss of orientation in the face of this apparently 
illegible, amorphous and violent abstract space Rushdie indicates the 
circumscribed ability of migrants to traverse and mould freely foreign social 
spaces of which they possess incomplete knowledge.  He thus evokes only 
a limited potentiality of effective resistance. 
 At points in Verses Rushdie describes successful reterritorialisations 
by London’s immigrants.  These include ‘the Jamme Masjid which used to 
be the Machzikel HaDath synagogue which had in its turn replaced the 
Huguenots’ Calvinist church’ (Rushdie 2006c, 285), and the tower blocks 
named formerly after the British colonial army’s victories but which now 
sport the names of anti-colonial leaders (461).  However, he subsumes his 
hints at social space’s differential potentiality beneath an overriding 
portrayal of Britain’s capital as a racially segregated city that appears 
heterotopian in its juxtaposing of incompatible white and non-white spaces 
without merging them.  As his character Otto Cone argues, 
161 
 
The modern city[…]is the locus classicus of incompatible realities.  
Lives that have no business mingling with one another sit side by 
side upon the omnibus[…]And as long as that’s all, they pass in the 
night, jostling on Tube stations, raising their hats in some hotel 
corridor, it’s not so bad.  But if they meet!  It’s uranium and plutonium, 
each makes the other decompose, boom (314). 
The race riots that occur later in the novel bear out Otto’s prediction of a 
violent clash of spatialities.  However, his notion that ‘each makes the other 
decompose’ (314) equally proves inaccurate.  Rushdie imagines London as 
a space of incompatible realities as Otto does, but one in which the realities 
and striations created by the biopolitical state and the superrace it 
constructs cause attempted migrant reterritorialisations to fail.  These forces 
maintain a racialised hierarchy of social spaces within the heterotopia.  In 
response to the subrace’s resistance, the biopolitical state in Verses 
reasserts its authority over London via an increased racialising police 
presence on the streets, raiding the Club Hot Wax (the deviant space in 
which pillars of the racialising establishment are burned in effigy) and killing 
Pamela Chamcha, whose dossier threatened to expose the Metropolitan 
Police’s use of black magic.  In describing these actions, Rushdie 
emphasises the racialising post-imperial biopolitical state’s extensive ability 
to suppress cityspace’s differential potentiality by striating the spaces it 
governs and curbing migrants’ efforts at reterritorialisation. 
 By portraying Gibreel’s failure to reterritorialise this hierarchical 
heterotopia significantly as a consequence of his inability to comprehend 
and thus to traverse London’s cityspace, Rushdie strengthens the degree 
to which his novel portrays migrants’ spatial realities as incompatible with 
those that the biopolitical regime and its superrace construct.  He not only 
suggests the capacity of Britain’s post-imperial elite to quell uprisings 
effectively by having its agents occupy particular spaces in the capital, but 
that the abstract nature of London as a whole precludes resistance by 
rendering it illegible to migrants.  Gibreel’s perception of London’s cityspace 
as nebulous and shifting appears partially as a symptom of his 
schizophrenia.  However, Rushdie also depicts his protagonist’s confusion 
as arising from the difficulty immigrants experience in reterritorialising a 
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social space which they cannot know as well as the superrace who striate 
it. 
 Rushdie portrays London as a space whose complexity makes it so 
inhospitable to immigrants that even the ‘[g]eographer’s London’ (156) of 
the A to Z cannot help Gibreel understand and traverse it freely.  In its 
ungraspable indeterminacy, the city resembles the psychotropic spaces of 
the Rann of Kutch and the Sundarbans in Midnight.  London’s shifting, 
deterritorialised form stymies Gibreel’s attempts to comprehend it:  
 the city in its corruption refused to submit to the dominion of the 
 cartographers, changing shape at will and without warning, making it 
 impossible for Gibreel to approach his quest in the systematic 
 manner he would have preferred.  Some days he would turn a corner 
 at the end of a grand colonnade built of human flesh and covered in 
 skin that bled when scratched, and find himself in an uncharted 
 wasteland, at whose distant rim he could see tall familiar buildings, 
 Wren’s dome, the high metallic spark-plug of the Telecom Tower, 
 crumbling in the wind like sandcastles (327). 
Here Rushdie defamiliarises London landmarks by incorporating them 
within a surreal, terrifying vision of nebulousness and decay.  He shows how 
Gibreel’s schizophrenia prevents him from finding his way through cityspace 
and thus from reterritorialising upon it. 
 However, although Gibreel’s difficulty in traversing and perceiving 
London’s spatial form arises partially from ‘the fatal logic of his insanity’ 
(201), Rushdie also uses his protagonist’s mental travails to evoke the 
struggles of migrants in general to shape destination spaces.  One passage, 
in which ‘[t]he city sends [Gibreel] messages’ (458) as he walks, combines 
these two themes.  London communicates both its treacherous 
formlessness and its malleability: ‘Not all migrants are powerless, the still-
standing edifices whisper.  They impose their needs on their new earth, 
bringing their own coherence to the new-found land, imagining it afresh.  But 
look out, the city warns.  Incoherence, too, must have its day’ (458).  Despite 
his confusion, Gibreel manages at one point to bring his own coherence.  
Rushdie depicts his protagonist’s most effective act of reterritorialisation – 
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the supernatural tropicalisation of London that Chapter One analysed – as 
an anti-colonial attempt to banish ‘British reserve’ and bring about the 
‘[e]mergence of new social values’ (355) more in line with his native India.  
By altering the city’s climate, Gibreel actualises the transformative 
potentiality of migration that proves central to Rushdie’s novel. 
 Yet because this successful supernatural reterritorialisation 
constitutes not so much an attempt to produce differential space as an 
alternative act of striation and even destruction, it evokes only a limited 
possibility of freedom from biopolitical oppression.  Rushdie shows how 
Gibreel’s tropicalisation of London partially causes the race riots in Brickhall 
that engender further biopolitical oppression, rather than creating a space 
in which other migrants may enact their own reterritorialisations: ‘the 
heatwave reached its highest point, and stayed up there so long that the 
whole city, its edifices, its waterways, its inhabitants, came perilously close 
to the boil’ (420).  Gibreel’s small victory in his quest to shape London’s 
social space proves pyrrhic.  Moreover, it does nothing to alter his view of 
the city as characterised primarily by a terrifying formlessness.  This 
enduring perception precludes further effective reterritorialisation. 
 In Verses Rushdie depicts London simultaneously as so striated that 
biopoliticians easily can suppress migrants’ movements of opposition to 
their racialisation, and as appearing so amorphous to the same migrants 
that they also struggle to resist through reterritorialising British social space.  
Out of Rushdie’s two main characters, only Saladin Chamcha eventually 
finds a sense of belonging within space.  He migrates back home to India 
and resolves to aid its transformation into differential space.  Yet in 
describing how Saladin attains this belonging by leaving behind a cityspace 
still inhospitable to even elite cosmopolitan migrants and confirming his 
rejection by the British city he wanted desperately to make home, Rushdie 
tempers the potentiality for a more pluralistic, differential world that his 
ending imagines. 
The Journey Back: Homecoming and a Possible Differential Space 
Rushdie bookends Verses with an arc of migration and return.  The novel 
valorises migration and movement, but also represents the pull of roots.  
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Rushdie counterposes the performative, discursive ‘British’ persona that 
Saladin Chamcha develops in the novel’s first chapter to a more embodied 
Indianness with which his protagonist becomes reconciled in the final 
chapter when he returns to Bombay and becomes an activist against Hindu 
communalism.  However, Saladin’s commitment to constructing differential 
space in India leaves intact London’s inhospitability to immigrants.  Rushdie 
contrasts his ending’s gesture towards space’s differential potentiality with 
his earlier, more frequent portrayals of the difficulty of actualising this 
potentiality. 
 Chapter One argued that Saladin’s attempts to become accepted as 
British fail because of phenotypical racism’s pervasiveness amongst 
biopolitical elites and superraces in post-imperial Britain.  Yet Rushdie also 
indicates that Saladin becomes racialised by his own biology.  Saladin 
experiences ‘accent slippage’ (Rushdie 2006c, 63) when he attempts 
Received Pronunciation.  When convalescing in Brickhall after his 
transformation, his heart begins ‘to misbehave, to kick and stumble as if 
it[…]wanted to metamorphose into some new, diabolic form, to substitute 
the complex unpredictability of tabla improvisations [from Indian classical 
music] for its old metronomic beat’ (253).  On the plane from London back 
to Bombay, his body and voice revert to what Verses describes as their 
innate original form: ‘old emotions were sending tentacles out to grasp 
him[...]his tongue was twisting again, sending his accent East along with the 
rest of him’ (514).  Rushdie implies that however violently humans may 
reject the spaces in which they are born, the link cannot be truly severed. 
 Verses suggests that embracing one’s roots by committing to 
transforming these spaces offers a potentiality of effective resistance to 
biopolitical oppression.  Saladin Chamcha returns home for his dying father 
and his lover Zeeny Vakil, but comes to feel not only the pull of his identity 
as an Indian but a particular kind of pluralist Indian politics that aims to 
construct differential space.  He completes his reintegration with India by 
joining a march against the Hindu nationalist Shiv Sena government in 
Bombay.  Rushdie initially leaves the sincerity of Saladin’s participation in 
the march open to question: ‘Me, taking part in a CP(M) event.  Wonders 
will never cease; I really must be in love’ (538).  Yet Saladin commits 
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genuinely to resisting the communal violence against which he and Zeeny 
protest: ‘Salahuddin[...]could not deny the power of the image’ of the 
‘unbroken chain of men and women linking hands from top to bottom of the 
city’ (541).5  Rushdie links the final fruition of Saladin’s love for Zeeny with 
his protagonist’s acceptance that her previous criticism of his comprador 
self was valid, and his identification with her secularist and pluralist idea of 
India as a space which must be reshaped along these lines.  Verses 
presents Saladin as having rejected his performative ‘Englished’ (439) self 
in favour of a pluralistic vision that allows for a deep personal bond with the 
idea of a differential, hybrid Indian national space.  His return home appears 
not as cowardice but as an attempted act of reterritorialisation. 
 Verses’ final chapter thus evokes a potentiality of effective resistance 
through making one’s home country into differential space.  However, 
Rushdie’s description of Saladin’s voice and physiognomy as only stable 
when he returns to India complements the way in which he depicts the act 
of migration to the former imperial centre as racialising.  By suggesting that 
human bodies can only attain a comfortable sense of place in their 
homeland, he again indicates the severe difficulty of shaping the destination 
space.  Saladin’s return home represents an affirmative engagement with 
pluralist politics, but also an admission that his capacity to reterritorialise 
upon Indian space far outstrips his ability to oppose biopolitical discourses 
and technologies in Britain’s alien cityspace.  Just as Rushdie portrays 
Gibreel Farishta’s confused wandering as inadequate to actualise London’s 
differential potentiality, he shows that Saladin Chamcha’s journey home 
leaves intact the city’s abstract, unknowable and amorphous space. 
 As with Midnight, a biopolitical reading of Verses informed by 
theories of social space as created by complex flows of reterritorialisation 
and deterritorialisation reveals that Rushdie depicts only a limited 
production and attenuated potentiality of differential space.  However, his 
novels written in the 1990s portray even more radically striated spaces, 
especially through their new and bleaker fictionalised versions of India.  In 
the Indias that Rushdie imagines in Moor and The Ground Beneath Her 
Feet, predatory biopolitical capitalism and political religious fundamentalism 
render cityspace more and more segregated and oppressive, and engender 
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increased communalist racialisation in rural space.  Ground suggests that 
migration to America offers a greater prospect for freedom and the 
differential.  However, this constitutes an anomalous upturn in the generally 
lessening degree to which Rushdie’s successive novels indicate that spaces 
of resistance to racism and bio/thanatopower can be constructed.  Using 
Foucault’s concept of the heterotopia to analyse the diverse yet abstract 
space of Bombay in Moor begins to bring this trajectory into greater focus 
by exploring the ways in which Rushdie engages with the waning differential 
potentiality of complex spaces within twentieth-century governmentality. 
Vertical and Horizontal Space in The Moor’s Last 
Sigh and The Ground Beneath Her Feet 
Whereas Verses concludes with a protagonist’s return to India and his 
newfound commitment to shaping its politics and culture into a more 
pluralist, hybrid form, both The Moor’s Last Sigh (1995) and The Ground 
Beneath Her Feet feature narrators who flee the country partially because 
they perceive no hope of doing so.  Moor and Ground demonstrate an 
evolution in Rushdie’s fictional representation of India in relation to Midnight 
and Verses, which both evoke the prospect of the nation’s future 
reconstitution into differential space.  In these later novels he portrays India 
as increasingly subject to two major deleterious striations.  He critiques the 
equally damaging and predatory territorialisations of capitalism, which he 
describes exploiting bare life and constructing abstract space, and 
Hindutva, the attempted reterritorialisation of India’s politics along 
communalist and majoritarian lines: what Nivedita Menon and Aditya Nigam 
call ‘the equation of Indianness with Hinduness’ (2007, 37).  Ground depicts 
a greater possibility of oppositional reterritorialisation through migration than 
Verses, but only in the form of a limited potentiality.  Especially when 
engaging with India’s post-independence (bio)politics, Rushdie’s 1990s 
novels represent the striations of predatory capitalism, religious 
communalism and biopower as near-impossible to resist through 
constructing differential space. 
 In Moor and Ground Rushdie stresses the polyvalent and complex 
(bio)political and spatial dynamics of India’s late twentieth-century 
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governmentality to a greater degree than in Midnight and Verses.  These 
spatialities intertwine regional and national political Hindu fundamentalism, 
national and global capital, and regional and national government.  
Rushdie’s move away from figuring India’s post-independence politics 
principally through the centralised nation-state means that central state 
biopower becomes less evident in his 1990s novels.  Their India-based 
sections, which he sets primarily in Bombay, produce no vivid descriptions 
of centre-mandated biopolitical oppression akin to the sterilisation campaign 
in Midnight or the racist British police crackdown in Verses.  However, he 
declines to use the increased complexity of politics and space in these 
novels in order to suggest a greater potentiality of differential space than in 
his earlier fiction.  Rushdie’s Bombayite protagonists are spatially distant 
from central state biopower’s excesses, but become subject to the 
biopolitics of Hindu regionalist communalism and to the abstract spaces of 
capital.  By showing how these forces combine to reterritorialise and striate 
the interrelated spaces of Bombay, Maharashtra (the region of which 
Bombay is the capital) and India, he underscores the enduring ability of 
oppressive territorialisations to militate against effective resistance even 
within intricate spatial matrices. 
 Through Abraham Zogoiby’s construction of skyscrapers and his 
attendant biopolitical exploitation of homo sacer as labour, Moor engages 
with the vertical reterritorialisation of Bombay’s cityspace and its conversion 
into a segregated heterotopia in the late twentieth century.  Considering 
these striations alongside the way in which the novel describes Hindutva’s 
horizontal permeation of cityspace and non-urban space reveals that 
Rushdie minimises the possibility of future resistance in Moor’s fictionalised 
version of India by depicting the spaces of Bombay and Maharashtra as 
abstract in a three-dimensional sense.  Ground proves an even bleaker 
imagining of late twentieth-century India.  In this novel capital and 
Hindutva’s reterritorialisations, which oppose each other in Moor, unite in 
the form of the ‘Great Goat Scam’ (Rushdie 2000, 232) in which a 
communalist politician parlays his crooked business dealings into national 
prominence at the centre of government.  In Moor Rushdie deploys Bombay 
as a metaphor for India.  He implies that the striation of the nation’s most 
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plural, vibrant city symbolises the failure to construct differential space in 
India in general.  In Ground he goes further by using the Great Goat Scam 
to exemplify the country’s wholesale striation, from central government to 
the most remote non-urban spaces.  Aside from Ground’s portrayal of a 
potential attenuated reterritorialisation through migration, reading Rushdie’s 
1990s novels through theories of the heterotopia, social space and schizo-
geography further reveals his growing disinclination to depict the possibility 
of freedom and resistance from biopolitical oppression within differential 
space. 
The Moor’s Last Sigh (1): The Vertical Territorialisations of Capital 
Through his fictionalised version of Bombay in Moor, Rushdie criticises the 
effect of capitalism and communalism’s oppressive territorialisations on the 
previously plural, hybrid city, and by extension the nation.  He implies that 
to striate Bombay, ‘the most Indian of Indian cities’ (Rushdie 2006b, 350), 
is to striate India.  As Rachel Trousdale argues, Rushdie depicts ‘Bombay 
[as] a metaphor for India in its history as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious 
society’ (2004, 98).6  In Moor’s early chapters Bombay’s pluralism and 
diversity reflect the incorporative hybrid heterogeneity of the ideal pluralist 
India that Rushdie sets forth in Midnight.  The city’s gradual transformation 
into a violent abstract space damages this model.  As Rushdie’s narrator 
Moraes states, ‘[t]hose who hated India, those who sought to ruin it, would 
need to ruin Bombay’ (2006b, 351).  By emphasising Bombay’s symbolic 
meaning as a site of waning differential potentiality, Rushdie provides an 
elegiac critique of the deleterious striations enacted upon India in the late 
twentieth century.  Moor shows how the reterritorialisations of predatory 
capitalism and Hindutva have opposed and thus complemented each other 
in rendering not just Bombay as abstract space but Maharashtra as well 
and, Rushdie implies, the entire nation. 
 This chapter has argued that because Rushdie’s fiction describes a 
variety of often nebulous and interpenetrating spaces it invites a biopolitical 
reading whose conception of space exceeds that offered by influential 
philosophers of biopower.  However, his later novels prove increasingly 
wont to depict the non-relational spaces that their theories posit.  Using one 
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such formulation, Stuti Khanna claims that ‘[u]sing Foucault’s idea of the 
heterotopia, the city in the work of Rushdie can be read as a space that 
simultaneously mirrors, idealises, and negates the (concept of the) nation’ 
(2009, 410).  Like this study, Khanna’s essay on cityspace in Rushdie 
identifies his fiction’s increasing reluctance to depict the possibility of future 
resistance to political oppression.  She argues that ‘[a] clear shift can be 
traced in Rushdie’s later work from a trajectory of return to one of flight, an 
outcome of his disenchantment with the ugly face of ethnic nationalism that 
the city has come to embody’ (410).  For Khanna, Rushdie’s lessening 
inclination to depict cityspace as heterotopian, and thus as pluralist, 
characterises this trajectory.  Yet her emphasis on the heterotopia as a 
possible space of resistance to nationalist myths fails to consider that the 
oppressive deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations that Rushdie’s later 
novels depict are characteristic of other kinds of heterotopia, whose 
complex spatialities prove susceptible to recuperation and recapitulation by 
rapacious businesspeople and oppressive political forces.  Analysing how 
Rushdie depicts Bombay as a city distinguished increasingly by juxtaposed 
spaces of poverty and fabulous wealth reveals that Moor charts not 
Bombay’s loss of heterotopian qualities but its transformation from a 
differential heterotopia of deviance (see Foucault 1997, 353) into an 
oppressive abstract heterotopia. 
 In Moor Rushdie places far more emphasis on Bombay as a centre 
of commerce (and capitalist corruption) than in Midnight.  He charts how 
India’s economy has evolved from an epoch of protectionism to a more 
globalised free market based around the city.  In the novel Abraham Zogoiby 
welcomes this economic liberalisation as an opportunity for greater wealth 
through predatory and criminal means.  He subsequently striates Bombay’s 
cityspace.  Although Abraham’s business empire also reterritorialises 
horizontally by intersecting with flows of global capital, Rushdie evokes its 
effect on lived space most vividly by depicting Abraham’s construction of a 
vertical striation.  Through his biopolitical exploitation of poor labourers and 
his attendant dotting of Bombay’s skyline with skyscrapers, Abraham 
renders the city an increasingly abstract heterotopian space, reterritorialises 
upon the pluralist ideal of India and even produces death. 
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 By describing Bombay as a ‘hovel‘n’highrise town’ (Rushdie 2006b, 
145), Rushdie emphasises its heterotopian qualities.  Hovels and highrises 
are juxtaposed, but remain separate.  Abraham’s skyscraper allows him to 
sequester himself from the poor below.  Beyond the spatial metaphor 
through which Rushdie describes Abraham’s wealth as a ‘city of gold’ 
becoming ‘the great metropolis of [his] present fortune’ (170), Moor also 
shows how capital creates and shapes space itself through construction 
projects which Rushdie suggests tend to exacerbate abstract heterotopian 
segregation.  Soja writes of ‘[c]ities[...]as centres of innovation, places 
where dense propinquity and interdependent co-presence are important 
shaping features of daily life’ (2010, 26).  However, Rushdie indicates that 
rich capitalists can escape this propinquity through the vertical spatial 
striations of the buildings they construct.  Abraham’s skyscraper renders 
him literally ‘above the Law’: ‘the Over World’s cackling overlord in his 
hanging garden in the sky, rich beyond rich men’s richest dreams’ (Rushdie 
2006b, 317).  In contrast to Rushdie’s narrator Moraes Zogoiby, who claims 
hopefully that Bombay ‘belong[s] to nobody, and to all’ (350-51), Moor 
implies increasingly that the city belongs to the few capitalists who erect 
skyscrapers not just for profit but so that they may rise above horizontal 
spatiality.  The novel exposes these capitalists’ lack of care for the human 
cost to the inhabitants of the lower regions with which these skyscrapers 
are juxtaposed.  Rushdie suggests that this cost often takes the form of 
death. 
 In Moor Rushdie figures Bombay’s skyscrapers not simply as 
commodities but as symbolic and productive of economic elites’ deadly 
power.  He depicts the city more and more as a space where ‘[f]or a man 
prepared to take risks, to give up scruple[...]the only limit to the money that 
could be made was the boundary of your imagination’ (182).  Abraham’s 
lack of scruples leads him to build his empire on the backs of ‘invisible 
people’ (212): homo sacer whose exploited labour enables him to striate 
vertical space by purchasing Bombay’s scarce land, seizing the airspace 
above through the reterritorialising construction of skyscrapers, and 
financing the process by subdividing and selling these new edifices.  
Rushdie indicates the veracity of Foucault’s argument that capitalism ‘would 
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not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the 
machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of 
population to economic processes’ (1990, 141).  Through his predatory 
biopolitics Abraham steers Bombay towards becoming an abstract 
heterotopian space which subjects the poor to the logic of capital. 
 Moraes states that ‘Abraham’s empire was large, and nine-tenths of 
it was submerged below the surface of things’ (Rushdie 2006b, 341).  This 
comment extends to the homo sacer Abraham employs and exploits.  
Rushdie’s portrayal of capitalism in Moor suggests a relationship between 
the biopolitical state’s racialising construction of homo sacer and this 
subrace’s subsequent appropriation as labour without rights: 
the city authorities decreed that any persons who had settled in 
Bombay subsequent to the last census were deemed not to exist.  
Because they had been cancelled, it followed that the city bore no 
responsibility for their housing or welfare[...]This was where Abraham 
Zogoiby and all those who had jumped on the great Reclamation 
bandwagon came in, generously hiring as many phantoms as they 
could to work on the huge construction sites springing up on every 
inch of the new land (186-87). 
Because the city’s government constructs this life as less than human and 
hence as dispensable, predatory capitalists like Abraham who perceive 
these figures as equally dispensable are able to take advantage: ‘the 
invisible people[…]continued to be classified as phantoms, to move through 
the city like wraiths, except that these were the wraiths that kept the city 
going, building its houses, hauling its goods, cleaning up its droppings, and 
then simply and terribly dying, each in their turn, unseen’ (212).  Homo sacer 
construct Abraham’s skyscrapers while suffering in the ground-level spaces 
of Bombay’s increasingly abstract heterotopia.  They are forced to give what 
little life they have in order to further the city’s segregation and erode its 
differential potentiality.  Abraham views death as necessary in order to 
optimise the market: a philosophy Warren Montag calls ‘necro-economics’ 
(2013, 204).  Moreover, in Moor’s later chapters Rushdie suggests not only 
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that the construction of skyscrapers produces death but that they continue 
to do so once erected. 
 Rushdie frequently associates skyscrapers with death.  In Verses 
they appear ‘like tombstones marking the sites where the torn corpse of the 
old city lay’ (Rushdie 2006c, 12).  However, in Moor late twentieth-century 
Bombay’s skyscrapers do not simply symbolise death by creating the aspect 
of abstract space in which, as Lefebvre argues, ‘[v]erticality and great height 
have ever been the spatial expression of potentially violent power’ (1991, 
98).  They also convert this symbolism’s murderous potentiality into death.  
Rushdie again suggests capital’s lethal influence on the city when a 
fictionalised version of the 1993 Bombay bombings (partially financed by 
unscrupulous capitalists) causes glass to rain from the exploding skyscraper 
above: ‘the great atrium at the top of Cashondeliveri Tower burst like a 
firework in the sky and a rain of glass knives began to fall, stabbing the 
running workers through the neck the back the thigh, spearing their dreams, 
their loves, their hope’ (2006b, 375).  Abraham’s business empire effects 
‘the deterritorialisation of the soil through privatisation’ of which Deleuze and 
Guattari write (1984, 250).   It simultaneously reterritorialises the city of 
Bombay through constructing a vertical spatiality of death on the soil which 
exploits and kills homo sacer in order to inure itself from the poorer ground-
level spaces of the heterotopia it striates.  Rushdie strengthens his novel’s 
scepticism regarding Indian space’s differential potentiality by suggesting 
that the violent political forces of Hindutva, while opposed to Abraham 
nominally, complement his vertical urban striations through their horizontal 
reterritorialisation of India’s cityspace and rural space alike.  Together these 
forces render India an abstract space in all three dimensions. 
The Moor’s Last Sigh (2): The Horizontal Territorialisations of Hindutva 
Not only does Rushdie suggest in Moor that the possibility of differential 
space in post-independence India and Bombay has been excised by 
predatory biopolitical capitalism’s vertical striations, but he depicts a 
concomitant threat from horizontal reterritorialisations by right-wing Hindu 
politicians.  Their ideology of Hindutva, as Ashis Nandy, Shikha Trivedy, 
Shail Mayaram and Achyut Yagnik put it, is characterised by an ‘effort to 
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convert the Hindus into a “proper” modern nation and a conventional ethnic 
majority and[...]corresponding efforts to turn the other faiths of the 
subcontinent into proper ethnic minorities and well-behaved nationalities’ 
(1995, vi).  Hindutva’s communalist discourse produces a reterritorialising 
movement which, Satish Deshpande argues, ‘has attempted[...]to 
essentialise the nation-space by re-sacralising it thereby stressing its 
irreducible and exclusive affinity for Hindus alone’ (1995, 3220). 
 This movement appears in Moor (and Ground) in the fictional form of 
Mumbai’s Axis (MA).  Drawing upon the real-life Bombay-based Hindu 
nationalist party, the Shiv Sena, Rushdie describes a political party which 
‘unit[es] regional and religious nationalism in [a] potent, explosive new 
group’ (2006b, 231).  His novel charts the reterritorialising horizontal spread 
of the MA’s political influence from its beginnings, to its gradual abstraction 
of Bombay’s cityspace, to its striation of Maharashtra’s countryside.  The 
power of the party’s racialising discourse and policies is augmented by a 
violent communalism that Rushdie depicts disturbingly as innate throughout 
Indian space. 
 Thomas Blom Hansen, amongst other historians, criticises the 
‘construction of communalism as the irrational force of primitive and atavistic 
hatred emanating from the “masses” steeped in tradition and superstition, 
and easy targets for manipulations’ (1999, 201).  Yet Moor posits just this 
construction.  Rushdie indicates that the threat to differential space comes 
not only from the central state but from India and its polis itself.  As John 
Clement Ball argues, 
[u]nlike the brutally top-down nature of social upheaval during the 
Emergency, the rise of the religious right is a function not just of 
charismatic leadership but of mass participation.  It is both a top-
down and a grass-roots movement.  To Rushdie it therefore 
represents a greater national crisis than the Emergency (2003, 161). 
Rushdie represents Hindu communalism not as an alien striation imposed 
upon Indians but as intrinsic to the nation’s cityspace and non-urban space 
alike.  He depicts both these types of locale as fertile ground for the MA’s 
manipulations.  Moraes speaks of ‘those who sought to ruin [India]’ (Rushdie 
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2006b, 351), but Rushdie suggests that India ruins itself in part.  He thus 
excises the potentiality of differential Indian space that Midnight and Verses 
evoke. 
 The appeal of the Shiv Sena, on which Rushdie bases the MA, 
historically has been strongest in Bombay, the city in which the party was 
founded.  Yet Moor depicts an interpenetration of Hindutva and Indian space 
that goes beyond historical evidence towards the atavistic.  By presenting 
Hindu communalism as inherent in India’s countryside, Rushdie portrays 
Hindutva not just as an urban phenomenon but as a continuum between the 
urban and the non-urban that he implies may enable fundamentalist political 
groups like the MA to striate all of India in the future. 
 In Moor Hindu communalist ideals intrinsic to the countryside arise in 
the politics of the urban MA, whose influence thus spreads easily back to 
rural areas.  Thinkers including Amartya Sen have critiqued the Hindu 
Right’s promotion in the 1980s and 1990s of the god Ram as a symbol of 
Hindu militarism and unity.  Sen argues that ‘[m]any Hindu schools of 
thought do not mention Ram at all, and, among the texts that do, many 
hardly portray him in the spectacular light of divinity in which the present-
day Hindutva activists insist on seeing him’ (2006, 48).  However, in 
fictionalising Hindutva’s growth in India’s post-independence politics 
Rushdie suggests that fervour for Ram in non-urban India predates the rise 
of urban political formations; that Hindutva actually originated in the 
countryside.  Early in the novel, Camoens da Gama becomes frightened by 
the crowd of village dwellers at a pre-independence rally staged by 
Mahatma Gandhi: ‘I had seen India’s beauty in that crowd[...]but with that 
God stuff I got scared.  In the city we are for secular India but the village is 
for Ram[...]In the end I am afraid the villagers will march on the cities and 
people like us will have to lock our doors and there will come a Battering 
Ram’ (Rushdie 2006b, 55-56).  Consequently, when Rushdie then 
describes the ideology of Ram Rajya – as MA leader Raman Fielding puts 
it, the idea that ‘when minority seeks to dictate to majority, then[…]the 
small[…]must accept to bend and move before the big’ (260) – taking hold 
in Bombay the striations appear not as unnatural top-down 
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reterritorialisations by politicians but as the actualisation of a communalism 
innate to India’s polis. 
 As Moor progresses, Rushdie strengthens his portrayal of India as a 
space incorporating minimal differential potentiality by showing how the 
communalism that he depicts as arising atavistically in India’s non-urban 
areas increasingly striates Bombay, and how this reterritorialisation in turn 
enables the MA’s growing band of violent cadres to exacerbate the 
Maharashtrian countryside’s existing communalism.  He evokes Bombay’s 
growing reconstitution as abstract communalist space in the years after 
independence by peppering his novel with descriptions of the MA’s 
reterritorialisations of the city, from their support for the kind of biopolitical 
slum clearances that Midnight depicts (125), to their racialisation of non-
Marathi speakers (298-99), to their seizure of cityspace through loud, 
colourful and aggressive religious festivals (314).  The communalist 
violence that Rushdie portrays as inherent within India’s non-urban space 
comes more and more to characterise politics in the city as well.  The MA 
preys on the knowledge that ‘it is not the civil norm for which men yearn, but 
the outrageous, the outsize, the out-of-bounds – for that by which our wild 
potency may be unleashed’ (305).  Its successful breaking of a mill strike in 
Bombay, aided by the violence of disaffected urbanites like Moraes, leads 
to electoral gains and thus an even greater striation of cityspace. 
 In describing how the MA’s violent communalist operations spread 
subsequently into the countryside around Bombay, Rushdie shows that 
establishing a base of operations in the city affords the party a greater ability 
to striate non-urban space more severely and hence to increase their 
ideological influence on India’s politics.  As Moraes states, ‘[t]he bandwagon 
had begun to roll’ (308).  He participates in multiple violent actions within 
non-urban space.  These include suppressing a revolt of female mill 
workers, reinforcing the caste system and forcing a young widow on to her 
husband’s funeral pyre (308).  The political power into which the MA parlays 
the existing tendency towards communalism in rural India means that 
Hindutva loops back into the spaces in which Rushdie implies it originated 
and striates them still further: ‘[e]ven in the most remote rural areas, where 
ideas such as Fielding’s had never before taken root, people had begun to 
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speak of the coming kingdom of Lord Ram’ (308-309).  By the end of the 
novel the communalist territorialisation of horizontal space in Maharashtra 
has become nearly total. 
 By showing how Abraham’s lethal skyscrapers reterritorialise vertical 
space, and the violent means by which the MA shapes the existing atavistic 
violence of Hindutva into a further reterritorialisation of horizontal space, 
Rushdie describes a national space which offers much less differential 
potentiality than the post-independence Indias of his previous fiction.  
Abraham Zogoiby and Raman Fielding oppose each other nominally as they 
engage in ‘the heavyweight unification bout to establish, once and for all, 
which gang (criminal-entrepreneurial or political-criminal) would run the 
town’ (351-52).  Yet Moor suggests that their striations actually complement 
each other in ruining Bombay, and therefore in symbolically ruining India.  
When bombs rip apart the city towards the end of the novel it proves 
uncertain, and unimportant, which of the two forces is primarily responsible 
(372).  Moreover, Rushdie strengthens his representation of communalism 
as inherent to Indian space by having Moraes assert the complicity of the 
nation’s polis in this act of destruction: ‘The explosions were our own 
evil[…]We have chopped away our own legs, we engineered our own fall’ 
(372-73).  Rushdie indicates that India has become striated by its public’s 
innate communalism, violence and greed as much as by that of its 
politicians and capitalists.  Moor forbears to suggest the possibility of a 
future differential India that Midnight and Verses incorporate. 
 In Ground Rushdie depicts Indian space as even more dystopian and 
abstract than in Moor.  The territorialisations of Hindutva and predatory 
capitalism once again militate against differential space.  However, in this 
novel Rushdie describes not an opposition between the two forces which 
reterritorialises India in the crossfire of their striations, but their conjunction: 
‘[t]he corruption of money and the corruption of power, united in a super-
corruption that no opponent could withstand’ (2000, 247).  India becomes 
such an abstract space that Ground’s protagonists migrate in order to thrive.  
These characters’ partially successful reterritorialisations of America mean 
that Ground represents a momentary aberration in Rushdie’s generally 
growing disinclination to present the possibility of effective resistance to 
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biopolitical racialisation and striation.  Yet this potentiality proves only 
attenuated.  As in Verses, Rushdie depicts the migratory journey as 
treacherous, the destination space as abstract and the migrant’s 
reterritorialising capacity as limited. 
The Ground Beneath Her Feet (1): The Great Goat Scam and Hindutva 
Capitalism 
Rushdie sets Ground in an alternate reality at a remove both from our world 
and that of Moor.  He characterises this reality not only by altering historical 
details but by doing so in order to depict space’s effective striation by 
movements of religious communalism and predatory capitalism more vividly 
than in his previous novels.  These movements prove particularly powerful 
in Ground’s fictionalised version of post-independence India.  Here, both 
urban and non-urban space’s differential potentiality become increasingly 
minimal.  The super-rich’s skyscrapers striate Bombay, as in Moor.  In New 
Delhi a fictional coalition government of Hindu fundamentalists and Indira 
Gandhi, Midnight’s villain, reterritorialises the nation as a whole into abstract 
space.  Even the countryside’s amorphous deterritorialised space becomes 
striated by agents of Hindutva and capitalist corruption.  Unlike in Moor, 
Rushdie depicts these figures as one and the same. 
 As in Moor, the MA attempts to reterritorialise India along 
communalist lines.  However, because the MA of Ground’s reality becomes 
more powerful politically than the version in Rushdie’s earlier novel, it 
striates Indian space more severely.  Whereas in Moor Rushdie suggests 
that the MA’s territorialisation of Bombay symbolises India’s ruination, in 
Ground he describes a communalism that spreads beyond Bombay and 
Maharashtra to reterritorialise upon the entire nation.  The MA ruins India 
not just symbolically but literally.  Rushdie indicates that the MA’s greater 
ability to effect these reterritorialisations in Ground arises from its use of 
corrupt predatory capitalism and its eschewing the antagonism towards big 
business that Moor describes.  He does not depict late twentieth-century 
India as the victim of a crossfire between opposing movements of Hindutva 
and predatory capitalism.  Rather, through MA politician Piloo Doodhwala’s 
‘Great Goat Scam’ (Rushdie 2000, 237) he shows how both forces work 
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together to reterritorialise India in urban and non-urban space alike, as well 
as at the heart of its central biopolitical government.  Piloo’s illegal business 
activities in the countryside finance his political activities in Bombay, win him 
the support of the poor villagers he employs en masse and propel him to 
power in New Delhi.  Rushdie stresses the interrelation of cityspace, non-
urban space and central government, and portrays the increasingly abstract 
nature of all three in his most minimal representation of Indian social space’s 
differential potentiality to date. 
 By charting Bombay’s transformation into a space of ‘cynical 
Mammon worshipper[s]’ (207), Rushdie represents the city in a similar way 
to Moor.  Ground shares the earlier novel’s concern with how skyscrapers, 
‘the giant concrete-and-steel exclamations that destroyed forever the 
quieter syntax of the old city of Bombay’ (154), reterritorialised the city’s 
vertical space increasingly in the twentieth century.  However, the novel 
portrays capital’s corruption and reterritorialising capacity most vividly in 
engaging with its effect on non-urban space.  Rushdie suggests that 
predatory capitalism has come more and more to facilitate Hindutva’s 
communalist striation of India’s countryside.  Whereas in Moor he depicts 
the MA’s influence as confined to Bombay and Maharashtra, here he 
imagines a fictionalised India in which the party’s use of capital enables its 
spatiality of Hindutva to spread further outwards, reterritorialise even more 
Indian space and excise the nation’s differential potentiality to a greater 
degree.  The MA’s ability to effect these reterritorialisations throughout India 
arises from Piloo Doodhwala’s profile.  Through his corrupt capitalist 
exploitation of Madhya Pradesh’s amorphous non-urban space, this MA 
politician-cum-businessman surpasses Moor’s Abraham Zogoiby in the 
‘surrealist boldness’ (233) of his corrupt business dealings and goes 
subsequently beyond Raman Fielding in obtaining political power at the 
centre of government in Delhi. 
 In describing rural Madhya Pradesh’s nebulousness Rushdie 
portrays not a potentiality of differential space but a locale even more 
deleterious to anti-biopower resistance than the inhospitable, unknowable 
Rann of Kutch and Sundarbans in Midnight.  Unlike these spaces, the area’s 
indeterminacy makes it recuperable by striating forces.  Piloo exploits the 
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countryside’s nebulousness and remoteness to aid the corrupt capitalist 
venture from which his political popularity and his eventual place at the heart 
of India’s central government derive.  Rushdie depicts the non-urban space 
into which the photojournalist Rai Merchant journeys, hoping to uncover 
details of the scam by which Piloo earns ‘[t]hree hundred million dollars per 
annum, free of taxes’ by claiming the ownership of ‘one hundred million 
wholly fictitious goats’ (233), as alien, amorphous and near-impossible to 
map.  He emphasises the territory’s recalcitrance to human comprehension 
by describing it as deterritorialised terra incognita: ‘The sheer 
unchartedness of rural India in its most profound depths never failed to 
amaze.  You turned off the road on to the rural tracks and at once felt as the 
earth’s early navigators must have done; like a Cabot or Magellan of the 
land’ (238).  The countryside’s unknowable remoteness enables Piloo’s 
deception in two ways.  Firstly, it hides the scam from the authorities.  
Secondly, because the terrain proves as inhospitable to its inhabitants as 
Rai finds it, rural Madhya Pradesh’s impoverished homines sacri – ‘life in its 
purest form, life seeking no more than to remain alive’ (236) – are all too 
willing to help Piloo earn his ill-gotten money in return for employment.  
Whereas in Midnight and Verses Rushdie indicates the prospect of spatial 
belonging and resistance within deterritorialised space, here he suggests 
that imbricated forces of Hindutva and predatory capital possess the ability 
to permeate India from its remotest areas to its urban centres of political 
power. 
 The Great Goat Scam rivals anything Abraham effects in Moor in its 
corruption.  However, because Piloo does not exploit homines sacri as 
Abraham does but raises them from such a state, he gains greater political 
power.  Here Rushdie engages with the networks of patronage through 
which communalist parties have accrued mass followings in post-
independence India (see Banerjee 1992, 67).  Ground emphasises Piloo’s 
support from the impoverished villagers to whom he gives jobs and 
sustenance and who view him as ‘a true man of the masses, a son of the 
soil’ (Rushdie 2000, 245).  When Rai exposes the Great Goat Scam this 
groundswell leads the central government, eager for MA support, to pardon 
Piloo.  MA penetration not just of cityspace or rural space but of India’s 
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central government ensues when Piloo becomes a key player in Indira 
Gandhi’s Congress-MA coalition.  For Rai this confirms ‘the total victory of 
Pilooist values’ (246) within Indian space.  Rushdie imagines a reality in 
which cityspace and non-urban space’s reterritorialisation by an unholy 
alliance of predatory capitalism and Hindutva allows an MA communalist-
cum-corrupt-capitalist to operate at the heart of the biopolitical nation-state.  
Ground’s India constitutes a more abstract space than any version of the 
country in his fiction. 
 Ground goes further than Moor in depicting a successful, extremist, 
murderous Hindu communalist party as a threat to pluralism in India.  It 
represents the culmination of Rushdie’s disenchantment with the idea that 
India’s nation-state, federal system and politicians can produce differential 
space.  Rushdie suggests more than ever that as ‘the precise instant of 
India’s arrival at independence’ (2008, 3) recedes into the past the country 
is becoming a space characterised less and less by values of hybridity, 
diversity and tolerance.  However, considering how Ground’s later chapters 
present the uncertainties and dangers of migration reveals that the novel’s 
reluctance to depict a significant differential potentiality within social space 
extends beyond its portrayal of India. 
The Ground Beneath Her Feet (2): Movement and Migration, Again 
Rai leaves India due to threats to his life following his exposing of the Great 
Goat Scam.  He joins his friends Vina Apsara and Ormus Cama in becoming 
a migrant and attempting to put down new roots.  Rushdie augments the 
severely limited potentiality of resistance that Ground’s India-set chapters 
depict by suggesting that migration does not lead necessarily to a stable 
sense of place or the production of differential space.  In representing the 
dangers of the migratory journey itself (as in Verses), describing the 
destination space of New York as heterotopian and segregated, and 
depicting the very ground beneath his characters’ feet as shifting 
perpetually, he indicates only a minimal possibility of reterritorialisation 
through migration within late twentieth-century governmentality. 
 In Ground Rushdie characterises India, through Rai, as a ‘place 
obsessed by place, belonging-to-your-place, knowing-your-place [in which] 
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we are mostly given that territory, and that’s that, no arguments, get on with 
it’ (2000, 55).  Rai resists this placial stasis.  He asserts the possibility of 
putting down new roots by reterritorialising the destination space to which 
one migrates.  Ground asks the question, ‘What if all of it – home, kinship, 
the whole enchilada – is just the biggest, most truly global, and centuries-
oldest piece of brainwashing?  Suppose that it’s only when you dare to let 
go that your real life begins?’ (176-77) 
 However, the novel also suggests the rarity of such migratory 
reterritorialisations, both in terms of the paucity of humans willing or able to 
attempt them and in terms of the difficulty of enacting these 
reterritorialisations should the will be present.  Rai argues that ‘in every 
generation there are a few souls, call them lucky or cursed, who are simply 
born not belonging, who come into the world semi-detached’ (72).  By 
stressing that the numbers of the semi-detached are few, Rushdie indicates 
the scarcity of attempted reterritorialisation through migration.  In later 
chapters he reinforces his narrator’s concomitant assertion that the state of 
placial non-belonging may prove a blessing or a curse for the few who 
attempt to create new roots.   Through Ormus and Vina’s struggles in Britain 
and America (and even to arrive there) Rushdie emphasises the dangers of 
migration and the obstacles to reterritorialising the destination space. 
 As in Verses, in which Saladin’s migration marks him as demonic, in 
Ground Rushdie portrays the mere act of journeying as fraught with a 
danger and uncertainty that transforms the self.  When Ormus flies to Britain 
he ‘feels a certain resistance in the air’ and the presence of ‘ghostly border 
guards’ (253).  Here Rushdie depicts not only airspace’s resistance to 
migration but its transformatory capacity.  Ormus senses that ‘a mutation is 
occurring at the level of the cell, of the gene, of the particle’, that ‘[t]he 
person who arrives won’t be the one who left, or not quite’ (253).  Although 
Rushdie presents this epigenetic mutation as far less deleterious than 
Saladin’s metamorphosis into a demon, contrasting this passage with 
Ormus and Vina’s later migration to America reveals that space in Ground 
possesses a capacity to shape humans far in excess of humans’ ability to 
shape space.  By describing how Ormus and Vina become assimilated 
within New York’s juxtaposed, segregated heterotopian spaces Rushdie 
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shows that while the migrant may attain a sense of place by planting new 
roots in the destination space, this can occur without a significant attendant 
reterritorialisation of the locale in a wider sense. 
 Ormus and Vina do not fail to reterritorialise New York entirely.  Rai 
writes that ‘[t]he city seems to organise itself around them, as if they are the 
principle[…]that makes sense of the rest’ (382).  Their fame means that their 
music and their private lives become significant parts of New York’s social 
space.  Beyond the city limits their political activism reterritorialises the world 
successfully in the name of causes including famine relief and 
environmentalism (478).  Vina’s death inspires numerous movements of 
resistance which Rushdie suggests may construct differential space in the 
future.7 
 Yet their presence in New York leaves its segregated, stratified, 
heterotopian nature unchanged.  Ormus in particular becomes shaped by 
New York’s cityspace rather than trying to reterritorialise upon it.  He 
territorialises vertically in a manner akin to Abraham Zogoiby in Moor, and 
thus assimilates himself within the dominant culture as does Saladin 
Chamcha in Verses.  Rushdie depicts New York in Ground as a ‘mighty 
pincushion’ (354) characterised by man-made vertical striations, similar to 
Bombay in his 1990s novels.  This heterotopia juxtaposes skyscrapers 
containing business HQs and luxury homes with ‘[t]he rusting decadence of 
the city at ground level, its shoulder-barging vulgarity, its third-world feel’ 
(387).  Instead of attempting to merge these contiguous spatialities into 
differential social space Ormus recoils from New York’s ground-level 
spaces.  Like Abraham, he prefers to spend his time living in a succession 
of ‘unshod, segregated world[s]’ (474) far above the city streets.  Meanwhile, 
Vina discovers not new roots but the realisation that every new place seems 
‘just as wrong as the place she’d left’ (163).  Vina and Ormus reterritorialise 
their destination space to an extent.  However, their ability to do so proves 
limited because of Ormus’ distaste for the ground and Vina’s perpetual 
feeling of non-place. 
 Rushdie not only presents heterotopian social space’s recalcitrance 
to change, but questions additionally the possibility of new roots or 
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differential space in a world in which the very terrain becomes progressively 
more unstable and difficult to traverse.  As with the Rann of Kutch and the 
Sundarbans in Midnight and London in Verses, amorphous and nebulous 
spaces in Ground produce terror and uncertainty rather than freedom from 
biopolitical oppression.  In a characteristically fantastical idiom, Rushdie 
describes this nebulousness as arising from human actions.  He utilises 
‘[g]eology as metaphor’ (203), but also as metonym.  Rushdie depicts space 
as man-made not merely in the Lefebvrian sense of social space but in the 
sense that human actions produce actual changes in the world’s 
topographical form: ‘human Faults cause earthquakes too’ (327).  Striating 
violence and greed alters geography and thus makes it harder for most 
humans, especially subraces, to reterritorialise in the face of these 
striations: 
In the West the earthquakes have stopped and the construction 
teams have moved in.  Banks and insurance companies are building 
their new palaces over the faults, as if to assert the primacy of their 
authority, even over the misbehaving earth itself[…] 
In the South, however, the devastation continues.  It’s as if the earth 
were discriminating against its most disadvantaged children (553). 
By showing the Earth fracturing by degrees and producing an attendant 
continuum of deleterious deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations, 
Rushdie complements his novel’s broad scepticism regarding the 
potentiality of producing differential space through migration.  He portrays a 
growing terrifying treacherousness in the planet’s social space, and its very 
geometric form. 
 Ground’s fictional version of India becomes more abstract and 
oppressive than that of Moor.  However, Rushdie suggests a potentiality of 
reterritorialisation through migration greater than that in the earlier novel, in 
which Moraes Zogoiby leaves India for Spain to find the mythical differential 
space of Palimpstine, only to be confronted with a village of ‘lost souls’ 
(2006b, 390).  Yet the latter of Rushdie’s 1990s novels portrays this 
potentiality’s actualisation as invariably limited, for reasons commensurate 
with his previous fiction.  Nebulous marginal space offers not freedom but 
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terror (as in Midnight), the act of migration presents danger (as in Verses) 
and space proves susceptible to striation by the forces of predatory 
capitalism and (bio)political communalism (as in Moor). 
 Even this attenuated possibility of differential space and 
reterritorialisation through migration outstrips that found in Shalimar.  In his 
latest novel to deal with twentieth-century (bio)politics Rushdie 
characteristically concerns himself deeply with space and its construction.  
However, he differentiates Shalimar from his previous fiction by depicting 
the prospect of differential space, and the resistance to bio/thanatopower 
that it enables, as superseded completely by the deadly striations of India’s 
army and Pakistan-backed jihadists.  Chapter Two of this thesis argued that 
Shalimar constitutes the novel in which Rushdie most emphatically affirms 
the pervasiveness and effectiveness of race-thinking and the massacres it 
seeks to justify within twentieth-century governmentality.  Identifying the 
increasing degree to which the novel’s representation of space mirrors 
Agamben’s notion of the inescapable, infinitely reproducible biopolitical 
camp reveals the centrality of the novel’s engagement with space to this 
portrayal.  This biopolitical reading thus reinforces the study’s argument that 
Shalimar marks the final point on the general trajectory of excised 
oppositional potentiality within the events of Rushdie’s successive novels 
that explore twentieth-century biopolitics. 
Precarious Spaces in Shalimar the Clown: Three 
Kinds of Camp 
In Shalimar’s fictionalisation of Kashmir’s recent history Rushdie describes 
a formerly differential space’s gradual reterritorialisation by thanatopolitical 
forces.  He criticises equally the lethal means by which India’s biopolitical 
state eroded Kashmir’s spatial autonomy as the latter half of the twentieth 
century progressed, and the jihadists who worked towards the region’s 
accession to Pakistan in this period.  In Rushdie’s novel, the Indian state’s 
construction of military camps and the establishment of terrorist camps by 
Islamist fighters shape Kashmir gradually into a camp in Agamben’s sense: 
‘the space that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the 
rule’ (1998, 168-69).   Charting the ways in which India and Pakistan shape 
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the valley into a space of total exception and abjection reveals that 
Rushdie’s most recent fictional engagement with biopower’s effect on 
spatiality incorporates the most minimal potentiality of constructing 
differential spaces of resistance and freedom that his fiction has evoked to 
date. 
 In describing how the Indian army officer Hammirdev Kachhwaha’s 
military camp renders Kashmir an abstract space by degrees, Rushdie 
portrays it not as a static receptacle for ‘all the cumbersome matériel of war’ 
(2006a, 95) but as a spatialising enclave of Indian bio/thanatopower within 
the valley that expands and reterritorialises more space as the novel 
progresses.  As India’s military power over Kashmir grows, so do the 
dimensions of ‘the camp everyone locally called Elasticnagar because of its 
well-established tendency to stretch’ (94).  Rushdie criticises the oppressive 
occupation occasioned by the efforts of India’s central biopolitical state 
during the years after independence to retain the region it viewed as an 
integral part of the nation.  He shows how it denuded the integrity, autonomy 
and differentiality of Kashmir’s space by reterritorialising upon it through 
establishing multiple military camps: ‘There were many Elasticnagars now 
and they were getting bigger and bigger’ (98). 
 Rushdie suggests in the novel’s later chapters that when India’s 
central government actualised the thanatopolitical potentiality of its 
racialising biopolitics in the late 1980s by decreeing that ‘the ultimate crime 
of challenging the territorial integrity of India’ (290) warranted deadly force, 
these reterritorialisations enabled India’s army to conduct its massacres 
more effectively.  In Shalimar this renders Kashmir an Agambenian camp in 
which the state of exception becomes the rule.  For Kachhwaha’s army, 
‘[t]he political echelon’s decision to declare Kashmir a “disturbed area” 
[is][...]greatly appreciated.  In a disturbed area, search warrants were not 
required, arrest warrants ditto, and shoot-to-kill treatment of suspects was 
acceptable’ (290).  Wielding the Indian state’s sovereign power, Kachhwaha 
takes full advantage of this carte blanche.  He constructs further 
thanatopolitical spaces of indistinction: ‘the secret torture chambers of 
Badami Bagh, those rooms which had never existed, did not exist and would 
never exist, and from which nobody had ever heard a scream’ (307).  For 
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the Indian soldiers in their military camp, killing is not killing, the spaces of 
torture do not exist officially and neither do their victims.  To use Agamben’s 
terms, Rushdie depicts Kashmir’s people as homo sacer, the exemplary 
victims of bio/thanatopower ‘exposed and threatened on the threshold in 
which life and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable’ (Agamben 
1998, 28).  However, Rushdie declines to place the blame for Kashmir’s 
reterritorialisation into an inescapable camp characterised by the mass 
production of bare life entirely on the Indian biopolitical state.  He attributes 
equal responsibility to the Pakistan-backed jihadists whose terrorist camps 
also contribute towards the region’s gradual conversion into a biopolitical 
camp by exploiting Kashmir’s porous borders in order to reterritorialise upon 
its space. 
 Shalimar depicts Kashmir’s external borders as nebulous, porous 
and lacking tangible striating effects.  They have more in common with the 
boundaries of the Rann of Kutch in Midnight than the more concrete barrier 
to Saleem Sinai’s telepathy.  However, as with Piloo Doodhwala’s capitalist 
exploitation of non-urban space in Ground, Rushdie indicates that 
provisional, shifting marginal locales, rather than fomenting a potentiality of 
differential, pluralist space, provide fertile terrain for reterritorialisations 
deleterious to this space.  Just as India in Moor becomes ruined by the 
combined effect of the antagonistic forces of Hindutva and predatory 
biopolitical capitalism, in Shalimar the permeable border between Indian- 
and Pakistani-administered Kashmir constitutes an opportunity for 
Pakistan-backed forces of spatial striation to oppose and, paradoxically, 
complement the Indian army’s violent reterritorialisations. 
 Rushdie asserts in Shalimar that the creation of the ceasefire line 
between Indian- and Pakistani-administered Kashmir arose from the 
inability of both Kashmiris and India’s central government to defend Indian-
controlled space against the ‘army of kabalis from Pakistan[...]cross[ing] the 
border, looting, raping, burning, killing’ (2006a, 85).  However, as Robert 
Wirsing argues, the historical LOC (Line of Control) ‘possessed very few of 
the attributes of a permanent boundary.  It was wholly military in its 
conception; and, drawn on the basis of positions held by the combatants at 
the time fighting between them ended, it was clearly designed for temporary 
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use’ (1998, 62).  Rushdie’s fictionalised version of Kashmir’s twentieth-
century history similarly represents the ceasefire line as both temporary and 
porous.  The ceasefire line in Shalimar proves unable to securitise the 
territory it circumscribes against the reterritorialisations of Pakistan-backed 
jihadist forces.  Kachhwaha grumbles about ‘Kashmiris on both sides who 
treated the line with contempt and walked across the mountains whenever 
they so chose’ (Rushdie 2006a, 97).  The LOC fails to prevent the continued 
migration of ‘[w]ild mountain men, fanatics, aliens’ (130) from the Pakistani-
administered side.  By describing how these fanatics striate more and more 
of the valley as the novel progresses, Rushdie portrays ‘the crescent 
shadow of Pakistan’ (132) as a more tangible spatial formation than any 
border delineating territory belonging to Kashmir.  Upon its creation 
Pakistan becomes a major force in the politics of the spatially provisional 
region it claims, whose borders prove permeable enough to allow the entry 
of reterritorialising jihadist forces espousing what Rushdie depicts as ideals 
alien to the naturally differential space of Kashmir. 
 Just as India’s army in Shalimar reterritorialises more and more of 
Kashmir and becomes increasingly thanatopolitical, Pakistan-backed terror 
cells enact a growing number of striations in line with Islamic fundamentalist 
ideology.  The jihadists of the novel, who become more powerful as it goes 
on, propagate a discourse that militates against the valley’s tolerant ethos 
of Kashmiriyat, ‘the belief that at the heart of Kashmiri culture there was a 
common bond that transcended all other differences’ (110).  By occupying 
more and more of Kashmir’s terrain they enable their ideology to shape a 
greater area of social space.  When Shalimar Noman returns from abroad 
the FC-22 jihadist camp appears ‘larger, more solidly constructed’ (275).  
Rushdie describes a similar expansion to that of Kachhwaha’s military 
camp.  Differential space becomes increasingly constrained in the middle.  
Through such fictional events as the violent jihadist takeover of the villages 
of Shirmal and Pachigam and its effect on Kashmiri women, Rushdie 
criticises the damaging effect on pluralism and tolerance of what he 
perceives as the historical reterritorialisations of an externally-backed, alien 
version of Islam whose spatiality eroded Kashmiriyat gradually during the 
late twentieth century.  Combined with the Indian military camp’s similarly 
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violent thanatopolitics, the jihadist camps render Rushdie’s Kashmir a third 
kind of camp: that which Agamben theorises.  This indistinct space of 
hopelessness, striation and lethality epitomises Rushdie’s most vivid 
affirmation of the vast capacity that the spatiality of bio/thanatopower 
possessed to quell resistance within twentieth-century governmentality. 
Conclusion: The Cessation of Resistance 
This chapter has argued that Rushdie’s novels invite a biopolitical reading 
which asserts that the variety of spaces that biopower produced within 
twentieth-century governmentality exceeded the notions of spatiality that 
Foucault and Agamben’s canonical theories of biopolitics posit.  It 
augmented these thinkers by using Lefebvre and Deleuze and Guattari’s 
conceptions of relational space to assemble an incorporative theory of 
spatiality which provided a critical vocabulary appropriate to considering the 
multiple abstract and differential spaces that Rushdie depicts.  By 
delineating more comprehensively than ever the gradual increase in 
abstract spaces of oppression throughout Rushdie’s fiction, this chapter 
showed the utility of this kind of biopolitical literary-geographical criticism.  
From the attenuated potentiality of freedom within differential space in 
Midnight and Verses, to the bleak Indian spaces of his 1990s novels, to 
Kashmir’s complete striation in Shalimar, Rushdie’s novels have become 
increasingly unlikely to depict the possibility of effective resistance to 
biopower through the shaping of social space. 
 However, outlining this trajectory as clearly as possible requires this 
study to consider the precise nature of the discourses and movements 
which take place within the spaces that Rushdie describes.  Chapters Four 
and Five argue that his novels indicate increasingly the idealism and 
impracticality of the modes of resistance that Foucault, Hardt and Negri, 
Agamben and Esposito advocate.  This brings into clearer focus the trend 
of lessening oppositional potentiality across Rushdie’s successive 
fictionalisations of twentieth-century history by charting the generally 
growing extent to which attempts at resistance in his novels fail to approach 
the heights of democracy, inclusiveness, public-spiritedness, fearlessness, 
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directness and sincerity that these theorists suggest erroneously are 
possible within contemporary governmentality.
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Chapter Four – Discourses of 
Resistance 
Introduction: Resistance in Rushdie 
Chapter Three charted two intertwined trends within Rushdie’s fiction: the 
expanding pervasiveness of oppressive abstract spaces in his novels, and 
his growing disinclination to portray a potentiality of resistance through 
differential spaces that militate against biopolitical control.  By considering 
how Rushdie describes spaces that biopolitical governments and 
superraces striate, this chapter provided a literary-geographical backing to 
Chapters One and Two’s arguments that he proves increasingly prone to 
depict bio/thanatopower’s efficacy.  Conversely, by delineating the second 
tendency Chapter Three began a broader inquiry into effective resistance 
to biopower, and its gradual waning, in Rushdie’s fiction. 
 In order to draw this trajectory more sharply, Chapter Four analyses 
how Rushdie figures discourses of resistance.  Chapter Five considers the 
ways in which he represents the movements that these discourses inspire.  
This study so far has illuminated the ways in which his novels suggest that 
the reality of twentieth-century biopolitical practice exceeds and 
problematises the canonical conceptions of biopolitical oppression that 
Michael Foucault, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Giorgio Agamben and 
Roberto Esposito have produced.  Chapters Four and Five argue that 
Rushdie indicates even more forcefully the impracticality of the discourses 
of resistance that these thinkers formulate and advocate.  However, these 
chapters assert that although these putative methods of resistance to 
biopower prove invariably ineffectual in resisting biopower, they contribute 
towards deconstructing it when they inform a biopolitical reading of literature 
that engages with the limits of their potency. 
 Chapter Four uses (and critiques) Foucault’s theory of discourse in 
order to analyse Rushdie’s growing tendency to depict the failure of 
discursive resistance to oppose biopolitical reterritorialisations effectively 
within twentieth-century (bio)politics.  For Foucault, ‘discourse is constituted 
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by the difference between what one could say correctly at one period (under 
the rules of grammar and logic) and what is actually said’ (1991, 63).  
Discourses are not measured against any empirical truth but ‘are 
characterised by the delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a 
legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms 
for the elaboration of concepts and theories’ (Foucault 1980a, 199).  This 
chapter uses Foucault’s concept of simple, sincere, fearless, public-spirited 
parrhēsia, a mode he appropriates from the Ancient Greeks in his late-
career thought.  It deploys good parrhēsia as a yardstick of effective 
‘“reverse” discourse’ (Foucault 1990, 101) against which to measure the 
often unclear, over-complicated, self-serving, narrowly disseminated and/or 
ineffective discourses that Rushdie’s characters produce in their efforts to 
oppose the politically powerful’s racialising truth-claims.  In so doing, 
Chapter Four shows how his fiction generally suggests more and more that 
reverse discourse proves ineffectual in countering the discursive norms and 
fields that biopolitical states and their constructed superraces delimit.  The 
Ground Beneath Her Feet evokes a potentiality of parrhesiastic resistance 
by describing how its protagonists’ sincere truth-claims foment mass 
oppositional organisations.  However, for the most part Rushdie’s 
characters increasingly fail to resist biopolitical oppression effectively 
through discourses constituting parrhēsia or including parrhesiastic 
elements; particularly when, as Chapter Five demonstrates, they attempt to 
transform discursive resistance into powerful political movements. 
 Foucault argues that ‘[d]iscursive practices are not purely and simply 
ways of producing discourse.  They are embodied in technical processes, 
in institutions, in patterns for general behaviour, in forms for transmission 
and diffusion, and in pedagogical forms which, at once, impose and 
maintain them’ (Foucault 1980a, 200).  Consequently, understanding his 
conception of discourse requires engaging with his work on the diffuse, 
capillary power relations that form every network in which humans 
disseminate and resist discursive truth-claims.  For Foucault power is 
everywhere, including the power of resistance.  However, this does not 
mean that reverse discourses prove necessarily more powerful than 
biopolitical regimes’ truth-claims, or even as powerful.  As well as providing 
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a background to his notion of how biopower may be resisted discursively, 
Foucault’s theory of pervasive, capillary power enables this chapter to trace 
in detail the broadly increasing unwillingness of Rushdie’s fiction to depict 
effective discursive resistance within the complex networks of discourse and 
power by which he characterises twentieth-century politics. 
Power and Resistance in Foucault 
Rushdie rarely describes reverse discourses unseating governments, 
dismantling oppressive apparatuses or lessening the power of biopolitical 
elites, but his novels always indicate to some extent that they may inspire 
future effective resistance.  However, his fiction has proven increasingly 
reluctant to evoke this potentiality.  Because Foucault perceives a power of 
resistance of variable potency as present in all power relations, his theory 
of power as processual and capillary enables this chapter to analyse the 
generally lessening degree to which Rushdie portrays effective reverse 
discourse as possible within the complex power networks of twentieth-
century (bio)politics. 
 Foucault’s conception of power asserts clearly the potentiality of 
effective resistance.  Even the mightiest sovereign does not possess power 
exclusively or monolithically.  Rather, power is processual and relational.  It 
is thus present in all (bio)political relations, including dynamics of resistance.  
Humans do not resist power, but use their own power to resist that which 
oppressive biopolitical governments wield. 
 For Foucault, not only are there ‘no relations of power without 
resistances’ (1980b, 142), but resistance constitutes a primary condition for 
power’s existence (see 2002b, 329).  However, his thought incorporates a 
tension between his assertion that resistance, like power, is everywhere and 
the extent to which oppressive (bio)political practices permit effective 
resistance.  As Dan Beer argues, Foucault ‘has certainly never claimed that 
power and resistance are necessarily equal to one another’ (2002, 89).  Not 
only do Rushdie’s novels suggest increasingly that discourses and 
technologies of oppressive (bio)power rendered resistance’s power 
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invariably ineffectual within twentieth-century politics, they indicate indirectly 
the inutility of the specific modalities of resistance that Foucault advocates. 
 In considering spaces not directly subject to biopower, Foucault’s 
notion of governmentality complements his conception of power by 
suggesting that resistance cannot be eradicated completely.  However, the 
method of resistance he proposes – parrhēsia – constitutes a discursive 
potentiality which regimes of biopower historically have prevented from 
becoming extant within governmentality.  By analysing the ways in which 
Rushdie’s novels engage with the suppression of this potentiality, this 
chapter uses them to critique the practicality of Foucault’s strategy.  
Moreover, identifying the generally growing degree to which Rushdie’s 
fiction enables this critique further delineates the trajectory of excised 
oppositional potentiality within his successive fictionalisations of twentieth-
century history. 
The Later Foucault: Governmentality and Parrhēsia 
As Chapter One observed, Foucault argues that the biopolitical state lacks 
the resources to police every member of the population, or even every 
member of the subraces it constructs: ‘[g]overnment’s limit of competence 
[is] bounded by the utility of governmental intervention’ (2010a, 40).  In order 
to operate efficiently the state induces its superrace to become what Julian 
Reid calls ‘self-securing subjects’ (2013, 116).  These bodies optimise their 
own health and productivity, remain orderly and join the state in racialising 
subraces within what Foucault calls governmentality.  Foucault’s theory of 
governmentality also allows that subjects under biopower may choose not 
to secure themselves or to accept their racialisation but to resist.  It was 
possible in the past to argue that Foucault did not offer an explicit strategy 
to oppose oppressive power (see Hartsock 1996, 46).  However, the recent 
(and ongoing) publication of his Collège de France lectures, which include 
extensive material on how humans may enact discursive resistance within 
governmentality via parrhēsia, invites a reading of Foucault that questions 
this representation of his political philosophy. 
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 Yet these newly published works have also exposed not just the 
difficulty of achieving parrhēsia and having it heeded by the politically 
powerful and the wider population (which Foucault himself admits), but the 
idealism and impracticality of reviving this frank, unfurnished, public-spirited 
Ancient Greek discourse as a method of resisting biopolitical oppression 
within contemporary governmentality.  Because Rushdie’s novels constitute 
an exemplary site of fictional engagement with twentieth-century 
governmentality, they can inform a critique that uses literature to interrogate 
the utility of Foucault’s strategy.  This reading charts the generally growing 
extent to which Rushdie suggests indirectly that the complexity of 
contemporary politics and reality, human beings’ personal failings and 
biopolitical oppression’s potency present obstacles to constructing this ideal 
of effective discursive resistance to biopower. 
 Understanding why achieving parrhēsia has proven so difficult 
historically, and increasingly challenging for Rushdie’s characters, requires 
engaging with its specific characteristics and its position within the 
intertwined networks of power and discourse.  Foucault’s suspicion of the 
notion of empirical scientific or moral truth leads him to characterise 
discourse as a ‘will to truth’ (1981, 55) which operates within a matrix of 
competing truth-claims made by various parties.  He argues that what 
populations accept as true depends on the ability of political actors to make 
people believe that their claims are truthful.  Consequently, although all 
truth-claims constitute and are constituted by power (Foucault 2004, 24), 
not all of them wield an equal amount of power.  The (bio)political state’s 
discourse sanctions certain truths within the polis and excludes others.  The 
government produces what Foucault calls a ‘regime of truth’ (1980b, 131).  
This discourse constitutes and buttresses the state’s apparatuses in turn. 
 Foucault’s Collège de France lectures focus on how humans may 
resist these regimes of truth through parrhēsia, an Ancient Greek discourse 
‘which roughly speaking means frankness, open-heartedness [and] 
openness of thought’ (2005, 169) within the democratic polis.  As Jeremy 
Moss argues, ‘Foucault made it clear that Greco-Roman ethics, as a whole, 
could not simply be grafted on to modern problems’ (1998, 4).  Yet 
Foucault’s late writings suggest that oppressive political (bio)power can be 
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resisted through a revival of good parrhēsia – a direct, fearless, sincere, 
public-spirited discourse spoken to a more powerful figure – within 
contemporary governmentality.  In analysing discursive resistance to 
biopower in Rushdie this chapter uses the concept of good parrhēsia as 
Foucault does, as an ideal of discursive resistance that stands in contrast 
with the self-interested or populist bad parrhēsia that often constitutes a 
more powerful truth-claim.  However, whereas Foucault asserts 
optimistically that good parrhēsia constitutes a potentiality of effective 
resistance to the process by which ‘[d]emocracy is in the process of being 
overrun by a bad parrhēsia’ (2010b, 168), Rushdie’s fiction indicates more 
or less consistently increasingly the near-impossibility of disseminating 
effective good parrhēsia, or reverse discourse based on parrhesiastic 
qualities, within twentieth-century governmentality’s complex, violent and 
oppressive (bio)politics. 
 In his Fearless Speech lectures (published in 2001) Foucault 
unpacks good parrhēsia’s features.  In the so-called Socratic type of 
parrhēsia, ‘telling the truth is regarded as a duty’ (Foucault 2001, 19) to the 
community in order to improve it.  To work effectively for the public good, 
parrhēsia must be direct and unfurnished discourse.  Simplicity enables 
parrhēsia to delineate clearly how this improvement may be enacted, and 
communicate the parrhesiast’s sincerity: ‘in parrhēsia, the speaker makes it 
manifestly clear and obvious that what he says is his own opinion.  And he 
does this by[…]us[ing] the most direct words and forms of expression he 
can find’ (12).  This advocation for a well-run, democratic polis must come 
from amongst the ordinary population.  As Foucault explains, ‘the 
commitment involved in parrhēsia is linked to a certain social situation, to a 
difference of status between the speaker, to the fact that the parrhesiastes 
says something which is dangerous to himself and thus involves a risk’ (13).  
Parrhēsia works through power against power’s repressive use by using the 
power of a direct, sincere, public-spirited discourse, spoken without fear to 
a more powerful – often sovereign – figure, to resist political tyranny and 
poor governance. 
 Foucault asserts the potential oppositional potency of this ‘particular 
way of telling the truth’ (2010b, 52), but also outlines the difficulty of meeting 
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good parrhēsia’s various conditions.  He argues that only humans who take 
control of their selves, physically and mentally, through sōphrosynē – 
‘restraint in the practice of pleasures’ (Foucault 1992, 78) – can control their 
discourse.  In his lectures on the care of the self (epimeleia heautou) he 
notes that to achieve such control through taming the self ‘one must have 
the ability, time, and culture, etcetera, to do so.  It is an activity of the elite’ 
(Foucault 2005, 75).   Only a limited number of figures outside of political 
and economic elites may practice sōphrosynē – and hence good parrhēsia 
– successfully (113). 
 Having good parrhēsia heeded by the population that it intends to 
help proves even more taxing than achieving the epimeleia heautou 
necessary to produce it.  Foucault argues that ‘[b]ecause parrhēsia is given 
even to the worst citizens, the overwhelming influence of bad, immoral, or 
ignorant speakers may lead the citizenry into tyranny, or may otherwise 
endanger the city’ (2001, 77).  A population may be unable to identify who 
truly has the polis’ best interests at heart.  Foucault warns that the politically 
powerful may ignore or repress public-spirited good parrhēsia and that 
citizens may choose instead to listen to self-interested or populist bad 
parrhēsia (82).  When the opinions most beneficial to the polis are 
unpopular, good parrhēsia’s power as a truth-claim becomes limited. 
 Though mindful of the obstacles to producing good parrhēsia, 
Foucault argues for its potential strength as a mode of discursive resistance.  
However, every Rushdie novel with the exception of Ground depicts the 
impossibility of practising good parrhēsia characterised by total sincerity, 
directness, courage and public-spiritedness in form and content within a 
complex, oppressive twentieth-century governmentality in which bad 
parrhēsia habitually overruns democracy.  Narratives including Saleem 
Sinai’s attempt to tell the story of his role in India’s post-independence 
history in Midnight’s Children indicate that the intricacy of contemporary 
politics militates against the knowledge of the self and its place within 
political reality that produces the epimeleia heautou which enables good 
parrhēsia’s discursive directness.  In other novels such as Shame Rushdie 
evokes the potential punishment for parrhēsia – the risk of which Foucault 
explores – that often engenders subtle resistance through allegory or art 
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rather than fearless speech.  His fiction suggests almost constantly that 
racialising biopolitical oppression, bad parrhēsia’s discursive power and the 
unwillingness of the population (particularly the constructed superrace) to 
accept alternative truth-claims coalesce to prevent parrhesiastic discourses 
of resistance to biopower from being disseminated widely and hence from 
inspiring powerful resistance. 
 Tracing Rushdie’s growing disinclination to depict effective 
resistance to biopolitical oppression through reverse discourse thus 
requires a new concept of ‘pseudo-parrhēsia’.  Several of the discourses 
that Rushdie’s novels describe can be considered pseudo-parrhesiastic in 
that they achieve a partial sincerity, simplicity, public-spiritedness and/or 
courage.  Saleem fails to produce a historiographical narrative that 
constitutes his own opinion entirely in Midnight, but his discourse’s broad 
sincerity renders it a powerful truth-claim.  In Shame, although Rani 
Harappa’s confinement within her house prevents her from disseminating a 
verbal parrhēsia within the political sphere, certain of her artworks condemn 
biopolitical oppression as directly as she can manage.  Considering the 
varying degrees to which Rushdie depicts obstacles to pseudo-parrhēsia 
within twentieth-century governmentality helps produce a biopolitical 
reading which critiques Foucault’s impractical strategy of resistance, but 
asserts its usefulness to literary study as a benchmark against which to 
measure ineffectual, less idealised fictional oppositional discourses.  In so 
doing it delineates more comprehensively the trajectory of waning 
oppositional potentiality that Rushdie’s successive fictional engagements 
with twentieth-century governmentality evoke.  This trajectory begins with 
Midnight. 
Rushdie’s Pseudo-Parrhesiasts (1): Midnight’s 
Children and Saleem Sinai’s Narrative Resistance 
Despite the disintegration of the narrator Saleem Sinai beneath the feet of 
India’s millions at the end of Midnight’s Children, the novel suggests that his 
reverse discourse may prove effective after his death.  It nevertheless 
invites a biopolitical reading that critiques good parrhēsia’s impracticality.  
For Foucault, good parrhēsia must be simple and entirely the speaker’s own 
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opinion.  Because of its complex, digressive style and the external forces 
that shape its content, Saleem’s narrative cannot form Socratic parrhēsia 
on either of these grounds. 
 Saleem only resolves very occasionally upon an unfurnished mode 
of narration, as when during his search for bodily obliteration during the 
1965 war he remarks, ‘I’m making it sound too noble; no orotund phrases 
must be used’ (Rushdie 2008, 474).  He proves neither willing nor able to 
fashion a historiographical narrative direct enough for its potential audience 
to understand it easily.  In Midnight Rushdie presents a narrative of copious 
descriptive and historical detail (213), digression (310) and linguistic and 
narratological exuberance whose style exceeds the parrhesiastic mode 
because Saleem perceives India’s post-independence history as too 
complex, uncertain and resistant to notions of empirical truth to be told 
simply.  Moreover, his interlocutor Padma’s demands, the impending death 
that makes him race against time and an unparrhesiastic fear of reprisals 
from his nemesis Shiva contribute towards shaping his narrative.  This 
renders it something other than his own personal, sincere, parrhesiastic 
opinion. 
 However, Saleem’s narrative style appears more a symptom of the 
state of contemporary parrhēsia than a damaging contribution towards this 
state.   His narrative’s unparrhesiastic nature does not indict him as an 
unskilled truth-teller.  Rather, it evokes the impossibility of articulating good 
parrhēsia within the relational matrix of discursive truth-claims that 
characterises contemporary governmentality.  Yet although Rushdie details 
the multiple forces that render Saleem’s narrative unparrhesiastic in its 
complexity, digressive nature and omissions, he suggests that its general 
pseudo-parrhesiastic sincerity and public-spiritedness in questioning the 
claims of India’s regime of truth renders it a powerful truth-claim against 
oppressive (bio)power.  He indicates at the end of the novel that Saleem’s 
story may change India for the better by inspiring others to produce a 
similarly sincere reverse discourse that problematises the state’s 
oppressive truth-claims further; a potentiality of pseudo-parrhesiastic 
resistance that becomes excised from Rushdie’s later fictional versions of 
the twentieth century. 
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The Untruthful Truth-Claims of Narrative 
By describing Saleem Sinai’s belief in narrative’s power to construct truth-
claims, in Midnight Rushdie questions the notion of empirical truth in a way 
that mirrors Foucault’s theory of truth and discourse.  He thus evokes a 
potentiality of effective discursive resistance.  For Foucault, ‘the possibility 
exists for fiction to function in truth, for a fictional discourse to induce effects 
of truth, and for bringing it about that a true discourse engenders or 
“manufactures” something that does not as yet exist’ (1980b, 193).  Saleem 
asserts the truthfulness of his supernatural narrative intertwining of India’s 
history with his personal life.  At the same time he accepts that it may be 
taken for fiction by those inclined to believe the official state version of Indian 
history, or scientific, purportedly empirical discourses of knowledge (the 
very truth-claims that inform biopower): 
To anyone whose personal cast of mind is too inflexible to accept 
these facts, I have this to say: That’s how it was; there can be no 
retreat from the truth[…]But no literate person in this India of ours 
can be wholly immune from the type of information I am in the 
process of unveiling (Rushdie 2008, 273). 
In depicting India as a space with the supernatural at the heart of its national 
imaginary, Rushdie problematises and relativises truth and knowledge.  
Within this context, he portrays Saleem’s fantastical narrative as no more or 
less truthful than any other telling of India’s post-independence history. 
 Yet by describing the external factors that limit his protagonist’s 
control of his own truth-claim Rushdie indicates the impossibility of 
achieving, within twentieth-century governmentality, the sincere explication 
of one’s personal opinion that characterises good parrhēsia.  Saleem’s 
historiographical narrative constitutes a truth, but not solely his truth.  His 
race to finish his narrative before he disintegrates and his omission of 
certain details for fear of reprisals confirm his inability to construct good 
parrhēsia, regardless of the truth he feels his narrative art carries. 
 Saleem’s body disintegrates as he produces his story.  His efforts to 
‘resist the cracks’ (168) twist his narrative into a form not entirely his natural 
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mode of storytelling.  His race against time makes him attempt to resist 
‘cracked digressions’ (168) on occasion, but his style remains largely 
incorporative and digressive rather than becoming simpler, more linear and 
therefore more parrhesiastic in form.  The primary effect of time constraints 
on his narrative art actually disallows parrhesiastic content by making him 
more careless about historical facts and his discourse’s consistency: ‘I’m 
racing the cracks, but I remain conscious that errors have already been 
made, and that, as my decay accelerates (my writing speed is having 
trouble keeping up), the risk of unreliability grows’ (375-76).  Saleem’s 
limited time in which to write prevents him from producing the type of 
discourse that his personal opinion would beget under ideal circumstances.  
His unparrhesiastic fear of repercussions inhibits him further. 
 Because Saleem feels threatened by his nemesis Shiva, he ‘push[es] 
him, the other, into the background’ of his story until ‘[h]e can be concealed 
no longer’ (568).  In inventing the story of Shiva’s death Saleem even gives 
up on any truth-claim whatsoever.  He falls victim to ‘the illusion that[…]it is 
possible to create past events simply by saying they occurred’ (619).  
Foucault emphasises ‘the fact that the parrhesiastes says something which 
is dangerous to himself and thus involves a risk’ (2001, 13).  Yet despite 
Saleem’s powerful, public-spirited critique of the Indian government’s 
biopolitical regime the risk that he is willing to accept proves limited.  
Rushdie suggests that the vicissitudes of time and fear prevent his 
protagonist from disseminating the completely personally-held, personally-
shaped truth of good parrhēsia. 
 However, Rushdie indicates that Saleem’s truth-claim carries a 
potentiality of effective pseudo-parrhesiastic resistance in its attempts to 
disseminate a reverse discourse of counterhistory against the biopolitical 
state’s racialising regime of truth, and its capacity to inspire similar 
discourses in the future.  Saleem’s narrative’s ornate rhetorical style and 
shaping by external forces preclude it from becoming good Socratic 
parrhēsia in the strictest sense.  Yet his profound conviction in his truth-
claim aligns with the truth-telling that Foucault describes, in which ‘the 
parrhesiastes says what is true because he knows that it is true; and he 
knows that it is true because it is really true’ (14).  Good parrhēsia arises 
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from a sincere belief in one’s own truth-claim and from a duty to the polis 
(19).  Its strength comes from this conviction rather than from reference to 
the established notions of truth that it resists.  Time and fear limit Saleem’s 
personal control of his narrative’s style and content, but his discourse 
incorporates pseudo-parrhesiastic characteristics of broad sincerity and 
public-spiritedness.  Rushdie uses these qualities in order to suggest that 
reverse discourse’s ‘shadows of imperfection’ (2008, 642) do not matter as 
long as the resisting truth becomes disseminated effectively and galvanises 
the polis to produce their own parrhesiastic or pseudo-parrhesiastic 
discourses of resistance to oppressive state (bio)power.  Although he hints 
that the complexity of Saleem’s narrative may preclude it from influencing 
India’s polis significantly, he indicates the possibility of its changing India for 
the better. 
Narrative Dissemination and The Tastes of Saleem’s Audience 
As he does in most of his later novels, in Midnight Rushdie indirectly 
indicates the impossibility of producing the most effective form of discursive 
resistance according to Foucault – the widespread dissemination of one’s 
own opinion expressed simply, directly and fearlessly – within twentieth-
century governmentality.  This chapter has argued that the external 
influences which shape Saleem Sinai’s narrative mean that it lacks the 
complete control over its own discourse that characterises good parrhēsia.  
Moreover, by describing the efforts of Saleem’s interlocutor Padma to 
induce him to write more simply and linearly, Rushdie portrays his 
protagonist’s narrative as caught between two modes of narration.  
Parrhesiastic directness makes it more likely to be understood when 
disseminated, but militates against the pseudo-parrhesiastic sincerity of the 
complex style that Saleem believes necessary to represent the truth of 
India’s post-independence history.  This bind further renders good parrhēsia 
unachievable. 
 Yet Rushdie suggests that Saleem’s truth-claim will be disseminated 
rather than suppressed after he dies.  This complex reverse discourse may 
change India for the better by inspiring others to attempt parrhēsia or 
pseudo-parrhēsia.  Saleem again mirrors Foucault’s questioning of the 
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notion of empirical truth when he asserts that ‘in autobiography, as in all 
literature, what actually happened is less important than what the author 
can manage to persuade his audience to believe’ (Rushdie 2008, 376).  
Rushdie indicates that Saleem’s sincere, public-spirited pseudo-
parrhesiastic discourse may work against power’s oppressive use in the 
future by persuading his audience to believe it, and thus to believe in reverse 
discourse’s capacity to oppose biopolitical oppression.  Though this 
potentiality is attenuated it appears greater than the prospects for resistance 
to biopower that most of Rushdie’s later novels depict. 
 The potentiality of effective discursive resistance in Midnight proves 
finite in part because Rushdie suggests that the complex unparrhesiastic 
form of Saleem’s narrative will render it difficult to understand when 
disseminated within India’s polis.  Saleem’s illiterate interlocutor Padma 
‘get[s] irritated whenever [his] narration becomes self-conscious’ (83) and 
digressive.  In Foucauldian terms, she steers Saleem’s narrative towards 
parrhesiastic directness.  Saleem bemoans Padma.  He ‘wish[es], at times, 
for a more discerning audience, someone who would understand the need 
for rhythm, pacing, the subtle introduction of minor chords which will later 
rise, swell, seize the melody’ (135).  Yet he misses her when she is gone, 
and feels the need at times for his narrative to ‘recapture [her] rapt attention’ 
(445).  In these episodes Rushdie shows how the tastes of Saleem’s 
audience – and by implication his potential wider public – force him to 
compromise his style in order to address them more effectively.  However, 
these moments of concession prove rare.  Timothy Brennan argues that 
‘Padma’s lower-class impulses in art merely symbolise the fatal immaturity 
of her class in the struggle for a meaningful democracy on a legitimately 
“Indian” terrain’ (1989, 105).1  Yet considering her role as an analogue for a 
possible wider, mostly illiterate and working-class, audience for Saleem’s 
reverse discourse produces an analysis that takes her failed attempts to 
shape his narrative into something more linear – and hence more 
parrhesiastic in form – less lightly.  Reading Midnight in the light of 
Foucault’s conception of discursive resistance through truth-claims reveals 
that the importance of whether Saleem’s audience believes his story literally 
is superseded by the issue of whether his narrative inspires resistance in its 
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audience when disseminated after his death.  His habitual refusal to heed 
Padma’s advice to write more simply suggests limitations to this future 
resistance’s potentiality. 
 Through Saleem and Padma’s relationship Rushdie 
characteristically indicates the impossibility of producing good parrhēsia 
within twentieth-century governmentality.  Saleem’s narrative is caught in a 
bind between a self-reflexive, non-linear and digressive mode which he 
perceives as vital to communicate sincerely the true nature of India’s post-
independence history, and a more readily comprehensible parrhesiastic 
style which paradoxically leads him away from the parrhesiastic quality of 
saying ‘what he knows to be true’ (Foucault 2001, 14).  Rushdie also uses 
Padma’s distaste for Saleem’s narrative style to evoke the difficulty of 
inspiring further reverse discourses even through a sincere but complex 
pseudo-parrhēsia. 
 However, Rushdie indicates the possibility of Saleem’s narrative 
being disseminated and accepted by India’s public despite its complexity.  
Padma complains about Saleem’s complex discursive mode.  She often 
loses interest in his narrative (Rushdie 2008, 537).  Yet on other occasions 
Saleem notes that she appears rapt: ‘I know now that she is, despite all her 
protestations, hooked.  No doubt about it: my story has her by the throat’ 
(44).  Midnight depicts her emotional investment frequently, as when she 
becomes ‘almost beside herself with anguish’ (496) after hearing of 
Saleem’s part in a coup in Bangladesh.  Although Rushdie uses Padma to 
infer that ordinary working-class Indians may find the digressive, 
incorporative nature of Saleem’s story unpalatable, her engrossment in his 
narrative at times implies the countervailing possibility.  Furthermore, in the 
novel’s ending Rushdie suggests that Saleem’s pseudo-parrhesiastic 
narrative may inspire millions of Indians to produce similar reverse 
discourses.  Through this possible dissemination of discursive resistance, 
he describes a potentiality of future resistance to state biopower that 
exceeds that which most of his later fiction evokes. 
 Rushdie deploys the metaphor of pickling to suggest this potentiality.  
In affirming the ‘[s]ymbolic value of the pickling process’ within ‘the 
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chutnification of history’ (642) which distils his discourse into an essence, 
Saleem once again mirrors Foucault’s relativist conception of truth.  He 
admits that ‘shadows of imperfection’ (642) characterise the process by 
which he immortalises his memories and his truth-claim.  However, he 
stresses his reverse discourse’s truthfulness and pseudo-parrhesiastic 
sincerity: ‘yes, I should revise and revise, improve and improve; but there is 
neither the time nor the energy.  I am obliged to offer no more than this 
stubborn sentence: It happened that way because that’s how it happened’ 
(644).  Not only does this chutnification ‘give immortality’ (644) to Saleem’s 
discourse, but Rushdie indicates that in doing so it creates a space for other 
Indians to produce their own reverse discourses against the country’s 
biopolitical regime of truth.  Saleem claims that his narrative’s sincerity 
renders it a powerful and potentially influential truth-claim: ‘One day, 
perhaps, the world may taste the pickles of history.  They may be too strong 
for some palates, their smell may be overpowering, tears may rise to eyes; 
I hope nevertheless that it will be possible to say of them that they possess 
the authentic taste of truth’ (644).  By entering his chutneys into the ‘mass-
production’ through which they will be ‘unleashed upon the amnesiac nation’ 
(643), he intends their public-spirited counterhistory of post-independence 
India to expose its iniquities and inspire further discursive resistance.  
Engaging with this potentiality of future reverse discourse by using 
Foucault’s conception of discursive power as a network of competing, 
proliferating, mutating and galvanising truth-claims countermands readings 
of Midnight such as Fawzia Afzal-Khan’s.  She claims that ‘[t]here seems to 
be no possibility for optimism in the cruelly ravaged world that is being 
passed on by Saleem’s generation to the next’ (Afzal-Khan 1993, 159).  
Although the novel’s final paragraph sees Saleem disintegrate, as Michael 
Reder argues, ‘the conclusion represents, to a great extent, a spiritual union 
of the individual with the world[…]Rushdie offers us a mystical acceptance 
of the somewhat harsh realities of today’s world, because he believes that 
we must actively participate in history, not try to escape from it’ (1999, 244).  
The pseudo-parrhesiastic discourse that Saleem leaves behind presents 
the method by which this participation and resistance can operate.  Rather 
than constituting a closure of the possibility of opposition to state biopower, 
Rushdie’s ambiguous final chapter suggests that Saleem’s truth-claim may 
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change India after his death.  He inculcates Midnight’s version of the 
nation’s post-independence history with the potentiality of effective 
resistance. 
 Despite Midnight’s constant suggestion that direct, fearless good 
parrhēsia cannot occur within contemporary politics, Rushdie indicates that 
Saleem’s pseudo-parrhesiastic narrative may change India for the better 
after the events of the novel by inspiring others to produce similar reverse 
discourses.  However, with the exception of Ground, his subsequent novels 
take a more jaundiced view of the possibility of effective reverse discourse.  
Analysing the diminishing extent to which Rushdie depicts powerful 
resistance through pseudo-parrhēsia in these novels further delineates the 
general trajectory of waning oppositional potentiality that his successive 
fictionalisations of twentieth-century history evoke.  In Shame, The Satanic 
Verses and The Moor’s Last Sigh, not only is good parrhēsia as hard to 
come by as Saleem finds it, but Rushdie portrays discursive resistance of 
any kind as ineffective in countering biopolitical oppression or doing so in 
the future. 
Rushdie’s Pseudo-Parrhesiasts (2): Resistance 
through the Creative Arts 
Often the most effective resistance available to Rushdie’s protagonists 
arises not from verbal discourse but through art that engages with the 
multiplicity and complexity of modern politics and oppression, whether 
through storytelling (as with Saleem Sinai) or through the visual arts (as with 
Rani Harappa’s shawls in Shame and Aurora Zogoiby’s painting in Moor).  
Where opportunities for good parrhēsia are scarce or completely absent, 
Rushdie shows that works of art potentially constitute effective opposition to 
regimes of truth.   By producing truth-claims that deconstruct biopolitical 
oppression or depict a better, more egalitarian world, they may carry 
pseudo-parrhesiastic qualities of directness, sincerity and/or public-
spiritedness.   
 Midnight evokes the possibility of future resistance through Saleem’s 
pseudo-parrhesiastic narrative artistry.  However, in Shame and Moor 
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Rushdie suggests more forcefully that works of art which incorporate a 
pseudo-parrhesiastic reverse discourse fail invariably to resist biopolitical 
oppression because of (bio)politicians’ refusal to listen and their adeptness 
at suppressing production and dissemination of these artworks.  He 
indicates that neither exposing political oppression through art nor using it 
to depict a new society works effectively towards actually building one.  
Continuing to critique the utility of Foucault’s strategy of discursive 
resistance by analysing these two novels’ reluctance to portray parrhesiastic 
or even pseudo-parrhesiastic resistance as powerful draws more sharply 
the trajectory of generally waning oppositional potentiality in Rushdie’s 
fictional engagement with twentieth-century governmentality. 
Shame: State Suppression of Direct and Allegorical Artistic Discourses 
In Shame Rushdie presents Peccavistan, the novel’s fairy-tale analogue for 
Pakistan, as a nation whose misogynist Islamist government disallows the 
possibility of women’s resistance.  Through the character of Rani Harappa, 
wife of Prime Minister Iskander Harappa, he indicates that even women who 
formed part of Pakistan’s socio-economic and political elite could not use 
reverse discourse to oppose biopolitical oppression within twentieth-century 
governmentality.  Although Rushdie states through his author-analogue 
narrator that women ‘march in from the peripheries of the story to demand 
the inclusion of their own tragedies, histories and comedies’ (1996b, 173), 
this inclusion functions more in terms of the presence of women’s 
discourses within the text’s narrative form than their efficacy in combating 
biopower within the events of the novel.  Rushdie characteristically implies 
the impossibility of good parrhēsia by indicating the necessity of allegorical 
forms of resistance under biopolitical tyranny.  Moreover, the ways in which 
he describes Rani’s failure to expose her husband’s crimes through her 
allegorical art, or even to disseminate it, suggest the difficulty of 
engendering lasting political change through the direct and/or sincere 
pseudo-parrhesiastic reverse discourse which constitutes the closest thing 
to public-spirited good parrhēsia that twentieth-century governmentality’s 
complex and often oppressive power relations allowed. 
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 Through Rani, Rushdie evokes the strictures that twentieth-century 
biopolitics placed on women’s resistance in countries with a stark divide 
between public and private (see Cundy 1996, 52).  He depicts this divide by 
describing Rani’s spatial location in her home, Mohenjo.  Rani initially 
perceives the house as the ‘backyard of the universe’ (Rushdie 1996b, 94).  
Despite her privileged elite status as the wife of a wealthy, powerful 
politician, her confinement to private space as a condition of this status 
renders her simultaneously ‘in exile’ (119).  Eventually, making the most of 
her situation, she makes the house her own fiefdom and becomes the ‘true 
mistress of Mohenjo’ (151).  Rani’s most powerful act of resistance occurs 
within Mohenjo’s walls after the new government places her under house 
arrest following Iskander’s deposing as Prime Minister and execution.  The 
shawls through which she produces her artistic reverse discourse aim not 
at criticising the new regime but at exposing her late husband’s biopolitical 
– and at times thanatopolitical – iniquities in government.  However, in the 
lengthy passage in which he describes Rani’s art Rushdie suggests the 
waning potentiality for fearless, public-spirited parrhēsia within twentieth-
century governmentality.  He charts Rani’s progression from a style that 
constitutes pseudo-parrhēsia both in terms of sincerity and directness, to 
allegorical forms that retain pseudo-parrhesiastic sincerity but lack this 
simplicity.  Additionally, Rushdie indicates that even pseudo-parrhesiastic 
resistance proves invariably futile by describing how Rani’s own daughter 
prevents the shawls from being disseminated when she becomes Prime 
Minister. 
 Saleem Sinai’s narrative in Midnight veers wildly between 
parrhesiastic directness and digressive complexity, but usually settles on 
the latter mode.  By contrast, in Shame Rushdie describes a near-constant 
trajectory of increasingly unparrhesiastic allegory in the sequence of shawls 
that Rani produces: 
 the torture shawl, on which she embroidered the foetid violence of 
 [Iskander’s] jails, blindfolded prisoners tied to chairs while jailers 
 hurled buckets of water, now boiling hot (the thread-steam rose), now 
 freezing cold, until the bodies of the victims grew confused and cold 
 water raised hot burns upon their skins: weals of red embroidery rose 
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 scarlike on the shawl; and the white shawl, embroidered white on 
 white, so that it revealed its secrets only to the most meticulous and 
 squinting eyes (193). 
Foucault writes that parrhēsia denotes a specifically verbal mode 
characterised by ‘the most direct words and forms of expression’ (2001, 12).  
Yet these early shawls’ stark artistic representation of violent excess 
constitutes pseudo-parrhēsia in its directness and the sincerity with which it 
attempts to expose Iskander’s oppressive use of disciplinary space.  By 
detailing such vivid artistic devices as Rani’s use of ‘red embroidery’ to 
denote ‘the foetid violence of [Iskander’s] jails’ (Rushdie 1996b, 193), 
Rushdie depicts a potentiality of public-spirited, fearless, powerful pseudo-
parrhesiastic resistance. 
 However, the piece that immediately follows ‘the torture shawl’ (193) 
proves less unmediated.  ‘[E]mbroidered white on white, so that it revealed 
its secrets only to the most meticulous and squinting eyes’ (193), this shawl 
in its unparrhesiastic opacity marks a turning point in the artistic sequence.  
The remainder of Rani’s artworks become increasingly allegorical and 
indirect.  In describing shawls including the piece which depicts ‘Iskander 
and the Death of Democracy, his hands around her throat, squeezing 
Democracy’s gullet’ (194), Rushdie evokes the fetters that forced artists to 
create subtler, less parrhesiastic reverse discourses under particularly 
tyrannical forms of twentieth-century biopolitics.  Even Rani’s later attempts 
at directness become stymied by the inadequacies of her art and her 
materials to represent properly the full horror of biopolitical oppression in 
Peccavistan.  The shawl in which there is ‘not enough scarlet thread to show 
the blood’ (195) brings to mind the restraints upon Saleem’s narrative style 
in Midnight.  Just as Saleem’s interlocutor, his lapses in memory, his 
truncated timescale and his unparrhesiastic fear of reprisal prevent his 
narrative from constituting a completely personal, honest truth-claim, Rani 
lacks enough thread to do full, sincere, direct, pseudo-parrhesiastic justice 
to the horrors that her husband ordered and abetted.  In this passage 
Rushdie charts in miniature the waning potentiality for parrhesiastic 
directness in Pakistan/Peccavistan that forces artistic reverse discourses 
increasingly to take more allegorical forms. 
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 Shame suggests that allegories like these later shawls, despite their 
lack of simplicity, may carry a pseudo-parrhesiastic sincerity which can 
resist biopolitical oppression effectively because it passes under the nose 
of the biopolitical regime undetected.  In a somewhat tongue-in-cheek 
narratorial interpolation Rushdie, or at least a narrator-figure who represents 
an alternate version of him, asserts allegory’s capacity to evade repression: 
If I had been writing a book of this nature [i.e., a realistic novel], it 
would have done me no good to protest that I was writing universally, 
not only about Pakistan.  The book would have been banned, 
dumped in the rubbish bin, burned[...] 
Fortunately, however, I am only telling a sort of modern fairy-tale, so 
that’s all right; nobody need get upset, or take anything I say too 
seriously (70). 
Rushdie’s narrator possesses the ability to disseminate his allegorical 
critique of Pakistan’s biopoliticians in the form of Shame itself because he 
resides in the freer society of Britain.  However, Rani fails to circulate her 
largely allegorical artistic reverse discourse beyond Mohenjo.  Catherine 
Cundy argues that the passage in which Rushdie describes Rani’s 
sequence of shawls constitutes ‘the embodiment of the text’s movement 
towards allegorical forms to represent its arguments’ (1996, 60).  Yet the 
potentiality for propagating sincere, pseudo-parrhesiastic allegorical artistic 
discourses through the text itself proves much greater than within the events 
it describes.  Shame’s events lack the possibility of effective discursive 
resistance that Midnight depicts. 
 By describing how Rani’s shawls remain confined within Mohenjo, 
Rushdie indicates the severe difficulty of enacting not just good parrhēsia 
but even pseudo-parrhesiastic resistance to biopower.  Ambreen Hai argues 
that ‘if Rani’s work is educational, transformative, and thus threatening 
enough to be censored, it must surely be politically potent’ (1999, 24).  
However, resistance’s disseminative practice carries more power than its 
potentiality in Shame.  Artistic reverse discourses resist oppression simply 
by their production, but altering power structures significantly requires a 
receptive audience within ‘the game of democracy’ (Foucault 2010b, 183).  
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Rani’s ‘shawls of memory’ (Rushdie 1996b, 191) in Shame are not 
disseminated to the wider polis.  Rushdie undercuts the oppositional 
potency of the variously direct and allegorical ways in which Rani’s shawls 
vividly depict political oppression even before he relates them.  He confirms 
that Rani’s artistic condemnations of Iskander that the reader is about to 
experience will remain within the private sphere: ‘instead of showing off her 
work to daughter or soldiers, she placed each shawl, on completion, in a 
black metal trunk full of naphthalene balls and fastened the lock’ (190).  At 
the end of Rushdie’s long passage concerning the shawls ‘all eighteen have 
been spread out and admired’ (196).  Yet they have only been viewed by 
narrator and reader, not by the people of Peccavistan.  Rani’s one ill-
conceived attempt at dissemination fails.  She delivers her art to her 
daughter, the new Prime Minister Arjumand Harappa, who ‘refus[es] to hear 
anything bad about her father’ (108).  Rushdie writes that ‘Rani[…]sends 
Arjumand, one day, a gift of eighteen exquisite shawls.  These shawls 
ensure that she will never leave the estate again: Arjumand has her own 
mother placed under guard.  People engaged in building new myths have 
no time for embroidered criticisms’ (277).  Rushdie suggests that women’s 
ability to influence the public by disseminating the artistic acts of resistance 
that they produced in private proved negligible within twentieth-century 
governmentality. 
 In Shame Rushdie continues to depict the unattainability of good 
parrhēsia under twentieth-century regimes of truth, as he does in Midnight.  
However, whereas Midnight promises at least the chance of Saleem Sinai’s 
truth-claim being disseminated effectively and inspiring India’s multitudes to 
produce their own pseudo-parrhesiastic reverse discourses against state 
(bio)power, Shame offers no equivalent possibility.  Rushdie’s third novel 
marks the first point on the general trajectory of waning potentiality that his 
post-Midnight fiction evokes with regard to resistance to biopolitical 
oppression.  As Chapters One and Three argued, his next novel, Verses, 
suggests that reverse discourses serve invariably to reinforce racist 
stereotypes of subraces as ungrateful and intransigent.  Yet in contrast to 
Shame, it evokes the prospect of future effective resistance through Saladin 
Chamcha’s return to India and commitment to oppose racialising 
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communalist forces.  Moor excises this increased potentiality.  Unlike 
Shame, here Rushdie indicates that although sincere pseudo-parrhesiastic 
reverse discourses cannot capture contemporary political oppression’s 
complexity and severity they may be disseminated into the polis, but asserts 
disturbingly that the polis may not prove receptive to these discourses and 
may choose instead to believe bad parrhēsia characterised by communalist 
racism. 
The Moor’s Last Sigh (1): The (Non-)Dissemination of Moraes Zogoiby’s 
Narrative 
Rushdie sets Moor in a darker fictionalised version of India than that of 
Midnight.  Artistic discourses akin to Saleem Sinai’s championing of 
pluralism and hybridity wield little discursive power in this reality.  The way 
in which Rushdie describes the possible dissemination of his narrator 
Moraes Zogoiby’s story shows that he evokes a far fainter potentiality of 
discursive resistance to state (bio)power than in the earlier novel.  As in 
Midnight, Rushdie indicates the impossibility of direct, parrhesiastic 
discourse in an era marked by multiple flows of oppressive biopower, yet 
suggests that complex discourses of resistance may nevertheless achieve 
good parrhēsia’s sincerity, fearlessness and public-spiritedness.  Like 
Saleem, Moraes creates a narrative discourse of resistance whose form and 
style is digressive, complex and exceeds received notions of historical and 
empirical truth, but which proves pseudo-parrhesiastic in its sincere attempt 
to expose capitalism’s corrupt underbelly and communalist biopower’s 
deleterious effects.  However, in contrast to Saleem’s reverse discourse, 
Rushdie depicts the possibility of Moraes’ story being disseminated and 
fostering political change as severely limited. 
 Stylistic resemblances abound between the complex first-person 
narratives that Rushdie creates in Midnight and Moor.  Both Saleem and 
Moraes produce a discourse that entwines personal experience with Indian 
history (or Rushdie’s fictionalised version).  In exposing the ways in which 
political and economic elites abuse power, they seek to create a better India 
by way of negative example.  Similarly to Saleem, Moraes will only 
occasionally ‘say[…]things baldly’ (Rushdie 2006b, 40) and 
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parrhesiastically within an incorporative and largely digressive narrative.  As 
in Midnight, Rushdie’s narrator does not have all the facts at his disposal 
(197-98) and intentionally omits some details of which he is aware (308).  
Yet in the Foucauldian sense of the parrhesiast disseminating ‘what he 
knows to be true’ (Foucault 2001, 14), Moraes affirms his discourse’s 
pseudo-parrhesiastic sincerity as a truth-claim in spite of its complexity and 
failure to constitute literal truth.  Just as he does with Saleem, through 
Moraes’ frequent interpolations addressing the reader Rushdie 
communicates his protagonist’s eagerness for his truth-claim to be believed 
despite its fantastical nature: 
I am going through time faster than I should.  Do you understand me?  
Somebody somewhere has been holding down the button marked 
‘FF’, or, to be more exact, ‘x2’.  Reader, listen carefully, take in every 
word, for what I write now is the simple and literal truth.  I, Moraes 
Zogoiby, known as Moor, am[…]a man living double-quick (2006b, 
143). 
Rushdie’s novels suggest consistently that representing the reality of 
twentieth-century (bio)politics requires an intricate, unparrhesiastic mode of 
discursive representation.  However, in both Midnight and Moor he indicates 
that complex reverse discourses may carry good parrhēsia’s sincerity in 
their pseudo-parrhesiastic attempts to deconstruct and resist biopolitical 
oppression. 
 Despite these similarities, the more limited circulation of Moraes’ 
critique of India’s post-independence (bio)politics means that it proves much 
less likely than Saleem’s to engender future resistance within the sphere of 
governmentality after his death.  Although Rushdie suggests that Saleem’s 
chutneys of memory and resistance may be unleashed upon an entire 
‘amnesiac nation’ (2008, 643) – perhaps via Braganza Pickles’ mass 
distribution network – only one copy of Moraes’ tale exists.  Moreover, 
whereas Saleem’s narrative remains intact, Moraes scatters his ‘bunches of 
scribbled sheets’ (Rushdie 2006b, 3) across Spain’s countryside.  These 
fragments of Moraes’ discourse will be shorn of context in the event of their 
reaching the handful of Spanish villagers that constitutes his possible 
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audience.  This social group cannot possibly form as powerful a movement 
of resistance to state (bio)power as Saleem’s potential mass Indian 
following.2 
 With respect to the ways in which Rushdie depicts pseudo-
parrhesiastic resistance in Moor, Moraes carries more importance not as a 
producer of discourse but as a symbol of hybridity in his mother Aurora’s 
paintings.  Aurora’s artistic reverse discourse opposes communalist 
racialising within India’s post-independence politics more effectively than 
does Moraes’ narrative.  However, Rushdie charts how her art becomes 
less influential as Indian politics becomes characterised increasingly by 
religious communalism.  He suggests that as the twentieth century 
progressed pseudo-parrhesiastic discourse’s capacity to enact change 
dwindled almost to nothing. 
The Moor’s Last Sigh (2): Aurora Zogoiby’s Art and The Erosion of Its Truth-
Claim 
In both Midnight and Moor Rushdie charts an increase in racism and 
biopolitical oppression in India’s recent politics.  Saleem Sinai’s narrative in 
Midnight implies a potentiality of future resistance and a return to the 
pluralist values that characterised Jawaharlal Nehru’s tenure as Prime 
Minister in the years immediately after independence.  However, in Moor 
the decline in the popularity of Aurora Zogoiby’s pseudo-parrhesiastic 
artistic lionising of pluralism and hybridity indicates that reverse discourse’s 
ability to oppose racism and biopower effectively has vanished. 
   In these two novels Rushdie evokes the impossibility of achieving 
good parrhēsia.  They thus contribute towards shaping a biopolitical literary 
criticism that questions the practicality of Foucault’s preferred strategy of 
resistance.  However, in both texts Rushdie suggests characteristically that 
complex discourses of resistance can carry good parrhēsia’s sincerity and 
public-spiritedness in their efforts to oppose racism and biopower.  The 
primary hope for a future pluralism that Moor depicts does not arise from 
Moraes’ ineffectively disseminated narrative but within his mother Aurora’s 
hybrid, multiplicitous, widely circulated art.  Through the hybrid figure of the 
Moor and her paintings’ central metaphor of palimpsest which refigures 
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India as the innately plural fictional country of ‘Palimpstine’ (Rushdie 2006b, 
226), Aurora militates discursively and pseudo-parrhesiastically against the 
communalist biopolitics that propagates views of distinct communities and 
‘invader-history that may have to be erased’ (364). 
 Although the complexity of Aurora’s work precludes good parrhēsia’s 
directness and transparency, it constitutes the very sincerity that renders 
her public-spirited art a powerful pseudo-parrhesiastic truth-claim: 
 Once the red fort of Granada arrived in Bombay, things moved swiftly 
 on Aurora’s easel.  The Alhambra quickly became a not-quite-
 Alhambra; elements of India’s own red forts, the Mughal palace-
 fortresses in Delhi and Agra, blended  Mughal splendours with the 
 Spanish building’s Moorish grace[…]The water’s edge, the dividing 
 line between two worlds, became in many of these pictures the main 
 focus of her concern[…]Often she painted the water-line in such a 
 way as to suggest that you were looking at an unfinished painting 
 which had been abandoned, half-covering another.  But was it a 
 waterworld being painted over the world of air, or vice versa?  
 Impossible to be sure.  
 ‘Call it Mooristan,’ Aurora told me. ‘[…]Place where worlds collide, 
 flow in and out of one another, and washofy away[…]One universe, 
 one dimension, one country, one dream, bumpo’ing into another, or 
 being under, or on top of it[…]’ (226). 
In describing this painting Rushdie outlines several of Aurora’s intricate 
compositional techniques and spatialities.  Not only does she dissolve 
borders between nations, as with her ‘red fort of Granada arriv[ing] in 
Bombay’, but she problematises both horizontal ‘dividing line[s] 
between[…]worlds’ (226) and vertical dividing lines between her 
palimpsestic painting and a half-covered layer that gestures towards yet 
another space.  Through an idealised concept of Moorish Spain as diverse 
and tolerant, Aurora advocates a plural, hybrid future for India: ‘one country, 
one dream’ (226). 
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 Rushdie depicts this hybrid art achieving effective anti-communalist 
discursive resistance in the years immediately before and after India’s 
independence.  Aurora’s early paintings achieve significant political import 
as a public spectacle commensurate with her fame as ‘the great beauty at 
the heart of the nationalist movement’ (116).  They become a powerful, 
nationally disseminated discourse of pluralism which enacts opposition to 
intolerance that exceeds potentiality.  Here Rushdie suggests that a place 
remains in his fiction for the idea of the plural and the promise of a better 
future less subject to oppressive biopower. 
 However, Moor’s early chapters also portray India as a nation which 
has always been subject to violence and communalism.  The ascendancy 
of pluralist ideals such as Aurora’s cannot cover up completely the violent 
misuse of power which Rushdie suggests has always been part of India’s 
history.  Moor hints at the brutality, communalism and corruption inherent 
within India’s polis at the pre-independence stage of the novel through 
Camoens da Gama’s vision of the fundamentalist ‘Battering Ram’ (56) and 
Abraham Zogoiby’s illegal business practices that set him on his way to 
being the head of a huge criminal empire.  Rushdie depicts communalism 
as stretching back even further: ‘[i]n 1524, ten years after Zogoibys arrived 
from Spain, there had been a Muslim-Jewish war in these parts’ (72).  He 
indicates that violence and communalism lie beneath more tolerant layers 
of the palimpsest that India’s history constitutes. 
 These forces come to the surface in Moor’s later chapters and 
construct a new layer of intolerance atop India’s palimpsest.  Consequently, 
the discursive power of Aurora’s pseudo-parrhesiastic art, within which the 
novel symbolically circumscribes the potentiality of a pluralist India, wanes 
significantly.  Aurora finds political influence in the post-Nehru nation elusive 
and critical success provisional.  Her paintings become subject to opposition 
from the ascendant Hindu nationalist party Mumbai’s Axis (MA).  MA leader 
Raman Fielding argues that ‘art and beauty must serve [a] national interest’ 
(260) that he conceives as animated by a majoritarian communalism.  Some 
of Aurora’s later critics agree.  They describe her art as ‘“deleterious” 
to[...]the temper of the age’ and call her ‘an irrelevance’ (261). 
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 An affirmative lionising of hybridity not only disappears from India’s 
public discourse in Moor but from Aurora’s later paintings.  Rushdie 
presents alterations in Aurora’s compositional style as broadly autonomous 
of emotional considerations, but the nature of her artistic depiction of 
mélange corresponds with events in her personal life at times.  Tragedy in 
the latter engenders pessimism in the former.  Hence, neither the Moor nor 
Palimpstine constitute an immutable symbol of beneficial cultural pluralism.  
Following Aurora’s estrangement from Moraes, the Moor ‘lose[s][…]his 
previous metaphorical role as a unifier of opposites, a standard-bearer of 
pluralism, ceasing to stand as a symbol – however approximate – of the 
new nation, and being transformed, instead, into a semi-allegorical figure of 
decay’ (303).  Aurora’s new artistic discourse recognises pluralism and 
hybridity’s susceptibility to disturbing distortions and fragmentations.  The 
Moor becomes ‘a new imagining of the idea of the hybrid – a Baudelairean 
flower, it would not be too far-fetched to suggest, of evil’ (303).  Aurora 
paints him as abstract, discombobulated, ‘a kind of human rag-and-bone 
yard’ (302) that she mirrors through a new Palimpstine comprised of 
formless scraps of detritus.  Through these ‘last pictures’ (303) of Aurora’s, 
Rushdie further suggests the waning of effective pseudo-parrhesiastic 
discourses of pluralism in the new India of the late twentieth century.  This 
loss of oppositional potentiality occurs even within the discourse of an artist 
who was once pluralism’s most forceful and influential advocate as well as 
within the polis in general.  Aurora receives a state funeral (318) and is 
lauded as a national icon after her death.  However, the ‘critical appreciation’ 
of her work by Zeeny Vakil, which is given the somewhat Bhabhaesque title 
of ‘Imperso-Nation and Dis/Semi/Nation: Dialogics of Eclecticism and 
Interrogations of Authenticity in A. Z.’ (329), does not promise to make it 
once more accessible and comprehensible to the masses it used to steer 
discursively towards pluralistic tolerance. 
 That Aurora Zogoiby’s older paintings reach and influence a mass 
audience in the Nehru years means that Moor evokes a greater potentiality 
of successful discursive resistance through pseudo-parrhēsia than Shame, 
in which Rani Harappa’s art remains confined within Mohenjo.  Yet the 
novel’s final chapters indicate that the capacity of Aurora’s early paintings 
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to inspire resistance against communalism has become denuded almost 
completely.  Rushdie presents the destruction of the Zogoiby Bequest in the 
1993 Bombay bombings (328) and the attendant consignment of the vast 
majority of Aurora’s art into the ‘the realm of irretrievable antiquity’ (373) as 
a pivotal moment in pluralism’s decline within his fictionalised Indian polis.  
With respect to Midnight, Moor represents a further erosion of pseudo-
parrhesiastic discursive resistance’s power and potentiality in Rushdie’s 
fiction.  Neither novel’s ending shows the truth-claims of its protagonist 
having much of a legible effect.  However, in Midnight Rushdie suggests 
that Saleem Sinai’s discourse may become influential in the future.  
Conversely, Aurora’s, once widely accepted within a more pluralist public 
sphere, has been subsumed beneath a palimpsestic layer of predatory 
capitalism, communalism and more diffuse and effective biopolitical 
technologies that allows only a negligible possibility of a more pluralist 
future. 
 The ways in which Rushdie depicts discourses of resistance in 
Ground stay the trajectory of waning oppositional potentiality that his 
successive fictionalisations of twentieth-century biopolitics evoke.  The 
power of resistance to biopolitical oppression in the novel proves 
attenuated.  However, unusually for Rushdie, Ground describes discourses 
of resistance that are disseminated widely and somewhat successfully.  
Despite the characteristic multiplicity and complexity of the novel’s setting, 
Rushdie even evokes the possibility of producing parrhēsia that inspires 
mass movements.  Analysing the extent to which the discourses of 
Rushdie’s three protagonists – Rai Merchant’s pseudo-parrhēsia, Ormus 
Cama’s bad parrhēsia and Vina Apsara’s good parrhēsia – resist or fail to 
resist biopolitical oppression further indicates the utility of Foucault’s 
concept of sincere, direct, simple and public-spirited good parrhēsia as a 
yardstick against which a biopolitical reading may measure reverse 
discourse’s efficacy in literature.  Moreover, examining the mass 
movements of peace and pluralism that Vina’s discourse inspires augments 
the work that Chapters One and Three accomplished in arguing that Ground 
represents a momentary interruption in Rushdie’s growing disinclination to 
affirm resistance’s potentiality and potency in his fiction. 
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Movements Inspired by Parrhēsia in The Ground 
Beneath Her Feet 
Ground imagines yet another alternate reality, different again from Midnight 
and Moor.  This world includes Rushdie’s bleakest fictionalised version of 
India to date.  Although India and the world in general fall gradually into 
instability and political oppression as the novel progresses, Ground marks 
the re-entry of effective, powerful discourses of resistance into Rushdie’s 
fiction.  Like Saleem Sinai, Rani Harappa and Aurora Zogoiby, his three 
protagonists produce art that aims to change the world and often to expose 
political elites’ iniquities.  They find more tangible success.  Rushdie begins 
once more to suggest that ‘[t]he world is not cyclical, not eternal or 
immutable, but endlessly transforms itself, and never goes back, and we 
can assist in that transformation’ (2000, 145).  Furthermore, he describes 
successful resistance through specifically parrhesiastic discourses.  The 
oppositional efficacy and public-spirited pseudo-parrhesiastic qualities of 
Rai Merchant’s photography vanish as his political commitment wanes.  
However, the influential discourses that Vina Apsara and Ormus Cama’s 
music enables them to propagate constitute parrhēsia in their sincerity, 
directness and fearlessness. 
 Rushdie implies that parrhēsia may have both beneficial and 
deleterious effects on the polis.  Vina’s parrhēsia galvanises mass 
movements against political oppression in life, and even more in death.  
Conversely, Ormus disseminates widely a discourse that takes parrhēsia’s 
verbal form but constitutes a vehicle for self-expression and nihilism – a bad 
parrhēsia – rather than an attempt at radical political change.  Ground 
represents a momentary interruption in the trajectory of growing reluctance 
to imagine effective resistance that Rushdie’s fiction comprises.  Yet the 
potency and potentiality of reverse discourses against (bio)political 
oppression in the novel proves attenuated. 
Pseudo-Parrhēsia in Rai Merchant’s Photography 
Rushdie contrasts the limited effect of Rai Merchant’s pseudo-parrhesiastic 
photography in militating against (bio)political corruption and thanatopolitics 
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with the influential verbal discourses that Vina Apsara and Ormus Cama 
produce.  He suggests that the sincerity, thorough public-spiritedness and 
constant political commitment that Rai’s art lacks constitute necessary 
criteria for effective discursive resistance within the wider polis.  Like Rani 
Harappa’s shawls in Shame and Aurora Zogoiby’s paintings in Moor, Rai’s 
early work possesses pseudo-parrhesiastic qualities despite being a non-
verbal artistic mode.  Similarly to good verbal parrhēsia, his photojournalism 
incorporates a public-spirited political commitment.  It transmutes his 
aesthetic impulse to ‘look at the darkness’ (Rushdie 2000, 211) into a frank 
critique of the politically powerful’s moral darkness.  Rai argues that ‘[t]he 
inhibited photographer should set down his camera’ (214).  He asserts a 
fearlessness also akin to that of Foucault’s good parrhesiast.  This allows 
his art to expose the misdeeds of corrupt (bio)political elites despite 
numerous threats (213).  Taking his mentor M. Hulot’s advice – ‘Find your 
enemy’ (223) – Rai identifies the kleptocratic MA politician Piloo Doodhwala 
as such.  Despite his failure to ruin Piloo with (stolen) photographs exposing 
his corruption, he continues to catalogue bio/thanatopolitical excesses the 
world over (419).  Courageous, risky and aimed at the powerful, Rai’s 
photojournalism produces a reverse discourse of pseudo-parrhēsia. 
 However, Rushdie portrays limits to the public-spiritedness of Rai’s 
photojournalism.  Rai admits early on in the novel that he stands ‘[h]alfway 
between voyeur and witness’ (13).  In an ambiguous later passage in which 
Rai relates his motivations for photojournalism, Rushdie presents the 
delicate balance between these two facets of his narrator’s artistry: 
Something in me wants the dreadful, wants to stare down the human 
race’s worst-case scenarios. 
I need to know that evil exists and how to recognise it if I pass it in 
the street.  I need it not to be abstract; to understand it by feeling its 
effect on me (342). 
Rushdie depicts Rai’s art as fuelled partially by his need to document evil’s 
existence and partially by his desire to experience its operations; to ‘stare 
down’ (342) evil in the sense of facing it head-on pseudo-parrhesiastically, 
but also simply to stare. 
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 Although Rai produces photojournalism not solely because he 
wishes to resist regimes of truth but because he is a ‘violence junkie’ (342), 
his work still constitutes a powerful reverse discourse.  However, by 
describing Rai’s later, more aestheticised photography Rushdie suggests 
that his narrator’s new lack of direct political commitment lessens his art’s 
ability to resist biopower.  By giving up photojournalism, Rai abandons his 
pseudo-parrhesiastic truth-claims.  Having moved from aestheticised 
photography to politically committed art, he makes a return journey.  He 
eschews ‘looking at atrocities in search of capital-A Atrocity’ in favour of 
capturing ‘the inexhaustible happenstance of life’ (446).  Rai’s former 
colleagues in photojournalism make a similar retreat from pseudo-
parrhēsia.  They devote themselves not to reverse discourse but to 
aesthetics, fashion and advertising (443-44).  In Ground’s later chapters 
Rushdie describes a general decline of public-spirited pseudo-parrhesiastic 
photojournalism amongst photographers.  He charts a similar abating of this 
reverse discourse’s presence in the public consciousness.  Rai’s 
photograph ostensibly (though not actually) capturing the moment of rock 
megastar Vina’s death becomes more famous than any of his shots of 
political oppression.  It ‘join[s] that small stock of photographic 
images[…]which actually become experiences, part of the collective 
memory of the human race’ (467).  In Ground Rushdie increasingly depicts 
photography as an artistic medium imbricated with a growing mass celebrity 
culture as opposed to any pseudo-parrhesiastic programme of political 
resistance.  He thus traces a waning potentiality of powerful reverse 
discourse through visual art. 
 Rushdie’s descriptions of how Rani’s shawls become progressively 
allegorical in Shame and how Aurora’s paintings lose influence in Moor’s 
fictionalised post-independence Indian polis suggest that the possibility of 
sincere, direct, courageous, potent reverse discourse has become extinct.  
Rai’s progressively apolitical art in Ground does not denote a similar 
excising.  Through his other two protagonists – Vina and Ormus – Rushdie 
suggests that the very celebrities he portrays as the most significant 
subjects of late twentieth-century photography can enact resistance more 
effectively than Rai by using their art and fame to disseminate reverse 
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discourse.  He satirises celebrities’ political pretensions, but nevertheless 
depicts the power of their truth-claims to change the world.  Rushdie 
indicates that a discourse of directness, simplicity, sincerity and courage 
combined with an influential public platform may engender forceful mass 
movements.  He reintroduces effective parrhēsia as a possibility in his 
fictional engagement with twentieth-century governmentality. 
 Vina’s political activism inspires movements against racism, 
dictatorship and misogyny.  However, through Ormus’ lyrics, which prove 
more nihilistic and self-indulgent than politically liberatory, Rushdie 
questions whether the widely disseminated parrhēsia of celebrities 
necessarily constitutes good parrhēsia rather than bad.  Unusually for 
Rushdie’s fiction, discursive resistance in Ground goes beyond mere 
potentiality and affects the polis tangibly and lastingly.  Yet he implies that 
some parrhēsia harms the world rather than helps it. 
Bad Parrhēsia in Ormus Cama’s Lyrics 
The way in which Rushdie describes the effect of Ormus Cama and Vina 
Apsara’s music on public discourse in Ground suggests the veracity of 
Foucault’s warning that ‘the overwhelming influence of bad, immoral, or 
ignorant speakers may lead the citizenry into tyranny, or may otherwise 
endanger the city’ (2001, 77).  He depicts music’s powerful discursive 
potential to change the world by resisting power’s oppressive use, but 
suggests that it may not do so necessarily.  Ormus and Vina’s fame as the 
driving forces behind VTO, the world’s most successful musical act, allows 
them a vast public platform from which to disseminate parrhēsia.  Vina’s 
discourse of political activism aims at liberation from political oppression and 
succeeds tangibly.  However, the truth-claims of Ormus’ lyrics, though 
parrhesiastic in form, give rise in their bad parrhēsia to a mass movement 
of self-indulgent nihilism millions strong.  This group welcomes the world’s 
end rather than attempting to change it. 
 The movement that Ormus’ lyrics inspire proves crucial to Ground’s 
representation of discursive resistance and its attenuated ability to resist 
biopolitical oppression.  Rai states that there are ‘a small number of 
bands[…]who steal into your heart and become a part of how you see the 
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world, how you tell and understand the truth’ (Rushdie 2000, 157).  VTO’s 
songs appear not as trivial entertainment but powerful examples of what 
Foucault calls ‘discourses of truth, that is to say, discourses having the 
status and function of true discourses’ (1980b, 210).  In describing the main 
truth-claim that these songs disseminate Rushdie indicates that a discourse 
that takes the form of parrhēsia may do nothing to resist (bio)political 
oppression.  He complements Foucault’s warning that bad parrhēsia can 
take the form of its good counterpart. 
 Ormus’ discourse appears parrhesiastic because of its direct, 
sincere, courageous characteristics.  Firstly, Rushdie depicts his message 
as a simple one: ‘The Quake is coming, the Big One that will swallow us all.  
Dance to the music, for tomorrow, suckers, we die’ (2000, 393).  Rai 
observes that ‘set down on the page without their music, [Ormus’ lyrics] 
seem kind of spavined, even hamstrung’ (354).  Their banality constitutes a 
parrhesiastic directness – absent from less influential narratives in 
Rushdie’s fiction including Saleem Sinai’s and Moraes Zogoiby’s – which 
renders their truth-claims readily comprehensible.3 
 Secondly, Ormus’ truth-claim constitutes parrhēsia in its sincerity.  As 
Foucault argues, the good parrhesiast ‘makes it manifestly clear and 
obvious that what he says is his own opinion’ (2001, 12).  Ormus’ manager 
Mull Standish, criticising his early musical efforts, tells him, ‘there’s too much 
of you missing from your music.  You’re phoning it in’ (Rushdie 2000, 303).  
By contrast, VTO’s most successful and most influential albums are steeped 
in Ormus’ sincerely felt truth-claims: ‘fury is evident in every chord, every 
bar, every line, fury deep-drawn like black water from a poisoned well’ (380).  
Finally, Ormus’ discourse parrhesiastically ‘opens [him] up [to] an 
unspecified risk’ (Foucault 2010b, 62).  His message’s radicalism leads to 
its widespread acceptance throughout the world, but also to extensive 
derision.  In the US ‘the perceived anti-establishment contents of Ormus’s 
lyrics’ (Rushdie 2000, 395) win him powerful enemies who almost manage 
to facilitate his deportation.  In India ‘[t]he government’s favourite godmen 
of the moment[…]announce that the former Indian and lapsed Zoroastrian 
“seismopropagandist” Ormus Cama must indeed bear a heavy 
responsibility for the West’s quake-inducing “doomsday scenario”’ (556).  
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They lead the government to exile Ormus from his homeland.  Because it is 
direct, sincere and addressed fearlessly to those more powerful than the 
speaker, Ormus’ discourse constitutes parrhēsia.  Moreover, unusually for 
a reverse discourse in Rushdie’s fiction, it becomes effective parrhēsia 
which influences legions of followers: ‘Everyone’s a New Quaker now’ (555). 
 Analysing Ormus’ discourse in terms of its parrhesiastic qualities 
produces a biopolitical reading that shows how Rushdie indirectly reinforces 
Foucault’s argument that a bad parrhēsia which lacks good parrhēsia’s 
public-spiritedness may nevertheless take its rhetorical form.  Foucault 
asserts that ‘in parrhēsia, telling the truth is regarded as a duty’ (2001, 19) 
in order to improve the community.  Despite the directness, sincerity and 
fearlessness of his protagonist’s truth-claim, Rushdie leaves it unclear how 
far Ormus aims at the polis’ renewal and how far he welcomes its 
annihilation.  Ormus’ discourse epitomises his ambiguous relationship with 
the cracking earth.  It propagates idealism and apocalypticism 
simultaneously.  Ormus asserts that ‘all we have to fall back on is harmony, 
all we have to protect us is the power of music and love’ (Rushdie 2000, 
438).  However, his ‘earthquake songs’ also constitute ‘rants in praise of the 
approach of chaos’ (390).  The new way of being that they attempt to inspire 
within twentieth-century governmentality is characterised by nihilistic 
defeatism rather than active opposition to biopolitical oppression. 
 Vina eschews Ormus’ apocalyptic bad parrhēsia and Rai’s later 
apolitical aestheticism.  By describing the mass anti-racist and feminist 
movements that she inspires in life and death, Rushdie depicts a strength 
of resistance that exceeds that found in his other fictional twentieth-century 
polities.  Once again using Foucault’s conception of good parrhēsia as a 
potentially effective means of resisting biopower delineates the ways in 
which Vina’s discourse fulfils the criteria for this modality.  This biopolitical 
reading complements Chapters One and Three in further revealing that 
Ground constitutes a temporary aberration in Rushdie’s generally growing 
disinclination to evoke the possibility of powerful resistance to biopolitical 
oppression in his fiction. 
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Good Parrhēsia in Vina Apsara’s Life and Death 
Vina Apsara manages to use her fame not just to disseminate a reverse 
discourse but to inspire mass movements that aim to make the world a more 
equitable place.  Her discourse carries the sincerity of parrhēsia as well as 
parrhesiastic acceptance of ‘an unspecified risk’ (Foucault 2010b, 62).  Vina 
speaks frankly regardless of the cost to her musical career: ‘while her 
marvellous voice ensured her a full slate of bookings, her bad mouth lost 
her many of them’ (Rushdie 2000, 225).  Like Ormus, Vina rises above this 
risk and powerful opposition to her truth-claims to inspire mass movements 
within governmentality.  However, she augments her reverse discourse’s 
sincerity, directness and fearlessness with a public-spiritedness that 
contrasts with and counteracts Ormus’ nihilistic bad parrhēsia. 
 Ormus and Vina campaign to the same ends initially.  On a level 
distinct from Ormus’ nihilistic lyrics, their parrhesiastic political activism 
proves effective in opposing racism and inequality.  The intellectuals Marco 
Sangria and Rémy Auxerre criticise the pair for attempting to use their 
celebrity to further political causes (425), but eventually Vina and Ormus 
claim ‘victory over the Sangria-Auxerre assault’ (428) through the potency 
of their truth-claims.  Vina in particular disseminates influential entreaties to 
world leaders in the name of numerous noble causes: famine relief; Third 
World debt cancellation; and environmentalism (478).  Rai’s comment that 
VTO ‘entered that zone of celebrity in which everything except celebrity 
ceases to signify’ (425) appraises the situation inaccurately.  Rather than 
signifying an emptying-out of meaning, the band’s power, wealth and public 
notoriety enable them to campaign and to resist.  In contrast to his earlier 
novels, in Ground Rushdie suggests the possibility not only of enacting good 
parrhēsia in an attempt to render the world freer and more equal, but having 
it listened to by the public. 
 Ormus’ parrhēsia moves increasingly towards nihilistic 
apocalypticism.  Yet Vina continues to inspire the attempted construction of 
a new, pluralist and just polis even – and especially – after death.  As with 
Rushdie’s suggestion in Midnight that Saleem’s narrative may galvanise 
further reverse discourses after he disintegrates, this posthumous capillary 
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truth-effect arises not from direct parrhēsia but from Vina’s heedless 
frankness inspiring others to do the same.  By ‘unleash[ing] the full power 
of the symbol she had constructed’ (162), her passing produces a fractal 
web of truth-telling that exceeds the implied potentiality of Saleem’s.  
Rushdie shows how Vina’s death opens up the mass dissemination of good 
parrhēsia within the world’s population: ‘Inspissated women in sexually 
segregated societies cast off their veils, the soldiers of oppression lay down 
their guns, the members of racially disadvantaged peoples burst out from 
their ghettos, their townships, their slums, the rusty iron curtain is torn’ (480).  
In contrast to Ormus’ ‘New Quakers’ (396), these mass movements base 
themselves not on apocalypticism but actions of sincere, public-spirited, 
risky but fearless resistance to political oppression.  Rushdie indicates that 
the parrhesiastic impulse that Vina’s death looses wields more power to 
change the world than Ormus’ eschatological lyrics. 
 The oppositional potentiality that Rushdie evokes by describing this 
parrhesiastic impulse proves finite.  Some self-interested figures 
appropriate Vina’s memory discursively in support of causes she would 
have rejected.  Rushdie describes a priest who ‘invites the stadium crowds 
[mourning Vina] to congregate each Sunday in their neighbourhood church, 
as Vina would very likely have wished’ (483).  Others continue to hate her.  
A crowd of Islamist women crow that the Vina phenomenon ‘reveals the 
moral bankruptcy and coming annihilation of the decadent and godless 
Western world’ (483).  In these passages Rushdie suggests that Vina’s 
passing opens up a ‘war of meanings’ (485).  He implies that it may become 
impossible to tell good parrhēsia like Vina’s from bad parrhēsia like Ormus’ 
within a free play of competing discursive truth-claims akin to the democratic 
maelstrom that Foucault posits.  However, Rushdie emphasises most of all 
the capacity of Vina’s death to inspire those who rally to resist power’s 
oppressive use by racist, misogynist and kleptocratic political elites just as 
surely as she resisted in life.  For Rai, this ‘possibility[…]is Vina’s true 
legacy’ (487). 
 Considering the ways in which Vina’s discourses, and those she 
engenders in death, constitute effective good parrhēsia illuminates 
Rushdie’s uncharacteristic affirmation of reverse discourse’s ability to resist 
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(bio)political oppression.  Ground proves primarily apocalyptic, but Vina’s 
truth-claims provide a vivid counterweight to the planet’s tectonic and 
societal cracking in the novel.  They transform the potentiality Rushdie’s 
other fiction describes into effective action through qualities of sincerity, 
simplicity, fearlessness and public-spiritedness.  Rushdie uses Rai 
Merchant to chart a waning possibility of effective resistance through 
pseudo-parrhesiastic visual art.  He also suggests bad parrhēsia’s strength 
by describing how the polis receives Ormus’ lyrics.  He satirises the cult of 
celebrity’s political import and pretensions.  However, through Vina he 
indicates the prospect of the mass dissemination and influence of reverse 
discourses opposed to tyranny, racism and misogyny within twentieth-
century governmentality.  Using good parrhēsia as a model against which 
to measure discourses of resistance reveals that Ground depicts an 
increased potentiality and strength of effective resistance to biopower when 
compared with Rushdie’s earlier novels, and especially when compared 
with Shalimar, his most recent novel to engage with twentieth-century 
biopolitics. 
Conclusion: From Discourses to Movements 
Rushdie’s novels indirectly affirm Foucault’s argument that ‘[w]hen 
parrhēsia is lacking[…]all are doomed to the master’s madness’ (2010b, 
161).  Ground shows that a sincere, direct, fearless, public-spirited, widely 
accepted discourse can produce a new governmentality of truth-telling that 
limits biopower’s oppressive effects.  Rushdie’s fiction suggests that good 
parrhēsia constitutes the most effective form of discursive resistance.  
However, he mostly indicates the impossibility of this discourse in a modern 
world characterised by biopolitical oppression and numerous, ever-shifting 
flows of power and resistance.  By deploying Foucault’s conception of 
effective good parrhēsia, and a new theory of pseudo-parrhēsia that seeks 
to identify parrhesiastic elements within artistic, allegorical and complex 
reverse discourses, Chapter Four has complemented this study’s 
investigations into racism, thanatopolitics and space in Rushdie’s novels.  It 
has helped to draw more sharply the trajectory of ebbing, then growing, 
oppositional potentiality in his fictional worlds from Midnight to Ground.  The 
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utility of this method in making this arc clearer outlines the means by which 
a future biopolitical literary criticism may analyse comprehensively the 
relative efficacy of resistance to biopower in other works of fiction. 
 This chapter has gestured towards an argument that Rushdie’s 
depictions of resistance suggest the relative ease of producing or 
disseminating parrhēsia or pseudo-parrhēsia as opposed to converting the 
potentiality of effective resistance into mass movements which militate 
against biopower.  Chapter Five goes beyond Chapter Four’s nascent 
investigation into resistance movements in Rushdie with respect to Ground.  
It reconsiders the ways in which the novels discussed previously portray 
attempts at political organisation in opposition to state biopower.  The 
chapter uses Hardt and Negri’s concept of the egalitarian, communicative 
multitude and Esposito’s notion of communitas as a totally inclusive, non-
racialising polity in a similar way to Chapter Four’s engagement with good 
parrhēsia.  It deploys these formulations as ideals whose impossibility 
Rushdie’s novels indicate increasingly by describing successful movements 
of resistance as possible only through bloody violence or the power of elites.  
This biopolitical reading augments the argument presented by this study’s 
previous chapters by further showing how Shalimar, in which all pluralist 
resistance movements are defeated by the end of the novel, constitutes the 
end point of a trajectory in which Rushdie has proven progressively reluctant 
to depict effective opposition to biopolitical oppression in his fictionalised 
twentieth-century polities. 
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Chapter Five – Movements of 
Resistance 
Introduction: Attenuated Resistance 
In The Ground Beneath Her Feet Rushdie suggests that parrhēsia may 
inspire mass movements that oppose biopolitical oppression.  However, 
Chapter Four argued that his fiction generally proves increasingly 
disinclined to evoke a potentiality of powerful discursive resistance within 
twentieth-century governmentality.  Chapter Five builds upon this 
investigation into Ground by considering more extensively Rushdie’s still 
greater, and concomitantly growing, reluctance to portray successful efforts 
to turn discourse into effective movements, especially when this discourse 
is animated by pluralist ideals.  As this study has shown, Rushdie’s 
successive novels have emphasised biopower’s efficacy more and more.  
This chapter argues that developing tendencies towards racialisation, 
hierarchy, unproductive violence and impotence in the resistance 
movements that his fiction portrays augment his depictions of racism, 
thanatopolitics and space in accounting for this trend.  From Midnight’s 
Children, in which Saleem Sinai’s faction collapses but creates the space 
for a future pluralist politics, to the rebels in Shame who topple a government 
but leave oppressive biopower intact, to the pervasive communalist violence 
that completely destroys the inclusive discourse of Kashmiriyat in Shalimar 
the Clown, Rushdie increasingly excises the possibility of political pluralism 
from his fictional engagement with twentieth-century biopolitics. 
 As an ideal against which to measure insufficiently direct, sincere, 
fearless and/or public-spirited discourse, parrhēsia offers a fruitful method 
of considering discourses of resistance in Rushdie.  However, Foucault only 
indicates vaguely how movements of resistance to biopower may be 
constructed.  Philosophers who extend Foucault’s thought into theories of 
how political movements may replace biopower with an inclusive non-
hierarchical politics prove more useful in charting Rushdie’s growing 
disinclination to depict effective resistance to biopolitical racialisation.  
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Considering the increasing extent to which his novels imply the limitations 
of these thinkers’ strategies reveals the utility of a biopolitical reading that 
uses literature’s indirect critique of unworkable methods of resistance as a 
means of deconstructing biopower and its capacity to crush opposition.  Just 
as Rushdie implies parrhēsia’s impracticality, in representing twentieth-
century governmentality his fiction suggests more and more the near-
impossibility of movements of resistance replacing biopower with the 
optimally pluralist society of communitas that Roberto Esposito theorises, 
let alone Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s more idealistic hybrid multitude 
of free subjectivity and communication. 
Hardt and Negri: The Multitude 
By criticising the ways in which power was stratified in twentieth-century 
politics, Rushdie’s novels portray increasingly the difficulty of constructing 
an effective non-hierarchical, inclusive movement of resistance and of 
creating an inclusive community through this praxis.  The few successful 
resistance movements that Rushdie depicts are non-pluralist and thus leave 
biopolitical discourses and technologies intact.  These include the 
conjunction of socio-economically privileged citizens that remove Raza 
Hyder from power in Shame, and numerous Islamist terror groups in 
Shalimar.  Hardt and Negri’s concept of the multitude – a possible future 
movement that includes all races within a non-hierarchical matrix of free 
subjectivity and communication – offers an ideal of resistance which 
Rushdie progressively suggests proves unworkable within contemporary 
governmentality. 
 In Empire (2000), Multitude (2006) and Commonwealth (2011), Hardt 
and Negri propose a programme of resistance to what they call Empire: the 
contemporary political paradigm of globalised, deterritorialised, late 
capitalist, American-led power relations and rule.  They write of economics, 
rights, politics, globalisation and war that biopolitics is ‘the fundamental 
category that demonstrates how all of the others are mutually implicated’ 
(Hardt and Negri 2006, 282).  Hardt and Negri draw upon Foucault’s theory 
that ‘from the seventeenth or eighteenth century onward, the human body 
essentially became a productive force’ (2004, 31).  However, their analysis 
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of this biopolitical productivity leads them to advocate a different strategy of 
resistance than parrhēsia: one which amalgamates discourses into a mass 
movement. 
 For Hardt and Negri, the subjectivities and social relations produced 
by and between humans potentially constitute an effective movement of 
opposition to biopower.  Whereas Foucault focuses on the resistance of 
individuals who may influence the polis discursively by disseminating good 
parrhēsia, Hardt and Negri theorise the multitude: a hybrid, productive, 
democratic, communicative movement produced by human society as a 
whole as it practices a new affirmative biopolitics against Empire.  The 
‘democracy of the multitude’ (Hardt and Negri 2011, 21) aims at freedom 
from hierarchical power relations by negating identity as an organising 
principle for resistance.  Hardt and Negri advocate a movement based on a 
hybrid multitude of differences within and between bodies.  This oppositional 
formation strives to create ‘not[…]a world without racial or gender difference 
but instead a world in which race and gender[…]do not determine 
hierarchies of power’ (Hardt and Negri 2006, 101).  Hardt and Negri do not 
want humans to be racialised politically, as under regimes of biopower.  
Rather, they desire the inclusion and acceptance of all identities within the 
global multitude, as long as decision-making is based on the free and 
equitable exchange of discursive truth-claims within a non-hierarchical 
communication matrix, instead of communalism: ‘[t]he multitude is 
composed of innumerable internal differences that can never be reduced to 
a unity’ (xiv).  The multitude replaces old identitarian conflicts with ‘a new 
milieu of maximum plurality and uncontainable singularisation’ (Hardt and 
Negri 2000, 25) which attacks biopolitical governments on multiple fronts. 
 However, the ways in which Rushdie portrays movements of 
resistance suggest increasingly the near-impossibility of replacing 
biopolitical apparatuses with a multitude within contemporary 
governmentality.  From Saleem’s racially divided and eventually defunct 
Midnight Children’s Conference in Midnight to Shalimar’s violent, often 
communalist terrorist groups, the resistance movements that Rushdie 
represents invariably eschew or fail to achieve non-hierarchical, non-
identitarian communicative pluralism in their organisational structure.  
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Furthermore, his novels indicate progressively the difficulty of going beyond 
Foucauldian discursive resistance by constructing an inclusive, plural 
community in general: what Esposito calls communitas. 
 Roberto Esposito: Community/Communitas 
The resistance movements that Rushdie describes not only fail increasingly 
to constitute a non-hierarchical, non-identitarian multitude but to create a 
pluralist society, if they aim to do so at all.  He depicts the gradual erosion 
of multiple pluralist political formations within twentieth-century 
governmentality.  These include Nehruvian politics in Midnight and 
Kashmiriyat in Shalimar.  Rushdie’s novels chart how biopolitical regimes 
which pluralist movements of resistance proved unable to resist effectively 
destroyed these ideals as the century unfolded, often abetted by more 
violent, communalist resistance groups.  Esposito’s notion of communitas 
denotes usefully the ideal inclusive polity that the movements of resistance 
Rushdie portrays fail or do not attempt to create.  His fictions lionise 
communitas constantly, but indicate more and more the difficulty of 
constructing it. 
 Esposito’s conception of resistance to biopower does not place 
biopolitical productivity between humans at its centre in the radical manner 
of Hardt and Negri, nor does it propose that humans eschew identity politics 
completely.  As Timothy Campbell argues, Esposito aims simply at ‘a 
thoroughgoing deconstruction of the intersection of biology and politics that 
originates in immunity’ (2006, 3).  He attempts no strategy of resistance but 
advocating an inclusive polis free from biopolitical racialisation by negative 
example.  Esposito sets a future optimal polis against the current less-than-
ideal community under biopower in which human bodies are ‘immunised 
against what they have in common’ (2011, 107).  In common with the 
multitude, this hypothetical polis – not necessarily a global one – forms ‘a 
locus of plurality, difference, and alterity’ (Esposito 2013, 55).  Esposito calls 
this locus communitas.  In contrast, for Esposito ‘we are a community made 
up of those who do not have community’ (15).  This community bases itself 
on immunitas.  Immunitas excludes certain groups or races from full 
citizenship on the grounds that to include every human within the community 
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risks disorder.  Under immunitas governments and their superraces disavow 
their obligations to the community’s most vulnerable and marginal members 
and regions. 
 Esposito argues that immunitas arises from human beings’ growing 
tendency towards the self-securing self-interest of governmentality: 
In the moment in which liberty is no longer understood as a mode of 
being, but rather as a right to have something of one’s own – more 
precisely the full predominance of oneself in relation to others – the 
subtractive or simply the negative sense is already destined to 
characterise it ever more dominantly (2008, 72). 
He suggests that recognising the deleterious effects of immunitas and the 
need to resurrect communitas may reverse the former’s increasing influence 
in politics.  Through negative example, Esposito’s work on immunitas 
attempts to beget a more equitable future politics. 
 Rushdie affirms the desirability of inclusive, hybrid societies through 
his own negative example.  Yet communitas fails all but completely to 
materialise in his fictionalised versions of twentieth-century 
governmentality.  The unworkable modalities of resistance and pluralism 
that Esposito and Hardt and Negri advocate prove useful to a biopolitical 
reading of Rushdie.  Identifying the lessening extent to which they 
materialise in his fiction further reveals his increasing disinclination to depict 
limits to biopower’s efficacy.  However, even Midnight, in which Rushdie 
describes a potentiality of future communitas through the dissemination of 
Saleem Sinai’s discourse and the existence of a new generation of magical 
children, mostly indicates the difficulty of creating pluralist resistance 
movements and communities. 
Failed Communitas in Midnight’s Children 
In Midnight Rushdie depicts the multiplicity and diversity of India’s polis, but 
also suggests the obstacles to constructing communitas or a multitude by 
representing and including all Indian regions and citizens at the political 
level.  Stephen Morton argues that ‘Rushdie’s choice of the word multitude 
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rather than people to describe the national population in Midnight’s Children 
is significant[…]because it is opposed to [Thomas] Hobbes’ idea of state 
control’ (2008, 45).  In De Cive (1642) Hobbes distinguishes between 
people and multitude (multitudo): 
 The people is somewhat that is one, having one will, and to whom 
 one action may be attributed; none of these can properly be said of 
 a multitude.  The people rules in all governments.  For even in 
 monarchies the people commands; for the people wills by the 
 will of one man; but the multitude are citizens, that is to say, subjects 
 (1949, 135). 
For Hobbes, governments of all sorts by definition govern in the name of 
their people.  Mass political organisation based on heterogeneous 
ideologies sets ‘the multitude against the people’ (135) and hence against 
state control.  To Hobbes, this is anathema. 
 Complementing Morton’s analysis of Hobbes by considering how 
Hardt and Negri theorise the multitude’s precise constitution further 
illuminates the ways in which Rushdie’s language evokes both the difficulty 
and the possibility of forming an oppositional multitude from India’s citizens.  
Hardt and Negri critique Hobbes’ concept of the people as ‘totalitarian’ 
(2000, 113).  They argue that ‘[a]n originary notion of the people poses an 
identity that homogenises and purifies the image of the population while 
blocking the constructive interactions of differences within the multitude’ 
(113): interactions which resist biopower.  However, in Midnight Rushdie 
portrays India’s population more as plural ‘multitudes’ (2008, 172) than a 
singular, powerful multitude.  He indicates that these multitudes cannot 
produce a multitude that forms an effective pluralist movement of resistance 
to biopower.  He implies consequently that they cannot coalesce to produce 
communitas. 
 The way in which Saleem Sinai describes India’s multitudes at the 
end of Midnight suggests that their plurality inevitably overwhelms both the 
individual and any attempt at a democracy of the multitude in Hardt and 
Negri’s sense: 
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 Yes, they will trample me underfoot, the numbers marching one two 
 three, four hundred million five hundred six, reducing me to specks 
 of voiceless dust, just as, all in good time, they will trample my son 
 who is not my son, and his son who will not be his, and his who will 
 not be his, until the thousand and first generation, until a thousand 
 and one midnights have bestowed their terrible gifts and a thousand 
 and one children have died, because it is the privilege and the curse 
 of midnight’s children to be both masters and victims of their times, 
 to forsake privacy and be sucked into the annihilating whirlpool of the 
 multitudes, and to be unable to live or die in peace (647). 
In the novel’s final paragraph Rushdie emphasises the multiplicity of India’s 
population and its enormous, increasing size by using an onrushing 
sequence of increasingly large, barely punctuated numbers: ‘one two three, 
four hundred million five hundred six’ (647).  This massive, heterogeneous 
population takes no coherent political form.  Instead it appears as an 
amorphous ‘annihilating whirlpool of the multitudes’ whose vast numbers 
will destroy the Midnight’s Children even ‘until the thousand and first 
generation’ (647).  Though substantial, this number of generations pales 
beside the hundreds of millions ‘reducing [them] to specks of voiceless dust’ 
(647).  The ending proves broadly consistent with the rest of Midnight.  Most 
of Rushdie’s novel indicates the difficulty of constructing communitas or a 
multitude from India’s plural multitudes. 
 Yet Rushdie represents Saleem’s attempts at forming an inclusive 
political movement from these multitudes ambivalently.  He details Saleem’s 
failures, but suggests the possibility of an effective pluralist politics arising 
from them in the future.  Rushdie depicts Saleem’s discourse of communitas 
as overly idealistic through his protagonist’s disgust at what Midnight 
portrays as the necessary partition of Bombay State into Maharashtra and 
Gujarat.  He further paints this discourse as utopian by describing the 
inability of the heterogeneous Midnight Children’s Conference (MCC) to 
function and resist biopower effectively as a non-hierarchical, non-
identitarian multitude.  This failure results from its members’ racism and 
Saleem’s autocratic leadership.  Rushdie also indicates that even the 
divided multitudes of the MCC’s hundreds do not represent all Indian 
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identities or regions and hence do not even potentially constitute an 
optimally plural communitas. 
 However, Rushdie evokes a potentiality of future resistance that 
partially mitigates his novel’s overriding emphasis on biopower’s efficacy 
and its near-apocalyptic ending in which India’s multitudes, having 
overwhelmed Saleem’s attempts to create a movement of resistance, 
destroy his body itself.  As Morton argues, ‘in his physical disintegration, 
Saleem allows for the structural possibility of a plural, heteroglot nation’ 
(2008, 46).  Rushdie implies that the destruction of Saleem and the MCC 
creates the prospect of a new pluralist politics, whose form he leaves 
undecided.  Analysing this augments Chapter Four’s identification of the 
oppositional potentiality that Saleem’s pseudo-parrhesiastic narrative 
promises.  The MCC’s failure to become a multitude or effectively to resist 
Indian state biopower indicates the unlikeliness of parlaying reverse 
discourse into a pluralist resistance movement.  Yet by suggesting the 
impermanence of Indira Gandhi’s biopolitical government and the existence 
of a second generation of magical children Rushdie affirms the possibility of 
communitas as well as its desirability. 
Saleem Sinai’s Pluralist Ideal and Jawaharlal Nehru’s Spatial Compromise 
Rushdie indicates that his protagonist Saleem Sinai’s belief in a pluralist 
nation built on communitas is overly idealistic.  Midnight’s fictional rendering 
of the State of Bombay’s partition into Maharashtra and Gujarat in 1960 
demonstrates how Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s egalitarian, 
anti-communalist ideal was often compromised in practice through having 
to deal with subnational forms of identity.  Rushdie’s treatment of the 
partition exposes the limitations of an idealised version of Nehruvian 
pluralism such as Saleem’s.  It affirms not just the inevitability but the 
necessity of political decentralisation through regionalism.  Rushdie thus 
exposes the difficulty of governing India as communitas. 
 For Rushdie, Bombay constitutes an exemplary space of diversity 
and cultural hybridity.  In Midnight he fills Saleem’s descriptions of the city 
of his childhood with exhilaration at the vividness and diversity of life and 
sensations to be found there (Rushdie 2008, 412-13).  However, Rushdie’s 
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novels also depict Bombay’s multiplicity engendering communal rivalries 
which result in necessary territorial reorganisation.  India’s external 
dimensions remained virtually fixed after independence, but the redrawing 
of internal borders was an ongoing process.  Eventually Nehru’s 
government accepted majority languages within regions as a basis for 
dividing India into states in most cases (see Guha 2007, 180-200).  Rushdie 
represents this process in Midnight.  Saleem states that in 1956 ‘India had 
been divided anew, into fourteen states and six centrally-administered 
“territories”.  But the boundaries of these states were not formed by rivers, 
or mountains, or any natural features of the terrain; they were, instead, walls 
of words’ (Rushdie 2008, 261).  Bombay’s status at this point in history, 
though, was undecided.  This led to political unrest that Rushdie describes 
in the novel: 
 The State was to be partitioned; then not to be partitioned; then 
 partition reared its head again.  And as for the city itself – it was to 
 be the capital of Maharashtra; or of both Maharashtra and Gujarat; 
 or an independent state of its own...while the government tried to 
 work out what on earth to do, the city’s inhabitants decided to 
 encourage it to be quick (309-10). 
 Rushdie sets Saleem’s childhood against a backdrop of violent 
language riots between Marathi and Gujarati speakers.  These groups each 
demand a state of their own and militate consequently against communitas.  
By representing these riots Rushdie questions the prospects for total 
inclusivity within a polis.  If even the State of Bombay, at the centre of which 
stands India’s most diverse city, cannot maintain its spatial political form 
peacefully then what hope exists for communitas in the nation as a whole, 
which includes an even greater plethora of identitarian affinities?  The 
historical Nehru also recognised this difficulty.  Eschewing dogmatic 
pluralism in the face of social unrest in Bombay, he effected the kind of 
compromise that Paul Brass applauds: ‘[m]ost of the language conflicts in 
the Nehru period, some of which became at times bitter and violent, were 
ultimately resolved through pluralistic solutions’ (1994, 157).  Almost 
paradoxically, the state acted pluralistically in this case by accepting the 
wish for a plural region to be partitioned into less plural entities.  In Midnight 
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Rushdie depicts Bombay State’s bifurcation as a necessary act.  This 
admission that pluralism in India may best be served by partition mirrors his 
later essay ‘The Assassination of Indira Gandhi’ (1984), in which he argues 
that ‘[f]or a nation of seven hundred millions to make sense, it must base 
itself firmly on the concept of multiplicity, of plurality and tolerance, of 
devolution and decentralisation wherever possible’ (Rushdie 1992, 44).  
However, the more idealistic Saleem accepts Nehru’s spatial compromise 
under sufferance.  He continues to perceive India as constituted ideally by 
a unitary communitas. 
 Saleem believes in a pluralism and multiplicity that somehow can 
resist the vagaries of compromise politics.  He regards the demands for 
Maharashtra and Gujarat as undesirable dreams based on ‘old dead 
struggles’ (Rushdie 2008, 262).  Elsewhere in Midnight Saleem affirms the 
beneficial effects of shared dreams which lead to tangible political and 
spatial formations.  He refers to India as ‘a dream we all agreed to 
dream[...]a collective fiction in which anything was possible’ (150).  
However, he also suggests that some dreams have adverse consequences.  
In the same passage Saleem calls India ‘a mass fantasy[…][which] would 
periodically need the sanctification and renewal which can only be provided 
by rituals of blood’ (150).  The Indian state enacts one such ritual later in the 
novel: the 1965 war which Saleem claims ‘happened because [he] dreamed 
Kashmir into the fantasies of [India and Pakistan’s] rulers’ (471).  Because 
Saleem recognises the power of collective fictions within politics, he decries 
those which oppose his vision of communitas.  He describes the marchers’ 
dreams as fevered, almost primal and therefore insubstantial compared with 
the more desirable collective fiction of pluralist India: 
the dream of Maharashtra was at the head of some processions, the  
mirage of Gujarat led the others forward.  Heat, gnawing at the mind’s  
divisions between fantasy and reality, made anything seem possible; 
the half-waking chaos of afternoon siestas fogged men’s brains, and 
the air was filled with the stickiness of aroused desires.  What grows 
best in the heat: fantasy; unreason; lust (231). 
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Saleem reacts unhappily when he realises that the vibrant, diverse city of 
his childhood cannot sustain a multilingual state: ‘we resigned ourselves to 
the partition of the state of Bombay’ (308).  Although the way in which 
Rushdie describes Bombay State’s partition in Midnight indicates its 
necessity, Saleem rejects Nehru’s compromise.  He considers it a betrayal 
of pluralism and communitas. 
 Later in the novel Rushdie renders Saleem’s attitude towards this 
partition ironic.  He shows that his protagonist, who bemoans the division of 
a plural region for reasons of administrative and societal order, cannot even 
make the MCC, a community of just five hundred and eighty-one Indians, 
into an effective multitude.  Because of the magical children’s tendencies to 
racialise each other and Saleem’s autocratic, immunising leadership, even 
this small group fails to become communitas.  Hence, it cannot transform 
India along similar lines. 
The Midnight Children’s Conference as Failed Multitude 
Saleem Sinai fails to keep his initial promise of consolidating the Midnight’s 
Children into a ‘loose federation of equals’ (Rushdie 2008, 305) 
unencumbered by spatial considerations of national and regional 
boundaries.  His autocratic, immunising leadership of the MCC and their 
inability to shed identitarian, racialising forms of belonging precludes the 
collective from becoming an equitable multitude of free communication and 
subjectivity.  Through the MCC, Rushdie tempers Midnight’s celebration of 
diversity and multiplicity.  By describing the MCC’s inability to function as a 
democratic, egalitarian movement he acknowledges the dependency of the 
hybrid national ideal upon people of diverse identities existing in harmony 
successfully.  Rushdie asks: if the MCC cannot become a peaceful, non-
hierarchical polis that acknowledges every member’s parrhēsia, how can 
the much larger and more diverse India? 
 Hardt and Negri’s strategy of resistance requires movements to 
excise identity politics (2006, 101) and eschew hierarchies of power.  The 
MCC manages neither.  Racialisations within the collective prevent it 
consistently from becoming a powerful movement of the multitude.  Saleem 
laments, ‘I found children from Maharashtra loathing Gujaratis, and fair-
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skinned northerners reviling Dravidian “blackies”; there were religious 
rivalries; and class entered our councils’ (Rushdie 2008, 353).  His group 
proves unable to form a peaceful, parrhesiastic and effective parliament.  It 
fails consequently to agree a practice of resistance (353-54).  By depicting 
the racially-divided MCC’s inability to coexist, Rushdie illustrates the 
difficulty of creating a pluralist politics which through the multitude’s 
communicative production agglomerates the parrhēsia of all participants 
into an effective praxis.  Saleem’s autocratic leadership and act of 
immunitas exacerbate this lack of pluralism within the group, and excise the 
potentiality of its future efficacy by precipitating its final dissolution. 
 Rushdie affirms the inevitable stratification of power that presents a 
further obstacle to constructing a democratic multitude when he details 
Saleem’s self-anointing as MCC leader.  Despite professing equality 
between his collective’s diverse members, Saleem finds himself ‘not 
immune to the lure of leadership’ on the grounds that his head serves as 
their meeting place: ‘didn’t the one who provided the club-house run the 
club?’ (315)  He proves initially a benevolent chairman.  He acts merely as 
the host of the group’s debates, a paternalistic ‘big brother’ (316).  However, 
by describing Saleem’s later leadership Rushdie indicates how purportedly 
inclusive bodies can undermine their own efforts at the communitas 
necessary to produce a multitude by operating under an immunitary logic. 
 Rushdie suggests in Midnight that once a figure rises to power within 
a community they are tempted invariably to take immunitary action to 
maintain their leadership.  Like Rushdie’s fictionalised Indira Gandhi, 
Saleem attempts to immunise himself against a perceived threat to his 
authority.  He expels his nemesis Shiva from the MCC because he hates 
‘the roughness of his tongue [and] the crudity of his ideas’ (314) and fears 
Shiva learning of his true birthright as the son of Ahmed and Amina Sinai.  
As Esposito argues, once a movement based ostensibly on pluralism picks 
and chooses which members it wants to retain it ceases to be truly plural.  
It is no longer communitas, but a community of immunitas.  Rather than 
accepting the risk of Shiva’s presence in his polis, Saleem immunises 
himself.  He therefore declines the ‘obligation of reciprocal donation’ 
(Esposito 2008, 50) that Esposito cites as a necessary component of 
240 
 
communitas regardless of the dangers of including certain people.  The 
remaining members accuse Saleem of ‘secrecy, prevarication, high-
handedness [and] egotism’ (Rushdie 2008, 414).  The collective collapses.  
Saleem envisions the MCC as an effective pluralist political movement 
against oppressive (bio)power, but because of his immunising leadership it 
becomes neither pluralist nor effective.  Moreover, Midnight’s narrative form 
suggests the impossibility of acknowledging and representing the parrhēsia 
of all members within a diverse community, even if immunising leaders such 
as Saleem (and Indira Gandhi) were so inclined. 
 By affirming that even a relatively small collective cannot recognise 
every single member’s interests, personalities and parrhēsia, Rushdie 
interrogates the capacity of a larger resistance movement or polis to do 
likewise.  Saleem states that his narrative ‘could not cope with five hundred 
and eighty-one fully-rounded personalities[...]they were the very essence of 
multiplicity’ (317).  Despite its length and complexity, his story does not 
present more than a handful of MCC members’ truth-claims.  Because 
Saleem’s narrative cannot integrate the parrhēsia of five hundred and 
eighty-one children to an equal degree, Rushdie implies that neither can the 
divided and hierarchical political movement in his brain.  He thus evokes the 
still greater obstacles to representing and acting upon the discourses and 
wishes of a polis numbering hundreds of millions.  A group of five-hundred 
and eighty-one cannot constitute a microcosm of India’s vast diversity.  
Although ‘the endless duality of masses-and-classes, capital-and-labour, 
them-and-us’ (354) wracks the MCC, India includes further differences, 
rivalries and prejudices.  Rushdie celebrates multiplicity in Midnight.  Yet he 
also questions how a regionally, religiously and culturally diverse nation 
such as India can function peacefully and equitably without central 
governmental leadership to mediate between groups and effect 
compromises, as in the case of Bombay State’s partition.  If the MCC cannot 
operate effectively along the multitude’s equitable pluralist lines, Rushdie 
suggests that India as a whole will find it even more difficult to become 
communitas. 
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A Possible Pluralist Future? 
Midnight highlights the obstacles to forming a multitude or a nation built on 
communitas.  However, in the novel’s final chapters Rushdie indicates the 
possibility of a future communitas.  He describes the persistence of political 
and magical symbols of pluralism.  The end of Midnight sees the Janata 
Morcha, a multifarious coalition of parties which ‘grew in all kinds of bizarre 
directions, until it embraced Maoist Communists[...]and extreme right-wing 
members of the Ananda Marg’ (Rushdie 2008, 582), defeat Indira Gandhi’s 
racialising biopolitical government in India’s 1977 election.  Saleem Sinai 
does not perceive the front ‘to represent a new dawn’, but acknowledges 
that ‘others[...]felt otherwise’ (616).  Its victory promises an Indian nation-
state governed along more pluralistic lines (even if history and Rushdie’s 
later writing record that the Janata government soon collapsed). 
 Rushdie later asserts that the Midnight’s Children, his novel’s 
symbols of the pluralist conception of the nation (as distinct from the nation-
state), are not defeated completely.  Indira Gandhi’s sterilisation campaign 
proves largely effective.  However, just as her bulldozers fail to destroy the 
Magicians’ Ghetto, her operatives lack the capacity to eradicate the 
Midnight’s Children.  One operative, the Widow’s Hand, tells Saleem that 
‘they would be satisfied with four hundred and twenty, they had verified one 
hundred and thirty-nine dead’ (612).  This makes five hundred and fifty-nine 
captured or dead out of the five hundred and eighty-one that did not die in 
infancy of ‘[m]alnutrition, disease and the misfortunes of everyday life’ (271).  
Twenty-two remain at large.  Although this does not represent a great 
proportion of the original group, Rushdie indicates that their numbers are 
bolstered by a second generation of magical children whose existence 
further belies the limits of state biopower.  He gestures towards the 
possibility of a new communitas. 
 Saleem undergoes a ‘draining-out of hope’ (611) when the 
government sterilises him and the vast majority of his cohorts.  The 
Midnight’s Children are ‘denied the possibility of reproducing themselves’ 
(613).  Moreover, they ‘los[e] their magic’ (614) as a result of the procedure.  
Saleem rejoices when he later learns that his nemesis Shiva’s pre-
242 
 
sterilisation philandering has meant that ‘in the boudoirs and hovels of the 
nation, a new generation of children, begotten by midnight’s darkest child, 
was being raised towards the future’ (616).  This elation appears premature 
at first.  That the powers possessed by the first generation of Midnight’s 
Children were conferred upon them through their birth within the hour of 
India’s independence rather than by genetics suggests that these new 
children do not necessarily possess the gift (or curse) of magic. 
 Yet in the novel’s final chapter Rushdie reintroduces the possibility of 
a magic that offers an oppositional potentiality.  At the same time he 
indicates that the prospect of a new pluralist nation remains limited.  Saleem 
describes his stepson Aadam Sinai (himself one of Shiva’s offspring) as ‘a 
member of a second generation of magical children who would grow up far 
tougher than the first, not looking for their fate in prophecy or the stars, but 
forging it in the implacable furnaces of their wills’ (625).  The passage in 
which Aadam speaks for the first time exemplifies Rushdie’s ambivalent 
portrayal of the second generation: 
 Abracadabra!  But nothing happens, we do not turn into toads, angels 
 do not fly in through the window: the lad is just flexing his muscles.  I 
 shall not see his miracles…Amid Mary’s celebrations of Aadam’s 
 achievement, I go back to Padma, and the factory; my son’s 
 enigmatic first incursion into language has left a worrying fragrance 
 in my nostrils.  Abracadabra: not an Indian word at all, a cabbalistic 
 formula derived from the name of the supreme god of the Basilidan 
 gnostics, containing the number 365, the number of the days of the 
 year, and of the heavens, and of the spirits emanating from the god 
 Abraxas.  ‘Who’, I am wondering, not for the first time, ‘does the boy 
 imagine he is?’ (641-42) 
Aadam’s first word not only alludes to magic, but because it is polysyllabic 
and hence theoretically beyond infants suggests its presence.  Saleem 
perceives the potential for his stepson to perform future ‘miracles’ (642).  
However, he worries that this ‘enigmatic first incursion into language’ (642) 
indicates the kind of megalomania that caused his autocratic leadership of 
the MCC and its subsequent collapse.  Because ‘Abracadabra’ is ‘not an 
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Indian word’, he also implies that Aadam’s magic will attempt to shape the 
Indian nation to a lesser degree than his own (642).  Rushdie indicates that 
though this second generation of magical children may combat (bio)political 
oppression in India more effectively than the first, their resistance will not 
necessarily materialise nor work towards communitas. 
 Midnight’s final paragraph further epitomises this ambivalence 
regarding the future: ‘it is the privilege and the curse of midnight’s children 
to be both masters and victims of their times, to forsake privacy and be 
sucked into the annihilating whirlpool of the multitudes, and to be unable to 
live or die in peace’ (647).  As Saleem disintegrates he predicts a similar 
fate for the second generation and all subsequent ones.  However, as 
Morton argues, ‘in his physical disintegration, Saleem allows for the 
structural possibility of a plural, heteroglot nation’ (2008, 46).  Despite 
Saleem’s death, his resistance movement’s inability to become an effective 
multitude and the sterilisation of the majority of the magical children, 
Rushdie suggests that India’s politics may one day accommodate diversity 
and multiplicity.  Through the racialising Indira Gandhi’s removal as Prime 
Minister and the existence of the second generation of children, he indicates 
both the limits of state (bio)power and the endurance of symbols of pluralism 
which may become ‘masters[…]of their times’ (Rushdie 2008, 647) by 
organising along different, as yet unthought, lines to the failed multitude of 
Saleem’s MCC.  Rushdie describes India as an ‘annihilating whirlpool of the 
multitudes’ (647), but also presents the seeds of future communitas. 
 In Midnight Rushdie affirms the desirability of pluralist, hybrid 
resistance. Although he explores the limitations of oppositional practices, 
he suggests that political pluralism may materialise in the future.  However, 
in his next novel, Shame, discursive resistance against biopower proves 
virtually impotent, and resistance forces do not even attempt to form a 
multitude.  Only violent, recursive means prove able to topple the dictator 
Raza Hyder.  His fall does not generate communitas but more of the 
biopolitical same. 
 
Failed Communitas in Shame 
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Chapter Four argued that in Shame a misogynist, racialising political class 
in the fictional nation of Peccavistan circumscribes parrhēsia’s influence on 
the polis by propagating its own truth-claims effectively while silencing those 
that oppose its (bio)power, such as Rani Harappa’s shawls.  Yet Rushdie 
portrays more powerful agents of resistance than Rani in the novel.  As 
Morton asserts, though Rani’s shawls ‘articulate the terror of Iskander 
Harappa’s governmental authority[…]it is Raza Hyder’s daughter, Sufiya 
Zinobia, who performs the role of the public secret’ (2008, 55).  By 
describing how Sufiya Zinobia ends the biopolitical dictatorship of Raza 
Hyder (Shame’s fictional analogue for the Pakistani leader General Zia ul-
Haq), Rushdie suggests that neither a government’s discursive truth-claims 
nor its biopolitical technologies can keep it in power indefinitely. 
 However, the manner of Raza’s deposing and death indicates little 
possibility that a movement of truly democratic resistance or an inclusive 
polis will come to characterise Peccavistan’s politics.  Sufiya mounts a 
campaign of violence in an attempt to avenge her father’s mistreatment of 
her rather than through parrhēsia or on behalf of communitas.  The terror 
and disorder that she causes lead Raza’s generals to mount a successful 
coup against him.  The wealthy Shakil sisters later kill him as vengeance for 
the death of their guerrilla son.  None of these socio-economically privileged 
figures constitute part of an affirmatively biopolitical multitude.  Neither do 
their actions work towards constructing one.  Because these characters 
leave biopolitical oppression intact, Shame fails to augment its emphasis on 
the provisionality of singular dictatorships with the nascent pluralist 
potentiality that the end of Midnight evokes. 
Sufiya Zinobia’s Resistance as Personal Vendetta 
In Shame Rushdie suggests the difficulty of opposing regimes of truth such 
as Raza Hyder’s through discourse or pluralist, egalitarian mass 
movements.  He depicts effective resistance as possible only through the 
violence of individuals and small groups belonging to the nation’s socio-
economic elite.  Shame’s dictator is removed by members of a hermetic 
political class that continues to hold power thereafter.  As punishment for 
his crimes, he is killed by three wealthy individuals rather than brought to 
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trial before his former subjects.  The construction of equitable communitas 
and the multitude’s communicative subjectivity prove absent in Raza’s 
deposing, his death and its aftermath. 
 The status of the nation’s women presents one of the most significant 
obstacles to communitas and the multitude in Shame’s fictionalised 
Pakistan.  Aijaz Ahmad has made the most influential critique of the way in 
which Rushdie represents women in the novel.  Ahmad argues that ‘[n]either 
the class from which the Pakistani segment of [Rushdie’s] experience is 
derived, nor the ideological ensemble within which he has located his own 
affiliations, admits, in any fundamental degree, the possibility of heroic 
action’ (1992, 139).  He relates this primarily to the plight of Shame’s 
women: ‘there is something fatally wrong with a novel in which virtually 
every woman is to be pitied, most are to be feared, at least some of the time, 
but none may be understood in relation to those fundamental projects of 
survival and overcoming which are none other than the production of history 
itself’ (151).  Ahmad considers Sufiya Zinobia as a destructive avatar of 
repressed female sexuality.  He writes that ‘so wedded is Rushdie’s 
imagination to imageries of wholesale degradation and unrelieved social 
wreckage’ (149) that when Sufiya rebels against Peccavistan’s oppressive 
rulers she does so in the form of a feral, unthinking brutality that Shame 
presents in sexualised terms.  Acts including Sufiya’s rape and murder of 
‘four youths[...]transfixed by those appalling eyes’ (Rushdie 1996b, 219) fit 
within what Ahmad deems ‘a system of imageries which is sexually 
overdetermined’ (1992, 144).  Though successful in its goal of gaining 
revenge on Raza, this mindless, sexualised cycle of violence fails to alter 
the country’s oppressive matrix of power relations. 
 Andrew Teverson defends Rushdie against Ahmad’s critique.  
Teverson argues that ‘Rushdie at no point suggests that he is representing 
all women in Pakistan, or indeed trying to make a point about women’s 
existence generally’ (2007, 141).  He asserts that ‘we might question 
whether or not it is true that Rushdie does present all the women in the novel 
as disempowered’ (142).  Sufiya’s campaign of resistance suggests that 
women may rebel powerfully against the biopolitical control over their bodies 
that Rushdie portrays as endemic in Peccavistan.  However, her violent 
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rampage arises primarily from her abuse at her family’s hands.  It 
consequently takes the form of a personal vendetta rather than an attempt 
to empower other women and hence work towards communitas.  
Considering Sufiya’s failure to bring about pluralist change shows that the 
possibility of successful resistance to (bio)political oppression in Shame is 
as negligible as Ahmad claims. 
 As Hardt and Negri argue, the very bodies that biopower seeks to 
control fuel the biopolitical production of the multitude (2006, 348).  
However, many of Rushdie’s female characters in Shame experience 
magical bodily transformations that militate against women’s freedom and 
agency.   Physiology becomes an agent of Islamist biopolitical oppression.  
These women are thus unable to participate fully in the community and to 
create communitas through democratic movements of the multitude.  The 
politically powerful husband of Raza’s daughter Good News cites religious 
doctrine to justify eschewing birth control, and uses clairvoyance to ‘kn[o]w 
which nights were best for conception’ (Rushdie 1996, 207).  The 
supernaturally large number of children that Good News is forced to bear 
(thirty-six in total) leads her to perceive ‘that there was no hope for women 
in the world, because[…]men would come and stuff you full of alien 
unwanted life’ (207).  Listlessness and eventual suicide result.  Through ‘the 
numberless children’ (235) of Good News and the transmogrifying shame 
that Sufiya experiences, Rushdie uses extreme bodily metamorphosis to 
evoke vividly biopower’s horrific effects on women.  He uses the 
supernatural to suggest biopower and misogyny’s overwhelmingly 
stultifying effects on human biology and consciousness.  His fictionalised 
excoriation of Pakistan’s Islamist biopolitical state virtually precludes the 
possibility both of women’s mass resistance against the central 
government’s patriarchal discourse, and a pluralist end to biopolitical 
oppression. 
 Unlike Good News, Sufiya manages to use her shame-transformed 
body to fight biopolitical control.  The supernatural strength of ‘the Beast 
bursting forth to wreak its havoc on the world’ (219) becomes an effective 
weapon of resistance which leads eventually to Raza’s deposing.  However, 
Sufiya’s bestial form and feral mind mean that she enacts her opposition 
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through the violent rage of a singular body rather than the ‘intelligent 
productivity’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, 344) of the multitude of bodies.  Her 
resistance is animalistic and barely conscious rather than political.  Sufiya 
does not rail against political elites in order to enfranchise oppressed 
women, effect a change of government or produce communitas.  She acts 
out of instinctual personal revenge for ‘her parents’[...][g]roans, insults, even 
the wild blows of exasperation’ (Rushdie 1996b, 121).  Although she 
represents the nation’s shame symbolically, her personal circumstances as 
‘the incarnation of her family’s shame’ (171) primarily engender her 
transformation.  Raza’s conception of the Beast as a ‘champion’ (262) of the 
oppressed or ‘the collective fantasy of a stifled people’ (263) proves 
erroneous.  Sufiya’s violence targets his regime to a degree, but arises long 
before his rise to power and continues (following a brief hiatus) after the 
government falls.  It eventually consumes the whole of Peccavistan in ‘the 
fireball of her burning, rolling outwards to the horizon like the sea’ (286).  
Rushdie’s apocalyptic ending further indicates that Sufiya’s exogenous, 
uncontrollable fury possesses little ability to alter the nation’s oppressive 
power structures.  Because of the supernatural transformation her family’s 
abuse and misogyny induces, she retains only the mental capacity to 
avenge herself upon specific fellow members of the elite.  She cannot 
conceive replacing this elite with a more equitable political system based on 
the biopolitical production of the multitude or on communitas.  Political 
change in Rushdie’s novel does nothing to preclude a biopolitical 
oppression that continues deleteriously to affect women’s bodies and mind.  
The circumstances of Raza’s fall from power offer merely a severely 
attenuated potentiality of dislodging biopolitical elites in the future. 
 In Shame Rushdie suggests that forces originating from within the 
regime’s stratum of society, such as the wealthy family or the exclusive 
political elite, prove far more likely than mass movements of the multitude 
to oust governments.  Raza is terrorised by his daughter, removed by his 
own generals and replaced by another member of the elite.  Arjumand 
Harappa comes to power and beatifies her war-criminal father as ‘the Martyr 
Iskander’ (276).  ‘[A]rrests, retribution, trials, hanging, blood, [and] a new 
cycle of shamelessness and shame’ (276-77) characterise her rule.  The 
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dynastic and hermetic cycle of Peccavistani politics reasserts itself.  Rather 
than constituting a liberation for Peccavistan or the construction of 
communitas, Raza’s removal functions as a point on a continuum of 
repression and violence.  That Rushdie admits the difficulty of removing a 
dictator by peaceful means (257) does not mean that biopower cannot be 
fought.  However, through Sufiya’s campaign against Raza Shame indicates 
the near-impossibility of doing so in a way that, through the multitude, 
articulates and implements ideals of pluralism and communitas that 
empower the polis and its women.  As Raza’s death further shows, only the 
violence of the elite can oppose biopolitical oppression effectively. 
The Death of a Dictator and the Stillbirth of Communitas 
In Shame all operations of resistance against Raza Hyder’s violent 
biopolitical government are themselves steeped in violence.  The horrific 
brutality Sufiya Zinobia visits upon innocent people (Rushdie 1996b, 219) 
does not promise a new, more peaceful and pluralist Peccavistan.  Neither 
does Raza’s eventual punishment for his thanatopolitical crimes.  Rushdie 
depicts both Raza’s deposing and his death as violent acts carried out by 
privileged members of Peccavistan’s elite.  Though enacted by women, 
these deeds do nothing to empower women in general by constructing 
communitas.  After Raza’s removal from office the thanatopolitical violence 
that his troops unleash on the tribals in the west of Peccavistan redounds 
upon him at the hands of three wealthy sisters.  Timothy Brennan calls 
Raza’s death ‘[u]topian vengeance’ (1989, 124) in the sense that Zia, the 
dictator’s real-life equivalent, was still in power.  However, a truly utopian 
vengeance would take the form of justice done in public by the multitude 
rather than the bloody, private revenge that Rushdie describes. 
 Raza’s death constitutes poetic justice.  The three mothers of Babar 
Shakil, the tribal guerrilla leader ‘shot for politics’ (Rushdie 1996b, 161) in a 
sortie led by Raza, avenge their son in a manner as horrific as any act by 
Raza’s thanatopolitical army against the tribals.  They repay Babar’s blood 
with blood: ‘the eighteen-inch stiletto blades of death drove into Raza’s 
body, cutting him to pieces, their reddened points emerging, among other 
places, through his eyeballs, adam’s-apple, navel, groin and mouth’ (282).  
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Yet, as with Raza’s removal from power, his death fails to work towards 
communitas or enfranchising Peccavistan’s oppressed women.  It arises not 
from the reparation of the multitude against tyranny but the settling of a 
personal grudge which removes agency from the population and places it 
in the hands of members of an elite.  Instead of ‘an absolute democratic 
power’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, 344) holding Raza to account for his crimes, 
three rich women take it upon themselves to slay the oppressor brutally in 
cold-blooded revenge.  Despite the presence of multiple successful 
individual acts of resistance in Shame, Rushdie questions the extent to 
which mass movements of resistance can constitute a non-hierarchical, 
inclusive multitude or effect lasting pluralist change to the biopolitical order. 
 Rushdie criticises the authoritarian state, Islamisation and biopolitical 
oppression in Shame.  However, by portraying the situation in 
Pakistan/Peccavistan as a fruitless cycle of violence and revenge he 
suggests the difficulty of combating these forces in peaceful, collaborative, 
democratic ways.  Shame’s elites construct regimes of truth so powerful that 
neither parrhēsia nor communitas prove possible.  The overthrowing of 
Rushdie’s fictional Zia-analogue indicates that only violence from within the 
political elite can dislodge a dictator.  Women are mostly prevented from 
acts of resistance by a supernatural conjunction of biopower and 
physiology.  Those that (violently) oppose the government fail to enfranchise 
other women in so doing.  In representing state biopower’s overall efficacy 
and the impotence of democratic, egalitarian political forces, Shame depicts 
little possibility that a multitude can militate effectively against biopolitical 
oppression.  The potentiality of pluralist resistance that Midnight evokes has 
been lost. 
 The level of this potentiality varies in Rushdie’s novels after Shame.  
The Satanic Verses suggests that discursive resistance against racism, as 
exhibited by the Brickhall rioters and the patrons of the Club Hot Wax, will 
likely prove ineffective.  The Moor’s Last Sigh charts the fall of the hybrid 
ideal of India as communitas and its replacing by the identitarian politics of 
Mumbai’s Axis.  The world in Ground proceeds towards an apocalyptic 
societal and topographical disintegration. 
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 Yet all of these novels depict the prospect of an egalitarian politics to 
a degree.  Saladin Chamcha resolves to fight Hindu communalism at the 
end of Verses.  Despite their waning influence on public discourse, Aurora 
Zogoiby’s paintings which avoid destruction in Moor continue vividly to 
evoke a more pluralist future India.  Ground in particular indicates the re-
entry of effective parrhēsia into Rushdie’s fictional polities.  Vina Apsara and 
Ormus Cama’s truth-claims inspire new global movements and 
communities that change the world tangibly, even if these do not quite 
constitute a multitude or communitas.  Rushdie portrays a greater 
potentiality of pluralist resistance in Ground than any of his preceding three 
novels. 
 However, Shalimar excises this possibility.  Rushdie imagines not the 
feasibility of pluralist resistance to Indian state biopower (as in Midnight), 
nor the powerful but non-enfranchising resistance that removes a dictator in 
Shame’s fictionalised Pakistan.  Instead he charts the total defeat of 
pluralism and hybridity in Kashmir’s politics by both India and Pakistan.  
Shalimar suggests that Rushdie’s fictional rendering of twentieth-century 
politics has ceased completely to represent both the multitude’s capacity to 
resist oppressive (bio)power effectively, and the nation’s potential to 
become a pluralist, hybrid communitas. 
Failed Communitas in Shalimar the Clown 
Of Rushdie’s novels, Shalimar proves most sceptical regarding the 
possibility of communitas and effective movements of pluralist resistance 
within twentieth-century politics.  Its bleakness arises from the sharp 
contrast between its early chapters, in which Rushdie imagines a Kashmir 
characterised primarily by peace and religious tolerance, and its conclusion.  
By the end of the novel, this ‘paradise on earth’ (Rushdie 2006a, 76) has 
become hellish at the hands of India and Pakistan’s bio/thanatopower.  The 
violence, death and terror that these foreign agents spread have eroded 
both the power of discourses and movements of pluralism and the 
potentiality of their future efficacy. 
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 In order to draw this trajectory vividly, Rushdie idealises the forces 
that resist communalism and external military control in the novel.  He 
presents Kashmiriyat (Kashmiriness), a historical cultural consciousness 
described in Shalimar as ‘the belief that at the heart of Kashmiri culture there 
was a common bond that transcended all other differences’ (110), as an 
immutably pluralist discourse of communitas.  Rushdie suggests that India 
and Pakistan’s post-Partition machinations carry far more responsibility for 
extinguishing communitas in the valley in the late twentieth century than 
communalist intolerance among Kashmiris or within Kashmiriness itself.  His 
desperation to identify and depict effective pluralist resistance movements 
in late twentieth-century Kashmir leads him to portray the Jammu and 
Kashmir Liberation Front’s resistance as based on this idealised discourse 
of Kashmiri autonomy and pluralism.  He thus omits many of the historical 
terrorist group’s more unsavoury and racialising acts. 
 Even these idealised forces of pluralist resistance are defeated 
eventually.  By Shalimar’s conclusion, Rushdie represents Kashmir’s 
political situation as forlorn.  The only remaining resistance movements are 
violent and identitarian.  They do not constitute a multitude nor aim at 
communitas.  The most effective opposition to India’s thanatopower comes 
through violent Pakistan-backed Islamist terror based on discourses of 
religious and racial supremacy rather than tolerance and pluralism.  The 
Kashmiri population, constructed as subrace, is caught in the middle of this 
discursive and physical violence.  In Shalimar Rushdie eschews the 
potentiality of parrhēsia and resistance that he reintroduced into his fiction 
in Ground. 
Kashmiriyat: Mutable or Immutable? 
India and Pakistan have disputed each other’s territorial claims to the state 
of Kashmir ever since Partition in 1947.  This conflict forms the core of the 
geopolitics that Rushdie depicts in Shalimar.  However, the novel refuses to 
privilege one claim to sovereignty over the other in representing Kashmir’s 
recent history.  For Rushdie, a third claim supersedes India’s and 
Pakistan’s.  Shalimar affirms Kashmir’s right to be considered a separate 
nation-state.  It conceives this state as based ideally on Kashmiriyat, a 
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pluralist historical discursive formation which Victoria Schofield describes 
as ‘a unique culture[…]which includes both the Hindus and Muslims’ (2000, 
184).  Rushdie indicates that politics in the valley has become characterised 
increasingly by a racialising ideology of communalist immunitas that his 
novel suggests is alien to this culture.  He not only portrays Kashmiriyat’s 
irreversible destruction but idealises it as a discourse of immutable, 
inclusive hybridity and tolerance.  Hence, the trajectory of waning 
potentiality for communitas that he charts in his fictionalisation of Kashmir’s 
recent history appears all the steeper.  Shalimar concludes the gradual 
lessening of the degree to which Rushdie’s novels have tended to depict 
the possibility of effective discursive resistance in twentieth-century politics. 
 In Shalimar Rushdie idealises Kashmiriyat as a discourse of 
communitas assailed by foreign forces of racialising immunitas.  Gyanendra 
Pandey argues that ‘[t]he view that harmony and mutual understanding are 
the norm (until challenged from the outside, especially by powerful states 
and large organisations) rests on an unduly sanguine and ahistorical 
construction of human nature and human society’ (2001, 63).  Yet Rushdie 
offers this construction in Shalimar.  He depicts Kashmiriyat as a tolerant, 
pluralist ethos undermined by a conjunction of a thanatopolitical Indian 
military presence and the fundamentalist Pakistan-financed Islamist 
terrorism which opposed the Indian army in the late twentieth century.  
Rushdie indicates that India’s and Pakistan’s governments harmed 
communitas and militated against Kashmiriyat by introducing violence and 
alien discourses of religious intolerance.  In fictionalising the waning of 
pluralism in post-Partition Kashmir, he emphasises most of all the 
deleterious effect of these outside forces.  He neither devotes significant 
attention to historical racial and religious divisions in the region in the years 
before or soon after Partition, nor accepts the mutability of tolerance’s 
presence within the discourse of Kashmiriyat.  Shalimar accepts the limits 
of Kashmir’s supposed natural peacefulness and tolerance when left alone 
by the two central governments that claim the space, but focuses far more 
on Kashmiriyat’s function as a desirable discourse of communitas and 
consequently of resistance to thanatopolitical tyranny and communalism. 
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 In a New York Times article of 1999 Rushdie argues, ‘“Kashmir for 
the Kashmiris” is an old slogan, but the only one that expresses how the 
subjects of this dispute have always felt; how, I believe, the majority of them 
would still say they feel, if they were free to speak their minds without fear’ 
(1999b).  Shalimar reflects this sentiment by lionising the beneficial effects 
of the kind of Kashmiri nationalism that developed in the 1930s based on 
nationalist leader Sheikh Abdullah’s conception of the territory as a neutral, 
religiously tolerant and, crucially, independent pluralist nation (see Ataöv 
2001, 57).  Despite its not being recognised as a separate country in 
international law or by India and Pakistan, for Rushdie Kashmir constitutes 
a nation by dint of a common culture encapsulated by Kashmiriyat.  His 
novel describes this ethno-national social and cultural consciousness as 
‘the belief that at the heart of Kashmiri culture there was a common bond 
that transcended all other differences’ (Rushdie 2006a, 110).  He depicts 
Kashmiriyat as an inclusive discourse of communitas that, historically, 
resisted attempts at government based on the dominance of one race or 
religious group.  Shalimar provides a powerful fictional indictment of what 
Rushdie represents as the alien (thanato)political forces of immunitas that 
acted upon the Kashmiri nation after Partition and eroded Kashmiriyat’s 
discursive power. 
 Rushdie suggests that if left to its own devices Kashmir would run 
naturally along the hybrid, inclusive lines of communitas.  Early on in 
Shalimar, before the advent of Pakistan-backed fundamentalist terror and 
the Indian army’s thanatopolitics, the villagers of Pachigam assert that 
‘though they were not connected [necessarily] by blood or faith[...]Kashmiris 
were connected by deeper ties than those’ (47).  The young Shalimar 
Noman perceives that ‘[t]he words Hindu and Muslim had no place in their 
story[...]The frontiers between the words, their hard edges, had grown 
smudged and blurred.  This was how things had to be.  This was Kashmir’ 
(57).  Rushdie’s portrayal of pre-Partition religious practices in Kashmir 
emphasises cultural hybridity.   According to Robert Young, the discourse 
and practice of cultural hybridity ‘makes difference into sameness, and 
sameness into difference, but in a way that makes the same no longer the 
same, the different no longer simply different’ (1994, 26).  Rushdie writes 
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that ‘[t]he pandits of Kashmir, unlike Brahmins anywhere else in India, 
happily ate meat.  Kashmiri Muslims, perhaps envying the pandits their 
choice of gods, blurred their faith’s austere monotheism by worshipping at 
the shrines of the valley’s many local saints’ (2006a, 83).  In Shalimar, 
Kashmiriyat forms part of a hybrid ethos of peace and tolerance that works 
akin to Homi Bhabha’s conception of a hybridity that by accepting difference 
and voiding identitarian fixity and hierarchy militates effectively against 
political oppression by ‘caus[ing] the dominant discourse to split along the 
axis of its power to be representative, authoritative’ (1994, 112).  Discourses 
of communalism and racism, prevalent in the vast majority of Rushdie’s 
fictional spaces, appear mostly absent in Shalimar’s early chapters because 
Kashmiriyat’s discursive power engenders communitas.  The hybrid 
religious practices and tolerance that Rushdie suggests are innate to 
Kashmir and Kashmiriness maintain the valley’s status as ‘heaven on earth’ 
(2006a, 28). 
 Although most of Rushdie’s portrayal of mid-twentieth-century 
Kashmir presents it as idyllic and harmonious, Shalimar’s early chapters 
describe a small amount of religious tension and misogyny in the valley 
even before the spread of fundamentalist Islam by Pakistan-backed 
militants.  However, he declines to suggest a continuity between these 
episodes of intolerance and the communalist and gendered bigotry that 
becomes more palpable later in the novel.  Rushdie attributes this waning 
potentiality of political pluralism and tolerance overwhelmingly to the 
immunising influence of India’s thanatopolitics and Pakistan-backed 
fundamentalist terror.  He thus forgoes a critique of Kashmiriyat or the idea 
that Kashmir naturally constitutes a space of hybridity and communitas. 
 As in Moor, less pluralist truth-claims acquire increasing discursive 
power as Shalimar progresses.  Yet even in the ‘Golden Age’ (80) of the 
novel’s Kashmir – the mid-twentieth century – communal conflict unrelated 
to India and Pakistan’s political machinations sometimes undermines the 
commonality of communitas that Rushdie attributes to Kashmiriyat.  No 
sooner does Abdullah Noman proclaim of his son Shalimar and Boonyi 
Kaul’s match, ‘There is no Hindu-Muslim issue[...]To defend their love is to 
defend what is finest in ourselves’ (110), than the debate over the wedding 
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threatens the village of Pachigam’s stability.  Rushdie writes that ‘Pachigam 
had divided into two camps, and long years of communal harmony were at 
risk’ (113).  The villagers eventually reach a compromise.  However, 
because this incipient communalism occurs before the fundamentalist ‘iron 
mullah’ (117) comes to the region, it indicates that hybridity and communitas 
did not always permeate Kashmir completely in this supposed Golden Age.  
The way in which Rushdie represents women’s rights in this period suggests 
likewise. 
 Rushdie’s depiction of Zoon Misri and Boonyi’s treatment following 
perceived sexual impropriety asserts the presence of misogyny in Kashmir 
before the years of widespread Pakistan-backed fundamentalist terror.  
Their punishment shows the villagers’ intolerance and even produces homo 
sacer in Boonyi’s case.  Rushdie writes that when Zoon is raped her family 
‘comforted her and bathed her and told her she had no reason to be 
ashamed’ (126).  However, thereafter ‘[n]o man ever came to ask for her 
hand in marriage.  That was how things were.  Nobody could defend it but 
nobody could change it either’ (129).  Rushdie describes an enduring stigma 
attached to rape survivors in Kashmir which has deleterious psychological 
consequences.  Zoon becomes ‘a vague drifting presence, half-human, half-
phantom’ (190) – a figure of indistinction.  Later, the legal indistinction that 
Agamben suggests produces bare life renders Boonyi as such.  After Boonyi 
breaks her marriage vows in order to leave Pachigam her family has her 
declared legally dead (223).  They turn her into homo sacer, the figure 
‘not[...]simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather 
abandoned by it, that is, exposed and threatened on the threshold in which 
life and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable’ (Agamben 1998, 
28).  ‘[L]iving in the world while also not living in it’ (Rushdie 2006a, 235), 
Boonyi occupies a state of exception.  Ill treatment of women becomes more 
widespread in Shalimar after fundamentalist truth-claims are disseminated 
into the valley, but through Zoon and Boonyi’s rendering as less than human 
Rushdie includes elements of intolerance within his generally idyllic 
fictionalisation of pre-1980s Kashmir. 
 Zoon and Boonyi’s suffering and the communalist rancour over 
Shalimar and Boonyi’s wedding show that Shalimar’s characters often fail 
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to put ideals of hybridity, communitas, tolerance and peace into practice.  
However, rather than attributing intolerance to limitations in Kashmiriyat’s 
inclusivity, Rushdie represents it as an aberration from Kashmir’s natural 
hybridity.  In his attempt to draw a stark contrast between a blessed Golden 
Age and the war-ravaged Kashmir of the late twentieth century, he idealises 
Kashmiriyat as a form of communitas by definition.  He fails to consider the 
potential mutability of the tolerant discourse he depicts as intrinsic to 
Kashmir and Kashmiris. 
 Any reading of Shalimar that perceives Kashmiriyat as immutable in 
the history upon which Rushdie’s novel draws cannot engage fully with the 
ways in which he fictionalises and idealises pre-1980s Kashmir.  Some 
writers have a fixed conception of the ethos Rushdie eulogises.  Jean-Luc 
Racine considers intolerant discourses such as Islamic fundamentalism to 
be ‘alien to the Kashmiriyat tradition’ (2004, 216).  However, others claim 
that Kashmiriyat is in fact malleable.  Mustapha Kamal Pasha asserts that 
in the uprising of the 1980s and 1990s, which Rushdie examines in 
Shalimar’s later chapters, ‘the emergent Islamic current in vast areas of the 
nationalist movement’ carried ‘the potential for changing the entire character 
both of Kashmiriyat and Kashmiri nationalism’ (1992, 373).  Kashmiriyat 
translates as ‘Kashmiriness’.  The term implies the subjectivity of what it is 
to be Kashmiri.  For Pasha and others Kashmiriyat takes many forms.  
Rather than communal conflict and intolerance constituting a betrayal of 
Kashmiriyat, these formations can become part of Kashmiriness. 
 Many writers regard the notion of an ineffably tolerant Kashmiriyat as 
a ‘homogenising discourse’ (Zutshi 2004, 329) that papers over real 
historical conflicts between the valley’s communities.  For Ananya Jahanara 
Kabir, Rushdie’s representation of Kashmiriyat constitutes this kind of 
‘placebo’ (2009, 144-45).  His novel repeatedly presents a fixed conception 
of Kashmiriness as communitas.  Abdullah and his wife Firdaus ponder 
whether or not ‘their beloved Kashmiriness’ (Rushdie 2006a, 131) is served 
by union with India yet fail to question the nature of Kashmiriness itself.  
When Kashmir later becomes scarred by violence Pyarelal Kaul worries that 
‘[m]aybe Kashmiriyat was an illusion[...]Maybe tyranny, forced conversions, 
temple-smashing, iconoclasm, persecution and genocide were the norms 
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and peaceful coexistence was an illusion’ (239).  He perceives the 
indestructibility of Kashmiriyat’s discursive power as illusive, but not its 
assumed exemption from elements of intolerance and violence.  Rushdie 
suggests that Kashmir’s politics in the twentieth century became 
characterised increasingly by racialisation.  However, although his elegy for 
Kashmir and Kashmiriyat depicts some communalist conflicts in the valley’s 
mid-twentieth-century ‘Golden Age’ (80), it eschews a critique of Kashmir’s 
supposed innate ethos of tolerant communitas under an emphasis on the 
external (thanato)political powers that oppose it. 
 Rushdie idealises Kashmiriyat by depicting a form of Kashmiriness 
characterised inherently by communitas.  His idealism does not extend to 
implying its discursive power’s permanence.  Shalimar charts the gradual 
erosion of the hybrid discourse of Kashmiriyat towards the end of the 
twentieth century by the immunitas of India’s thanatopolitical army and 
Pakistan-backed fundamentalist terrorists.  The most effective movement of 
resistance to these forces in the novel comes from the Jammu and Kashmir 
Liberation Front (JKLF).  Rushdie idealises this Kashmiri nationalist terrorist 
organisation in a similar manner to Kashmiriyat.  Just as he overplays 
tolerance and hybridity as intrinsic facets of Kashmiriness, he 
overemphasises the presence of these ideals in fictionalising the historical 
JKLF.  Though the JKLF in Shalimar does not constitute the democratic 
multitude that Hardt and Negri imagine, Rushdie suggests that the group 
aims at communitas as well as Kashmir’s independence.  The political 
situation in Kashmir becomes so desperate by the novel’s later chapters 
that it presents a terrorist organisation as the valley’s least worst chance to 
retain what Rushdie portrays as its natural way of life, and must omit the 
group’s historical communalist activities in order to suggest even an 
attenuated potentiality of future pluralism. 
Resistance through Terror (1): The JKLF 
The political events that Rushdie describes in Shalimar gradually erode 
communitas in Kashmir.  The most effective movement of resistance to 
India and Pakistan’s thanatopolitics in the novel is a violent terrorist 
organisation rather than a peaceful, democratic multitude.  The historical 
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JKLF, as Türkkaya Ataöv argues, ‘by reducing politics to criminal actions 
and by accepting violence as the style of struggle[...]disorganise[d] the 
authentic forces of change’ (2001, 106).  Rushdie nevertheless depicts its 
brutal resistance as the most potent counterweight to what he represents 
as alien forces of intolerance.  Moreover, his eagerness to identify effective 
movements of pluralist opposition in late twentieth-century Kashmir leads 
him to allot the JKLF a more generous fictional treatment than historical 
reality would suggest.  Morton observes that Shalimar’s narrator ‘appears 
to support the secular nationalism of the Kashmiri separatist movement 
against both the influence of the Indian military and the iron mullahs from 
Pakistan’ (2008, 143).  As Morton adds, Rushdie is not ‘simply an uncritical 
defender of the JKLF’ (144).  However, Shalimar goes to great lengths to 
humanise the JKLF’s fighters and to present it as a pluralist movement not 
just for Kashmiri independence but for communitas.  Rushdie glosses over 
its unsavoury part in the spread of communalist violence in the valley in the 
history upon which his novel draws.  As with his treatment of Kashmiriyat, 
he idealises historical resistance to India and Pakistan’s violence and 
intolerance in the name of depicting Kashmir as an innately pluralist and 
tolerant nation if left unmolested by external (bio)political powers. 
 Rushdie does not present the JKLF as a democratic multitude or its 
members as unimpeachable heroes.  The group’s organisational structure 
is hierarchical and its fighters’ motives often ignoble.  Some fight for 
Kashmir, some for ‘women, power and wealth’ (Rushdie 2006a, 257).  Their 
methods of obtaining funding actually harm the cause of Kashmir’s freedom 
and independence in many cases.  JKLF cell leader Anees Noman’s 
argument that ‘free isn’t free of charge’ (253) affirms the necessity of 
billeting and the extortion of ordinary Kashmiris for the greater good.  
Rushdie later states that ‘ISI [Pakistani secret service] funding to the JKLF 
was being reduced and the [Islamist] Hizb was getting the cash instead’ 
(299).  He stresses that the historical JKLF was once a regional outpost of 
Pakistan’s thanatopolitical foreign policy. 
 However, Rushdie places far greater emphasis on his fictional JKLF 
fighters’ humanity and their wish for a Kashmiri independence characterised 
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by hybrid, tolerant Kashmiriyat and consequently by communitas.  In one 
passage he writes, 
 [a]ll the men in the liberation front were afraid almost all the 
 time[…]They  feared betrayal, capture, torture, their own cowardice, 
 the fabled insanity of the new officer in charge of all internal security 
 in the Kashmir sector, General Hammirdev Kachhwaha, failure and 
 death.  They feared the killing of their loved ones in reprisal for their 
 few successes, a bridge bombed, an army convoy hit, a notorious 
 security officer laid low.  They feared, almost above all things, the 
 winter, when their high-ground encampments became unusable, 
 when the Aru route over the mountains became impassable, when 
 their access to arms and combat supplies dwindled,  
 when there was nothing to do but wait to be arrested, to sit shivering 
 in loveless garrets and dream of the unattainable: women, power and 
 wealth[…] 
 […]The Kashmiris of Kashmir were shivering, leaderless and very 
 close to defeat (256-57). 
Here Rushdie shows his novel’s empathy with the JKLF.  The passage 
humanises them by detailing at length the suffering caused by the various 
fears that arise from the precariousness not just of their resistance 
movement’s success but of their lives.  Rushdie’s description of the militants 
as ‘Kashmiris of Kashmir’ (257) suggests that they represent a more 
authentic voice of Kashmir’s people than the fundamentalist groups fighting 
for union with Pakistan.  In keeping with his near-constant emphasis on the 
natural tolerance of Kashmiris and Kashmiriyat, Shalimar portrays the JKLF 
as less violent and more secular than these Islamist factions.  Unlike the 
fundamentalists who deploy suicide bombers, Anees places limits on his 
group’s violence – ‘we will die as men of culture, not barbarians’ (254) – 
even when he attempts to save the villages of Pachigam and Shirmal from 
domination by Pakistan-backed Islamists.  Rushdie uses the members of 
his fictionalised JKLF, in their fearful and dilapidated state, their relative 
mercy and their opposition to religious communalism, as a counterpoint to 
the remorseless, hardline, alien ‘iron commando’ (314) fighting for Islamic 
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fundamentalism and union with Pakistan.  Although he does not celebrate 
or condone terrorism, he presents the JKLF as the lesser evil because its 
violence in the novel operates in the name of Kashmir’s freedom from 
India’s military thanatopower and Pakistan-backed communalist terrorism, 
and in the name of tolerance and communitas. 
 However, Shalimar’s sympathy with the JKLF’s campaign for 
Kashmir’s independence leads to a simplistic fictionalisation of the 
massacres and mass displacement of the valley’s Hindu pandit population 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which for Yunas Samad represented ‘the 
final nail in the coffin of Kashmiriyat’ (2011, 167).  Rushdie omits the JKLF’s 
historical role in the exodus in favour of attributing the pandits’ fate to a 
conjunction of Pakistan-backed Islamic fundamentalism and the inaction of 
India’s government.  As with Kashmiriyat, in order to depict Kashmir as a 
naturally pluralist and tolerant nation he idealises a force opposing external 
control of the valley by suggesting that it also works towards communitas. 
 In describing the suffering of Kashmir’s pandits Rushdie poses a long 
series of unanswered questions: 
 There were six hundred thousand Indian troops in Kashmir but the 
 pogrom of the pandits was not prevented, why was that.  Three and 
 a half lakhs of human beings arrived in Jammu as displaced persons 
 and for many months the government did not provide shelters or 
 relief or even register their names, why was that.  When the 
 government finally built camps it only allowed for six thousand 
 families to remain in the state, dispersing the others around the 
 country where they would be invisible and impotent, why was that 
 (2006a, 296). 
His narrator does not answer these questions definitively.  However, he 
implies heavily that they can be explained either through the Indian state’s 
limited (bio)power to make life live or its lack of political will to do so.  In 
blaming the pogrom of the pandits on India’s inability to secure the valley 
against alien Islamist terrorists, particularly the fictional Lashkar-e-Pak 
group, Rushdie exculpates the JKLF for its historical role in the massacres.  
Navnita Chadha Behera argues that historically the ‘JKLF was the main 
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force behind the expulsion of the minority pandit community, with many of 
its cadre implicated in the brutal killings of Kashmiri pandits’ (2006, 150-51).  
Rushdie subsumes this disquieting aspect of the JKLF.  Instead he 
emphasises their anti-fundamentalist activities.  This leaves an aporia in his 
elegy for Kashmiriyat.  He cannot answer the question, ‘why was that’ 
(Rushdie 2006a, 296) fully.  Although Rushdie depicts the JKLF as 
ineffective, unheroic and not constituting a democratic multitude, the group 
appears in Shalimar as a force dedicated to preserving Kashmir’s freedom 
and pluralist communitas from the deleterious actions of India and 
Pakistan’s governments.  This presentation aids his novel’s argument that 
tolerance and peace characterise Kashmir’s society if outside political 
powers leave the valley alone, but elides the JKLF’s own part in spreading 
communalist violence and intolerance in Kashmir’s recent history. 
 Rushdie’s eagerness to portray Kashmir as an innately pluralist and 
hybrid nation does not extend to denying the effect of violence and 
communalism on political pluralism in the valley in recent decades.  He 
idealises Kashmiriyat and the JKLF in terms of their religious tolerance 
rather than their ability to resist the overwhelming discursive and military 
power of the forces of thanatopolitics and Islamic fundamentalism that he 
depicts as alien to Kashmir and Kashmiriyat.  By the end of Shalimar 
Rushdie excises the potentiality of effective resistance and future pluralism 
more completely than in any of his novels. 
Fundamentalism vs. Kashmiriyat 
In Shalimar, especially by the end of the novel, various Pakistan-backed 
fundamentalist terrorist groups constitute more effective movements of 
resistance to the Indian army’s thanatopolitics than pluralist organisations 
such as Rushdie’s idealised secular JKLF.  Not only do these factions not 
form a democratic multitude, but they eschew the discourses of tolerance 
and pluralism that the novel (erroneously) suggests inherently characterise 
Kashmir’s ‘Golden Age’ (80) and the JKLF’s ideology.  By emphasising the 
foreignness of the leadership and financing of Shalimar’s fictional 
fundamentalist movements Rushdie depicts them as alien to the nation and 
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its supposed natural state of communitas, particularly when support from 
Pakistan’s immunising government makes them more powerful. 
 In describing the fictional mullah Bulbul Fakh, the novel’s most 
prominent Islamist, Rushdie emphasises his alienness.  He renders him 
richly symbolic as a creation of political forces external to the valley by using 
a fantastical literalisation of geopolitical causality: ‘The Indian army had 
poured military hardware of all kinds into the valley, and scrap metal 
junkyards sprang up everywhere[...]Then one day by the grace of God the 
junk[...]came to life and took on human form’ (115).  Here Rushdie evokes 
the historical role of India’s immunising bio/thanatopower in begetting 
resistance movements characterised increasingly not just by terrorism but 
by discourses of religious fundamentalism and immunitas that his novel 
suggests are inimical with Kashmiriyat.  Shalimar implies that if Kashmir 
were to have been left free, extremists like the ‘iron mullahs’ (115) would 
never have emerged and communitas would have endured. 
 Bulbul’s communalist discourse proves as foreign to Kashmir as the 
mullah himself.  Bulbul condemns those ‘who mistake tolerance for virtue 
and harmony for peace’ (116).  He elides Kashmiri nationalism with religious 
communalism.  He thus countermands the pluralism and hybridity that 
Shalimar depicts as inherent to Kashmir and Kashmiriyat.  Rushdie writes 
that Bulbul ‘spoke the language harshly, like a foreigner’ (115).  By 
describing ‘the powerful hypnotic spell woven by [his] harsh seductive 
tongue’ (125) on the people of Shirmal, Shalimar suggests that such a spell 
is necessary to convert the naturally peaceful Kashmiris into religious 
communalists.  Bombur Yambarzal’s discourse of resistance – ‘This 
thickheaded, comical, bloodthirsty moron is what you have all decided to 
become’ (124) – lifts the enchantment eventually.  However, Bulbul returns 
later in the novel.  In addition to suggesting the Indian army’s responsibility 
for creating the mullah, Rushdie goes on to portray him as a product of 
Pakistan’s nation-state and its financing of Islamist terrorism.  He depicts 
Bulbul, and by extension his communalist ideals, even more emphatically 
as an alien presence in Kashmir produced by foreign political powers.  He 
suggests characteristically that the immunising biopower of nation-states 
eroded communitas’ discursive power as the twentieth century progressed. 
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 In Shalimar’s later sections Rushdie fictionalises the process by 
which the Kashmiri elections of 1987, which Ayesha Jalal describes as 
‘royally rigged’ (1995, 179) in favour of the pro-India National Conference, 
precipitated a new uprising characterised by fundamentalist terrorism and 
financed by Pakistan.  He writes, ‘[t]housands of previously law-abiding 
young men took up arms and joined the militants, disillusioned by the 
electoral process.  Pakistan was generous.  There were AK-47s for 
everyone’ (Rushdie 2006a, 276).  Bulbul appears among the militants.  He 
is now not merely a preacher of communalist hatred but a fully-fledged 
terrorist fighting for Islamic fundamentalism and Kashmir’s accession to 
Pakistan.  He continues to disseminate the truth-claim that ‘[w]hen the world 
is in disarray then God does not send a religion of love’ (262), but proves 
able to do so more effectively than in mid-1960s Shirmal because of 
increased disillusion at Indian rule within Kashmir.  Pakistan’s government 
exploits this disenchantment.  The terrorist group that Bulbul commands 
forms a regional outpost of the ‘centre for worldwide Islamist-jihadist 
activities set up by Pak Inter-Services Intelligence’ (264).  Symbolically, he 
wishes to spread ‘Pakistani salt’ (264) on Kashmir as if to claim the space.  
Through the growing influence of Bulbul’s violent fundamentalism and pro-
Pakistan discourse, his terrorist camp comes to occupy more and more 
Kashmiri territory.  His foreign-backed and alien movement of resistance to 
India’s biopower progressively lessens the discursive power of Kashmiriyat: 
of tolerance, communitas and Kashmiri independence. 
 By the end of Shalimar, resistance based on violent communalist 
acts and discourses of immunitas has almost completely superseded the 
JKLF’s movement of pluralist communitas.  Even the possibility that these 
supposedly alien discourses pervaded late twentieth-century Kashmir less 
than totally, which Rushdie figures through the performativity and lack of 
fundamentalist ideology of Shalimar Noman’s terrorist resistance, proves 
attenuated.  Despite Shalimar’s actions being motivated by personal rather 
than ideological considerations, because he joins and participates in 
Bulbul’s violent, racialising movement the violence he commits nevertheless 
harms communitas in Kashmir. 
Resistance through Terror (2): Shalimar Noman 
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Ironically, Rushdie uses his novel’s most prominent terrorist to suggest that 
Pakistan-backed fundamentalism did not necessarily motivate anti-India 
forces in late twentieth-century Kashmir.  Personal revenge, rather than 
Islamist fervour or a desire to harm communitas, inspires Shalimar Noman’s 
militancy.  Shalimar condemns Pakistan as ‘the enemies pretending to 
rescue us in the name of our own God except they’re made of death and 
greed’ (Rushdie 2006a, 248).  He values not the Islamist ideology its 
government and its mullahs propagate but the resources it affords him: 
‘Over the mountain there are training camps.  Over the mountain there are 
comrades and weapons and money and political backing.  Over the 
mountain I will find the rainbow’s end’ (260).  For Shalimar, joining 
Pakistan’s cause and accepting its aid represents a means to an end.  
Although he justifies accepting Pakistan’s help by saying, ‘I want to drive 
the army bastards out and our enemy’s enemy is our friend’ (259), he 
focuses far more on killing the man with whom his wife eloped.  Shalimar 
lacks political commitment.  His terrorism is consequently deeply 
performative.  Because of his training as an actor he can affect a simulacrum 
of ‘the total abnegation of the self’ (267) and thus convince Bulbul Fakh of 
his devotion to his immunising movement.  As Robert Eaglestone argues, 
Rushdie offers ‘the strangely hopeful idea that this terrorist assassin is 
motivated by personal not religious motives: motives, that is, that might be 
satiated fairly easily’ (2010, 366).  Through his protagonist Rushdie presents 
the possibility that the reach of Pakistan-backed Islamic fundamentalism in 
Kashmir is less than total even within terrorist organisations.  He thus 
indicates that discourses and movements of immunitas may not necessarily 
pervade Kashmir’s politics in the future. 
 However, Shalimar’s merely performing the role of a fundamentalist 
terrorist does not negate the effect of the atrocities he commits on Kashmir’s 
peace and Kashmiriyat.  Just as Rushdie portrays the JKLF as a force for 
communitas despite some of its members being motivated primarily by fame 
and money, he suggests that Shalimar’s actions in the undemocratic non-
multitude of Bulbul’s faction contribute towards communitas’ increasing 
erosion regardless of his motivations.  Though Shalimar does not fight for 
the fundamentalism that Rushdie depicts as un-Kashmiri he does not 
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combat it either.  His personal revenge succeeds because of Kashmir’s 
irreversible militarisation, and contributes towards it.  Through its 
protagonist, Shalimar presents only a limited possibility that the Kashmiriyat 
ideal will again come to animate Kashmir’s politics in the future. 
 By the end of Shalimar the Kashmiris that Rushdie depicts as 
naturally tolerant and peaceful are caught irrevocably between India’s 
racialising state thanatopolitics and a fundamentalist resistance movement 
which also produces death, and which seeks a Kashmir bereft of 
communitas and subject to the power of Islamist truth-claims and Pakistan’s 
central government.  Even the potentialities of pluralist resistance that the 
novel evokes through certain characters and movements are perverted in 
some way.  Rushdie does not go as far as to depict the JKLF, the most 
powerful political movement working for Kashmir’s independence, as a 
democratic multitude.  Yet he idealises the group disturbingly by omitting its 
historical practices of immunitas, just as he romanticises the discourse of 
Kashmiriyat which he portrays as animating its supposedly pluralist 
ideology.  Shalimar’s militancy is performative and driven by personal 
revenge rather than fundamentalism, but he nevertheless harms 
communitas because he participates in violent, racialising terrorism as a 
means to an end.  These oppositional formations, such as they are, are 
extinguished by Shalimar’s conclusion.  The way in which Rushdie 
describes the increasing ability of Pakistan’s central government, via its 
financing of terrorist groups, to disseminate a fundamentalist communalism 
foreign to Kashmir indicates a complete absence of potentiality for 
movements or even discourses of effective pluralist resistance within the 
valley’s governmentality.  His most recent novel to explore twentieth-century 
(bio)politics proves his most sceptical regarding the prospect of future 
communitas. 
Conclusion: Loss of Potentiality, Loss of 
Resistance 
Reading Rushdie through Esposito and Hardt and Negri’s thought reveals 
that the extent to which he suggests communitas, and the multitude that 
may bring it about, to be lost causes within contemporary governmentality 
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builds almost consistently with each successive novel.  From Midnight to 
Shalimar, his characters’ attempted movements of opposition to 
communalism, biopower and immunitas generally fail more and more 
completely to bring about an inclusive polity or to constitute non-racialising, 
non-identitarian ‘biopolitical production’ (Hardt and Negri 2011, x) 
organisationally.  Resistance which alters the political power structure 
effectively in these novels, as in Shame, does not aim at a new, equitable 
polis and emerges from within often racialising political elites. 
 Philosophers of biopower formulate potentially powerful praxes of 
resistance.  However, a biopolitical reading that measures the degree to 
which Rushdie’s novels imply the impracticality of these modalities shows 
that he indicates increasingly that forming an effective pluralist political 
movement against biopower proves far harder than articulating 
parrhesiastic or even pseudo-parrhesiastic reverse discourses.  The power 
that truth-claims of nationalism, biopower, racism, religious fundamentalism 
and misogyny wield precludes the creation of such groups in his fiction.  This 
chapter thus also asserts that literature, including Rushdie’s, may not only 
deconstruct biopolitical oppression by indirectly critiquing theories of 
practical resistance, but gesture towards the means by which a more 
realistic programme of opposition may operate.
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Conclusion 
Rushdie Studies continues to be characterised by a growing engagement 
with ever more specific aspects of his fiction and its intellectual background.  
In recent years these have included family (Kimmich 2008), visual culture 
(Mendes, ed. 2011) and Indian popular cinema (Stadtler 2014).  However, 
the field has not yet produced a substantive analysis of the degree to which 
Rushdie’s individual novels suggest that humans may combat political 
oppression within contemporary polities.  Critics have gestured towards ‘a 
trajectory from the city as a utopian space to a dystopian one’ (Khanna 
2009, 411) in his work, and cited Shalimar the Clown, his most recent 
fictional engagement with twentieth-century politics, as his bleakest 
(Teverson 2007, 222).  Yet the exact nature of Rushdie’s generally 
lessening inclination to evoke a potentiality of effective resistance in his 
fictionalisations of recent history has remained elusive. 
 This study has argued that tracing this trajectory comprehensively 
requires conceiving politics as biopolitics.  Its methodology built upon 
previous work that engaged with how Rushdie weaves history and politics 
into his fiction (Harrison 1992; Morton 2008).  It used theories of biopolitics 
to conceptualise and vivify the complex power relations that permeate the 
polities he imagines, and hence shape governance and resistance within 
them.  These theories’ emphasis on how discourses animate diverse 
technologies of societal ordering, bodily optimisation, political oppression 
and even mass killing, and the ways in which these practices operate upon 
and are operated by humans, helped reveal the precise extent to which 
Rushdie’s novels suggest the possibility of resisting (bio)political oppression 
within these power relations. 
 The broad, incorporative conception of race formulated by Michel 
Foucault’s foundational, influential writings on biopolitics aided this study in 
illuminating how Rushdie presents the discourses that biopolitical 
governments deploy to identify which humans to protect through their 
technologies, and which to punish.  For Foucault, race arises not from 
biology but from the state’s attempts to securitise itself against resistance 
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and disorder.  The state identifies a majority superrace whose health, 
productivity and safety its biopower seeks to optimise against unruly, 
supposedly intrinsically Other subraces that ostensibly jeopardise this 
process.  This discourse buttresses the state’s power by persuading the 
superrace to view subraces as the greatest danger to their security and 
hence to accept their biopolitical ordering.  This makes both superraces and 
subraces less likely to threaten governmental biopower.  Criticism of how 
Rushdie represents, problematises and even reifies race (Brennan 1989, 
147; Teverson 2007, 26; 164) has focused primarily on racisms commonly 
identified as such in literature, history and sociology: phenotypical, 
culturalist and ethnicist.  Foucault’s thought enabled an analysis of 
Rushdie’s work that complemented these inquiries by engaging with how 
these racisms function in his novels as a means of convincing superraces 
to submit to biopolitical optimisation and ordering.  Moreover, Foucault’s 
expansive notion of race offered a method of conceiving the ways in which 
Rushdie presents the capacity of discourses of order and securitisation 
themselves to produce additional racisms.  Subraces in Rushdie’s fiction 
are often created not through any biological or cultural criteria but because 
they present a threat to biopower’s smooth operation.  These include 
Saleem Sinai’s magical collective in Midnight’s Children, tribal rebels in 
Shame and Kashmiris in Shalimar.  This study showed that Rushdie 
represents race more widely and variously than has been supposed.  
Hence, it argued that he indicates the near-impossibility of transcending 
race.  Considering this greater array of racisms brought into clearer focus 
the generally growing degree to which his novels suggest the difficulty of 
resisting the biopolitical technologies that these discourses animate. 
 This study’s engagement with racialising discourses and biopolitical 
technologies in Rushdie was further informed by thinkers whose work on 
biopower and race is inspired by (and often critiques) Foucault.  Their 
theories provided useful critical vocabularies and conceptual frameworks 
which complicated and thus augmented the Foucauldian conception of race 
and power that underpinned this thesis.  Giorgio Agamben’s concept of 
homo sacer – human life which the state constructs as less than human – 
allowed an analysis of the spaces of legal indistinction within which 
269 
 
governments in Rushdie’s novels often place these figures, such as the 
immigration centre in The Satanic Verses.  It also illuminated the use of this 
dehumanising discourse to justify massacres in Midnight, Shame and 
Shalimar.  Roberto Esposito’s claim that tendencies towards exclusionary 
securitisation increased in the twentieth century permitted this study to chart 
Rushdie’s increasing inclination to suggest likewise.  For example, The 
Moor’s Last Sigh and The Ground Beneath Her Feet both portray India’s 
polis as characterised more and more by religious communalism and 
predatory capitalism.  Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s critique of 
Foucault’s failure to address the way in which subjectivities and social 
relations, produced by and between humans, enable an oppositional 
‘biopolitical production’ (2006, 146) provided a means by which to 
conceptualise attempts by Rushdie’s characters to transmute discursive 
resistance into effective praxis.  Rushdie does not mention Foucault, Hardt 
and Negri, Agamben or Esposito in his work.  Nor does he use their 
terminology to describe biopolitical racialisations and technologies.  Yet in 
exploring similar questions of race, power and oppression by fictionalising 
examples of historical biopolitical practice, he indicates the veracity of many 
of their claims.  By outlining the relative presence in his novels of the forms 
of racialisation and persecution these thinkers theorise, this thesis charted 
Rushdie’s growing disinclination to depict a potentiality of effective 
resistance. 
 However, Rushdie also implies that the nature of twentieth-century 
biopolitics exceeded the thought of Foucault, Hardt and Negri, Agamben 
and Esposito.  Considering the ways in which his fiction indirectly 
problematises their theories enabled this study to move beyond a reading 
merely shaped passively by canonical theories of biopolitics, towards a 
dialectical biopolitical literary criticism. 
 Biopolitical literary criticism holds that not only can theories of 
biopower inform a reading of fiction, but works of fiction can help formulate 
a theory of biopower.  Literature which engages with specific technologies 
and discourses of biopower can increase our understanding of their 
historical and contemporary practice, and gesture consequently towards 
practical strategies of resistance to political racialisation and oppression.  
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This study has asserted that Rushdie’s novels provide an exemplary site of 
biopower’s operation in fiction.  His work indicates the utility of concepts 
including superrace, subrace, homo sacer and biopolitical production.  
However, in indirectly problematising Foucault, Hardt and Negri, Agamben 
and Esposito’s formulations Rushdie also suggests the need to devise a 
new conception of biopolitics.  Building upon his (unintended) critiques of 
canonical philosophies of biopower and augmenting them with other critical 
theories allowed this thesis to engage more precisely with his portrayal of 
twentieth-century biopolitics.  It showed that a notion of biopolitics which 
conceptualises biopower’s discourses and technologies accurately in 
politics, history and fiction may arise from fiction itself as easily as from the 
first two fields, and possibly more so. 
 By describing the ways in which the superrace’s racism strengthens 
the state’s racialising biopolitical oppression, Rushdie’s novels indicate the 
need to augment Foucault’s state-centric theory of race with other 
genealogies of para-state racisms.  Midnight, Shame and Shalimar 
emphasise the pre-existing racialisation that begets massacres under 
circumstances of political instability and perceived insecurity.  Rushdie thus 
suggests the inadequacy of Agamben’s assertion that biopolitics and 
thanatopolitics became homologous in the twentieth century, and Esposito’s 
claim that biopolitics morphs into its thanatopolitical opposite when 
massacres occur.  Analysing comprehensively the ways in which he 
describes the diverse, often nebulous spaces in which these racialisations 
and massacres take place and are resisted requires a theory of post-space 
that goes beyond both Foucault’s conception of the heterotopia in which 
competing spaces come into contact within a certain place without merging, 
and Agamben’s notion of the inescapable, infinitely reproducible camp of 
exception.  Within these fictional spaces Rushdie illustrates the 
impracticality of Foucault’s strategy of resistance based on a sincere, direct, 
fearless, public-spirited discourse of good parrhēsia, and Hardt and Negri’s 
idea of opposing biopower through a non-hierarchical, democratic, 
communicative movement of the multitude. 
 Using Rushdie’s novels to critique canonical theories of biopower 
allowed this study to formulate a theory of biopolitics that could engage 
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more accurately with his depictions of its discourses and technologies.  
Considering thanatopolitics not as homologous with or diametrically 
opposed to biopolitics, but as a conditional potentiality inherent within its 
practices, highlighted how Rushdie increasingly depicts the circumstances 
of political insecurity and instability which lead to this potentiality’s 
actualisation.  Measuring the relative presence of nebulous post-spaces and 
oppositional territorialisations within fictional worlds characterised primarily 
by camps and heterotopias aided a consideration of his growing 
disinclination to portray the production of social spaces free from biopolitical 
oppression.  Though this study questioned the feasibility of parrhēsia and 
the multitude as effective modalities, charting the degree to which 
discourses and movements of resistance in Rushdie’s novels achieve these 
forms brought his excising of effective opposition to biopower in his novels 
into still clearer focus.  Using Rushdie as a case study has shown how 
biopolitical readings may use literature to interrogate the limitations of 
theories of biopower, but can also recuperate and augment these 
philosophies to produce a conception of biopolitics appropriate to literary 
study. 
 Delineating this notion further requires engaging with literature 
beyond Rushdie, and theories of biopower outside this study’s remit.  
Although this thesis focused on selected concepts from Foucault, Hardt and 
Negri, Agamben and Esposito, their work is still being translated and 
published.  Future releases will offer ideas that engender fresh perspectives 
on literary depictions of biopower, but may also prove subject to biopolitical 
readings that use fiction to identify added aporias in their thought.  Through 
theoretical augmentations, these readings can produce more ways of 
conceiving biopolitical practice and resistance that exceed these thinkers’ 
canonical theorisations.  In turn, these new formulations will come to inform 
analyses of other works of literature. 
 Additional considerations of biopower in literature may build upon this 
thesis by focusing more closely on specific facets of overall biopolitical 
practice absent or negligible in Rushdie’s work.  Further inquiries could 
follow Christopher Breu by ‘think[ing] about the way in which materiality can 
form one site of resistance to and divergence from the dominance of 
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biopolitical forms of governance and economic organisation in twentieth- 
and twenty-first century life’ (2014, x) across a range of novels.  They might 
also examine how recent fiction has engaged with twenty-first century 
political trends towards expanding panopticism as a result of the War on 
Terror and the growing insecurity engendered by increasing global flows of 
population (Updike 2006; Hamid 2007; Shamsie 2009).  Investigating how 
literature represents medicine as a component of biopolitical practice may 
intervene tellingly in the increasingly prominent discipline of the medical 
humanities, which ‘focus[es] not on the practical resolution of ethical [and 
medical] problems but on their cultural and historical contexts, emotional 
and existential dimensions, and literary and artistic representations’ (Cole, 
Carlin and Carson 2015, 2).  Theorists of biopolitics have begun to engage 
with what Nikolas Rose calls ‘the new forms of pastoral power that are taking 
shape in and around our genetics and our biology’ (2001, 22).  Biopolitical 
readings can engage with literary responses to the sinister, racialising 
potential of the kinds of molecular biology that the mapping of the human 
genome has engendered, through which biopoliticians and scientists may 
use new medical knowledge to create racial difference both discursively and 
biologically (Mitchell 2004; Zeh 2014).  As Una Chung argues, ‘[t]he “bio” of 
biopolitics comes to name a much larger number of things than those 
discussed explicitly by Foucault’ (2011, 281).  Theoretical engagements 
with any past, current or future aspect of biopolitics are augmented by works 
of literature just as productively as they inform a reading of the novels, 
poems or plays in question. 
 By exploring the numerous ways in which Rushdie’s novels illuminate 
and are illuminated by theories of biopower, this thesis has argued for the 
necessity of biopolitical literary criticism to literary studies and academic 
inquiry into biopolitics alike.  If fiction suggests that race exceeds what is 
generally thought of as race, that the political exceeds what is generally 
thought of as the political and that resistance must consequently exceed all 
previously thought strategies of resistance, then it indicates the need for a 
biopolitical theory that exceeds existing biopolitical theories.  Through 
biopolitical literary criticism, literature provides the means by which we may 
discover it. 
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Endnotes 
Introduction 
 
1 The Year’s Work in English Studies, published annually by Oxford University Press, 
remarks frequently upon the preponderance of Rushdie criticism in its surveys of writing on 
South Asian literature: ‘As usual, Rushdie is the individual writer most widely written about’ 
(Abodunrin et al. 2004, 1006); ‘As in previous years, substantial critical attention was paid 
to canonical figures in 2006, with Salman Rushdie once again taking centre stage’ 
(Abodunrin et al. 2008, 1195); ‘A preoccupation with the diaspora emerges as the strongest 
theme in this year’s list, and once again it is Salman Rushdie who garners the lion’s share 
of the attention’ (Abodunrin et al. 2011, 994); ‘Among contemporary writers, it was 
predictably Salman Rushdie[…]who commanded the maximum critical attention’ 
(Carpentier et al. 2014, 1179). 
2 This study deploys the term ‘thanatopolitics’ rather than Achille Mbembe’s ‘necropolitics’ 
to describe the massacres that racialising biopolitical states perpetrate, for two reasons.  
Firstly, ‘thanatopolitics’ is used more widely.  Secondly, Mbembe’s notion of necropolitics 
incorporates not just massacres but ‘the creation of death-worlds, new and unique forms 
of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring 
upon them the status of living dead’ (2003, 40).  This thesis uses ‘thanatopolitics’ to 
describe violent massacres of subraces, and Agamben’s concepts of homo sacer and the 
state of exception to theorise the living dead who are not (yet) massacred but who live 
under the threat of death.  This distinction provides more theoretical clarity than grouping 
both categories under the umbrella of ‘necropolitics’. 
3 Although Fury (2001) also concerns the twenty-first century rather than the twentieth, it 
still engages with racist discourses and technologies of biopower.  It thus further indicates 
Rushdie’s late-career scepticism that the racialisations that characterised twentieth-century 
(bio)politics may be resisted in the future. 
4 Foucault’s theory of governmentality delineates in detail the ways in which humans 
participate in their own biopolitical optimisations, and the discourse of ‘frankness, open-
heartedness [and] openness of thought’ (2005, 169) by which they may resist this 
optimising.  However, his work proves almost bereft of material regarding how, as 
Rushdie’s novels indicate, the race-thinking of the superrace the state constructs 
complements the government’s racialising biopolitical activities.  Foucault emphasises 
usefully that states may produce multiple racialisations based on any criteria they desire, 
but the diversity and numerousness of the actors that enact these racialisations in 
Rushdie’s fiction exceeds his thought, as Chapter One of this study argues. 
5 This study uses the terms ‘neo-colonial’ and ‘post-independence’ in Ella Shohat’s sense.  
For Shohat, the concept of the neo-colonial, ‘like the “post-colonial” also suggests 
continuities and discontinuities, but its emphasis is on the new modes and forms of the old 
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colonialist practices, not on a “beyond”’ (1992, 106).  By contrast, ‘[t]he term “post-
independence”[…]invokes an achieved history of resistance, shifting the analytical focus to 
the emergent nation-state. In this sense, the term “post-independence”, precisely because 
it implies a nation-state telos, provides expanded analytical space for confronting such 
explosive issues as religion, ethnicity, patriarchy, gender and sexual orientation, none of 
which are reducible to epiphenomena of colonialism and neo-colonialism.  Whereas “post-
colonial” suggests a distance from colonialism, “post-independence” celebrates the nation-
state; but by attributing power to the nation-state it also makes Third World regimes 
accountable’ (107).  In criticising the racialising biopower that post-independence regimes 
wielded, Rushdie’s fiction attempts this accountability. 
 
Chapter One – Biopolitics and Race 
 
1 Ramachandra Guha writes, ‘Nehru articulated an ideology that rested on four main pillars.  
First, there was democracy, the freedom to choose one’s friends and speak one’s mind 
(and in the language of one’s choice) – above all, the freedom to choose one’s leaders 
through regional elections based on universal adult franchise.  Second, there was 
secularism, the neutrality of the state in matters of religion and its commitment to 
maintaining social peace.  Third, there was socialism, the attempt to augment productivity 
while ensuring a more egalitarian distribution of income (and of social opportunity).  Fourth, 
there was non-alignment, the placement of India beyond and above the rivalries of the 
Great Powers.  Among the less compelling, but not necessarily less significant, elements 
of this worldview were the conscious cultivation of a multiparty system (notably through 
debate in Parliament), and a respect for the autonomy of the judiciary and the executive’ 
(2007, 433). 
2 Saladin quotes from Nirad Chaudhuri’s The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian (1951). 
3 Fawzia Afzal-Khan offers a reading of Verses that views the Brickhall riots not as a futile 
attempt at destroying race-thinking but as an intermediate point that by asserting opposition 
to racism paves the way for further resistance: ‘Clearly, hatred and anger, however 
righteous, can only lead to violence that in the end is self-destructive.  Yet Rushdie seems 
to be resigned to the fact that this is a necessary stage in the Manichean opposition created 
by colonialism.  Such destruction is, in fact, a tactic necessary to purge the world of the 
subject-object dialectic between coloniser and colonised’ (1993, 171). 
4 Lilliput and Blefuscu are two islands in Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels (1726), satirical 
portraits of Britain and France respectively.  Similarly to its equivalent in Fury, Swift’s Lilliput 
suffers from sectarian divisions. 
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Chapter Two – Thanatopolitics 
 
1 See also Vassilena Parashkevova, who argues that ‘[t]he urban triangle of Shame’s 
Q./Quetta, Karachi and Islamabad indicates the contours of Pakistan – East, South, and 
North – which is seen, in this way, as a national fiction that entraps its citizens’ (2012, 57). 
 
Chapter Three – Biopolitics and Space 
 
1 See Edward Casey for a dissenting view which argues that ‘[f]rom being lost in space and 
time (or, more likely, lost to them in the era of modernity), we find our way in place’ (1993, 
29). 
2 See Søren Frank (2011) for an extended Deleuzian reading of Rushdie’s fiction. 
3 In Shame Rushdie imagines a much narrower variety of spaces than in Midnight.  He 
subsumes his exploration of humans’ capacity to shape social space under an overriding 
concern with the disciplinary carceral spaces that the biopolitical state establishes, and the 
remote ‘zone[s] of instability’ (Rushdie 1996b, 23) that it striates almost completely. 
4 That Gibreel experiences a transformation as deleterious as Saladin’s, despite avoiding 
incarceration in the biopolitical immigration camp, further supports the argument that the 
act of migration itself contributes significantly and atavistically to the construction of 
subraces in Verses. 
5 Crucially, Rushdie now refers to him not by his Anglicised name – Saladin, the 
Europeanised name that the crusaders bestowed upon the defeated sultan – but by the 
name given to him by his father. 
6 The concept of Bombay as a metaphor for India has proven so prevalent in Indian public 
discourse that there is even a book which incorporates it into its title (Patel and Thorner, 
eds. 1995). 
7 See Chapter Four of this study for an extended analysis of the resistance movements that 
Vina inspires. 
 
Chapter Four – Discourses of Resistance 
 
1 Roger Clark defends Rushdie against charges of condescension towards Padma: ‘One 
could argue that Rushdie makes fun of Padma and therefore that she cannot constitute a 
serious audience, let alone a challenge to scepticism.  Yet one would have to ask, what 
character, including Saleem himself, remains unscathed in the novel?’ (2001, 77) 
2 Matt Kimmich identifies a greater potentiality of resistance through this dissemination.  He 
argues that ‘[t]his could be read as his shedding of his past, fragmenting his life, so he can 
finally dissolve; at the same time, he does open his story up to whoever may find his notes 
nailed to fences and gateposts, a readership distinct from Vasco Miranda or any other 
characters in the novel’ (Kimmich 2008, 240). 
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3 A typically simple and apocalyptic VTO song goes, ‘For Jack and Jill will tumble down, 
the king will lose his hollow crown, the jesters all are leaving town, the queen has lost her 
shoe; the cat has lost his fiddling stick, so Jack be nimble, Jack be quick, as all the clocks 
refuse to tick, the end of history is in view’ (Rushdie 2000, 389).  Even Ormus’ more opaque 
lyrics take the form of easily understood metaphors: ‘Ooh Tar Baby yeah you got me stuck 
on you.  Ooh Tar Baby and I can’t get loose it’s true.  Come on Tar Baby won’t you hold 
me tight, we can stick together all through the night.  Ooh Tar Baby and maybe I’m in love 
with you’ (276). 
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